Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

This Assembly is well aware of the various initiatives taken by India in its consistent and vigorous striving to achieve global nuclear disarmament which has been a major objective of our foreign policy. India had been the first country which in 1954 called not only for a standstill agreement on all nuclear testing but also for a Convention to ban the use of nuclear weapons and a comprehensive Action Plan to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. These efforts have stemmed from our firm belief that global security can only lie in the total elimination of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction. No country can feel secure as long as thousands of nuclear warheads, capable of mindless destruction of human civilization many times over are retained by a handful of countries and this is sought to be justified by the disingenuous assertion that deterrence provides security for those States, while ignoring the security requirements of other States. We have seen that partial measures which have not been part of an overall step by step process have been notoriously unsuccessful, unless their real purpose was only to strengthen this nuclear hegemony and not in fact to contribute to nuclear disarmament. As long as these weapons of mass destruction remain with their awesome potential and global reach, no man, woman or child can feel safe. India's commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons therefore stems as much from a position of principle as from a clear perception of its own security.

India's policy on the CTBT stems from this fundamental view of global nuclear disarmament, that only the total elimination of nuclear weapons will enhance the security of India, and of all people and of all nations. We have always believed that a CTBT should be a first definitive and irreversible step on the road to nuclear disarmament. The CTBT that we sought was meant to ensure an end to further qualitative development, upgradation or improvement of nuclear weapons and should have signaled a sea change in the perceptions of nuclear weapon States who have sought to retain nuclear weapons for the last half a century. It was this consideration that led India to cosponsor the UNGA resolution in 1993 which announced the start of negotiations on a CTBT in the Conference on Disarmament. It was the same belief which formed the basis of the negotiating mandate in the Conference on Disarmament in which the Conference was asked to "negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, which would contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security". It is important also to recall that while the negotiations on the CTBT were taking place, the Heads of State or Government of Non aligned countries emphasized that the CTBT to be meaningful in the context of a disarmament treaty must be considered an important step in the process leading to the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons within a specific time frame. The Heads of State of Government also supported the total elimination of all nuclear testing without exception and emphasized that any activity relating to further research and development on nuclear arsenals, or their production, would run contrary to the spirit of the CTBT.

The 50th session of UNGA has been called to resume consideration of Agenda Item 65 - the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). We are of the view that the GA should consider the CTBT in its essential perspective, the perspective of nuclear disarmament and progress towards the common objective of a nuclear weapon free world. We are deeply concerned that the resumed session is being asked to consider a text which disguises the ineluctable fact that it is a text on which the negotiating body was unable to reach consensus; was not even forwarded by the Ad hoc Committee on the Nuclear test ban to the Plenary of the Conference on Disarmament. This procedure erodes the standing of the Conference on Disarmament. Treaties are made through voluntary agreements and the legitimate exercise of sovereign choice and not by procedural maneuver and political persuasion.

Mr. President, all the delegations present in this Assembly were not present in the Conference on Disarmament. Those who were present will know and those who were not present need to be aware of the context in which these negotiations took place. In January, 1993, India had called for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament. Later that year India co-sponsored the UN resolution on the CTBT and while participating actively in the negotiations continued to press for the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. Following the call given in Cartagena by the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement and the General Assembly resolution 50/70 P which was supported by 106 countries, the nonaligned and like minded states continued to strive for the establishment of an ad hoc committee in the CD to commence negotiations on a phased program of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time bound framework but these appeals were turned down. While the CTBT negotiations were in progress, the NPT was indefinitely extended whereby the nuclear weapon States contrary to their obligation to give up nuclear weapons sought instead to wrest the right to retain them in perpetuity. Having achieved the indefinite extension of the NPT these countries then argued before the ICJ that not only had the retention of nuclear weapons been legalized by the NPT but -so had their use. Immediately after the Review Conference which as we know failed to agree on a Review particularly on the implementation of article VI of the NPT some nuclear weapon States continued their explosive tests: we had at that time stated that these tests would inevitably affect adversely the negotiations in the CTBT. Clearly the nuclear weapon States have no intention of giving up their dependence on nuclear weapons and nor do they have any intention of letting the CTBT become an impediment in their pursuit of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. These events outside and within the Conference on Disarmament found their immediate reflection in the negotiations: Those who were party to the negotiations will recall the clear refusal by the nuclear weapon States to accept any treaty language which spelt a definite end to the qualitative development of their nuclear weapons. In such circumstances, it was not surprising that the negotiations were skewed and the text which emerged far from being the intended historic step towards a nuclear weapon free world, will only succeed in perpetuating a discriminatory status quo.

