India and Pakistan: Consequences of Nuclear Testing
Karl Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs
2:10 P.M. EDT Friday, June 26, 1998
MR. INDERFURTH: Actually my portfolio did not include everything. You'll notice that it did not include U.N. dues. (Laughter.) (With a laugh) -- that was not part of my portfolio in New York --
Q What dues?
MR. INDERFURTH: I know! That's the point! (Laughs.)
I'm very pleased to be back at the Foreign Press Center. I do have a brief statement that, if you'll indulge me, I will read for you. I think it may set the stage for some of your questions, or at least hopefully set the tone for where we are in our government's deliberations on the next steps.
Six weeks after the first Indian nuclear tests, and those that were then conducted by Pakistan, we are still facing a serious situation in South Asia. Tensions between India and Pakistan remain high, although their rhetoric has moderated. Both India and Pakistan have declared moratoriums on testing, but there are still many steps they could take to reinforce the global nonproliferation regime.
Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Sharif have agreed to meet during the SAARC Summit in Colombo on July 29th. We hope they will hold productive discussions which address the differences between them, including Kashmir, and will lead quickly to resumption of their senior level dialogue. It is clear that direct talks between the two countries are essential. In the end, no effort to restore regional stability or resolve tensions can be effective unless the brunt of the responsibility and effort is borne by India and Pakistan themselves.
The United States has imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan under the Glenn Amendment. Other countries have joined us. The sanctions will exact a price, but their purpose is not simply to punish, but to influence the behavior of the two countries. As was demonstrated yesterday at the World Bank, we do not want to increase the burden on the poor of India and Pakistan. The United States considers India and Pakistan friends. We want to see both countries prosper in peace. We believe that an intensified nuclear arms race in South Asia would be a tragedy. Besides the terrifying threat of an accident or outbreak of war, emphasis on high- tech nuclear and missile competition will greatly strain both countries' economies. New Delhi and Islamabad already recognize that spending on education and social services is inadequate. Increased military outlays will further deplete budgets and prevent the kind of human -- the kind of development of human resources that both countries so badly need and we want to support.
We have a strong interest in keeping open the lines of communication with both India and Pakistan. We remain -- we must remain engaged. And while sanctions will exact a price, we must also work with both governments to chart a path for the future. That future ideally will produce concrete actions by both governments to demonstrate a strong commitment to nuclear and missile restraint and to reducing regional tensions.
These actions should include signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty without conditions, refraining from missile tests and agreeing not to weaponize or deploy missile systems, halting the production of missile material and participating constructively in negotiations toward a fissile material cutoff treaty, formalizing existing pledges not to export or transfer nuclear and missile -- nuclear and ballistic missile technology or expertise; and, for the sake of regional stability and prosperity, resuming direct dialogue to address the root causes of tensions, including Kashmir.
Deputy Secretary Talbott's June 12 meeting with Jaswant Singh, a close adviser and confidant to Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee, was a good meeting, and we are looking forward to further contacts. We want to engage India and find some basis for moving ahead.
We will be having similar meetings with Pakistani officials, starting with Foreign Secretary Shamshad Achman (sp), who will be in Washington this coming Monday. The purpose of this senior dialogue is to restore the sense of confidence and direction we had hoped to build in advance of the president's planned trip to the region in November, which is now under review. We want to see how much progress can be made by early fall before deciding whether the visits can take place.
The international community will also remain focused and working productively on these issues. Following on the P-5 and G-8 meetings, we will continue to encourage other nations and organizations to be involved. We stand ready to share our expertise and capabilities to help India and Pakistan monitor military activities and avoid miscalculation, and above all, to assist the two in settling their differences. India and Pakistan already have confidence-building measures in place, such as nonattack on nuclear installations, limits on approach to each other's airspace, advance notification of military movements, and hot-lines between the directors general of military operations and the prime ministers.
We and others could help them establish more. Some examples include helping to establish agencies to verify agreements, sharing experience on inspections, help with remote monitoring of borders, facilitating dialogues and strengthened agreements on observation of military exercises.
