May 13, 1998
[EXCERPTS] PRESS BRIEFING BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL BERGER
8:25 P.M. (L)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Berlin, Germany)
____________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release May 13, 1998
PRESS BRIEFING BY
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL BERGER
Radisson SAS Hotel
Berlin, Germany
8:25 P.M. (L)
..................
Q Sandy, what would the United States like the
G-8 summit to do on the issue of India?
MR. BERGER: Well, I'm sure this will be raised at
the summit. I would hope that the participants at the summit
would issue a very strong and clear statement condemning the
action of India and calling upon it not only to cease this series
of tests, but to stop testing, sign the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. And we would hope that individual nations would take
concrete and tangible actions that would make it very clear that
the era of nuclear testing is ending. And India is, in a sense,
swimming against the tide.
We were pleased today to see the Japanese government
announce that it was cutting off aid, they were suspending aid to
Japan (sic), and we would hope that other countries would
consider similar steps.
Q Sandy, if the Pakistanis go ahead and do a test
of their own, would the U.S. -- would the President be required
under law to impose the same kinds of sanctions against Pakistan?
MR. BERGER: I think the law is fairly clear, that
if a non-nuclear -- so-called non-nuclear state undertakes a
nuclear test, it is covered by the provisions of the Glenn
Amendment and sanctions will be applied.
We would certainly hope that Pakistan would not do
that in its own self-interest. I think if the Pakistanis were to
refrain from that act, notwithstanding what the Indians have
done, I think it would gain the high moral ground in the world
and I think that would redound to its benefit.
Q Sandy, what did the Pakistani Prime Minister
tell President Clinton when he asked him not to take that road?
MR. BERGER: Well, I don't think -- just as the
President didn't characterize what the Prime Minister said, I'm
not going to either. It was a very good conversation. I think
the President made the argument as to why, notwithstanding
considerable public pressure at this point in Pakistan, it would
be in Pakistan's interest to not respond in kind. I think the
Prime Minister listened attentively, but he made no commitments
and I'm not going to characterize that.
Q How could President Clinton go to either
Pakistan or India this year?
MR. BERGER: Well, we've -- you know, we've made no
decision whether to change our plan at this point to go to India
and Pakistan. I think we need to let some time go by and see how
this plays out before we make any decision.
Q Sandy, if I can follow on that if I can. There
was a story late today which suggested that the Indian government
had finished its testing and was now willing to consider a
testing ban. If they did that, would that smooth things over and
perhaps allow for a visit?
MR. BERGER: Well, it would certainly be -- I think
the report you refer to I think is accurate, that is that the
government of India has indicated that this is the end of this
series of tests. I don't believe that it has said that it will
never test again. Clearly, it would be, I believe, in India's
interest to unequivocally make that commitment. And the most
unequivocal way it could make that commitment would be to become
signatories and then ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I
think that would do a great deal to help improve India's standing
in the world.
Q Sandy, do you see any evidence that in fact
that is India's intention, that they have signaled in any way,
shape, or form to the United States they're now willing to do
that?
MR. BERGER: No, I have no evidence that they're
going to do that. I'm saying I think it would be very much in
their interest to do it. What India has done over the last two
days has not been, in my judgment, in India's own long-term
self-interest. That is this is, as the President said, a vibrant
democracy, an important country, a country that has been
unshackling itself from a lot of the economic baggage that has
held it down for many years. It has enormous potential.
But now that the world, now that the five declared
nuclear nations -- Russia, China, the United States, France,
Great Britain, and 149 minus five other countries have foresworn
nuclear testing, nuclear testing is simply, I think as the
President said, unnecessary, unjustifiable at this point, and we
would hope that they would make that same commitment.
Q Sandy, can you explain the importance of Strobe
Talbott's mission now to Pakistan, why that's --
MR. BERGER: Secretary Talbott and General Zinni
will go off to Pakistan. The President raised the idea this
morning with Prime Minister Sharif, whether it would be useful
for a representative or a delegation -- not a delegation -- a
representative to come to Pakistan to discuss these issues with
him. And Prime Minister Sharif said he would be pleased to have
an official come.
