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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

QUESTION: The chairman of the Indian atomic energy commission says that the US Government denied him a visa to go to a conference in Alabama this week. Is that so?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. This doctor applied for a visa on June 29 - Chidambaram -- sorry, Doctor. His passport and application fee were returned to him on July 9, and he was informed that our current visa procedures were under review as a result of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests.

This isn't technically a refusal; we told them it was under review. He hasn't persisted in his effort. We are reviewing our science and technology engagement with both countries. This could have an impact on Indian and Pakistani scientists engaged in nuclear and missile development programs. A part of that review includes the visa application process for such individuals. It is not - let me emphasize - not an across the board restriction on scientists from either country.

QUESTION: Well is it across the board for nuclear scientists?

MR. RUBIN: We are engaged in a review across the board of our science and technology engagement, and it could have an impact, that review, on India and Pakistani scientists engaged in nuclear and missile development programs. Because of that review and the specification I just gave you, his visa request and application fee were returned to him on July 9.

QUESTION: What was he going to be doing that was --

MR. RUBIN: My understanding is he was attending a conference.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. RUBIN: At a university that I will provide you the name of after the briefing.

QUESTION: I mean, was it specifically nuclear-related or missile-related or something like that? I mean, presumably it was.

MR. RUBIN: It's my understanding that it was a technical scientific conference.

QUESTION: The vice chairman of the Association of Crystallographers.

MR. RUBIN: He's the head of India's atomic energy commission.

QUESTION: Right, and he's vice chairman of this crystallography conference.

MR. RUBIN: Right, but because of the broad-based review that's ongoing and because of his position as the head of India's atomic energy commission, we told him that his application would have to be reviewed, and he didn't persist.

QUESTION: Do you have any idea how long this review is going to take?

MR. RUBIN: As long as it takes to do it right.

QUESTION: Jamie, are you aware of others being denied visas for this conference?

MR. RUBIN: I don't have any further information on that. If you have a specific question, I'll try to get you an answer.

QUESTION: Were others denied visas for this conference?

MR. RUBIN: I don't think we normally provide broad-based information on every visa application. If you have a particular person in mind, I'll try to get you an answer if we can act on it. But let me say that broadly speaking, we are reviewing scientific exchanges in this area. So this is not a policy specific to this individual; it's a broad-based policy.

QUESTION: Jamie, generally speaking, do you have a feel for how involved Indian and Pakistani scientists have been in these types of exchanges over the years, where they would have had access to American nuclear or missile technology or discussions thereof? Was it a fairly open --

MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't presume that because a scientist comes to the United States that they are gaining access to technology or know-how about how to build nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles, which was implied in your question. On the contrary, what we try to do is to prevent that kind of thing from happening, and try to make sure that those people who are seeking information, know-how or technology are not receiving it here in the United States.

But as part of a broad-based sanctions policy, with respect to India and Pakistan, that includes denial or opposition to loans in the IMF, it is appropriate for us to put restrictions in this area, and we are looking at what those restrictions ought to be.

QUESTION: Their program has been going on for decades, and I'm just wondering whether that program might have benefited in the past, before you guys were here, from those types of exchanges.

MR. RUBIN: The key ingredient in nuclear proliferation is the fissile material -- material that has been enriched to a point that it can create a nuclear chain reaction. That is not normally something that you can obtain from a scientific exchange or a discussion of that kind. It requires equipment, technology that you have to obtain from around the world. So if the suggestion implicit in your question is that somehow these exchanges are the cause of India becoming a nuclear power, we would reject that.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - contributed --

MR. RUBIN: I've told you what we regard to be the critical component, and that is fissile material; and to create fissile material you need very specific technology and very specific capabilities that you can't obtain by going to a conference in the United States.

(The briefing concluded at 2:45 P.M.)