U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
MONDAY, JUNE 22, 1998
Briefer: JAMES P. RUBIN
| RUSSIA | |
| 16-20 | Reports of Plans to Sell Nuclear Plants to India / US Relations / Mtg in London re ndia, Pakistan / Transfers to Unsafeguarded Facilities / Penalties for Sale |
| 20 | Nunn-Lugar Military Exchanges |
| INDIA | |
| 17 | Effect of Sanctions |
| INDIA / PAKISTAN | |
| 18 | Next Steps |
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB # 74
MONDAYUNE 22, 1998, 12:45 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
................
QUESTION: Are you aware of reports of Russian plans to sell some nuclear plants to India?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I am aware of reports in that regard, and they are not good news. Even before India's latest test, we urged Russia not to proceed with the reactor sale to India, as it is not consistent with Russia's obligations as a member of the Nuclear Supplier's Group; that is not to sell reactors to countries that don't have so-called full scope safeguards - safeguards on all facilities.
The most recent Russian announcement sends precisely the wrong signal at the wrong time. It undercuts the good work we have done together in the Permanent Five and the G-8 to get India to understand that nuclear testing does not bring rewards. It sends the wrong signal at the wrong time. In our effort to fight non-proliferation, we've urged Russia not to go forward with its nuclear cooperation with India; and we urge Russia, therefore, to reconsider these accounts of its intention to go forward.
QUESTION: What do you make of it? I mean, the United States is always sort of trumpeting its good relations with Russia; and yet, in so many areas - and now this one seems to be quite egregious - Moscow is working at cross-purposes with you.
MR. RUBIN: I would certainly disagree that I've been blaring any trumpets from this podium with respect to relations with Russia. I will refrain from bringing a trumpet on any subject to avoid being accused of trumpeting anything.
(Laughter.)
But trumpet aside, let me try to answer your question. With respect to our relations with Russia, we do believe we have built a cooperative relationship, and that we work together on many, many issues. I'm not going to list them all for you, but you could probably list them as well as I could. That is a marked change from the Cold War and from the period immediately thereafter. Let's bear in mind, American and Russian soldiers are now operating together in Bosnia, under the SFOR operation. That is a remarkable thing. It doesn't mean, however - and it has never been our intention to suggest it means - that we on Russia agree on every subject or we agree on every tactic to approach, when we do agree on a subject.
With respect to India and Pakistan, we had a very good meeting in London. The members of the G-8 agreed to some very important steps, including the fact that the eight would postpone consideration of loans to India and Pakistan. So it's not simple to - it's not fair to simply say that nothing is happening; frankly, there is a great deal happening in the sanctions area. With respect to this particular decision, what I'm stating to you is what our policy is -- which is, in areas where we disagree, we don't hesitate to say so. In this case, we think that this signal is the wrong one; that it is too close to business as usual. It sends the wrong message to India and Pakistan at a time when the international community is trying to demonstrate to them, as we have so successfully, that their decision was a mistake.
With respect to this area, let me say that we do believe that sanctions that were imposed on India are having a substantial direct and indirect effect. Although the Indian economy had been experiencing some lags before sanctions were imposed, it appears already that the sanctions have added to existing concern among investors, and have further diminished investor confidence. The reported recent downturn in the Indian economy dates from before the test and sanctions, and is the result of broader economic forces. Nevertheless, we are implementing our sanctions package fully, correctly and properly; at the same time recognizing that we want to minimize unintended consequences.
So the sanctions are working. There are many things where we and the Russians are working together on; this one we disagree. So I'm stating our disagreement, rather than trumpeting something that we avoid trumpeting.
QUESTION: Where do you go from here on this whole issue of trying to force a change in the Indian and Pakistan behavior. Specifically, what, if anything, do you want to get out of China on Pakistan at the summit?
MR. RUBIN: With respect to China on Pakistan at the summit, I think we have stated quite clearly that we want to see greater cooperation from the Chinese in the area of accepting international norms in the missile area, as well as working to ensure that all that goes with that commitment are implemented. That would have an effect on potential cooperation with Pakistan.
But let me add - and you can accuse me of pointing out something that isn't bad news, and you might even call it trumpeting if it's not bad news. That is that China has been constructive and has worked with us and has been a part of our process to send a very strong signal to India and Pakistan that its decisions to test were a mistake. China chaired a meeting in Geneva that you're familiar with, and came into that meeting with constructive positions across the board. They had an affirmative agenda on the things that Pakistan should and shouldn't do. They've talked to the Pakistanis about ensuring that there is no retransfer of any technology or equipment that could be useful in this area.
So China has played a responsible role since these tests, and that is better for the security of the United States than being in a position where we don't talk to the Chinese because people somehow think that sticking our head in the sand is a better way to advance the national interests of the United States.
