Paper Questions U.S. `Concern' Over Missile Program
by Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, director of Indian
Defense Studies and Analysis
Delhi DAINIK JAGRAN
29 Dec 94 p 1, 11
[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. Under Secretary of Defense Lynn Davis recently said in Washington that India should give up its nuclear program and should not deploy the surface-to-surface missile `Prithvi', which has been developed from indigenous technology. Here the fact is being ignored that missiles are already deployed in the region and if India is to ensure its defense capabilities, it cannot do it without these missiles.
It is difficult to understand how only India's missiles endanger regional peace while other regional countries have already acquired foreign missiles and related technology. China has deployed hundreds of missiles with nuclear and nonnuclear warheads. It is also going to develop three new class of accurate mobile missiles. These new missiles will be deployed within the next six years. During the eighties, China developed the M-11 and M-9 missiles especially for export purposes. Pakistan has admitted several times that it has acquired surface-to-surface missiles from China.
According to London's reputable Institute of International Strategic Studies, Pakistan had deployed Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 missiles by 1992. Both these missiles have a range of 300 km. It is also developing the Hatf-3 missile, which will have a range of 600 km. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia under an agreement acquired CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China in 1988 which have a range of 2,700 km. It is worth considering that the Missile Technology Control Regime -- MTCR -- had come into force one year before the China-Saudi Arabian agreement. In 1992, Chinese experts modified these missiles. These missiles have been deployed south of Riyadh for the last five years. If these missiles are defensive in nature, they would have been used against the Iraqi missile attacks on Saudi Arabia in 1991. Since they were not used, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that they have a specific attack role. It is worth mentioning that these missiles deployed in Saudi Arabia can target Western India. The supply of these missiles violated the MTCR, but the United States did not take any action in this connection.
Afghanistan acquired hundreds of Scud missiles from the erstwhile Soviet Union which are still present in the vicinity. Iran not only deployed the surface-to-surface missile, but used them against Iraq as well. It also has special ties with China and North Korea in connection with the development of long range missiles. It recently concluded an agreement with North Korea for missiles and related technology worth $500 million. Here again, while talking about the deployment of ballistic missiles, we are not including the American and Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles and the submarine-fired ballistic missiles of the five nuclear powers.
The United States well knows that there is no reliable defense system against ballistic missiles. Even countries like the United States have to spend billions of dollars for the next 10-20 years to deploy such a system. If any country wants to face the threat posed by ballistic missiles, it has to go for a counter-offensive missile system. This is what India is doing; and the United States is targeting it through its discriminatory nonproliferation policies. The United States suggests that India should not deploy the 150-km range `Prithvi' missile lest it begin an arms race in the subcontinent. The United States is differentiating between capability and deployment, the fine details of which need deeper consideration.
Nearly all missiles in South Asia are of a mobile type. If any country is requested to keep possession of its missiles but not deploy them, how can it be verified whether missiles have really been deployed or not? Defense planners of any country only consider the existing capabilities. That is why the United States while negotiating INF had emphasized the inclusion of the Soviet missiles in Asia because they could be redeployed anywhere during a crisis. The difference between deployment and nondeployment can only be described as academic.
There must be some other reasons for the U.S. opposition to the deployment of the `Prithvi' missiles. It is logical to say that after the deployment of `Prithvi', Pakistan would take out M-11 missiles from the crates and fit them on the launchers. This, however, should not be a cause for concern for us because Pakistan could do this any time under any conditions. But then the United States would have to act against China and Pakistan in the light of the MTCR, for which it would have to pay a price. On the other hand, the U.S. goal could be to prevent the development of the medium range `Agni' missile by opposing `Prithvi'. There is a link between the `Prithvi' and the `Agni'. It appears that the `Agni' program is running on a delayed basis or, as some sources in India say, some complications have been experienced. If the United States is successful in preventing the deployment of the `Prithvi', its case for preventing the development of the `Agni' will become strong.
The development of our missile capabilities is aimed at experimenting with nonnuclear weapons -- there are five such types [of weapons] for `Prithvi' alone. It is also clear that without keeping the `Agni' program going, it will be useless to talk about the policy of keeping the nuclear option open. That is why it is imperative that the `Agni' program should also be continued, even if it takes some time. Can we give legitimacy to the U.S. concern without compromising our defense requirements?
In the meantime, it will be wise to deploy the `Prithvi' under the Army's Central Command. India should not be expected to unilaterally give up its defense options against the threat of ballistic missiles. By asking India not to deploy the `Prithvi' and not to develop the `Agni', the United States is displaying a peculiar insensitivity to India's basic defense concerns in this sensitive region.
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