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16 November 1998

TRANSCRIPT: TALBOTT WORLDNET "DIALOGUE" ON SOUTH ASIA

(U.S. is committed to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons) (8410)
Washington -- The United States is committed to the goal of eventually
eliminating nuclear weapons. "And that is not just pie in the sky.
That is not just lip service," says Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary
of State.
In a USIA Worldnet "Dialogue" November 13 with Islamabad and New Delhi
on "Peace and security in South Asia," Talbott said the U.S. has "both
a short-term and a long-term objective with India and Pakistan. The
long-term objective is that we hope that all countries on the face of
the Earth will adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We realize
that's not on right now. ... In the short term we are proposing what
we think to be imminently reasonable interim steps which coincide with
what we are hearing from our Indian and Pakistani interlocutors are
the security doctrines and needs of the two countries involved."
Talbott outlined five issues that he said are the non-proliferaton
essence of the dialogue that he has been conducting with India and
Pakistan:
1.  Adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). 
2. With regard to the production of fissile material ... we hope that
the two governments will decide for reasons of their own that it makes
sense to have a moratorium on further production of that kind of
material until the negotiations on this subject in Geneva can produce
a universal ban on the production of fissile material.
3. With respect to ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft, we
are hoping that the two governments will see fit as a matter of in
each case unilateral defense policy, to restrain and restrict the
development and deployment of those delivery systems so as not to
exacerbate or accelerate the ballistic missile arms race that might
otherwise prove ruinously expensive to the two countries, and also
destabilizing.
4. On the issue of export controls, making sure that Indian and
Pakistani laws and regulations are very much in keeping with
international norms so that these two countries continue to do what I
think they've already established a pretty good track record in doing,
and that is making sure that they don't transfer dangerous
technologies to other countries.
5. The United States is prepared to continue to use its good offices
with India and Pakistan to try to foster or encourage direct dialogue
between the two countries on the key issues that divide them and have
been the source of such enmity and occasional conflict over the years,
and that includes of course the issue of Kashmir.
Following is the transcript of the Worldnet program:
(Begin transcript)
MR. FOUCHEUX: Hello, and welcome to Worldnet's "Dialogue," I'm Rick
Foucheux. Peace and security in South Asia are important to the
region, to the world, and especially to the United States. Yesterday
Mr. Strobe Talbott, deputy secretary of state, gave a major speech
regarding this issue at the Brookings Institution here in Washington.
A full transcript of his remarks can be found on both Internet Web
sites of the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Information Agency.
The Web sites are listed here as follows: www.state.gov and
www.usia.gov.
Having said that, I am honored to introduce Mr. Strobe Talbott to our
program today. Mr. Talbott, thank you very much for taking the time to
be with us.
MR. TALBOTT:  Good day, Rick, I'm happy to be here.
MR. FOUCHEUX: As we're rather short on time, let's go directly to our
participants to begin today's discussion. Go ahead please with your
first question or comment in Pakistan.
Q: Deputy Secretary of State Mr. Strobe Talbott, this is --
(inaudible) -- from Islamabad, Pakistan. I think I would not be wrong
in saying today that at least informed opinion in Pakistan is
gradually moving toward the consensus on signing the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty. But there is still a very strong apprehension that
the CTBT may be followed by subsequent demands for Pakistan to
undertake other non-proliferation measures that might undermine its
national security. Mr. Secretary, what would you say are the ultimate
parameters of your current dialogue with India and Pakistan?
MR. TALBOTT: Well, first let me say I am pleased to hear from you,
sir, that there is an emerging consensus with regard to the CTBT. I
think there is an overwhelming objective case to be made that
adherence to the CTBT is, as your question suggests, not only not
contrary to Pakistan's security interests, but actually will enhance
those interests. And I think that the same case can be made with
respect to India, and I know we will be touching on that in the course
of this discussion.
I would take issue with your use of the word "demands." The United
States is not in the position of making demands on its friends in
Pakistan or its friends in India. The essence of the dialogue that
President Clinton and Secretary Albright have asked me to conduct with
Shamshad Ahmed (sp) in Pakistan and with Jaswant Singh in India is
precisely a dialogue that is a discussion between and among friends
about how to improve all of our interests synergistically. This is not
a zero-sum game. It's not a case of the United States making demands
against its friends. We are talking about steps that might be taken
that will improve the security prospects, both for India and for
Pakistan, and also enhance the international non-proliferation regime.
Now, there are indeed other steps that we are urging upon both India
and Pakistan in addition to adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, and those are essentially the following. With regard to the
production of fissile material, the stuff out of which bombs are made,
we hope that the two governments will decide for reasons of their own
that it makes sense to have a moratorium on further production of that
kind of material until the negotiations on this subject in Geneva can
produce a universal ban on the production of fissile material.
