EVOLUTION OF INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY
PAPER LAID ON THE TABLE OF THE LOK SABHA
ON 27TH MAY, 1998
1. On 11 May, a statement was issued by Government announcing that India had
successfully carried out three underground nuclear tests at the Pokhran
range. Two days later, after carrying out two more underground sub-kiloton
tests, the Government announced the completion of the planned series of
tests. The three underground nuclear tests carried out at 1545 hours on 11
May were with three different devices - a fission device, a low-yield
sub-kiloton device and a thermonuclear device. The two tests carried out at
1221 hours on 13 May were also low-yield devices in the sub-kiloton range.
The results from these tests have been in accordance with the expectations
of our scientists.
2. In 1947, when India emerged as a free country to take its rightful place
in the comity of nations, the nuclear age had already dawned. Our leaders
then took the crucial decision to opt for self-reliance, and freedom of
thought and action. We rejected the Cold War paradigm whose shadows were
already appearing on the horizon and instead of aligning ourselves with
either bloc, chose the more difficult path of non-alignment. This has
required the building up of national strength through our own resources, our
skills and creativity and the dedication of the people. Among the earliest
initiatives taken by our first Prime Minister Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, was the
development of science and inculcation of the scientific spirit. It is this
initiative that laid the foundation for the achievement of 11 and 13 May,
made possible by exemplary cooperation among the scientists from Department
of Atomic Energy and Defence Research & Development Organisation.
Disarmament was then and continues to be a major plank in our foreign policy
now. It was, in essence, and remains still, the natural course for a
country that had waged a unique struggle for independence on the basis of
'ahimsa' and 'satyagraha'.
3. Development of nuclear technology transformed the nature of global
security. Our leaders reasoned that nuclear weapons were not weapons of
war, these were weapons of mass destruction. A nuclear-weapon-free-world
would, therefore, enhance not only India's security but also the security of
all nations. This is the principle plank of our nuclear policy. In the
absence of universal and non-discriminatory disarmament, we cannot accept a
regime that creates an arbitrary division between nuclear haves and
have-nots. India believes that it is the sovereign right of every nation to
make a judgement regarding its supreme national interests and exercise its
sovereign choice. We subscribe to the principle of equal and legitimate
security interests of nations and consider it a sovereign right. At the
same time, our leaders recognised early that nuclear technology offers
tremendous potential for economic development, especially for developing
countries who are endeavouring to leap across the technology gaps created by
long years of colonial exploitation. This thinking was reflected in the
enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1948, within a year of our
independence. All the numerous initiatives taken by us since, in the field
of nuclear disarmament have been in harmony and in continuation of those
early enunciations.
4. In the 50's, nuclear weapons testing took place above ground and the
characteristic mushroom cloud became the visible symbol of the nuclear age.
India then took the lead in calling for an end to all nuclear weapon testing
as the first step for ending the nuclear arms race. Addressing the Lok
Sabha on 2 April, 1954, shortly after a major hydrogen bomb test had been
conducted, Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru stated that "nuclear, chemical and
biological energy and power should not be used to forge weapons of mass
destruction". He called for negotiations for prohibition and elimination of
nuclear weapons and in the interim, a standstill agreement to halt nuclear
testing. The world had by then witnessed less than 65 tests. Our call was
not heeded. In 1963, an agreement was concluded to ban atmospheric testing
but by this time, countries had developed the technologies for conducting
underground nuclear tests and the nuclear arms race continued unabated.
More than three decades passed and after over 2000 tests had been conducted,
a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was opened for signature in 1996, following
two and a half years of negotiations in which India had participated
actively. In its final shape, this Treaty left much to be desired. It was
neither comprehensive nor was it related to disarmament.
5. In 1965, along with a small group of non-aligned countries, India had put
forward the idea of an international non-proliferation agreement under which
the nuclear weapon states would agree to give up their arsenals provided
other countries refrained from developing or acquiring such weapons. This
balance of rights and obligations was absent when the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) emerged in 1968, almost 30 years ago. In the
60's our security concerns deepened. But such was our abhorrence of nuclear
weapons and such our desire to avoid acquiring them that we sought instead
security guarantees from major nuclear powers of the world. The countries we
turned to for support and understanding felt unable to extend to us the
assurances that we then sought. That is when and why India made clear its
inability to sign the NPT.
