<b>XI LOK SABHA DEBATES<i> Session II, Budget </i> </b> XI LOK SABHA DEBATES Session II, Budget Wednesday, July 31, 1996 / Sravana 9, 1918 (Saka)
Type of Debate: SHORT DURARTION DISCUSSIONS (RULE-193)
Title: Chinese nuclear test and CTBT. (Not concluded)
Text:
MR. CHAIRMAN (SHRI CHITTA BASU): The House shall now take up discussion under rule 193 regarding Chinese nuclear test and CTBT. The hon. Minister of External Affairs is to make a statement on this subject.1600 hours (Mr. Speaker in the Chair)
THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (SHRI I.K. GUJRAL): Mr. Speaker, SirI had addressed this House on the issue of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on the 15th July1996 setting out the Government's policy on this issue. The discussion that followed reflected the national consensus underlying the Government's policy. I am speaking today because of new developments of which hon. Members are aware: the 45th test conducted by China on the 29th July, 1996.
Several countries have issued statements expressing their varied points of view. Some of the leading ones while regretting or even condemning the Chinese 45th nuclear test have, at the same time, noted that after this test, China may join the other nuclear weapon States in observing a moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. On our part, we are dismayed by the nuclear tests carried out by nuclear weapon Statesparticularly as the CTBT negotiations are in progress. We have always believed that these tests take the world further away from the goal of universal nuclear disarmament. As this House knows, since 1945, the five nuclear weapon States have carried out 2047 tests. The USA and Russia have conducted the largest number : 1032 and 715 respectively. France has conducted 210 tests while China and UK have conducted 45 tests each. These tests have contributed to the nuclear arms race and shown that partial steps do not lead to nuclear disarmament.
India has taken a consistent and principled position on nuclear disarmament. This is whysince 1954, when Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru called for a ban on nuclear weapon tests, we have urged that the CTBT must be seen as a first step on the road to nuclear disarmament. The approach taken by India in the CTBT negotiations, therefore, calls for a genuinely comprehensive CTBT with a view to ending future development of nuclear weapons and placing the CTBT in the framework of a step-by-step process of nuclear disarmament leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. On-going testing programmes whether at test sites or in laboratoriesare clear indications that the nuclear weapon States are not willing to give up their reliance on their nuclear arsenals and consider the CTBT merely as a non-proliferation measure.
Such testing programmes inevitably give rise to questions relating to India's national security. While we have adopted a policy of restraint after demonstrating our capability, we remain fully conscious of the evolvintg secutiry situation. We are committed to taking all steps necessary to enable us to cope with any threat that may be posed to the security of India.
As hon. Members are aware, I was in Jakarta last week to attend the meetings of the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Post-Ministerial Conference. ThereI also had a number of bilateral meetings with Foreign Ministers from other countries present. Some of them, notablythe US Secretary of State Warren Christopherthe Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, Foreign Minister Ideka of Japan, Foreign Minister Downer of Australia and the Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy discussed with me the CTBT negotiations at Geneva. I elucidated in clear terms the Indian point of view. I also highlighted the consistency in our policy as well as the strength of conviction arising out of the national consensus. During multilateral meetings, this subject also came up. Many of our concerns were shared by other participants. These concerns were most clearly voiced by the Chairman, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Alatas who appreciated India's principled stand about the goal of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world as well as the need to ensure that the CTBT brings an end to vertical proliferation.
The CTBT negotiations have resumed in Geneva in the Conference on Disarmament day before yesterday, that is on the 29th July, 1996.
Our stand in the negotiations is appreciated by many countries. Several non-aligned countries are in favour of strengthening the provisions relating to "scope" as also the references to nuclear disarmament in the draft Treaty text. They show understanding of our position, and, in particular, they acknowledge that the present formulation on Entry into Force is without precedent in treaty negotiating practice. Yetthese countries find it difficult to accept our proposals to modify the draft treaty text because of the rigid position adopted by a small number of countries. In our statements and in bilateral discussions, we have made it clear that India cannot sign the Treaty in its present form. We have also made it equally clear that India cannot permit any language in the draft treaty text which will impose an obligation on Indiadirectly or indirectly. If there are attempts to push forward such a text, we will have to oppose such efforts. We continue to remain engaged in the negotiations in Geneva in order that our national interests are fully safeguarded.
(ends)
SHRI SAT MAHAJAN (KANGRA): Sir, I have a point of clarification here. The photographs of Shri Gujral and of the Chinese Foreign Minister have appeared. They have been in deep consultation. He has not mentioned about that. ... (Interruptions) I would like to know what has happened.
MR. SPEAKER: No, Shri Mahajan, this is not the way.