I think that, again, the purpose here is to further
make the argument to Pakistan -- which is, you know, right next
door and has just seen this act that is quite destabilizing and
is obviously, as the President said, the Pakistani people feeling
quite exercised about this, to try to make the argument to Prime
Minister Sharif that Pakistan could gain a great deal in the
national community right now if it refused to respond in kind.
Q Is that kind of to send a signal to India?
MR. BERGER: No, General Zinni knows this area very
well, knows the people very well. Obviously, there are many
different institutions within the Pakistan government whose
opinions are brought to bear on decisions such as this, and we
thought it would be useful for him to join Talbott.
Q Sandy, after being blind-sided in the first
round, did the United States Intelligence Agency see this second
round of tests coming? Did India alert us that it was going to
do this? And does the President still have full confidence in
the CIA director?
MR. BERGER: Let me say -- first of all, after the
first tests on Monday, Secretary Pickering spoke directly to the
Indians and asked them specifically whether they intended to
explode any further devices. And the Indians were nonresponsive
to that question. So obviously we were apprehensive after the
first set of tests that there could be more.
I think with respect to the intelligence side of
this, first of all one has to recognize this is a difficult
intelligence undertaking. But the specific answer to your
question is the President absolutely has full confidence in
Director Tenet -- we talked about it specifically today -- and
both confidence in his I think very, very strong leadership of
the intelligence community and confidence that he will review the
facts and circumstances surrounding the events of the last few
days in a very thorough and objective way with the outside help
of Admiral Jeremiah, who, as you know, was General Powell's vice
chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is a man of enormous both
integrity and wisdom and expertise. And we'll see what happens.
Q Sandy, what role did the President's
apprehension about a second round of tests play in the decision
not to delay invoking a legislation further and to go ahead and
impose the sanctions. Did he hope to forestall the second round
of tests or did --
MR. BERGER: I lost you in your negatives there. Do
you want to try that again.
Q I'll try it again. If the President was
apprehensive that there was going to be a second round of
tests --
MR. BERGER: Well, what I said is we were -- I don't
think I said that -- I think this has taken place really at a
level below the President, with Pickering and others concerned
after three tests were there going to be more.
Q But he made the decision to invoke the
legislation before the second round of tests. So what I'm
wondering is, was that in hopes of forestalling the second round
of tests. So what I'm wondering is, was that in hopes of
forestalling a second --
MR. BERGER: No. I think the decision was made
yesterday to invoke the sanctions and to not seek the 30-day
provision. The President actually made that decision on the
plane. It was communicated back immediately to Washington. And
I think that decision would have happened whether or not there
were further tests at that point.
When I say -- knowing there were three tests,
obviously, I think Under Secretary Pickering wanted to ask them
directly whether there were going to be more. They did not give
a responsive answer.
Q Sandy, could you tell us how and by whom the
President was informed of each of the series of tests?
MR. BERGER: He was informed of the Monday test by
me on Monday morning, and of the second tests today, also I think
by myself.
Q What was his reaction, Sandy, when you told him
about the tests this morning? Surprise?
MR. BERGER: Well, I think -- you know, the
President, as he said, is deeply disappointed by this. I think
that he, number one, seeks to build a stronger partnership
between the United States and India. This is obviously a setback
to that effort. And number two, has devoted enormous energy to
nonproliferation and has accomplished a great deal with the
Nonproliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
denuclearization of Belarus, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, strategic
arms reductions with the Russians.
So any step backwards -- you know, you make four
steps forward and one step backwards. I think that he was not
happy about it.
Q Was he surprised, Sandy? I mean, he had just
hours before asked -- personally asked the Indian government not
to do this, warned them that the sanctions were going to be
imposed, and then just a few hours later two more tests.
MR. BERGER: Well, I think decisions like this in
terms of tests are not things that are turned on and off in a
second. This obviously had been previously planned by the Indian
government.
Q What steps is the administration -- what
concrete steps is the administration willing to take to induce
Pakistan not to test? I mean, aside from sort of the rhetoric
and the high moral road, what can you offer them?
MR. BERGER: Well, there has been a continuing
effort on the part of our administration to improve our
relationship with Pakistan. As you may recall, the Pressler
Amendment, which was enacted in the '80s, pretty much closed down
any assistance that we could give the Pakistan.