6. The Lok Sabha debated the NPT on 5 April, 1968. The then Prime Minister,
late Smt. Indira Gandhi assured the House that "we shall be guided entirely
by our self-enlightenment and the considerations of national security". She
highlighted the shortcomings of the NPT whilst reemphasising the country's
commitment to nuclear disarmament. She warned the House and the country
"that not signing the Treaty may bring the nation many difficulties. It may
mean the stoppage of aid and stoppage of help. Since we are taking this
decision together, we must all be together in facing its consequences".
That was a turning point. This House then strengthened the decision of the
Government by reflecting a national consensus.
7. Our decision not to sign the NPT was in keeping with the basic objective
of maintaining freedom of thought and action. In 1974, we demonstrated our
nuclear capability. Successive Governments thereafter have continued to take
all necessary steps in keeping with that resolve and national will, to
safeguard India's nuclear option. This was also the primary reason
underlying the 1996 decision in the country not subscribing to the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); a decision that met the unanimous
approval of the House yet again. Our perception then was that subscribing
to the CTBT would severely limit India's nuclear potential at an
unacceptably low level. Our reservations deepened as the CTBT did not also
carry forward the nuclear disarmament process. On both counts, therefore,
yet again our security concerns remained unaddressed. The then Minister for
External Affairs, Shri I.K. Gujral had made clear the Government's reasoning
to this House during the discussions on this subject in 1996.
8. The decades of the 80's and 90's meanwhile witnessed the gradual
deterioration of our security environment as a result of nuclear and missile
proliferation. In our neighbourhood, nuclear weapons increased and more
sophisticated delivery systems were inducted. Further, in our region there
has come into existence a pattern about clandestine acquisition of nuclear
materials, missiles and related technologies. India, in this period, became
the victim of externally aided and abetted terrorism, militancy and
clandestine war through hired mercenaries.
9. The end of the Cold War marks a watershed in the history of the 20th
century. While it has transformed the political landscape of Europe, it has
done little to address India's security concerns. The relative order that
was arrived at in Europe was not replicated in other parts of the globe.
10. At the global level, there is no evidence yet on the part of the nuclear
weapon states to take decisive and irreversible steps in moving towards a
nuclear-weapon-free-world. Instead, the NPT has been extended indefinitely
and unconditionally, perpetuating the existence of nuclear weapons in the
hands of the five countries who are also permanent members of the UN
Security Council. Some of these countries have doctrines that permit the
first use of nuclear weapons; these countries are also engaged in programmes
for modernisation of their nuclear arsenals.
11. Under such circumstances, India was left with little choice. It had to
take necessary steps to ensure that the country's nuclear option, developed
and safeguarded over decades not be permitted to erode by a voluntary
self-imposed restraint. Indeed, such an erosion would have had an
irremediably adverse impact on our security. The Government was thus faced
with a difficult decision. The only touchstone that guided it was national
security. Tests conducted on 11 and 13 May are a continuation of the
policies set into motion that put this country on the path of self-reliance
and independence of thought and action. Nevertheless, there are certain
moments when the chosen path reaches a fork and a decision has to be made.
1968 was one such moment in our nuclear chapter as were 1974 and 1996. At
each of these moments, we took the right decision guided by national
interest and supported by national consensus. 1998 was borne in the
crucible of earlier decisions and made possible only because those decisions
had been taken correctly in the past and in time.
12. At a time when developments in the area of advanced technologies are
taking place at a breathtaking pace, new parameters need to be identified,
tested and validated in order to ensure that skills remain contemporary and
succeeding generations of scientists and engineers are able to build on the
work done by their predecessors. The limited series of five tests
undertaken by India was precisely such an exercise. It has achieved its
stated objective. The data provided by these tests is critical to validate
our capabilities in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields for
different applications and different delivery systems. Further, these tests
have significantly enhanced the capabilities of our scientists and engineers
in computer simulation of new designs and enabled them to undertake
sub-critical experiments in future, if considered necessary. In terms of
technical capability, our scientists and engineers have the requisite
resources to ensure a credible deterrent.