... (Interruptions)
1607 hours
Firstly, the Indian Plan on the Nuclear Disarmament was put through in the United Nations General Assembly on 9th of June, 1988 in which the Action Plan statedamong other things, that, firstly, there should be a binding commitment by all nations to eliminate nuclear weapons in stages by the year 2010 at the latest. It is now 1996. This was said in 1988.
Secondly, all nuclear-weapon States must participate in the process of nuclear disarmament. All other countries must also be a part of this process early. To demonstrate good faith and to build the required confidencethere must be tangible progress at each stage towards the common goal. We do not see any of these anywhere on the nuclear agenda. Instead we have first the NPT and now the CTBT. There is no mention of disarmament the way we wanted it.
The United States Defence Secretary and the Chairman of the National Security Council have quite clearly stated that we need nuclear weapons for the next 50 years and beyond. Just before the commencement of the Conference of disarmament, France carried out tests in quick succession, China carried out tests in quick succession and we know that recently also China has carried out a test in total disregard to what is going on or the direction in which the CTBT is supposed to take us all. So, there is no evidence to suggest that there is any commitment on disarmament on the part of nuclear weapon countries and we have also come to this conclusion that indeed there is none.
We carried out a test in 1974. In 1968, China had carried out its first test. We should not only look at the total of 45 tests that they have carried out but we should look at the span in which they have been deliberately carrying out tests and they have been carrying out tests in violation and in confrontation with all the norms that the international community has laid down. This is the point that has to be borne in mind. Our neighbourChina is totally uncontrollable in this matter and therefore, not only has our environment nuclearised but it has nuclearised in the hands of a country that takes no notice of international conventions, international directions or whatever talks are going on. They are active participants of these talks and they have carried out the tests just three days back.
What have we done in these 22 years? We have carried out debates. What were the debates about? Was it on our capability? We have already demonstrated those capabilities. Was it on our financial resources, our viability or the desirability of carrying out these tests? A lot of morality is thrown into this and we are unable to look at this problem in the cold light of reasoning. We think that we are occupying the moral high ground. Is having a bomb immoral? When your neighbours have itwhen your neighbours who are uncontrollable have it, is it immoral? Is using it as a deterrence immoral? Yes, its first use is immoral, using as a form of coercion is immoral but this is precisely what the nuclear countries are doing at the moment. CTBT is the form of nuclear coercion that they are doing in the Conference, giving it good names, a respectable place to talk about but basicallyit is a nuclear coercion.
Sir, the only immoral thing is to abdicate our responsibility and the ability to deal with nuclear coercion. The only immoral thing is not to look at our supreme national security interest. We have lost a lot of ground since 1974. This country of ours ranks among the top five nations in technology attainment and with all that, we are being pushed into wilderness of nuclear have-nots. And we have opted this status because of our escapist and ambiguous nuclear policy. This escapist policy, drift and dithering have encouraged the West to apply pressure on us in one form or the other, whether it is NPT or CTBT.
Later on they may give it another name and call it as Missile Control Technology Treaty. But this pressure is mainly because they find us as escapists and dithering.
Sirthe Statement of the Minister of External Affairs reminded me of an iceberg. It definitely showed something but hid a lot. There is another reason why it reminded me of an iceberg. An iceberg has no locomotion of its own. It has no direction of its own. It is totally subject to the currents and cross-currents of the sea and when it reaches warm water it dissolves. It loses its shape. This is exactly what it has reminded us.
In this Conference, which has just ended, we may say that a number of countries were with us. Just now the hon. Minister of External Affairs said that our stand was appreciated by a number of countries but no country worth the name has backed us. We have no friends in this. Nobody is prepared to vote with us. Nobody is prepared to walk two steps with us. The main reason is that some of them do not themselves want the CTBT. The others want us to sign on the dotted line.
Our great friend Russia has said, they would not let us get away from this. Pakistan says"We are in it if India is in it". And, the British Ambassador says, "India is a recalcitrant country wriggling off the hook". Virtually every State is away from us in this. This is a serious thing. We say that we occupy a moral high ground but nobody is with us on this treaty, either they want us to sign or they will be using us to get off the hook themselves by blaming India for destablising this treaty, of taking it off the rail. This is an amazing situation. Appreciation is not good enough in the world of real politics. Where are the people who are with us on this issue?
Basically, the Nuclear Powers want to perpetuate a family of haves and a family of have nots. Basically the CTBT is an effort in nuclear apartheid. Are we going to accept that? The treaty is all very well in its own place but what about our national security? What about the nuclearisation of our environment? In thatwe must look at the capability of a country not its stated intentions. Today, one of our Northern neighbours may say that we are very friendly. They had said it before also and we came to know otherwise. Therefore, we have to go by the capability and the stark truth is that our North has been nuclearised. Our West is fast getting nuclearised and, therefore, we should look at it from the point of view whether we can withstand nuclear coercion, and whether we can give a befitting reply to this nuclear coercion. Only a few days backon a query in Rajya Sabha, the hon.Minister of External Affairs said, "It is not necessary to make the bomb now. Tomorrow, I do not know".
