on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Almost 50 years ago, India took the lead in calling for a ban on nuclear testing. In fact, in this very House, Jawaharlal Nehru, addressing the Lok Sabha on 2 April, 1954 after the first hydrogen bomb test was conducted, called for a "standstill" agreement to halt nuclear testing pending progress towards elimination of nuclear weapons. Since then, we have persisted with our efforts to convince the international community of the need for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which would bring an end to the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and mark the first step on the road to nuclear disarmament. In the Conference on Disarmament, the CTBT negotiations have now been going on for two and a half years. The negotiators have the unambiguous mandate to conclude a CTBT which would contribute effectively to the prevention of proliferation in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security", We have participated actively and constructively in these negotiations and have put forward a number of proposals consistent with the mandate. We have stated clearly that the CTBT must be truly comprehensive and not leave any loopholes that would permit nuclear weapon states to continue refining and developing their nuclear arsenals at their test sites and laboratories. We have underscored the importance of placing the CTBT in a universal disarmament framework, as part of a step-by-step process aimed at achieving complete elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. It is a matter of regret that CTBT, as it has emerged, does not do justice to the mandate. Without being anchored in the nuclear disarmament framework, it will not contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. Our proposals were put forward in a constructive spirit in order to engage in negotiations. These were not presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. What we are seeking is a commitment to engage in negotiations that will lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time frame. Naturally, we have our own idea of what is a reasonable time frame but we are willing to negotiate this with other countries. We realize that such negotiations are not part of the CTBT but we would like the CTBT to act as a catalyst for these negotiations. Without such a commitment reflected in the CTBT, we are convinced that this treaty will be an end in itself rather than a first step on the road to nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, the nuclear weapon states remain unwilling to make any meaningful commitment with regard to eliminating their nuclear arsenals. Our nuclear policy, as expressed in the CTBT negotiations, is intimately linked with our national security concerns. We have never accepted the notion that it can be considered legitimate for some countries to rely on nuclear weapons for their security while denying this right to others. This has been a consistent policy, also reflected in our rejection of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has been shown that knowledge and technology cannot be the monopoly of a handful of countries. In 1974, India carried out a successful peaceful nuclear explosion, demonstrating its nuclear capability. For 22 years, we have exercised a policy of unparalleled restraint and refrained from undertaking additional tests. Yet, as has been stated in this House by previous governments, we continue to maintain our option so that we are able to take all necessary measures to cope with any threat that may be posed to the security of the nation. We cannot allow this option to be restricted in any manner if other countries remain unwilling to accept the obligation of eliminating their nuclear arsenals. We are deeply conscious of the fact that other countries in our region continue their weapon programs, whether openly or in a clandestine manner. On the basis of recent statements and developments, we have been obliged to conclude that the nuclear weapon states have no intention of giving up their nuclear weapons. This makes it inescapable that our national security considerations will be the governing factor in our decision making. Hon'ble members are aware of the plenary statement made by our permanent representative in tile Conference on Disarmament on 20 June on CTBT. We undertook consultations on this issue, cutting across party lines, in order to ensure that the statement reflected a national consensus. in the statement, we announced that India cannot subscribe to the CTBT in its present form, We have also subsequently indicated that we will be constrained not to associate with the international monitoring system being set up to verify the CTBT. We stated that in light of our clear stand on this issue, we are unable to accept any obligations which affect our sovereign right of decision making. Since then, a new draft text of the CTBT has been introduced. Discussions on this are scheduled to resume on 29 July in Geneva. On the face of it, the new text does not attend to the issues that we have been raising, Therefore, we cannot endorse or accept the text in its present form. We will remain engaged in the discussions when these resume on 29 July in order to ensure that our freedom of action is not constrained in any manner. Our approach will remain a responsible approach, but we have to safeguard our national interest. If other countries reach their own consensus, that is their sovereign decision. We would expect that all countries will respect our decision and ensure that the treaty, with which we will not be associated, not impose any obligations on India. These views will be conveyed to the Conference on Disarmament. I have taken this opportunity to keep hon'ble members informed about the government's policy on this issue and I hope that this will enjoy their support. I would like to assure this House that the government sees this as an issue of vital national concern and is fully conscious of its responsibility. We have demonstrated the strength of our conviction and national resolve in the past. We remain confident that we can do so again. |
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