India participated constructively but with increasing concern in the CTBT negotiations. Our concerns regarding the direction in which the negotiations were proceeding were expressed in this very Assembly last year when we pointed out and I quote: "We are glad that negotiations are in progress, but we also note that nuclear weap9n States have agreed to a CTBT only after acquiring the know-how to develop and refine their arsenals without the need for tests. In our view, the CTBT must be an integral step in the process of nuclear disarmament. Developing new warheads or refining existing ones after a CTBT is in place, using innovative technologies, would be as contrary to the spirit of the CTBT as the NPT is to the spirit of nonproliferation. The CTBT must contain a binding commitment on the international community, especially the nuclear weapon States, to take further measures within an agreed time-frame towards the creation of a nuclear weapon free world".

In Geneva, we tried through intensive engagement in the negotiations to correct the shortcomings of the evolving text and submitted proposals in writing and verbally. The intention of our proposals was first to place the CTBT firmly in the disarmament context by including in it a commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons within a time bound framework. The disregard with which preambular references have been treated in other disarmament treaties convinced us that such a commitment would be meaningful only if it is contained in the operative part of the CTBT. It was clear to us that though a specific time frame for elimination of nuclear weapons would require detailed consideration, at least a commitment would act as a catalyst for multilateral negotiations for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a reasonable span of time. Such a commitment would also have shown to the international community that the nuclear weapon States were actually committed to this objective and not wedded to retaining these weapons indefinitely.

The second thrust of our approach was to ensure that the CTBT become what it was intended to be - a watershed in the development of nuclear weapons. When India first proposed the standstill agreement in 1954, explosive technology was the only one being employed for nuclear tests. We are all now aware that today it is only one of the technologies available to nuclear weapon States. Technologies relating to sub-critical testing, advanced computer simulation using extensive data from previous explosive testing and weapon related applications of laser ignition can open the way to fourth generation nuclear weapons even without explosive testing. To be relevant today and to achieve its intended purpose the CTBT should have banned not only test explosions but all nuclear tests which could lead to development and upgradation of nuclear weapons.

Mr. President, these were not unreasonable proposals.. They were proposals based on the necessity of making the Treaty truly comprehensive and of ensuring that it led to the elimination of these weapons of mass destruction from our planet, an objective to which an overwhelming majority of nation States is committed. ' Yet, these proposals were disregarded in the negotiations by the nuclear weapon States. There was little or no effort to engage India to address these concerns. Instead a text was produced by the Chairman of the negotiating group, under an artificial deadline, which ignored these concerns and contained only a discriminatory instrument against horizontal proliferation.

Mr. President, our security environment has obliged us to maintain the nuclear option. We have exercised unparalleled restraint with respect to our nuclear option. Countries around us continue their weapon programs either openly or in a clandestine manner. In such an environment, we cannot permit our option to be constrained or eroded in any manner as long as nuclear weapon states remain unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Indian security interests, as those of all states, can be safeguarded only in a world free of nuclear weapons. This is a position which has and shall remain grounded in complete national consensus.

We were disappointed with the result of the negotiations but we were also aware that there were others who wanted to go ahead with such a treaty despite its shortcomings. We could have restrained ourselves from a move to oppose consensus and stepped aside to let the treaty go forward for adoption by those who so desired. But in full knowledge of our decision not to subscribe to the treaty, a provision was included which required India among other countries to sign and ratify the treaty in order for it to come into force. This is perceived by us as an attempt to restrain a voluntary sovereign right and to enforce obligations on India without its consent. Such a provision is unprecedented in multilateral negotiating practice and runs contrary to customary international law, which holds that a treaty does not create obligations for a third state without its consent. Mr. President, India repeatedly urged the CD to modify this position and even proposed an alternative provision along the lines of the Entry into Force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Other proposals which were made were only cosmetic in nature and did not address India's concern. Finally, we were told that any modification would unravel the text. Yet the same text was modified to take into account the concerns of another country. We expected that our sovereign right not to subscribe to the treaty would have been respected as we respect the right of others to subscribe to it. The refusal of a very small group of countries to allow the change in the Entry Into Force article left us with no choice but to express our dissent and to withhold consensus in the CD. We did not seek to block a text from emerging from the CD even though we did not agree with such a text. But we were deliberately thrust into a position in which we were left with no choice but to stop the transmittal of such a text containing as it did a provision contrary to international law, a provision which we continue to view as coercive.