13. Our policies towards our neighbours and other countries too have not
changed; India remains fully committed to the promotion of peace with
stability, and resolution of all outstanding issues through bilateral
dialogue and negotiations. These tests were not directed against any
country; these were intended to reassure the people of India about their
security and convey determination that this Government, like previous
Governments, has the capability and resolve to safeguard their national
security interests. The Government will continue to remain engaged in
substantive dialogue with our neighbours to improve relations and to expand
the scope of our interactions in a mutually advantageous manner. Confidence
building is a continuous process; we remain committed to it. Consequent
upon the tests and arising from an insufficient appreciation of our security
concerns, some countries have been persuaded to take steps that sadden us.
We value our bilateral relations. We remain committed to dialogue and
reaffirm that preservation of India's security create no conflict of
interest with these countries.
14. India is a nuclear weapon state. This is a reality that cannot be
denied. It is a not a conferment that we seek; nor is it a status for
others to grant. It is an endowment to the nation by our scientists and
engineers. It is India's due, the right of one-sixth of human-kind. Our
strengthened capability adds to our sense of responsibility; the
responsibility and obligation of power. India, mindful of its international
obligations, shall not use these weapons to commit aggression or to mount
threats against any country; these are weapons of self-defence and to ensure
that in turn, India is also not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion.
In 1994, we had proposed that India and Pakistan jointly undertake not to be
the first to use their nuclear capability against each other. The
Government on this occasion, reiterates its readiness to discuss a
"no-first-use" agreement with that country, as also with other countries
bilaterally, or in a collective forum. India shall not engage in an arms
race. India shall also not subscribe or reinvent the doctrines of the Cold
War. India remains committed to the basic tenet of our foreign policy - a
conviction that global elimination of nuclear weapons will enhance its
security as well as that of the rest of the world. It will continue to urge
countries, particularly other nuclear weapon states to adopt measures that
would contribute meaningfully to such an objective.
15. A number of initiatives have been taken in the past. In 1978, India
proposed negotiations for an international convention that would prohibit
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This was followed by another
initiative in 1982 calling for a 'nuclear freeze' - a prohibition on
production of fissile materials for weapons, on production of nuclear
weapons and related delivery systems. In 1988, we put forward an Action
Plan for phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a specified time
frame. It is our regret that these proposals did not receive a positive
response from other nuclear weapon states. Had their response been positive,
India need not have gone for the current tests. This is where our approach
to nuclear weapons is different from others. This difference is the
cornerstone of our nuclear doctrine. It is marked by restraint and striving
for the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.
16. We will continue to support such initiatives, taken individually or
collectively by the Non-Aligned Movement which has continued to attach the
highest priority to nuclear disarmament. This was reaffirmed most recently,
last week, at the NAM Ministerial meeting held at Cartagena which has
"reiterated their call on the Conference on Disarmament to establish, as the
highest priority, an ad hoc committee to start in 1998 negotiations on a
phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a
specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The
collective voice of 113 NAM countries reflects an approach to global nuclear
disarmament to which India has remained committed. One of the NAM member
initiatives to which we attach great importance was the reference to the
International Court of Justice resulting in the unanimous declaration fom
the ICJ, as part of the Advisory Opinion handed down on 8 July, 1996, that
"there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a
conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects
under strict and effective international control". India was one of the
countries that appealed to the ICJ on this issue. No other nuclear weapon
state has supported this judgement; in fact, they have sought to decry its
value. We have been and will continue to be in the forefront of the calls
for opening negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, so that this
challenge can be dealt with in the same manner that we have dealt with the
scourge of two other weapons of mass destruction - through the Biological
Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. In keeping with our
commitment to comprehensive, universal and non-discriminatory approaches to
disarmament, India is an original State Party to both these Conventions.
Accordingly, India will shortly submit the plan of destruction of its
chemical weapons to the international authority - Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We fulfil our obligations whenever we
undertake them.