With our support we succeeded in enacting an
amendment to the Pressler Amendment that was sponsored by Senator
Brown of Colorado about two years ago, Hank Brown, which repeals
some of Pressler. And pursuant to that we have been able to
restore some aid to Pakistan, some assistance. And I think we
will examine what more we can do both bilaterally and
multilaterally.
Q Sandy, did India deliberately mislead U.N.
Ambassador Richardson to believe such tests were not going to
happen? Did that come up? And has President Clinton responded
to a letter from the Indian Prime Minister blaming relations
basically with China for the need to do this?
MR. BERGER: The letter you refer to I think arrived
in our office hours before we left on our plane to come here.
Q Has the President seen it?
MR. BERGER: I think the President is aware of it.
I don't know whether he's seen it. What was the other part?
Q When Richardson was in India.
MR. BERGER: Well, you know, one never knows who
knows what in a government such as the government of India with
respect to a matter like this.
Q What does that mean?
MR. BERGER: Well, did the people who -- the bottom
line is that he certainly was not told they were going to test.
Q Was he told --
Q Did he ask?
MR. BERGER: Excuse me?
Q Did he raise the issue?
MR. BERGER: I think this issue was raised by him,
as it has been raised by every American representative in almost
every conversation with the Indians
Q Did they deliberately mislead him to believe
that such a test wasn't going to take place?
MR. BERGER: Well, they were not forthright about
it. The reason I'm not accepting your characterization is that,
first of all, I don't know who Ambassador Richardson talked to,
whether they were people who should have been in a position to
know. I think there are probably people in the Indian government
themselves who were not aware that this was taking place.
Collectively, obviously, the government of India was not
forthright with Ambassador Richardson.
Q Richardson was told, though, that there
wouldn't be another series of tests; is that correct? He was
told no.
MR. BERGER: I don't know the answer to that.
MR. STEINBERG: He was told that they were
conducting a strategic review.
MR. BERGER: That's right. He was told no decisions
would be made until they were essentially done with this defense
policy review. And I think we were led to believe that that was
not within days or weeks of being completed.
Q Sandy, aside from Pickering's suspicions that
there might be more tests --
MR. BERGER: It's not just Pickering, but Pickering
spoke to the Indians.
Q Okay. Aside from the fact that they were not
willing to say, no, we're not going to test anymore, did the
intelligence community see signs that another test was coming as
quickly as it was?
MR. BERGER: Until we have all of the facts from the
review that Director Tenet is undertaking, I think, particularly
since I'm halfway around the world or a third of the way around
the world, I'm not going to comment on what information they had
or didn't have. I think George's intent is to do that quickly
and expeditiously and report very soon on that.
Q Was the President informed, Sandy, that more
tests were imminent?
MR. BERGER: No, we had no specific information.
Q On sanctions, can you tell us what the
practical effect is on our relationship with India? How much
money, do we have arms deals that are now going to be suspended,
is there a dollar bill figure on how much this impacts?
MR. BERGER: I happen to have an answer to that
question if I can find it. Scope of Indian sanctions:
determination of bilateral assistance except humanitarian items,
$51.3 million of AID development assistance for FY '98; $91
million PL-480, FY98; 2) termination of military sales and
financing -- that's FMS and IMET -- $775,000; 3) termination of
licenses for munitions list items, $476 million worth of those
items -- that's whatever is on the munitions list, and it's not
just computers -- those were approved since 1994; $41 million
more approved in calendar year '97; $35 million pending; 4)
termination of credit and guarantees by any U.S. government
agency or instrumentality -- there are $2 million TDA grants
pending, $4 billion in Ex-Im guaranteed spending, $10.2 billion
OPIC insurance and finance pending, and $20 million in
agricultural export credit guarantees pending; 5) opposing
loans/guarantees in international financial institutions -- there
are about $3.8 billion of such loans that are coming up in the
IBRD, IDA -- Asia Development Bank; 6) prohibit U.S bank loans or
credit to the government of India except to purchase food or
agricultural commodities -- $1.98 billion is the current loan
exposure; 7) prohibit exports of specific goods and technologies
under the Export Administration Act, not including food,
agricultural commodities, items related to congressional
oversight of intelligence activities, $12 million in pending
license requests.
