18 June 1998
PRIVATE EXPERTS STRESS IMPORTANCE OF INDIA-PAKISTAN SANCTIONS
(Action could slow nuclear development, they say) (900) By Jacquelyn S. Porth USIA Security Affairs Writer Washington -- A senior fellow at the Brookings Institution says it is important for the established nuclear weapons states "to regroup" to inhibit countries like India and Pakistan from crossing the next critical threshold by deploying nuclear weapons on delivery systems. Bruce Blair told the National Press Club Forum's Committee June 18 that the risk of regional war in South Asia through miscalculation or accidental launch is now greater because both India and Pakistan lack reliable command-and-control structures and early warning systems. The recent tests on the subcontinent were "an eye-opener" for those who thought the Cold War had ended and that the nuclear era was finally "winding down," Blair said. The Indian and Pakistani tests have done much to raise nuclear consciousness and may even suggest that the nuclear era is just beginning, he added. Another panelist, Joe Cirincione, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said the world may be witnessing "the next great wave of proliferation." The crisis on the subcontinent is still developing and is likely to get worse before it improves, he suggested. He predicted that India and Pakistan will weaponize their nuclear devices and subsequently deploy them. Cirincione said every Defense Department war game ever conducted involving India and Pakistan "always goes nuclear." These are two countries, he pointed out, that have experienced 50 years of conflict and three wars. Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, said the recent Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests are merely part of a process. The tests provided both sides with additional data but have not really created a new situation on the subcontinent, he said, because both countries must still solve the problem of delivering the nuclear bombs they had already been building. Milhollin stressed the importance of imposing serious sanctions on India and Pakistan. If the United States were to pursue only minimal sanctions against them, he said, it would send "a message to the rest of the world that we don't care." Sanctions will make it harder for the two countries to sustain and further develop their nuclear programs, he added. Cirincione agreed that imposing only moderate sanctions will send the wrong message to India and Pakistan. He also said the testing by the two countries was "an unmitigated disaster" for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While he said that the tests may have the effect of energizing the international community and the Clinton administration on the subject of non-proliferation, he admitted to being pessimistic about such a prospect. International efforts to cap the Indian-Pakistani nuclear effort where it is, asking both countries to refrain from conducting further tests, calling on the two governments to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and entering into negotiations for a fissile material cutoff treaty are all good next steps, Cirincione said. He noted that he does not expect India and Pakistan to implement those steps even though it is clear that nuclear tests have not made these countries any more secure. Jack Mendelsohn, deputy director of the Arms Control Association, said India's weapons tests were not designed to change the strategic equation on the subcontinent. Instead, he said, they were an attempt to demonstrate "nuclear hair" on a party chest in India and project an image of a country which wishes to be taken seriously. There is still a chance to prevent destabilization in the region, Mendelsohn suggested. He said he doesn't think India is "dead set on nuclear deployment" because it recognizes that putting nuclear weapons into its operational forces would be destabilizing. Pakistan, meanwhile, is not interested in provoking the situation he said, but rather has been caught up in an action-and-reaction chain of events. Mendelsohn stressed the need for the international community to press for an Indian-Pakistani moratorium on nuclear testing. Meanwhile, the rest of the world must endorse the CTBT, he said, regardless of actions by India and Pakistan. France and Britain have already ratified the treaty, but he said U.S. leadership is needed because Russia and China are waiting for the United States to act before they do. Mendelsohn took exception to Cirincione's analysis of the effect of the recent nuclear tests on the NPT. He said the regime has not been devastated by Indian and Pakistani testing. The NPT still needs to be held up as "an international norm" of behavior because it has been "extraordinarily valuable," he said. Although denuclearization of India and Pakistan is a certain goal, he conceded that achieving it is "a long way off." Blair also highlighted the problem of Russian dependency on a doctrine of launching nuclear weapons on any warning of possible attack. This is particularly worrisome, he said, because Russia's nuclear control system is deteriorating and the Year 2000 computer problem may cause Russia's early warning system "to go haywire." Since Russia is so strapped economically, he said, it has done little to attend to the Y2K problem, as it is known. As a result, he suggested Russian nuclear control may be at risk by the end of the century. In an effort to mitigate the potential Russian problem, Blair said the Defense Department is considering ways to feed U.S. early warning data into Russia's system. He described this as a laudable idea, but suggested it would be even better and safer for the U.S. and Russia to take their weapons off alert status.
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