With respect to ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft, we
are hoping that the two governments will see fit as a matter of in
each case unilateral defense policy, to restrain and restrict the
development and deployment of those delivery systems so as not to
exacerbate or accelerate the ballistic missile arms race that might
otherwise prove ruinously expensive to the two countries, and also
destabilizing.
And then there's the issue of export controls, making sure that Indian
and Pakistani laws and regulations are very much in keeping with
international norms so that these two countries continue to do what I
think they've already established a pretty good track record in doing,
and that is making sure that they don't transfer dangerous
technologies to other countries.
So those four issues -- the CTBT plus the three that I just mentioned
-- are the non-proliferation essence of the dialogue that I have been
conducting.
MR. FOUCHEUX: Thank you in Islamabad. We'll go now to India for
questions. Please go ahead in New Delhi.
Q: My name is Shanka Vajpee (sp), former Indian ambassador to
Pakistan, China and the United States, I might say in ascending order
of difficulty. (Laughter.) Good to see you again, Mr. Secretary. I
feel almost ashamed to question so courteous and well reasoned a
presentation as you have made, but I feel the whole basis of it seems
to be misplaced. You start by saying the essential point that you
recognize is the right of each of us to make our own security
decisions, and then you propose four steps which have nothing to do
with our security decisions. It is true that we are dealing here with
two different issues -- the need for an international regime to
control nuclear proliferation and the security issues of India and
Pakistan. We need to separate these two, because as far as the latter
is concerned I believe what we have just done strengthens security in
the subcontinent.
MR. TALBOTT: I gather -- I didn't hear a question mark, but I gather,
ambassador -- I gather the question is do I agree with that
proposition.
Mr. Ambassador, we seem to have a slight technical difficulty. Let me
respond to what you have said. First, let me say that your tenure in
Washington as India's ambassador is well remembered. I personally
remember in a previous line of work as a journalist meeting with you
from time to time, and it's good, even though I can't see you, to make
your acquaintance again.
I think that in fact the four issues that we're discussing in our
dialogue with India and Pakistan do go to the heart of the security
interests of both countries, as does the fifth issue that we are
discussing. The fifth issue is that the United States is prepared to
continue to use its good offices with India and Pakistan to try to
foster or encourage direct dialogue between the two countries on the
key issues that divide them and have been the source of such enmity
and occasional conflict over the years, and that includes of course
the issue of Kashmir.
On the subject of whether the tests in May enhanced or detracted from
India's security, all I can say, Mr. Ambassador, is that we have an
honest disagreement here between us. We have been open-minded on this
subject. You have not seen from the United States either a dogmatic,
rigid or a reflexive response. We have kept our eyes and our minds
open in studying the implications of what first India and then
Pakistan saw fit to do, and we are convinced that in fact neither
country is safer today. Why? For two reasons.
First of all, because the competition between India and Pakistan,
which has been there for a long time, has now taken as it were a
quantum leap to a new level. At a minimum that carries with it the
danger of huge economic costs which we would modestly suggest from our
vantage point neither country can very well afford given the other
needs of a developing economy and populations that count on their
government to look to the basic needs and human services.
And, second, the nature of these weapons can be very destabilizing.
And one of the points I made in my speech yesterday was that the
United States has very much in mind when it observes the situation in
South Asia our own experience over 50 years managing a dangerous
competitive relationship with another superpower, the Soviet Union,
which had a military dimension to it. Just managing the nuclear side
of that competition alone cost the United States five and one half
trillion dollars. And the costs of prosecuting that rivalry on the
Soviet side contributed to the end of the Soviet Union and the Soviet
system. And then on top of that there's the danger of war. We're
talking here about two countries that have been to war three times.
And to have nuclear weapons in that mix cannot be reassuring to
anyone, particularly in the absence of mutual restraints and
confidence-building measures on the two sides that would at least keep
the competition under some kind of control.
And we have both a short-term and a long-term objective with India and
Pakistan. The long-term objective is that we hope that all countries
on the face of the Earth will adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
We realize that's not on right now. That is precisely a long-term
objective. In the short term we are proposing what we think to be
imminently reasonable interim steps which coincide with what we are
hearing from our Indian and Pakistani interlocutors are the security
doctrines and needs of the two countries involved.
Q: (Inaudible) -- I am from Times of India. I was formerly the
director of the Institute for Defense Studies. Good morning, Mr.
Ambassador. I am agreeable that nuclear weapons do not enhance
security. In fact, that is the reason why we have always advised the
United States that it should commit itself to ultimate nuclear
disarmament and should move towards it. And therefore the NNPT
extended indefinitely and unconditionally was a very major disastrous
mistake.
Now what we would like to ask you is: Why is it that the United States
would recognize that a nuclear won cannot be won, cannot be fought?
