Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

In 1995, India had participated in the adoption by consensus of resolution 50/65 which, inter alia, called on the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable CTBT which would contribute effectively to both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects, so as to enable its signature at the outset of the 51st session of the GA.

The resolution proposed for adoption today in Document A/50/L.78 quotes only selectively from resolution 50/65 and proposes a text identical to the one on which there was no consensus in the body which had been charged with negotiating it. It has been presented as a national text to bypass the lack of consensus on it in the Conference on Disarmament. In addition, diverging from usual practice, the GA is being asked to 'adopt' the text, a function usually that of a Conference of States. The resolution also calls on all States to sign the Treaty - even after it is known that the text is a non-consensual one.

The CTBT requested by resolution 50 / 65 should have been one which would have contributed effectively to nuclear disarmament. We have, during the negotiations, been convinced by the nuclear weapon States that they had no intention of giving up their nuclear weapons. Weak preambular paragraphs have been included to pay lip service to nuclear disarmament and stronger paragraphs which had been introduced by the neutral and non-aligned countries during the negotiations were ignored. India is, in any case, not satisfied with mere preambular references - we have seen the fate of such preambles in other treaties. We had wished and continue to wish for a genuine commitment by the nuclear weapon States to eliminate their nuclear weapons in a reasonable and negotiated finite span of time. Without such a commitment the treaty becomes an unequal treaty which retains the present discriminatory nuclear regime -sanctioning, in effect, the possession of nuclear weapons by some countries for their security and that of their allies, while ignoring the security concerns of other States.

Secondly, the CTBT envisaged by resolution 50/65 should have been one which would have contributed effectively to nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects. The text presented for adoption bans only explosive testing. The reason is clear. Such a prohibition is today considered acceptable by the nuclear weapon States as these states have already completed their programmes of explosive testing. They are well placed to exploit the lessons learnt through their extensive testing programmes, through more sophisticated and non-explosive technologies. During the negotiations treaty language that would have signified an end to the qualitative development and upgradation of nuclear weapons, thus curbing vertical proliferation, was categorically rejected, thereby frustrating another key element of the mandate. It is also our view and indeed our concern, that this partial test ban treaty is not only flawed, but is a dangerous one. As the 1963 PTBT which banned nuclear testing in the atmosphere resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of underground tests, we feel that this Treaty, far from being a ban, will encourage a nuclear weapons technology race, a consequence that a CTBT should have prevented. As this text will not lead to the qualitative capping of the development of nuclear weapons, it cannot be considered an integral and first step of a nuclear disarmament process.

The CTBT requested by the General Assembly should have been one which was multilaterally negotiated and universal -one which would attract adherence by all States by meeting the concerns of all States. Our concerns were ignored. The flawed text which is now proposed for adoption was negotiated in its most critical aspects, by a handful of countries and presented to the majority of the international community on a virtually 'take it or leave it basis'. India could not accept this text in the Conference on Disarmament and cannot agree to it now in the General Assembly.

We also believe that the text fails in the overarching objective set out in the mandate reiterated in GA resolution 50/ 65 - "the enhancement of international peace and security". This is the striving of the entire world community. The text has betrayed this ideal. It has confirmed and perpetuated the existing global insecurity born of a world divided unequally into nuclear haves and have-nots.

Mr. President, General Assembly resolutions are the expression of the will of nations in which multilateral treaties can find their sanction. General Assembly resolutions by definition cannot support violations of international law. The text circulated by the sponsors contains a provision in its article 14 on Entry into Force, which is contrary to the fundamental norms of international law. This provision which makes ratification by India and 43 other countries essential for Entry into Force of this Treaty was introduced after India had clearly stated that it was not in a position to subscribe to this treaty in its present form. Customary international law lays down that no obligations can be imposed on a country without its specific consent. We had indicated that we would withhold our consent to the Treaty text unless our concerns were addressed. We did not want such a provision on Entry into Force to be included in the text and repeatedly urged the Conference on Disarmament to change this article, so as to enable those countries who wanted the Treaty, flawed though it was, to achieve it, if that was indeed their intent, though it would have been without India's signature. We could have prevented, Mr. President, the present sad turn of events in which a text which runs contrary to customary international law has been brought for adoption to the General Assembly of the UNI. Mr. President, I would like to declare on the floor of this august Assembly that India will never sign this unequal Treaty, not now, nor later. As long as this text contains this article, Mr. President, this treaty will never enter into force.

The resolution in document A/50/L.78 is as flawed as the treaty text it proposes for adoption.