I'd like to make a final fundamental point. While we do not accept the rationales given by India and Pakistan for testing or possessing nuclear weapons and believe that the tests have diminished their security, we must continue to recognize that as sovereign nations, both India and Pakistan have legitimate security concerns and interests. And we must bear that in mind as we move forward. We have far too many national interests at stake to do anything other than engage under these terms.
So with that opening statement --
MR. SILVER: Okay. We've got a question right here.
Q Aziz Halifa (sp), India Abroad.
Rick, could you specify what progress you are looking towards before -- if the president is to consider a visit? Could you specify what progress are you looking for?
MR. INDERFURTH: Well, I think that the progress that we're looking for is contained in part in the statement that I just read --
Q So it's that whole laundry list?
MR. INDERFURTH: It is, well -- we refer to this as something other than a laundry list. We think that it is a framework for moving forward in our relations with India and Pakistan. And this -- I want to stress something. This is not a U.S.-only list of those things that we would like to see India and Pakistan do. All of you know that there was the meeting of the Permanent Five members of the Security Council in Geneva, followed by the adoption of a U.N. Security Council resolution, followed by the meeting of the G-8 and other countries in London. The list that I have drawn from here, the framework, is quite consistent with what other countries and organizations have also listed.
So, these are the types of steps that we would like to see if we can make progress on, as we approach the decision concerning the president's trip. We are hopeful that as a result of the recent events in May, that we may now have an opportunity to make progress on some of these very difficult issues. So this is the framework.
MR. SILVER: Jim?
Q Jim Anderson, V.P. of the German Press Agency. Rick, you may be familiar with the Senate testimony yesterday by several Pentagon officials who say, in effect, that this administration loosened the limits on export controls to the extent that it bears a responsibility -- in India and Pakistan, among other countries -- for allowing vital technology, missiles, for example, to go to Pakistan. In effect, they're saying that Pakistan could not have made its last missile jump without the help of U.S. technology, which was permitted by the Clinton administration. Do you -- are you familiar with that --
MR. INDERFURTH: I an actually -- I have not seen that testimony. And these were Defense Department official that said that U.S. technology assisted in Pakistan's missile program?
Q Yeah. They were officials of the Defense Technology Security Administration.
MR. INDERFURTH: Yeah.
Q Anyway, maybe you can address it in general terms. Has this administration, in line with its policy of promoting exports, loosened technology controls?
MR. INDERFURTH: Not to my knowledge. What I would need to do is to get the testimony and get back to you with a more considered response.
I will tell you that in terms of our concerns here about export controls, we have worked very hard not only within the U.S. government, but also with other countries. There are a whole series of formal agreements and groups such as the Nuclear Supplier Group, and the MTCR, the Missile Technology Control Regime, that we have been very much actively engaged in and a part of to see that sensitive nuclear and missile technology does not proliferate. And we have worked very closely with other governments to see that they adhere to those guidelines, even if they may not be a member of those specific groups.
So again, I will look at this. But I do not believe, and I certainly do not agree with the notion that our exports have contributed to the kind of missile developments that we are now trying to see go no further. But again, we'll provide more information.
Q Parasuram, Press Trust of India. Two questions. One is, what is the status of the banks in India, American banks? Are they subject to American law or Indian law? Can they operate normally? And also, if you are going to interfere with the functioning of the banks, are you not destroying the global economy, to which both India and the United States are committed?
And secondly, I find that the demands on India seem to change from day to day and hour to hour. One spokesman says India should sign the CTBT, another says also the NPT; and then thirdly, we are told that you should not deploy missiles; fourthly, they say that you should not test missiles; and fifthly, that they should not be nuclear-tipped. Is there any kind of authority to list what you demand? And also, how do you view the Indian demand that the five powers will have to get rid of their nuclear weapons by certain dates, not immediately, but by an agreed date, and the whole problem is solved.
MR. INDERFURTH: I think that's three questions. (Laughter.)
MR. SILVER: I think so too.
MR. INDERFURTH: I counted three -- maybe four.
MR. SILVER: You can pick and choose -- two out of three.
MR. INDERFURTH: Let's start with the banks. The Glenn Amendment sanctions very much relate to banks. We have no desire or intention to destroy the international banking system or to see the collapse of that banking system or the collapse of any economy as a result of the imposition of the Glenn Amendment sanctions. It is not our desire to punish, but to influence.