And we have just undergone $5.5 trillion of expenditure, which is too
spending money on all these things, which knowing full well existence
of nuclear weapons in the world really enhances nuclear threats to
everybody, including the United States. And it will create problems of
nuclear terrorism. Why is it you are not able to agree India -- let us
get towards nuclear disarmament? What we have done in terms of tests
here is to break through the nuclear apartheid. We know very well that
nuclear wars are not going to be fought, they are not going to be won,
and therefore bringing in here your experience of the Cold War is we
don't act. And we are not going to spend that money, we are not going
to behave like that.
First, we would like to know why is it that you are still sticking to
the nuclear weapons, and you are not agreeing with us to move towards
nuclear disarmament?!
MR. TALBOTT: We are agreeing with you. First, let me say that since
you are associated with the Times of India that I am very grateful to
the Times of India for opening some of its pages to an article that
I've written based on the speech that I gave here in Washington. I
think it's very, very important that U.S. government policy and
objectives be understood in India and Pakistan, and I appreciate the
chance that I've had in that regard thanks to the Times of India.
Now let me go to the essence of your question. This is an argument we
need not have, because essentially we agree. That is, the United
States under a series of presidents, both Republicans and Democrats,
has remained committed to the goal of eventually eliminating nuclear
weapons. And that is not just pie in the sky. That is not just lip
service. The United States has been working with the other nuclear
weapon states to move in the direction of elimination.
Now, the most prominent and salient example of that is the former
Soviet Union, now Russia. President Clinton devoted a great deal of
time in his first year in office to making sure that with the break-up
of the Soviet Union there were not four new nuclear weapon states in
the territory of the old USSR. And he succeeded in that diplomacy.
There is only one, Russia. And President Clinton has worked
persistently with President Yeltsin to move from START II, the
strategic arms reduction talks' second round to START III, and under
START III we will bring the arsenal, the nuclear arsenals of the two
countries, down 80 percent below Cold War levels. And that need not be
the floor. We will seek keeping reductions. We have reduced the number
of shorter-range nuclear weapons by 90 percent. The British and the
French have committed themselves to voluntary reductions of their own.
My colleague from the State Department, undersecretary of state for
security issues, John Holum, is in Beijing even as we speak talking to
the Chinese about disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. So
in fact we are I think acting on the obligations that we as a nuclear
weapon state have under the NPT to move towards disarmament.
As for the phrase "nuclear apartheid," I simply must with respect
reject it as emphatically as possible. I fail to see how India's
decision to test nuclear weapons, to declare itself a nuclear weapon
state, and Pakistan having followed suit, how that contributes to the
cause of disarmament. That just strikes me as, to put it very gently,
illogical.
MR. FOUCHEUX: All right, thank you in India. We'll now return to
Pakistan for more questions. Please go ahead once again in Pakistan.
Q: Mr. Secretary, I am Senator -- (inaudible) -- chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I'd like to thank you for your
statement. My colleague had indicated that there is some strong
opinion in favor of eventually signing the CTBT. But I can tell you
this is on the assumption that Pakistan's nuclear program as achieved
will not be affected, which means that there will be no follow-up in
signing the NPT.
Now, in your statement, sir, you have stated that the common objective
of P-5 and G-8 in achieving the non-proliferation and universal
adherence to NPT will remain the objective, and India and Pakistan
will not be recognized as nuclear weapon states. I think there is
going to be a problem that once the CTBT is signed and if the question
arises in a dialogue of Pakistan's or India's rolling back the
program, can there be any assurance to those signing the CTBT that
their security interests which they consider are vital will not be
affected? Is there a chance of amending the NPT to accommodate the new
nuclear powers? Thank you, sir.
MR. TALBOTT: I think the answer, senator, is probably somewhere in
between what you fear and what you are recommending or what you hope
for. I would not envision amending the NPT in order to accommodate
India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states. I think that there are
simply too many other countries in the world which have made what we
regard as the right and sensible course -- namely to abandon nuclear
weapons aspirations or status for us to break faith with them in this
regard.
However, I want to be very clear about something. The kind of
breakthrough which President Clinton and Secretary Albright are hoping
will result from the dialogue that I am carrying out with Shasham
Ahmed (sp) and with Jaswant Singh does not include necessarily India
or Pakistan changing its position with regard to the NPT. The
breakthrough that we are looking for requires significant, we would
hope definitive progress, on the issues that I have mentioned -- CTBT,
fissile material, a restraint -- set of strategic restraints on
ballistic missiles and export controls. That will allow us to move
into a whole new era of relations both bilaterally and multilaterally.
But the NPT will simply remain out there as something that we disagree
about.
