DATE=6/11/98
TYPE=BACKGROUND REPORT
NUMBER=5-40661
TITLE=REGIONAL REACTION TO NUCLEAR TESTS
BYLINE= ED WARNER
DATELINE= WASHINGTON
CONTENT=
VOICED AT:
INTRODUCTION: THE NUCLEAR TESTS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN HAVE
RAISED FEARS OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THOSE TWO NATIONS. BUT WHAT
ABOUT THEIR NEIGHBORS AND BEYOND? WILL THEY TOO SEEK NUCLEAR
WEAPONS IN IMITATION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN, THUS ADDING TO
REGIONAL INSTABILITY? WILL CHINA, A NUCLEAR POWER, BECOME MORE
COMBATIVE? VOA'S ED WARNER ASKED SOME SPECIALISTS ON SOUTH ASIA.
TEXT: IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT INDIA AND PAKISTAN HAVE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS. WITH THE RECENT TESTS, THEY HAVE GONE ONE STEP FURTHER.
SO FAR, SAY SPECIALISTS ON SOUTH ASIA, THERE IS NO REAL CHANGE
IN THE BALANCE OF POWER.
THE PROBLEM IS WHAT COMES NEXT AND HOW DO OTHER COUNTRIES REACT,
ESPECIALLY CHINA, WHICH HAS BEEN LABELED INDIA'S NUMBER ONE ENEMY
BY MEMBERS OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT IN NEW DELHI?
STEPHEN COHEN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AND THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION NOTES INDIA AND CHINA HAVE THE LARGEST TERRITORIAL
DISPUTE OF ANY TWO COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD TODAY:
// COHEN ACT //
SO THE CHINESE COULD PLAY IT EITHER WAY. THEY COULD TAKE
THE HIGH ROAD AND CONTINUE A RATHER MODERATE DIPLOMACY
IN THE REGION. THEIR POSITION ON KASHMIR IS VERY MUCH
LIKE THAT OF THE AMERICANS, TRYING TO STRIKE A BALANCE
BETWEEN THE CLAIMS OF BOTH SIDES. ON THE OTHER HAND,
THEY COULD DECIDE THEY WILL POKE THE INDIANS. THEY MAY
ALSO COME TO SEE THE INDIANS AS AN EMERGING, MAJOR
THREAT TO THEMSELVES.
// END ACT //
MR. COHEN SAYS THE CHINESE COULD MAKE TROUBLE FOR INDIA IN
VARIOUS WAYS WITHOUT MUCH RISK TO THEMSELVES. THEY COULD MOVE
TROOPS NORTH OF INDIA. THEY COULD INCREASE THEIR HELP TO
PAKISTAN.
BUT CHINA HAS NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FEARS OF ITS OWN, SAYS DANIEL
BYMAN, A POLICY ANALYST AT RAND, A WASHINGTON RESEARCH
ORGANIZATION:
// BYMAN ACT //
CHINA IS NEXT TO THREE ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES -
JAPAN, TAIWAN AND SOUTH KOREA - ALL OF WHICH COULD
PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF THEY SO CHOSE. NONE OF THEM
HAVE DONE SO FOR VARIOUS REASONS. HOWEVER, IF
PROLIFERATION GOT OUT OF HAND AND WERE NOT CONTROLLED,
I THINK CHINA WOULD WORRY TREMENDOUSLY IF ANY OF THESE
COUNTRIES WENT NUCLEAR, AND I THINK THAT IS BEIJING'S
MOST PRESSING CONCERN.
// END ACT //
GIVEN THESE CONCERNS, MR. BYMAN THINKS CHINA WILL LARGELY SUPPORT
U-S POLICY, WHICH IT HOPES WILL CONSTRAIN INDIA AND PAKISTAN
WITHOUT GETTING BEIJING INVOLVED.
MEANWHILE, THERE ARE FEARS OTHER MUSLIM COUNTRIES WILL FOLLOW
PAKISTAN'S EXAMPLE OF CREATING AN "ISLAMIC BOMB." BUT THESE
NATIONS DO NOT NEED PAKISTAN TO SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SAYS MR.
COHEN. THEY WANT THEM, WISELY OR NOT, FOR THEIR OWN NATIONAL
REASONS:
// COHEN ACT //
THE PAKISTANI TESTS HAVE APPARENTLY REVIVED ISLAMIC
FEELINGS IN A LOT OF COUNTRIES THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE
EAST BECAUSE THEY CONTRAST PAKISTAN WITH ISRAEL. THEY
FEEL THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THERE IS
NO NEARBY MUSLIM STATE WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT IS AN
ARGUMENT THAT DRAWS MOSTLY FROM EMOTION RATHER THAN
RATIONAL STRATEGIC ANALYSIS. BUT IT COULD LEAD TO A
GREATER HEIGHTENED POPULISM - NUCLEAR POPULISM.
// END ACT //
MORE THAN NATIONAL SECURITY IS INVOLVED, SAYS KHALID BIN SAYEED,
A PAKISTANI PHILSOPHER AND AUTHOR OF "WESTERN DOMINANCE AND
POLITICAL ISLAM." HE SAYS USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEFIES THE
INJUNCTION OF THE PROPHET MOHAMMAD NOT TO KILL THE INNOCENT,
WHICH WOULD SURELY BE THE RESULT OF A NUCLEAR ATTACK:
// SAYEED ACT //
SO HOW WOULD ISLAM BECOME A GUIDANCE TO MANKIND IF IT
INDULGES IN THIS KIND OF DESTRUCTION? IT IS THE DUTY AND
RESPONSIBILITY OF (PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER) NAWAZ
SHARIF AND PAKISTAN, WHICH WAS CREATED AS AN EXEMPLARY
ISLAMIC SOCIETY, TO REMIND MUSLIMS OF WHAT THEIR
RESPONSIBILITIES ARE. NO MUSLIM CAN TAKE PLEASURE OR
PRIDE IN A BOMB THAT KILLS IN THIS FASHION.
// END ACT //
NOR CAN INDIA OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY, SAYS MR. SAYEED, WHO BELEIVES
MORAL AS WELL AS STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE
ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. (SIGNED)
NEB/EW/GE
11-Jun-98 5:02 PM EDT (2102 UTC)
NNNN
Source: Voice of America
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