With respect to where we go on India and Pakistan, Deputy Secretary Talbott had a good initial meeting with their special representative in this area, and we would expect to have similar contact with the Pakistanis in the near future and try to convince them that they need to make commitments along the lines that the Chinese and the American-led group demanded; and that is on not testing any further nuclear tests, on joining the Comprehensive Test Ban as a non-nuclear weapons state and on not weaponizing its missiles and not testing its missiles and ultimately getting commitments that go beyond unilateral pledges in that area. That's what we're working on; so far, so good. But these were setbacks to the cause of non-proliferation. We were very honest and clear on that, and now we're working to try to make sure the signal is not sent to the rest of the world that testing is a good idea.
Despite this decision of the Russians, it still should be clear to any country considering such an action that it has harmed India and Pakistan's standing in the international community, harmed their economy and set back their efforts.
QUESTION: In London, the Secretary's speech, which was quaintly called an intervention, was distributed, and it tracked almost precisely later with the statement or the communiqué issued. The only major point she made that there was nothing in the communiqué to reflect was her appeal that they stop helping India and Pakistan with their technology. And I've been asking since then if they turned her down. This is your answer - I mean, Russia's given the world its answer now - I don't mean you. That's the answer - that Russia is not going to stop helping India; and why would you expect Pakistan's friends now to back of, if that's the example being set by one of America's terrific friends?MR. RUBIN: Well, Barry, believe me, we're not sugar-coating this. This is not good news, so what we're --
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - talking about a few troops in peacekeeping operations, and that's minor compared to the spread of nuclear technology.
MR. RUBIN: I don't think stopping the war in Bosnia is a minor issue at all; and I think bringing peace to Bosnia and deploying forces - military forces - in a joint command situation is a major transforming event.
With respect to the civilian technologies, remember what this issue's about. This issue is not about transferring nuclear weapons or transferring weapons-grade plutonium or weapons-grade uranium. It's about our view - and this is very important to get the nuance right - that you should not cooperate with a facility in a country where every facility is not under safeguards. The Russian view is that this particular program is not cooperating with an unsafeguarded facility; it's cooperating with safeguarded facilities, even though there are unsafeguarded facilities in India. So let's not over-dramatize the potential proliferation concern.
At the same time, what I said holds - the message is the wrong one. It's the wrong message at the wrong time, and we are going to urge the Russian Government to reconsider. It would be better for the world if all the major countries in the world were as clear as they could be, even at the risk of effecting its own economy - as our sanctions clearly do - because the cause of non-proliferation is so important.
QUESTION: Have you heard from them on the Plutonium 2000 proposal she made at the Stimson Center?
MR. RUBIN: I'll have to get back to you on that.
QUESTION: Do you know if Russia faces any penalty for this sale? From what you're saying, it's not a clear cut violation of this Nuclear Supplier's Group provision.
MR. RUBIN: No. We believe that the nuclear - no, that's not what I'm saying. We believe that the Nuclear Suppliers Group provision that you only provide cooperation to facilities when that country is under full-scope safeguards is what pertains.
The Russians take the view that they had a generalized agreement of this kind of thing in the past and since it is a safeguarded facility, it is grandfathered -- to use the term of art - to permit it. We don't agree with that. They have said they were going to go forward. Secretary Albright raised this with Foreign Minister Primakov in Geneva, and we are disappointed by what we are hearing. We think it's not good news, it's bad news; it sends the wrong signal at the wrong time.
QUESTION: What they have violated, then, is the rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group?
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, it's not a treaty and so violation is one of those words that is very tricky in the international legal lexicon. We believe that the Russian argument that this type of cooperation was previous to their joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group is too general and overly broad, and that they should be leaning against actions like these when it comes to countries that don't have full-scope safeguards like India.
QUESTION: So this --
MR. RUBIN: We believe they are acting inconsistently with the rules.
QUESTION: Yes. But the contractor negotiation of it began prior to the --
MR. RUBIN: That's the dispute - is we don't believe that a generalized commitment that was made many, many years ago to help in this area is sufficient justification for this particular step.
QUESTION: Also on Russia - what is the point of view of the State Department of the Nunn-Lugar exchanges between the US and the Russian military - specifically General Habiger's trip to Russia where he visited six strategic nuclear bases -- the Russians have been to this country doing the same -- seeing that some of these missiles are actually not targeted that the Russians have. Is this building confidence? Is this a good move?
MR. RUBIN: The short answer is yes. We believe that the more that we and the Russians can understand the strategic posture of our countries and understand the capabilities of our forces and the ways in which they operate - provided appropriate security precautions are taken - it helps avoid any miscalculations or misunderstandings. In general, that it a good thing.
.................
(The briefing concluded at 1:45 P.M.)
[end of document]
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