POKHARAN '98: TWO TRACK FOLLOW-UP ACTION ON ANVIL
Brigadier Vijai K Nair
In the words of Admiral Nayyar, Chairman of the Forum for Strategic &
Security Studies, "The global strategic atlas was radically changed on 11 May
when India conducted three nuclear tests, landing itself firmly in the
category of a nuclear weapon state [NWS]."
As expected international recrimination on India's nuclear testing is pouring
in. The US with its massive arsenal of over 10,000 nuclear weapons poised for
'first use' to resolve conflict, having just conducted a sub-critical nuclear
test of its own, has announced the imposition of sanctions on India. The
sanctimonious Australian Government, while sheltering behind the nuclear
umbrella provided by the US, in exchange for bases in Australia for the
projection of the US nuclear war fighting machine, has recalled its High
Commissioner. Japan, while accumulating a weapons usable plutonium inventory
of many 100s of tons, and secure under a guaranteed US nuclear umbrella, has
withdrawn its aid package to India. Space consideration precludes listing the
totality of the hypocrisy of the developed world, in its misguided effort to
stop horizontal proliferation while giving nuclear benefactors free rein to
proliferate vertically.
For what? To penalise India who, having fought to advance the cause of
elimination of nuclear weapons for 44 years, has had the temerity to take
into consideration the progressively debilitating security environment and
create its own defensive deterrent capability to safeguard its security
interests.
The experience of seeing, what they considered an ineffectual, state thumb
its nose at them has, left the developed world traumatised. So much so that
they have failed to understand that even 'economic deterrence' has failed. If
the intention is to prove that economic retaliation will bring India to its
knees, they have a second surprise coming their way. Finally, if not now, the
realisation will hit them. They will understand that they need mechanisms
other than sanctions to meet this fundamentally changed scenario. They must
either, adjust to the reality that nuclear non-proliferation is unattainable,
and decide to live in a world of nuclear weapon states as posited by Kenneth
Waltz. Or bow to the aspirations of the larger global community, fast
swelling with disaffection amongst their own people with the continued
retention of nuclear weapons. India, having broken out from the artificial
barriers of political and economic ostracisation, has forced these two
choices on the Nuclear Weapon States [NWS], who have hitherto blocked all
efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.
Having taken the step to go overtly nuclear, after three decades of avoiding
the issue, India cannot now sit back and hope that the elimination goal will
come about on its own. This bold step to challenge the NWS and their nuclear
beneficiaries must be made to pay. This requires a well orchestrated,
two-track policy.
1. Seize the initiative and press for immediate and irreversible negotiations
to the final elimination of nuclear weapons globally while guarding against
temptation to succumb to economic and political pressures to become party to
the horizontal non-proliferation regime.
2. Relentless development of its nuclear strategy to demonstrate to the NWS
that it will survive and flourish in a nuclear weapon infested world, despite
all the mechanisms they may employ to circumscribe that capability, in the
event that the first track policy does not succeed.
The first, if it succeeds is the ideal, it means the realisation of the core
on which the Indian philosophy has been built over the past five decades. The
second is a fall back position which cannot be ignored in the event the NWS,
in their misplaced confidence, decide they would prefer to live in a world
with numerous nuclear weapon states.
Then where can India be expected to go after having successfully completed
its series of five nuclear weapons tests? Within the framework of the larger
strategy, which it has put into play, it needs a quick follow up along both
tracks. Allowing a vacuum to build up will be counterproductive with a
negative affect on the national well being.
Track one requires India to pitch its initiatives immediately at the CD while
the world is still paying attention. Without making any apologies for its
actions, India should, as a NWS, insist on the commencement of negotiations
at the CD, for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In initiating the
revitalisation of the nuclear disarmament agenda India must lay its objective
clearly on the table and explain the two-track concept it intends to follow.
It must clearly articulate a commitment to reverse its nuclear strategy
within the negotiated framework of elimination of nuclear weapons, in keeping
with similar drawing down by the other NWS.