And I think that the World Bank loan that went through yesterday is a demonstration that where we have spoken about humanitarian exceptions and basic human needs, that we are serious about seeing those programs go through. We will be just as serious, as will our G- 8 colleagues, about postponing those IFI loans and assistance which do not meet the standards of basic human needs.
The banking provisions of the Glenn amendment sanctions are still being finalized by Treasury.
As you know, last week Deputy Secretary Talbott had a press briefing where, along with others in the -- from departments and agencies, (he) discussed the implementation of the Glenn amendment sanctions. It has taken us longer than we would have liked to bring full clarity to the implementation. But the fact is, as you all know, this was the first time these sanctions had ever been imposed, and our hope had been that they would never have to be imposed.
So the banking sanctions are still being finalized by Treasury. There will be executive orders, and I can't go any further than that. We still have to find out.
Now on the list of demands that we have made, I would prefer not to place these in the category of demands. In fact, if you look at the communiqus that have been issued, if you look at my congressional testimony, if you look at statements that have been made, we have not articulated these as demands, nor do we intend to.
We have listed those things which we believe would be important steps forward, in terms of responding to the international community's concerns about -- very grave concerns about India's and then Pakistan's nuclear tests. I don't think that we are going from one day to the next with one set of steps and then the next day adding to it or subtracting from it. Again, I would look -- if you want to look at one statement, I would look at the P-5 communiqu. I think that that is almost certainly the best comprehensive document that comes to mind as being those things which the international community has articulated by the P-5 and then endorsed by the G-8 and others, and the Security Council -- would be the right set.
Now on the question of the general and global disarmament, which I know has been a long-standing desire of India to see take place, the United States is very aware of our responsibilities under the Nonproliferation Treaty in Article 6. And for the life of me, I cannot understand why there isn't greater recognition of the steps that have been taken to dramatically reduce the United States nuclear arsenal and to accede to international agreements that only a few years ago the United States was opposed to, including a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, including fissile material cutoffs. These are things that we are now actively supporting and in some cases championing as steps for the international community to take, very much in line with the Article 6 provisions of the NPT.
We are hopeful that we'll be able to go further. We do have as the ultimate goal the elimination of nuclear weapons, but we do not believe that at this point we are able to turn that goal into a time- bound framework, but we are working very hard to see these weapons reduced and these weapons eliminated. That is why we were so profoundly disappointed that India and Pakistan went ahead with nuclear tests, because we believe that the current of history is running in the opposite direction; we're moving away from nuclear weapons, not toward nuclear weapons or a buildup of nuclear arsenals.
So, I think I answered all four.
MR. SILVER: I think you did. (Laughter.) And Ambassador --
MR. INDERFURTH: And maybe even more in there. (Laughter.)
MR. SILVER: Ambassador Inderfurth makes a good point. Please, if we're going to get through this, let's try one question to a person and not a shopping list.
Q Afzal Khan from Pakistan. Notwithstanding your various disclaimers that the sanctions and other measures you adopted after the tests are not designed to bring about the collapse, particularly of Pakistan's economy, but the net impact of your repeated -- these announcements and these statements that Pakistan's's economy is very vulnerable and about to collapse if these sanctions are rigidly applied, so it already has had a devastating impact there on the investment and general economic landscape there. So have your realized -- repeated these statements, the impact it has there?
MR. INDERFURTH: There is no question that the imposition of these sanctions will have consequences beyond the sanctions themselves. It is not only the United States but other countries, including Japan and several of the Nordic countries, others that have imposed sanctions. There has been worldwide condemnation of the decisions by the government of India and the government of Pakistan to conduct nuclear tests. And there is no question that there is a concern around the world about stability in South Asia as a result of that. And one does not have to be an economist to recognize that that will lead to a lack of investor confidence, which leads to a slowing of economic growth. We also have seen decisions taken quite independently by the Standard and Poor's and Moody's in terms of the ratings. All of this is a part of -- if you will, an economic- financial reaction to the events that took place in May.
