Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

I had addressed this House on the issue of CTBT on 15 July, setting out the government's policy on this issue.  The discussion that followed reflected the national consensus underlying the government's policy.  I am speaking today because of new developments of which hon'ble members are aware - the 45th test conducted by China on 29 July. 

Several countries have issued statements expressing their varied points of view.  Some of the leading ones while regretting or even condemning the Chinese 45th nuclear test have at the same time, noted that after this test, China may join the other nuclear weapon states in observing a moratorium on nuclear explosive testing.  On our part, we are dismayed by the nuclear tests carried out by nuclear weapon states, particularly as CTBT negotiations are in progress. We have always believed that these tests take the world further from the goal of universal nuclear disarmament.  As this House knows, since 1945, the five nuclear weapon states have carried out 2047 tests.  USA and Russia have conducted the largest number - 1032 and 715 respectively.  France has conducted 210 tests while China and UK have conducted 45 tests each.  These tests have contributed to the nuclear arms race and shown that partial steps do not lead to nuclear disarmament. 

India has taken a consistent and principled position on nuclear disarmament.  This is why, since 1954, when Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru called for a ban on nuclear weapon tests. We have urged that the CTBT must be seen as a first step on the road to nuclear disarmament.  The approach taken by India in the CTBT negotiations therefore calls for a genuinely comprehensive CTBT with a view to ending future development of nuclear weapons and placing the CTBT in the framework of a step-by-step process of nuclear disarmament leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework.  Ongoing testing programs, whether at test sites or in laboratories, are clear indications that the nuclear weapon states are not willing to give up their reliance on their nuclear arsenals and consider CTBT merely as a non-proliferation measure. 

Such testing programs inevitably give rise to questions relating to India's national security.  While we have adopted the policy of restraint after demonstrating our capability, we remain fully conscious of the evolving security situation.  We are committed to taking all steps necessary to enable us to cope with any threat that may be posed to the security of India. 

As hon'ble members are aware, I was in Jakarta last week to attend the meetings of the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Post-Ministerial Conference.  There, I also had a number of bilateral meetings with foreign ministers from other countries present.  Some of them, notably US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, Foreign Minister Ikeda of Japan.  Foreign Minister Downer of Australia and Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy - discussed with me CTBT negotiations at Geneva.  I elucidated in clear terms the Indian point of view.  I also highlighted the consistency in our policy as well as the strength of conviction arising out of the national consensus.  During multilateral meetings, this subject also came up.  Many of our concerns were shared by other participants.  These concerns were most clearly voiced by the chairman, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Alatas who appreciated India's principled stand, both about the goal of achieving a nuclear weapon-free world as well as the need to ensure that the CTBT bring an end to vertical proliferation. 

The CTBT negotiations have resumed in Geneva in the Conference on Disarmament day before yesterday on 29 July.  Our stand in the negotiations is appreciated by many countries.  Several non-aligned countries are in favor of strengthening the provisions relating to "scope" as also the references to nuclear disarmament in the draft treaty text.  They show understanding of our position, and in particular, they acknowledge that the present formulation on Entry into Force is without precedent in treaty negotiating practice.  Yet, these countries find it difficult to accept our proposals to modify the draft treaty text because of the rigid position adopted by a small number of countries.  In our statements and in bilateral discussions, we have made it clear that India cannot sign the treaty in its present form.  We have also made it equally clear that India cannot permit any language in the draft treaty text which will impose an obligation on India, directly or indirectly.  If there are attempts to push forward such a text, we will have to oppose such efforts.  We continue to remain engaged in the negotiations in Geneva in order that our national interests are fully safeguarded.