Q: Mr. Secretary, I am General -- (inaudible) -- from Islamabad. My
question pertains to the scope of inspections under the CTBT. Recently
there was a report in a section of our press indicating that the U.S.
team of experts who are visiting here in Islamabad, they have
indicated that the inspections may also include visiting certain
nuclear installations. Is that impression correct or not?
MR. TALBOTT: I think I would leave that issue for the experts to
discuss with your experts. Obviously CTBT must be sufficiently
verifiable so that all parties can have some degree of confidence that
the regime represented by the CTBT will be observed universally. But
there will need to be a monitoring system as part of adherence. And
incidentally this is an issue that is very much the subject of lively
debate here in the United States. We have only signed the CTBT. We
have not yet ratified it. We are hoping that the new Congress will do
so. And one of the issues that we need to persuade some skeptical
members of Congress about is that through the kind of monitoring
system you are talking about it can be sufficiently verified.
Q: Mr. Secretary, this is -- (inaudible) -- again. I am going to shift
the plane of our conversation a little. As Pakistan's foreign
secretary I participated in two rounds of foreign secretary level
talks several years ago. I find that the conversations that my
colleague Shamshad (sp) is conducting today are not qualitatively any
different or better from what I've experienced. Now, my question to
you is you have indicated in yesterday's speech as well that basically
to concern India and Pakistan getting together to resolve their
problems. But if they are unable to discuss this goal issue, what we
call the "flashpoint" of peace and security in this part of the world,
is there any thinking in the administration as to what more can be
done by the United States to make this dialogue productive?
MR. TALBOTT: I would put it this way: Our minds are certainly open to
new ideas from any quarter about ways in which we can play a more
effective role in fostering, facilitating or encouraging what has to
be a direct dialogue between India and Pakistan.
I don't have the historical perspective that you do. I will mention
that a predecessor of mine in the State Department, Mike Armacost, who
was undersecretary of state for political affairs here in the State
Department in previous administrations, said a little bit something
like you just did -- he had a sense of deja vu as he listened to yet
another exposition of this subject.
But I do think it's significant, particularly in the wake in the tests
in May and the tensions that those generated, that now at least
Shamshad Ahmed (sp) and Mr. Ragana (sp) have been able to get down to
some nitty-gritty questions, like opening up bus routes between India
and Pakistan, sharing of water, energy trading, confidence-building
measures and that kind of thing. So in other words I do think it's
good and hopeful that the discussions have gone from simply procedural
questions, which as you know can be themselves tangled enough, to
practical steps.
And the United States will stand ready to help as much as possible,
but of course we can do so only at the behest of both parties.
MR. FOUCHEUX: This is Worldnet's "Dialogue." Our guest today is U.S.
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott on South Asia issues. And we
return with more questions now from New Delhi.
Q: Mr. Talbott, my name is Said Nakvi (sp), a mere journalist amongst
this very impressive array of ambassadors, senators and experts on
nuclear policy. In fact I missed an interview with you about a year
ago, if you might recall in Washington.
Now the very newspaper, Times of India, which published your
exposition on South Asia, has in the next page another article which
talks of China to conduct slight test of ICBM. Now, surely that is a
matter of concern to you, to us here in South Asia. How do you respond
to that news item which actually emanated in the Washington Post.
MR. TALBOTT: First of all, I think of myself still as essentially a
journalist. I regard it as a noble profession, although I am enjoying
my current sojourn in another profession.
The China factor is a dimension of this issue that I addressed with
some thought, both in the speech that I gave yesterday and also in the
articles in the Times of India. Yes, of course we have a deep interest
in the way in which China decides to develop its own strategic
programs and pursue its defense interests. And we are engaged in a
direct dialogue with them right now on the subject. Earlier in this
program I mentioned that John Holum, the undersecretary of state, is
in Beijing talking about many of these issues. Secretary Albright will
be meeting with the Chinese foreign minister. There will be other high
level meetings during the week ahead, and non-proliferation, arms
control and the goal of disarmament will be very much on that
bilateral agenda between the United States and China, and I assure you
that the issue of how China can contribute constructively and
responsively to a damping down of tensions in the region, including in
ways that should answer the legitimate security concerns and defense
interests of India will be very much on our minds and on that agenda.
Q: Vajpee again, Mr. Secretary. If I may just revert to our earlier
point -- when I talked about the advancement of the security situation
in South Asia, I was not unaware of all the points you have made --
the dangers, et cetera. But to the extent that Pakistan's genuine -- I
mean genuine as distinct of trumped-up fears of India -- are a cause
of tension in South Asia. Anything that adds to Pakistan's sense of
security should be a stabilizing factor. And what we are looking for
in this dialogue with Pakistan is some greater sense of self-assurance
on their part, because we have given up the one advantage we had,
which was the conventional superiority. They have everything they need
for their security -- the dialogue with India can be more substantial.