We think that there is a way for that to be corrected; and that is to listen to the international community, to respond as fully and as constructively to the steps that we are urging. That will certainly allow the United States government to move away from sanctions. We're not there yet, clearly. We have only just resumed a high-level dialogue with the Indian government and beginning to do that with the Pakistani government.
But the world is watching. And the world, I am absolutely convinced, will respond in a positive and quick fashion if India and Pakistan decide to take steps to address the nuclear and missile concerns of the international community, resume their dialogue. I think July, at the SAARC summit, offers the two prime ministers a golden opportunity to demonstrate that they are committed to resolving peacefully the long-standing differences between the two countries and the world will stand up and applaud if they make that commitment and then take concrete steps to demonstrate that commitment. That is what we want to do, and I guarantee you that the economic -- the adverse economic impact that you see of the current situation, in the current situation, can be reversed almost as quickly if those kinds of steps are taken, and that's what we hope will happen.
Q Loc (sp) Virguel (sp), Asia Today -- (word inaudible). Mr. Inderfurth, you said that Kashmir is the root cause of the problem. What do you think the administration has now in mind to solve the Kashmir problem, and also if the administration's position has changed after the nuclear tests, and also, when you went to India, I think you had long discussions with the Indian authorities over the Kashmir issue and the future of South Asia. So what is the position today?
MR. INDERFURTH: I'm not sure we had long discussions when we were in India on the Kashmir issue. I just want to correct that. I also said, I had said that Kashmir was the root cause of the tensions. I'd like to expand that to say that the international community considers that Kashmir is one of the root causes of the tension between India and Pakistan, and again, looking at the communiques that have been issued by the P-5 and the G-8, Kashmir is clearly placed in that context.
And there is no doubt that there is increased international attention to Kashmir as a result of the nuclear tests that took place, as well as statements made by officials in both governments after those tests. The world is, I think, very concerned that Kashmir could be once again, as it has been in the past, a flash point. We know that Kashmir has been the cause of two wars between India and Pakistan. And now with the nuclear weapons capability of both India and Pakistan, that only raises the concern that if by accident or miscalculation or intention there was further conflict, that the consequences for India and Pakistan and the region and, indeed, the world, would be catastrophic. So for all those reasons, there is increased attention.
It is also clear, as you read the communiques, that there is not a call for any one country or any one organization to become a mediator in this dispute. We do believe it must be resolved between the parties, only through direct talks, taking into account the wishes of the Kashmir people will this issue be resolved.
But the international community can assist; it can provide support, encouragement, and other forms of assistance. And if you listened to my remarks, I elaborated on some of those things which the international community might be able to do in more practical, concrete terms in terms of providing that assistance. And again, in the communiques by the P-5 and the G-8, those offers of assistance have been made. What we would most like to see is an agreement by the two parties to call on the international community to provide that assistance. I can guarantee you that there would be an immediate and positive response. I Pakistan and India came to the international community and said, "We need assistance in doing this or that," it would happen in a heartbeat. So that's what we're hoping to see.
Q Can I just have a quick follow-up?
MR. SILVER: No. (Laughter.) Why don't we go to the back?
Q Seema Sirohi from The Telegraph. Mr. Inderfurth, what is the message the president is carrying to the Chinese government regarding its role in assisting the nuclear missile program of Pakistan? How high would this be on the agenda and during official talks?
MR. INDERFURTH: The president sees his trip to China as an excellent opportunity to discuss with Chinese officials the situation in South Asia. Secretary Albright had an opportunity to do that with Foreign Minister Tang (sp) in Geneva when the P-5 communiqu was adopted.
It is our view that China can play -- and should play -- a constructive role in easing tensions in the region. There is no question that India and China should be talking with each other. We are fully aware of the statements that Indian officials have made about China and the security environment in Asia and how China is a key element of that, from the Indian perspective.
We had hoped that relations between India and China were improving as a result of Jiang Zemin's visit to New Delhi in 1996. And recently the Chinese Army chief of staff had been to New Delhi.
We very much want to encourage India and China to meet, to have direct dialogue, to share their views and concerns, and hopefully assuage those concerns about security issues. That is something that President Clinton will be encouraging and endorsing in his talks.