And then there's a final note here -- note that the
final numbers will depend on legal determinations as to the
precise scope of the sanctions. So I would take those as
estimates.
Q Which companies are hit the hardest?
MR. BERGER: I have no idea.
Q Sandy, has there been contact with China?
Q Sandy, didn't you meet this month with a
delegation of officials from the Indian government yourself?
MR. BERGER: Yes, I met with the foreign minister
last week.
Q Are you suggesting that the foreign minister of
India may not himself have known about this imminent test?
MR. BERGER: Foreign Secretary, excuse me. I
certainly raised this issue with him, and there was no indication
of any intention to test. I can't tell you what he knew.
Q But you suspected he either --
MR. BERGER: I don't want to --
Q -- didn't know or deliberately misled you.
MR. BERGER: I don't want to speculate. I raised
this issue with him as we do routinely in our contacts with
India. One of the fundamental concerns we have is the arms race
between India and Pakistan and the cycle of action/reaction --
both with respect to nuclear programs and with respect to
missiles. So we have raised this continually with the Indians,
both in terms of the manifestations of this tension and also the
cause of the tension: why we were very pleased to see a dialogue
begin between the Indian and Pakistan government several months
ago. So this is something we always raise, and I did. And the
answer was general and kind of standard fare.
Q Sandy, was there contact with China?
Q Sandy, regardless of how you characterize this,
what does it to you that this country, India, is willing to
mislead the U.S. administration? What does that say to you about
their intentions?
MR. BERGER: I think it was a fairly expensive
decision for them.
Q Sandy, have we had any contacts with the
government of China over this? And if so, what was their
reaction?
MR. BERGER: My understanding is that Secretary
Albright was in the process of having a conversation with Chinese
officials. I have not spoken to her since then.
Q Is India still a likely candidate to be part of
the Security Council, the new Security Council? And isn't that
process of reform now a little bit more complicated?
MR. BERGER: Well, Security Council reform I think
goes way beyond India. We have indicated we'd like to see an
expansion of the Security Council, we'd like to see Germany and
Japan come on as permanent members, plus three others to be
chosen on a regional basis. And we still believe that.
Q Sandy, I have a question about the credit
guarantees? Could you just clarify a little bit --
MR. BERGER: Probably not.
Q All right, I'll try. Does that have to do with
loans and guarantees to just the Indian government, or is that
Indian companies or U.S. companies doing business with Indian
companies, or U.S. companies doing business --
MR. BERGER: Do we know that, whether these
guarantees are -- whether they're to the government or to -- I
don't know the answer.
Q It says "any," sounds pretty broad.
Q And on that same subject, Indian sovereign debt
trading -- is that included, too?
MR. BERGER: I'm sorry. I don't have -- there was a
briefing I believe back in Washington on some of the details of
this. I'm not -- obviously having been with the President all
day -- in a position to answer all those questions. We certainly
can get answers to all those questions.
Q Sandy, did the President talk about the
sanctions with Chancellor Kohl? And did he ask Chancellor Kohl
to impose similar sanctions? Will he be doing the same kind of
thing in his bilateral meetings with Mr. Chirac and Yeltsin at
the wider G-8 meeting?
MR. BERGER: There was a discussion of this with
Chancellor Kohl. And I think the President hopes that other
countries will both make their views known in very clear and
unequivocal terms and also take tangible steps to manifest those
so that the consequence of this is significant as a deterrent to
other countries engaging in this kind of activity.
Q Didn't Kohl snub you when he said that he was
looking at sanctions and that he didn't want to raise tensions?
MR. BERGER: Well, this has only happened today,
okay. So it may not have been a full, complete discussion within
the German government. I would not take what Chancellor Kohl
said as the final word on this.
Q Sandy, would the President have acted as
quickly as he did if it were not required by the law that he go
ahead with this? And are there further steps that are being
contemplated that might be more punitive on the Indian
government?
MR. BERGER: The answer to your first question I
believe is yes, he had an option to try to push this down the
road, which he quickly rejected. There are -- I mean, this is a
fairly substantial and powerful set of sanctions. I'm not aware
of anything in American sanctions laws that is comparable to
this. And let's see how this plays out before we talk about
further steps.
Thank you.
END 9:02 P.M. (L)
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