We have a feeling in this country that it is being deliberately going
through the same paces every time we meet in order to present the
appearance of stalemate and stimulate an intervention. It's good to
hear you say that you do not want to intervene unless asked by both
sides. I doubt that you'd be asked by us. So we do have to develop
this dialogue separately. But until that happens we do need this
dialogue with you. And as far as I understand we have very substantial
points on each of the four other issues that you have raised.
My only question is that since -- even though you may be moving
towards your obligations of NPT, since it is obvious to everyone for
the foreseeable future nuclear weapons will be possessed by some
states, India does have a security dilemma which you have recognized,
and I would request you to suggest to us how we can reconcile our need
for security through this choice that we have made with the
non-proliferation objective that we also subscribe to along with you?
MR. TALBOTT: Mr. Ambassador, let me try to respond as succinctly as I
can. You know from your time in Washington that Washington is filled
with think tanks, non-governmental organizations, not to mention
members of Congress who take an active interest in arms control and
disarmament issues.
We have heard quite a few voices from those sectors saying that the
only responsible position for the United States to take in response to
the tests in May is to insist that India and Pakistan put the genie
completely back into the bottle. That is to say that they untest the
weapons, they disavow nuclear weapons, they accept the status of
non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT. And that should be the only
benchmark. We don't agree with that, because we practice the art of
the possible. We realize that that is not possible in the foreseeable
future.
Everything that we are talking about with our Indian and Pakistani
colleagues is within the parameters of what we think is realistic and
doable given what India and Pakistan have chosen to do and have set
their interests on. We haven't, for example, said India and Pakistan
must accept the NPT tomorrow, or even the day after tomorrow. We
haven't said that India and Pakistan must agree not to test ballistic
missiles, even though we think that a ban on the testing of ballistic
missiles would actually be a positive step. What we have proposed are
doable things -- things that are in the confines of stated Indian and
Pakistani defense policy. So basically I'm saying yes to what you are
urging us to do. We are making proposals that are very much within the
framework of what we are hearing. This is very much a two-way dialogue
that we are having with Islamabad and New Delhi. We have absorbed what
India and Pakistan have said they must do, and have said well within
the confines of what you say you must do there are some things that
you could also do that will make your people and your state safer --
and make you part of the solution rather than being part of the
problem of global non-proliferation.
Q: Mr. Secretary, Pakistan was compelled to respond to India's nuclear
weapons, because we wanted to restore the strategic balance. In the
conventional field also we feel that we do need certain weapons to
restore this balance -- the imbalance that exists between India and
Pakistan. In that connection I would like to draw your attention to
the F-16s which President Clinton had also indicated that there will
be some forward movement in that direction. Would you say -- I would
like you to comment that whether this issue will move forward during
the visit of our prime minister to the United States?
MR. TALBOTT: I hope so. I think it might. Exactly how and how fast is
something we are still working on. You may or may not be aware that
after the Indian test in Rajistan (sp), and before the Pakistani test
in Baluchistan, I visited Islamabad and made what was obviously not a
totally persuasive case to Prime Minister Sharif that he resist the
pressure and the temptation to test. Had Pakistan been able to take
that step, or not take that step perhaps I should say, we would have
very easily been able to put Pressler and Symington and the other
Pakistan-specific sanctions behind us, sanctions that we as an
administration have been trying to do something about for some time.
For reasons that we understand objectively, although we didn't agree
with, Pakistan of course did have to feel that it had to test. But we
are still working to make as much movement as possible towards
restoring some important aspects of the relationship, including by the
way in military-to-military cooperation. One of the sanctions relief
measures that President Clinton has decided on in the past week is to
restore the international military education and training program for
both countries, but that we hope will be a step in the direction of
further normalization, depending on the progress that we can make in
the dialogue.
Q: This is -- (inaudible) -- again from Islamabad. You mentioned your
background in journalism. From time to time there are speculative
stories that India is trying to arrive at a kind of secret deal with
the United States, which is in return for signing the CTBT it would
require the transfer of sensitive technology and certain other
privileges, like a permanent seat on the Security Council. Is that a
part of your dialogue with Mr. Jaswant Singh or no?
MR. TALBOTT: No. Let me repeat: no. Jaswant Singh and I are having a
very thorough and open discussion of all aspects of the issue, and I
might add that I feel very fortunate on a personal as well as
professional basis to have interlocutors of the quality of Jaswant
Singh and Shamshad Ahmed (sp), that the United States, in the words of
a president earlier in this century is very much against secret
covenants secretly arrived at. Among other things the secrets never
hold and it's not a proper way to do diplomatic business among
democracies, which all three of our countries are.
The issue of Indian aspirations to be a permanent member of the
Security Council is not on the agenda of my discussions with Jaswant.