Provided India can convince the other non-nuclear weapon states [NNWS] of its
intent, considerable pressure could be mounted on the hitherto recalcitrant
NWS. It must also convince the fast growing anti-nuclear weapons public in
the NWS so that internal pressures are brought to bear conjointly. To achieve
this India could, make an undertaking, at an appropriate time, and definitely
before the September 1999, when the CTBT is due to enter into force, that it
would unilaterally impose a provisional moratorium on testing. This
commitment being conditional on the commencement of negotiations for the
institution of the NWC in a time bound framework, that would be finalised in
the negotiating process. Failure on the part of the NWS to negotiate the NWC
would then leave India free to test if it had doubts about the reliability of
its nuclear arsenal or if another state was to conduct a test. If convincing
and honestly implemented, this initiative would lead to substantially void
mounting acrimony and provide the NAM countries cause to rally to India's
cause "the elimination of nuclear weapons."
To engineer a trade off on its declared position, in any form whatsoever, to
mitigate the effect of economic or political actions initiated by the NWS to
coerce India to reverse its nuclear strategy, would be counterproductive. The
incentive for the NWS to negotiate the NWC would substantially reduce if
India were to project the image of a state under siege. Reversal of the
nuclear strategy must only become apparent once the NWC is in position.
Therefore, India must ensure that the second parameter i.e. to demonstrate
India's nuclear deterrent is firmly in place, by simultaneously making its
second track policy discernible.
While the conduct of five highly sophisticated nuclear tests demonstrates a
capability, the credibility of the strategy rests on a plethora of related
issues. That of a capacity to effectively utilise these capabilities to meet
the strategic objectives laid down by the political leadership. India,
therefore, has to proceed with development and induction of hardware and be
seen to be doing so. This includes:
(a) Develop and induct a series of missile systems that would: assuredly
penetrate hostile airspace in the technological environment that would
pertain two decades into the future; reach extreme ranges prescribed by the
nation's nuclear strategy from secure launch sites, both mobile and static,
from sea, land or air. In the existing environment it would require: an IRBM
that could threaten retaliation against targets visualised 360 degrees around
India; sub-surface launched missiles to guarantee survival of the strategic
deterrent; and, cruise missiles to enhance accuracy and penetration.
(b) A warhead inventory in keeping with the targeting policy dictated by the
nuclear strategy. This embraces numbers and types. Yields would have to be
commensurate to the required levels of target punishment dictated by
strategy.
(c) A national policy for: command and control with an enlightened
leadership; integration of the technological, military, intelligence and
other agencies to maintain, secure and implement the nuclear strategy.
Command-posts, hardened communications, space and atmospheric electronic
support systems and so on.
(d) Validation of hardware to be incorporated in the nuclear infrastructure,
some of which may have to be tested under pressures and temperatures of a
nuclear explosion.
By overtly going nuclear India has made a fundamental change in her approach
to both nuclear disarmament and the deteriorating security environment. This
has been done at tremendous political, economic and moral costs. It cannot
now be frittered away by bargaining an in between position through
conceptually unsound acceptance of the discriminatory non-proliferation
regime, even in part. The deal, if any, must be struck on the "global
elimination of nuclear weapon" and nothing less. The slightest indication of
weakening in the national resolve and India will singularly be the loser.
India's nuclear tests offer an unprecedented opportunity by drawing the world
out of its smugness and dramatically focusing attention to the problem of
nuclear weapons and providing India a credible opportunity revitalise the
cause of the universal abolition of nuclear weapons. The next step is to get
there.
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Brigadier Vijai K Nair
Executive Editor
Forum for Strategic & Security Studies
Safdarjung Airport
New Delhi 110 003
INDIA
Tele: 091 118 572483 & 091 11 462 8336. Fax: 091 11572425
E-mail: magoo@giasdl01.vsnl.net.in
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