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Atomic Energy Commission Chairman R. Chidambaram is in favour of India signing the CTBT purely from the scientific point of view. He is confident about India's nuclear capability and feels that India should not be denied access to superior technology and sanctions imposed by the United States should be lifted.

Chidambaram talks about India's nuclear capability, its dreams and problems in his first ever frank interview with The Hindustan Times. His views are pertinent, particularly on the eve of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's scheduled visit to New York next week. Excerpts from the interview.

Q: Are you in favour of India signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?

A: It is a political decision. From purely scientific point of view we have no problem. We want a credible nuclear deterrent. Considering the large number of data we have collected from Pokhran II tests and the fact that there was an excellent match between measured and calculated yields I have no difficulty with the moratorium announced by the Government. After the one test in 1974 we could not have signed CTBT but today after five sophisticated use of modern nuclear tests we can go ahead and sign.

Q: What do you mean by credible nuclear deterrent?

A: The United States has conducted over a 1,000 tests out of 2,000 nuclear tests done by various countries in the world since 1945. Russia has done about 700, China 40 odd and the remaining couple of hundred by France and other countries. We have done three which is enough for our purposes.

Q: How many tests would be needed to prove a credible nuclear deterrent?

A: Firstly, the number of tests you do must be proportionate to the number of types you want to design. The United States has gone in for over 70 designs while we have gone for three robust designs. They are (a) fission device around 50km which we have tested, (b) Thermo nuclear device (popularly known as Hydrogen bomb) 45 kilo tonnes. This also has a variable yield which can be increased which has been tested too and (c) sub kilo tonne (low yield device) which can be used as a tactical weapon. These three are enough for us for a credible nuclear deterrent.

Q: According to a recent American newspaper report, India and Pakistan are supposed to be claiming inflated nuclear strength?

A: I just do not understand from where they made the measurement and what kind of equipment they used. They agree that on the first day we had 50 kilo tonnes. CTBT global seismic network is supposed to have a detection network of one kilo tonne. I just do not understand what kind of equipment they used and at what distance from Pokhran.

Q: Why do you say that you don't require to test again?

A: Suppose you are a designer and you are testing in 1950s, you would make the test on the basis of your knowledge of physics, engineering and electronics existing at that point of time. Suppose in the next 10 years there is a change in these, and you test again but it is the same device. If I test in1998 and my knowledge of physics, electronics and engineers is more superior, then one test in 1998 is equivalent to several tests in a decade. We have enough data and we don't need to test again.

Q: Negotiations are going on between Jaswant Singh and Talbott on CTBT. What is that you want from the United States?

A: I do not want to talk about the details of the negotiations. We need scientific cooperation as an equal partner basis and not on a donor-recipient basis. That makes you vulnerable. Developed countries often talk of donor fatigue. India also does not accept technical assistance from IAEA. We will participate in IAEA conferences and coordinated research projects. We have also gifted nuclear equipment to developing countries. These are the promotional role is that any assistance given by the IAEA is not used for military purposes. There are three different kinds of safeguards - comprehensive safeguard, voluntary safeguard and facility specific safeguard.

Q: What are you looking for from the United States on the nuclear programme?

A: India is not a fully developed country and there are gaps in technology. Also no country can be fully self-sufficient and nobody knows what new knowledge is in store. Technology is growing. We should not be denied the access to these new things.

Q: What about nuclear proliferation?

A: You can talk of proliferation which has two sides - one is import and the other is exports. India has never exported any equipment or technology which has been misused while some of the vociferous supporters of NPT have exported equipment and parts which have been used in clandestine programme. India's export controls are excellent. India is a classic non-proliferator. In terms of imports which is related to technology control we have carried out sophisticated tests. We have shown by the five tests we have comprehensive knowledge in that field. I emphatically say that there should be no technology controls on India. This realisation will dawn on those people who are criticising India now it will also be of commercial interest for these nuclear who nuclear powers. Every analysis shows that up to 2010 AD there will be a marginal drip in nuclear installed capacity in the west while there will be a 100 per cent increase in Asia. This is where they need us. Nuclear power is more needed in developing countries than developed countries. And per capita electricity consumption will go by eight to ten times in India and this can not happen without nuclear energy.