Indeed, I would think to say the issue is altogether premature and not
really directly relevant to what we are talking about here today.
Q: Mr. Secretary, you have in your statement also mentioned very
clearly that the president looked to India to continue its emergence
as a global power, and also for India and the United States to be
natural partners in making our shared expertise in high technology as
a source of dynamism. Sir, in this question we have seen that on the
question of missiles India has so far carried out more than 23 tests.
One was only yesterday. And Pakistan has just carried out one test --
(inaudible) -- and much was made of one test of Pakistan. And India's
tests go virtually unnoticed. There is a feeling in some circles in
Pakistan that the various amendments to the assistance act, the Glenn
Amendment, the Solarz Amendment, the Symington Amendment and the
Pressler Amendment are all applied from time to time to Pakistan. And
there was at least in the historical perspective a degree of
connivance at India's program of nuclearization. I hope that this
policy is undergoing a change, and now that there would be a more
evenhanded approach to the two countries.
MR. TALBOTT: Well, without accepting the premise of your question, I
can certainly assure you that evenhandedness is precisely the guiding
principle of the diplomacy that President Clinton and Secretary
Albright have asked me to carry out in this instance. And I can assure
you that neither under the current administration in Washington, nor
its predecessors has the United States ever connived with India,
either with regard to the development of nuclear weapons or their
delivery vehicles. And I assure you also that when either country sees
fit to test a ballistic missile, a nuclear-capable ballistic missile,
it does not go unnoticed -- not by a long shot -- in Washington. And
indeed under the rubric of strategic restraint some of the suggestions
we are making to both countries would try to put a lid as it were on
this particular kind of competition.
You know, it's interesting to me as somebody who has worked hard on
this subject for the last six months to hear the difference in
perceptions between the two sides. Your question suggests that the
United States in some way has favored India at the expense of
Pakistan. When I gave my speech in Washington yesterday a number of
Indian journalists suggested in their questions that the United States
was tilting or discriminating in favor of Pakistan against India,
because we have lifted in a targeted and on an emergency basis our INF
sanctions with regard to Pakistan. We do not see that as in the least
discriminatory against India. We are trying to respond to what we see
as a dire economic crisis in Pakistan. We think that if that crisis
were to get worse it would be contrary to India's interests as well as
everybody else's, and that's why we are addressing it. But again the
watchword of our policy is precisely "evenhandedness."
MR. FOUCHEUX: Our program continues as we go back once again to New
Delhi for more questions. Please go ahead once again in New Delhi.
Q: Mr. Secretary, what you are suggesting appears to be entombing the
NPT with a number of measures on which we can agree, like CTBT, FMCT
and restraint measures, et cetera, into a larger kind of arrangement
in which the non-proliferation regime could be furthered.
Now, in India we have proposed new first use, as well as we are just
now in the U.N. General Assembly we have moved the resolution for
nuclear risk reduction. Why wouldn't the United States join these
measures so that we can advance non-proliferation? Or does the United
States have different kinds of views for its own use of nuclear
weapons and different standards for others?
MR. TALBOTT: I have already addressed the question of the United
States' ongoing and resolute commitment to the goal of disarmament,
and I have cited some numbers to illustrate how we are practicing what
we preach, which is to say we are working with the Russians and others
to make sure that the levels of our nuclear arsenals are indeed coming
down. And we hope to continue that process in the years and decades to
come.
Let me just say a word or two about no first-use. This is a question
of doctrine, of declaratory policy. It's a matter of government saying
what they would or would not do in a nuclear crisis. We just don't
happen to feel that that is anywhere near as important as what kinds
of weapons they have, how they are deployed, and how they are
conducting the rivalry between them in hardware and in nuclear
capability. And that we think should remain the focus of our own
negotiations with the Russians and the future of strategic arms
reduction, and in our dialogue with India and Pakistan on South Asian
security.
Q: Mr. Talbott, since this is some kind of a cross between a dialogue
and a press conference, may I ask whether President Clinton's
postponed visit to the subcontinent is being rescheduled? I mean, you
appear to be generally sanguine about the way your conversation with
Jaswant Singh and Shamshad Ahmed (sp) is progressing. Are you equally
sanguine about the fact that there may be a visit early next year?
MR. TALBOTT: Well, I guess I am glad that I have been able to convey a
sense of not being either panicked or depressed, if those are the
antonyms of "sanguine." But I wouldn't want to say that I am sanguine
in the sense of being complacent or overly optimistic that we will
have the kind of breakthrough that we are looking for. I am not sure
that we will. It's going to take a good deal of political courage on
the part of all parties. I might add by the way including on the part
of our president, who has already shown political courage in being
willing to stake out some near and middle-term goals that stop short
of universal adherence to the NPT, because he is so eager to get on
with the constructive relationship with these two countries.