Now we have also been having over the last number of years a very intense discussion with the Chinese about nonproliferation matters, including as they relate to Pakistan, and we believe that we have made progress in that regard. And I think that many of you have attended hearings and briefings by others in the department that have a nonproliferation portfolio, which have discussed those things where we think we have made progress.
So we do not see China in any fashion as a mediator in South Asian disputes. But we do see China as an important player, along with the United States and others, in trying to assist the parties, either directly or indirectly, toward resolving these differences.
And again, we believe that it would be very helpful in that regard for China and India to speak directly and to see if, by that kind of a direct dialogue, that some of the concerns and perhaps some of the misunderstandings can be resolved.
Q (Off mike.)
MR. SILVER: (Laughs.) We can't do it. Let's go here. I am sorry.
Q Shaheen Hrungdon (sp) of Pakistan. About the collapse of the economies. Rick, who is going to determine whether a particular economy is going to collapse? And if you determine that, what are you going to do about it? What steps will you take?
MR. INDERFURTH: Number one, we do not want to see, nor will we take steps, that would lead to the collapse of the Pakistan economy, and this is something that we think would be enormously serious and something that we will do what we can to avoid, in whatever fashion would be appropriate for us. The IMF, of course, has an ongoing responsibility with respect to its programs in Pakistan, and I know that the IMF is looking at this very closely.
Again, this is all running in a different direction than we want it to go. We don't want to see either India or Pakistan under sanctions. And indeed, President Clinton, prior to the decision by Pakistan to test, had made what we think a very substantial offer that would have had Pakistan at this moment moving in a far different direction than being concerned about a collapse of its economy.
Things were under consideration which would have been moving Pakistan in exactly the opposite direction, where its economy would have been strengthened and we wouldn't be having this discussion.
However, although we disagreed with the decision to test, that decision was made, and so now we have to look very carefully at what steps are being taken. But again, this is a matter of concern and one, I think, that we and others in the international community will be watching very closely.
Let's go back to this side.
Q Rick (Sridhar ?) from the Hindu newspaper. Going back to Mr. Clinton's visit to the subcontinent late this fall, you said that a review would be taken by early fall whether -- rather kind of decision would be made by early fall whether he would indeed undertake the trip or not. Now, my question is, how -- at a time when you have not even finalized the scope of the sanctions and other things, how can president even visit a region that is under sweeping economic sanctions of the United States?
MR. INDERFURTH: I guess you start from the first point, which is that we consider ourselves, the United States, friends of both countries. We're not dealing with countries that we do not have a desire to strengthen our relations to find ways of addressing our problems. We have a fundamental difference with Pakistan and India on their nuclear missile programs and a great concern about their inability to directly address and resolve their differences, including Kashmir. That does not mean that we do not want to engage both countries directly as members of the international community and with members of the international community to try to see what we can do about this.
The president had very much wanted to, and continues to want to, make that trip to South Asia, which would include India and Pakistan as well as Bangladesh. However, the events of May have placed this in a different light. We have a major issue that has to be addressed, and we're hopeful that over the next several weeks that we'll be able to see some progress toward addressing that. We realize that these things can not be resolved overnight, so we're looking for steps in the right direction. And with good will and with a common purpose to resolve these issues, I think that we would be able to move forward, including on the president's trip. But, that's something that we're going to be working very hard on during the weeks ahead.
MR. SILVER: I think we have time for maybe two more questions. Let's take one here.
Q (Name inaudible), Japanese Newspaper. I have just one quick logistic question. You said next Monday you're going to have a meeting with a Pakistan senior official. On the U.S. side, who would be in the meeting? This, which -- (word inaudible) -- the meeting, after this meeting, what kind of forum do you want to have with India and Pakistan -- bilateral, each India and Pakistan, or would you like to mediate a bilateral meeting between India and Pakistan?
MR. INDERFURTH: Yeah. The deputy secretary, Mr. Strobe Talbott, has been designated by the president and the secretary of state to be the administration's lead official on contacts with Indian and Pakistani officials on this immediate issue of the nuclear tests and its aftermath and how we go from here. So he will be meeting with the foreign secretary and also Undersecretary Pickering will host a luncheon for him.