17. Traditionally, India has been an outward looking country. Our strong
commitment to multilateralism is reflected in our active participation in
organisations like the United Nations. In recent years, in keeping with the
new challenges, we have actively promoted regional cooperation - in SAARC,
in the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation and as a member
of the ASEAN Regional Forum. This engagement will also continue. The
policies of economic liberalisation introduced in recent years have
increased our regional and global linkages and the Government shall deepen
and strengthen these ties.
18. Our nuclear policy has been marked by restraint and openness. It has
not violated any international agreements either in 1974 or now, in 1998.
Our concerns have been made known to our interlocuters in recent years. The
restraint exercised for 24 years, after having demonstrated our capability
in 1974, is in itself a unique example. Restraint, however, has to arise
from strength. It cannot be based upon indecision or doubt. Restraint is
valid only when doubts are removed. The series of tests undertaken by India
have led to the removal of doubts. The action involved was balanced in
that it was the minimum necessary to maintain what is an irreducible
component of our national security calculus. This Government's decision has,
therefore, to be seen as part of a tradition of restraint that has
characterised our policy in the past 50 years.
19. Subsequent to the tests Government has already stated that India will
now observe a voluntary moratorium and refrain from conducting underground
nuclear test explosions. It has also indicated willingness to move towards a
de-jure formalisation of this declaration. The basic obligation of the CTBT
are thus met; to refrain from undertaking nuclear test explosions. This
voluntary declaration is intended to convey to the international community
the seriousness of our intent for meaningful engagement. Subsequent
decisions will be taken after assuring ourselves of the security needs of
the country.
20. India has also indicated readiness to participate in negotiations in the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
The basic objective of this treaty is to prohibit future production of
fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
India's approach in these negotiations will be to ensure that this treaty
emerges as a universal and non-discriminatory treaty, backed by an effective
verification mechanism. When we embark on these negotiations, it shall be in
the full confidence of the adequacy and credibility of the nation's
weaponised nuclear deterrent.
21. India has maintained effective export controls on nuclear materials as
well as related technologies even though we are neither a party to the NPT
nor a member of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group. Nonetheless, India is
committed to non-proliferation and the maintaining of stringent export
controls to ensure that there is no leakage of our indigenously developed
know-how and technologies. In fact, India's conduct in this regard has been
better than some countries party to the NPT.
22. India has in the past conveyed our concerns on the inadequacies of the
international nuclear non-proliferation regime. It has explained that the
country was not in a position to join because the regime did not address our
country's security concerns. These could have been addressed by moving
towards global nuclear disarmament, our preferred approach. As this did not
take place, India was obliged to stand aside from the emerging regime so
that its freedom of action was not constrained. This is the precise path
that has continued to be followed unwaveringly for the last three decades.
That same constructive approach will underlie India's dialogue with
countries that need to be persuaded of our serious intent and willingness to
engage so that mutual concerns are satisfactorily addressed. The challenge
to Indian statecraft is balancing and reconciling India's security
imperatives with valid international concerns in this regard.
23. The House is aware of the different reactions that have emanated from
the people of India and from different parts of the world. The overwhelming
support of the citizens of India is a source of strength for the Government.
It not only tells that this decision was right but also that the country
wants a focussed leadership, which attends to national security needs. This
the Government pledges to do as a sacred duty. The Government have also
been greatly heartened by the outpouring of support from Indians abroad.
They have, with one voice, spoken in favour of the Government's action. The
Government conveys its profound gratitude to the citizens of India and to
Indians abroad, and looks to them for support in the difficult period ahead.
24. In this, the fiftieth year of our independence, India stands at a
defining moment in our history. The rationale for the Government's decision
is based on the same policy tenets that have guided the country for five
decades. These policies were sustained successfully because of the
underlying national consensus. The present decision and future actions will
continue to reflect a commitment to sensibilities and obligations of an
ancient civilisation, a sense of responsibility and restraint, but a
restraint born of the assurance of action, not of doubts or apprehension.
The Gita explains (Chap.VI-3) as none other can:
(Sanskrit Shloka which interprets as: Action is a process to reach a goal;
action may reflect tumult but when measured and focussed, will yield its
objective of stability and peace)
27.05.1998
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