But whether India and Pakistan will see fit in terms of the sovereign
defense obligations and perceptions of each government to take the
kind of steps that we think de minimis are really required here, that
remains to be seen.
Now, as for the president's trip, this subject comes up virtually
every time I meet with the president. In fact, it's kind of
interesting. President Clinton has had a full plate of foreign policy
of late. As you know, he spent nearly 10 days working on the Middle
East peace process. As we speak we are in the midst of a very serious
showdown with Iraq, and yet virtually every time his foreign policy
team meets with him he wants to know how things are going with India
and Pakistan. And one reason is because he genuinely very much wants
to visit the subcontinent next year. But he is prepared to make the
visit to New Delhi and Islamabad only if he has a high degree of
confidence that the conversations he has with Prime Minister Sharif,
Prime Minister Vajpee and their governments will be forward looking
and positive and will not have to be backward-looking and going over
the same ground essentially that we are covering in this good dialogue
here today. So he's counting on me and Secretary Albright and others
to put this issue as much as possible behind us, and allow him to move
forward when he actually comes to the region.
Q: Vajpee is given the last chance here to restate his case. It's
perfectly evident that there has been a good dialogue. And from what I
understand -- and there's no need for you to be either sanguine or
disappointed -- the fact is I believe our side has put forward some
very genuine proposals, and that should lead towards some kind of
constructive movement forward.
But if I may once again suggest to you that the premise from which we
start needs to be changed if we are to make any real progress. We in
these overtures from Washington are confronted with an effort to fit
the India-Pakistan security situation into a general framework of
non-proliferation. My submission to you, Mr. Secretary, is that
non-proliferation is not a global issue, and there is no point in
trying to apply universal solutions to problems that are not
universal. There are three problem areas -- the Middle East, as you
call it, Korea and South Asia. Each of them requires special
treatment, and I believe that until that day comes, which you say will
come when everyone goes non-nuclear, India will have to stay nuclear,
and we would like to work out an arrangement that can be fitted in in
the long run but meets our security at the moment. I am glad that you
have said no to the various sectors of hardness that the think tanks
of America sometimes throw out. And we welcome the constructive
efforts you are making. I was wondering if you would like to take one
further step and disassociate the South Asian security issue from the
general proliferation issue.
MR. TALBOTT: No. I want to match in graciousness your comments. But I
want to respond with as much candor as respect, Mr. Ambassador. No, I
emphatically would not like to delink or dissociate South Asian
security from global security. And I will tell you in all frankness
that I find it odd, even paradoxical, even contradictory, that a
statesman such as yourself representing a great country which has
aspirations to global leadership would put forward the very dubious
proposition that non-proliferation is anything other than a global
issue. It is a global issue, and we hope very much that India, as an
emerging global power, will treat it as a global issue. And with the
same degree of mixing candor and respect, I will tell you what we are
doing in our approach in this dialogue is precisely the opposite of
the way you just characterized it. What we are doing is taking our
non-proliferation objectives, both globally and regionally, and
fitting those into the framework of what India itself is saying are
its defense and deterrence needs. So I am just turning on its head the
proposition that you put forward, and I hope very much that Prime
Minister Vajpee, my friend and colleague Jaswant Singh, whom I am
meeting in Rome next week, will see it in that way. This is a big step
in your direction as it were, and we are making a parallel step with
regard to Prime Minister Sharif and Shamshad Ahmed (sp) and our
Pakistani friends.
But in any event, I think that whatever the differences among us here
we have managed to establish in this conversation first of all a lot
of clarification of each other's position; and, second, I think we are
all in a position of kind of equipoise between excessive sanguineness
on the one side and discouragement on the other. That's exactly the
right posture to be in. And onward to Rome, and I hope to a better
relationship among the three of us. Thank you very much. I have
enjoyed being with you.
Q: Mr. Secretary, I am glad to hear from one of our Indian colleagues
that at last they have come to the realization -- although you have
not agreed with them -- that non-proliferation is not a global issue.
We have been making efforts over the years to make South Asia a
nuclear-free zone. We were committed to non-proliferation. But we were
always given the answer it's a global issue and unless we give up ours
-- (inaudible) -- non-proliferation India could not accommodate our
request. We hope that if this special issue is treated as a regional
issue, and the two countries can reach an understanding at least on
the regional basis to observe mutual restraints, strategic restraint,
both in the nuclear as well as in the conventional, and make general
progress in resolving the dispute on Kashmir and other issues. And we
need your support, external support of the international community,
for continuing that process of dialogue.