We see the next steps in terms of contacts with India and Pakistan on this issue as multi-layered, if you will. We think that the international community will continue to express its views. We are making a very clear bilateral effort with both governments. We believe that other capitals are doing the same. The instruction coming out of both Geneva and London was for those countries that joined in the communique to find the appropriate channel at the appropriate level and in the appropriate way to express those views to the two governments.
So we want to very much engage both New Delhi and Islamabad in this discussion of how to move forward. And we think that there will be a variety of ways -- through the international community, through regional groupings, bilateral contacts.
It is not an issue that is going to go away; it is one that I think that all of us are committed to staying with for the long term, and hopefully -- but hopefully making progress in the short term.
MR. SILVER: Okay. And our last question.
Q Mr. Inderfurth, I'm Arin Basu with Radio Free Asia. I have two very quick questions.
The first one is: You said that progress has been made with the Chinese on missile talks. It's not readily apparent to us what the progress has been, because the question still remains, are the Chinese selling missiles to Pakistan or not? The administration has never really given us a lucid answer on that. I wonder if you could address that and about missile deployments in Tibet and military buildup in Tibet, which was one of the arguments that the Indians made before they tested -- if you could address it.
And very quickly, I had an opportunity to ask President Clinton about this a couple of days ago, about his trip to South Asia, and he said he was very anxious to go. And it seemed almost that the administration wishes this was one instance there was not a Glenn amendment which went into place so quickly, that --
MR. INDERFURTH: Which is --
Q That automatic sanctions went into place. It seems that the administration is desperately looking for a way out of this sanctions situation into a negotiating situation, where all your sticks are in place and your carrots are not really evident. I was wondering if you could address that.
MR. INDERFURTH: You know, I don't necessarily agree with the way that you put that, because we are seeking sanctions flexibility. We do believe -- and I'm talking generically, not Glenn amendment or Symington amendment or Pressler amendment or all those others -- amendments that have imposed sanctions in this or that region of the world -- we do believe that the president requires greater authority and flexibility in terms of the implementing sanctions. And I think, if you will, one of the positive outcomes of the imposition of the Glenn Amendment has been a debate in Congress and with the executive branch -- I mean, we're engaged in this -- about, you know, how best to pursue our policy goals and objectives and how to deal with this in terms of legislative authority.
So we're looking now to see if it will be possible to provide the president with greater flexibility, waiver authority. But at the same time, we are moving ahead with the implementation of the Glenn Amendment, as required by law, and we are not seeking any authority to lift Glenn per se. We will certainly seek that authority and will speak to Congress once we have seen positive movement on the kinds of issues and steps that I have outlined here, and others have as well.
So there are two things working here: One, a general debate about sanctions and how best to pursue those; and two, the specifics of this or that sanction and how to proceed. And I'm, again, very pleased that many members of Congress are looking at this again and working with us to think through how U.S. policy objectives can best be met.
Now, going to the other issue of China, again, I will stand on those statements -- I regret that you felt that they have not been as forthcoming as you would like -- of other U.S. government officials that we have made progress with China on proliferation issues. We do believe that China, in recent years, by joining certain control regimes or adopting the guidelines of those, has demonstrated a much more constructive approach to proliferation issues, including toward Pakistan. Now, I know that isn't the specifics that you want, and I will, in part, defer to my nonproliferation colleagues at the department for fuller information.
With respect to Tibet, now this was, if I remember correctly, Defense Minister Fernandes, soon after taking office, had a number of comments that he made with respect to China, including Tibet, including missiles. That is precisely the kind -- or that is precisely the reason why we believe that India and China need to have very direct and frank discussions to clear away any misperceptions, to try to assauge concerns, and to try to move together in a way that, again, we thought was beginning to take place on a much more positive basis as a result of the Chinese president's visit, as a result of the border talks, which we were of the view had been making some progress.
So I don't want to get into commenting on Tibet or other statements that Indian officials have made. But we believe that those statements are precisely the reason why we believe the two governments should be talking. And if they are able to assuage their respective concerns, we think that that may play into our ability, along with others', to see the nuclear and missile competition in South Asia diminished. And that's what we want to see.
MR. SILVER: Well, thank you very much, Ambassador Inderfurth.
Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. (Scattered applause.)
END
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