Facing the Nuclear Facts In India and Pakistan
It's Time to Refine a Simple-Minded U.S.Policy
By Richard N. Haass and Gideon Rose
Sunday, January 5 1997; Page C02
The Washington Post
Of all the parts of the world where U.S. policy is held hostage by a single-issue constituency, South Asia is one of the worst.
For more than a decade, the American government's approach to India and Pakistan has been dominated by attempts to keep both countries from developing nuclear weapons. Even before the Soviet Union collapsed, nuclear nonproliferation became the top U.S. priority in South Asia, fixed there by binding legislation which subordinated other aspects of both relationships.
Despite U.S. efforts, however, both India and Pakistan now have nuclear weapons or the ability to quickly assemble them. Neither shows any signs of changing course. Such behavior has triggered U.S. sanctions, which in turn have further constricted our relations.
This makes little sense. U.S. interests today require the expansion of economic, military and political ties with both countries. It is long past time to end the relative U.S. neglect of two nations which represent a fifth of humanity. The work is difficult, but the payoff would be significant.
The rationale for engagement is different in each case. Pakistan's political system is in dire shape; the country has the potential to become a failed state. That would be a humanitarian nightmare -- and a threat to regional and even global peace. The United States needs to try to head off such a tragic outcome. Congress's sanctions currently make this impossible.
India, on the other hand, has the potential to become a full-fledged major power. It is a democracy whose economic ties with the United States show great promise and whose strength can help promote stability across Asia. We should explore the formation of a real strategic partnership.
The United States needs to adapt its policies to existing circumstances. Congress and the Clinton administration must recognize that India and Pakistan, like Israel, occupy a special category in the world. Neither is one of the five states permitted to have nuclear weapons by the international community. Nor are they rogues. Rather, they are responsible states with undeclared, and to a large extent unproven, nuclear weapons capabilities. The theology of nuclear nonproliferation may be universal, but policy in its application must be discriminating. Engaging them is not a "reward" for their nuclear behavior so much as a recognition that the U.S. has a range of interests to promote.
It may be regrettable that India and Pakistan are now in a position to deploy and use nuclear weapons in a crisis, but it is important to appreciate that both countries have exercised restraint. India's decision not to follow its 1974 test with more tests is unique in the nuclear era, and Pakistan's apparent unilateral freeze on the production of weapons-grade uranium is no less remarkable. Moreover, it is even possible that their mutual nuclear capabilities have contributed to stability in the region. U.S. policy should thus be directed at building upon existing nuclear caution, transforming it into a set of understandings that can deepen over time.
This means that the United States should stop pressing for the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs to be rolled back completely, an outcome which is simply not in the cards for the foreseeable future. Instead, the United States should try to head off the worst-case scenario, one likely to emerge unless current trends are halted: the overt deployment of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by both countries and an active arms race between them. The United States should also discourage both India and Pakistan from exporting nuclear weapon-related material, technology or expertise. A nuclear South Asia is one thing; South Asians helping others less responsible to gain nuclear weapons is quite another.
In striving for these goals, the United States should not simply threaten penalties. It should also lead the international community in offering real incentives. Congress, in particular, will need to alter its approach. Unconditional sanctions that curtail assistance and that cannot be adjusted by the president deny policymakers the abili ty to execute complex policies that promote U.S. interests.
What would the new strategy of "dual engagement" involve? Regarding India, the United States should adopt a declaratory policy that acknowledges India's growing power and importance and arranges regular reciprocal visits of senior officials. The U.S. government should also loosen its constraints on the transfer of dual-use technologies, increase military cooperation, aid India's civilian nuclear power program and undertake limited conventional arms sales that do not enhance India's nuclear weapons capability. The United States should also support India's entry into the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and possibly other global institutions such as a substantially expanded G-7.
At the same time, the United States needs to restore close working relations with Pakistan. This should include extending credits for trade and investment; helping forgive or reduce debt; and providing aid to support social welfare, economic modernization, privatization, and the reform of tax, electoral and development mechanisms -- all of which will promote Pakistan's political and economic stability.
The United States should also maintain its channels of communication to the Pakistani military, both assisting it with training and encouraging it to support the development of a more firmly rooted democratic political system. International Military Education and Training would help keep Pakistan's armed forces professional and linked to the West. The United States should also resume limited conventional arms sales to Pakistan that do not contribute to Pakistan's nuclear weapons programs or alter the fundamental military balance in the region.
Some of these measures should go forward unconditionally, since they promote U.S. interests. In certain areas, however, the desire and ability of the United States to expand relations will depend on Indian and Pakistani behavior. India's recent decision to impede progress on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as well Pakistan's continuing work (with Chinese help) on a plant to manufacture ballistic missiles, are demonstrably unhelpful. Moreover, destabilizing moves by either country would almost certainly restrict the possibilities for cooperation and might even result in the reintroduction of selective, preferably multinational, sanctions. Any such decision, however, should be made by the executive branch, after consultation with Congress and other governments and only if sanctions make sense in light of the full range of U.S. national security interests.
As for direct Indo-Pakistani relations, it is no exaggeration to describe them as less developed than were U.S.-Soviet relations at the height of the Cold War. The United States should help defuse tensions by encouraging regular contact between the two countries in a wide variety of areas. With regard to Kashmir, one of the region's most bitter and intractable problems, there is no "right" or realistic solution to the conflict in sight. The U.S. government does not have a great deal of leverage on this issue, and the time is not ripe for Washington to launch a major initiative. U.S. interests in both countries are best served at this point by working with other governments on a step-by-step approach towards a series of interim, rather than "final status," objectives.
U.S. interests in South Asia, although not vital, are important and increasing. The end of the Cold War should permit a substantial improvement in relations between Washington and both New Delhi and Islamabad. But seizing this opportunity will require more creative thinking than has been the norm -- and an administration willing to make South Asia a foreign policy priority.
Haass directs foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution; Gideon Rose is a national security policy fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. They are chairman and project director of a council study on U.S. relations with India and Pakistan to be published tomorrow.
© Copyright 1997 The Washington Post Company
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