Why is it not necessary now? What parameters will lead us to a decision to make the bomb? Which crises are we waiting for? Has not our environment been nuclearised? Is Pakistan not making a galloping progress? Is China not a nuclear power, and a threat? Every time the Bharatiya Janata Party has asked this questionwe have been told that it is not the right time. What is the definition of this `right time'? No bomb! I specifically want to read here a part of the statement of the hon. Minister of External Affairs of 15th July.
"We continue to maintain our options so that we are able to take all necessary measures to cope with any threat that may be posed to the security of the nation. ... On the basis of recent statements and developments, we have been obliged to conclude that the nuclear weapon States have no intention of giving up their nuclear weapons. This makes it inescapable that our national security considerations will be the governing factor in our decision-making."
But no bomb!
This is one aspect that knocks the bottom out of our security concern statements. What is our security concern? What other security environments are we looking for? What will happen that we take a totally mutually contradictory stand now that we want to keep our optionswe want to look after our security, but no bomb?
This is a national issue, not a party issue. More so, it is a national security issue. It is a national security issue of a very very long range implication. It is not today or tomorrow that we can decide and get on with it. I feel, and we have been talking for a long time, that we should go in for a bomb. I feel that all these problems, all these negative requirements - to say "No NPT", "I would not sign CTBT" - would go if we had a plan, if we had an option, if we had something which we could say we will also do.
Prof. Cohena security sepcialist in South Asia, has just one sentence to say, "No sovereign country is going to compromise its survival for the sake of a treaty". I think, that is quite certain. Our own thinkers have said that for quite some time, but somehow we refuse to gain initiative. We refuse to take initiative and evolve a positive policy that will enable us to have a say in the nuclear matter.
It is reported that our representative in the Conference of Disarmament had said that there was no serious consultation with India. Yet, India is a nuclear threshold State. That is our only power that we have some capability, we have known capability to be able to make a nuclear devicea nuclear weaponand she says there have been no serious consultations with India. This is her own statement. Can we evolve a policy that would cope with the nuclearisation of our security environment?
Can we evolve a policy that will enable us to cross that Laxman rekha from a nuclear-capable State to a nuclear weapon State?
There is another important matter about entry in force. There are a few specific questions on this. Firstly, do we intend to block this Treaty or do we merely intend to stand aside and let others sign it? If we intend to block it - because if we do not, then this has no meaning - how do we propose to do it? It says:
"India should sign it. In three years' timeif it has not signed itthen there will be another Conference how to accelerate the entry in force."
It really means in a fine language how to put dabaav to accelerate our interest? Supposing we do not sign it, and we just stand aside, are we going to allow a smooth passage otherwise? How do we block it from the States' deciding to put India aside, get it ratified by certain countries, send it to U.N. General Assembly, and have it passed by a simple majority? What is our exact policy? We have to have a blue-print, a clear cut blue-print which will see the problem through in the long range. It is quite clear that the nuclear countries are desperate to get India into sign this Treaty. It is also quite clear that this is important to them. I may compliment the External Affairs Minister that his stand in ASEAN and now has been forthright. It has been clear and within the restricted parameters that we had been working. I must compliment him. But these are the questions, on which we, people, are working to circumvent our moves to put us aside, if required, and thereafter make sure that the Treaty gets ratified and then passed in the U.N. General Assembly. How are we going to block it? We have to think long term on this issue.
Just nowthis morning, I find a softening of our attitude.
"A number of ploys are being tried out to push that CTBT, despite India's stand and at some places India's softened stand at CTBT. Doubts on key provisions may delay CTBT. West may bypass India to push through CTBT. Is there any softening of our attitude? Is there any resiling from our original position? Is there any point where we are going backi?
That is the other point, Sir, that we will like a clarification on.
Basicallywe have just had a major statement by the Leader of the Opposition in Bangalore which can form a blue-print of what we are talking about. I will just read out before I conclude:
"India should block the draft from attaining a consensus and prevent it from being forwarded it to the U.N. General Assembly when the draft comes up for considerationon on July 29th in Geneva...
"...Today our national security is threatened as never before. China and Pakistan, which have committed aggression against us, possess nuclear weapons. It is absolutely necessary that India possesses nuclear weapons and India should also be a nuclear weapon power. Nuclear Weapon States want India to remain nuclear naked. India cannot agree to such an international regime -- what he called Apartheid. Draft Treaty was not linked to nuclear disarmament.
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