12 November 1998
TALBOTT GIVES "PROGRESS REPORT" ON U.S. DIPLOMACY IN SOUTH ASIA
(Asks India, Pakistan to recalculate cost of nuclear arms race) (1020) By Peter Sawchyn USIA Staff Writer Washington -- India and Pakistan should reconsider the costs of developing nuclear weapons before engaging in an arms race that is likely to increase tension in South Asia, and challenge the "viability of the global nonproliferation regime," says Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. In a speech at The Brookings Institution November 12, Talbott spoke about the United States' ongoing efforts to halt nuclear proliferation in South Asia, and outlined the Clinton Administration's policy goals that have guided those efforts during the past six months. U.S. relations with India and Pakistan were dramatically altered in May after both countries conducted underground nuclear tests. The blasts -- five by India and an equal number by Pakistan -- triggered mandatory U.S. economic sanctions against both countries, and a reassessment of U.S. policy toward South Asia. Since then, Talbott said he has held more than a dozen separate talks with senior officials from both sides that focused on three goals, which "we believe reflect everyone's interests -- theirs, ours and the world's." They are: preventing an escalation of nuclear and missile competition in South Asia; strengthening global non-proliferation; and promoting an Indo-Pakistani dialogue to improve relations, including talks on the subject of Kashmir. In making the case for non-proliferation, Talbott said the United States is drawing from its own experience with nuclear weapons, and from what U.S. officials believe is a "misreading of that experience by many Indians and Pakistanis." According to Talbott, many Indians and Pakistanis have said the nuclear tests conducted by both countries could foster nuclear stability in South Asia in the same manner that peace was maintained between the U.S. and the Soviet Union for five decades during the Cold War. "They should look at the record again ... from the hard-headed perspective of what it took to manage the rivalry," Talbott said. "The U.S. and the Soviet Union had more than one narrow escape. India and Pakistan have even less margin for error than the U.S. and U.S.S.R. did over Cuba and Berlin, if only for geographic reasons, since no ocean separates them." By contrast, India and Pakistan fought three wars during the same time, and engage in frequent, and sometimes fatal, artillery exchanges over the disputed territory of Kashmir. In addition, Talbott said, there's the "economic dimension" of maintaining nuclear security that both sides must reconsider. "Before India and Pakistan decide to replicate the U.S. and Soviet nuclear competition, they should consider the price tag," Talbott said. "A recent Brookings study estimated that maintaining the American nuclear capability cost the United States just under $5.5 trillion dollars. On the other side of the Iron Curtain, comparable expenses contributed to the disintegration of the Soviet system and state," he said. However, perhaps an even "more serious economic threat" to the two developing nations is the fact that foreign investment is likely to decline because "risk-averse investors will back away" from unstable and unpredictable situations, Talbott said. Thus, Talbott said, when the U.S. urges Indians and Pakistanis to halt their nuclear-arms and appeals for restraint, "it is not from a position of smug superiority." Instead, he said, U.S. officials are only "trying to share the cautionary lessons of our own experience." Regarding the U.S. sanctions imposed on both countries in the wake of the tests, Talbott defended them as "necessary." Not only were they required by law, and effective in sending a signal to other nations contemplating the nuclear option, Talbott said the sanctions were also a way for the U.S. to "keep faith" with those nations like Brazil, Ukraine and Argentina, who renounced nuclear weapons despite their capacity to develop them. Recently, however, Talbott said, the U.S. has taken steps to mitigate the effects of some of the sanctions through a series of "targeted waivers" to ensure that there are no "unnecessary and unintended consequences" for other U.S. interests at stake in the region. For example, President Clinton last week eased sanctions on both countries in response to the positive steps they have taken since May to address U.S. concerns over non-proliferation, Talbott said. Specifically, the Administration has resumed support for U.S. business and investments under the auspices of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Ex-Im Bank and the Trade and Development Agency. In addition, restrictions on lending by private U.S. banks have been waived, and military-to-military contacts with both countries will resume. Lastly, in an effort to avert a total economic collapse in Pakistan, the U.S. has signaled its support for an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program to keep Pakistan from defaulting on its international debt. Despite the easing of sanctions, and the focus on accomplishing near-term policy goals, Talbott stressed that "universal adherence" to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains a primary, long-term goal for the United States. "We do not, and will not concede, even by implication, that India and Pakistan have established themselves as nuclear-weapons states under the NPT," Talbott said. "This is a crucial and immutable guideline for our policy." Meantime, Talbott said the U.S. would continue "working intently" with both countries to encourage them to take practical steps to avoid a nuclear arms race and to reduce tensions on the Subcontinent. These include signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, halting all production of fissile material, and dealing with the underlying causes of the Indo-Pakistani "nuclear competition." "No amount of diplomatic exertion on our part, on non-proliferation or on any other subject, will have much effect unless and until India and Pakistan can liberate themselves from their own enmity," Talbott asserted. "And while we and others can help through our good offices with both, that liberation will occur only through direct, high-level, frequent and, above all, productive dialogue between the two of them."
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