MR. TALBOTT: You will have it. The formulation you just used -- mutual
strategic restraint -- is a good summary I think of what we are
proposing with regard to a number of the benchmarks, and I am happy to
have yet another occasion in this conversation to reaffirm the
willingness, and indeed the eagerness, of President Clinton and the
United States to help on the Pakistani-Indian dialogue.
Q: As I mentioned earlier, India has moved a resolution on nuclear
restraint by all nuclear weapon powers in the U.N. General Assembly,
and it is coming up for voting today. What will be the U.S. stand on
it? I hope you will be supporting India in promoting nuclear restraint
all over the world.
MR. TALBOTT: Well, I have already said in this conversation that the
United States has taken a leadership position with regard to nuclear
reductions, arms control. We are in practical ways, as well as
rhetorically, committed to the goal of disarmament. With regard to
specific resolutions that come up in the United Nations and elsewhere,
we have to take a hard look at the actual language, because we have
some treaty obligations as well. But on the general proposition, my
friend Jaswant Singh has a phrase that he often uses with me: "We will
not be found wanting." And I think that's true with regard to
strategic arms reductions and advancing the goal of disarmament.
Q: Mr. Secretary, this is -- (inaudible) -- regarding the IMET which
you had mentioned, and I am very glad to learn that the IMET will be
restored -- in other words the training facilities the United States
gives to India and Pakistan. But what will be -- (inaudible) -- of
getting some nuclear hardware from the United States which we used to
get before -- the spare parts in nuclear hardware? Is that also in the
cards?
MR. TALBOTT: It depends on what's in the Pakistani hand. We have got
to make some more progress on the outstanding benchmarks. I mean, we
have -- I think that what Prime Minister Sharif and Prime Minister
Vajpee did with regard to the CTBT when they spoke before the United
Nations was definitely an important, positive step. We've also made I
think some progress with regard to export controls.
Where we need to make more progress is on the issue of strategic
restraints and on fissile material. If we can have a real breakthrough
there, and we hope obviously to use Prime Minister Sharif's visit to
Washington in early December to accelerate the process, then I think
more steps will be possible on our side. We've been -- we, the
executive branch of the United States government, have been consulting
very closely with Congress. We need to keep the Congress very much on
board in our approach and so far we are doing that. But we need to be
able to point to additional progress in the two parallel dialogues in
order to get more in the way of sanctions relief.
Q: Mr. Talbott, we in New Delhi have through the decade found a
genuine bilateralism between Washington and New Delhi, but an absent
quantity more or less. It has always been the parity between India and
Pakistan. I mean in your article this morning in Times of India you
talk of "cradle of civilizations," and beginnings of several religions
-- I suppose you're meaning India. And then you go on to talk about
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Then you go on to talk of more than
one billion people. Now, under one billion people reside in India. And
yet this -- and in fact there is a problem of imbalance in South Asia.
India has, after 1971 the creation of Bangladesh, India has become the
largest country surrounded by six other nations of SOC (sp). And all
the other -- but you -- instead of seeing this bloc as a whole issue
somehow it is India and Pakistan seem to be yoked together in your
perception. Is that -- do you think there is something in my
perception that is faulty?
MR. TALBOTT: I would never say that. I would say that -- I would offer
an alternative perspective, which again I do with respect, and that is
that India and Pakistan seem yoked together in each other's
perceptions. This is a phenomenon that I encountered in my days as a
journalist when I used to go to the subcontinent, and I've seen it
quite prominently in my two excursions into the region since becoming
deputy secretary of state.
The very first trip I undertook in 1994 as deputy secretary was to go
to India and Pakistan on what were essentially non-proliferation
issues, and I of course spent the last six months on this. And what
strikes me -- I must be honest with both sets of panelists here -- is
the extent to which each side is preoccupied in a zero-sum win-lose
sense with what the other side is doing. I think there was one example
of that this week, if I may say so, and that is when the United States
undertook to relax international financial institution sanctions so
that the IMF could help rescue Pakistan from its dire economic straits
many Indians -- not all Indians, but many Indians reacted as though
this was discriminatory against India, contrary to India's interests.
And then of course this conversation has produced a couple of comments
to the effect that the United States -- from the Pakistani side -- the
perception that the United States is tilting towards India.
So I think if there is any yoking together here it's between you
folks, if I may put it that way. And we just hope very much to be part
of a process that over time will lead to a lessening of that kind of
enmity and mutual distrust. But we realize that in the final analysis
it's up to you. All we can do is wish you well and help in every way
that we can.
MR. FOUCHEUX: And with that I am afraid we have run out of time for
our program today. But I would like to thank all of our participants
for joining us, and especially you, Mr. Strobe Talbott at the State
Department for taking time to be here.
MR. TALBOTT:  Happy to be with you, Rick.
MR. FOUCHEUX: For Worldnet's "Dialogue," I'm Rick Foucheux. Until next
time, good day.
(End transcript)