Third Session of the Conference on
Disarmament 1998
Statement by the Federal Government Commissioner for
Disarmament and Arms Control, Ambassador Dr Rüdiger Hartmann
Geneva, July 30, 1998
Mr President,
Allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency
for the Third Session of the Conference on Disarmament in 1998.
Ukraine has not only renounced possession of nuclear weapons but
also completely eliminated large arsenals of nuclear weapons.
Against this background, it is particularly fortunate that you,
Ukraine's representative, will guide the work of the Conference
at the present crucial juncture. You can rest assured that you
have my delegation's full support as you strive to move forward
to substantive work.
I should also like to express my gratitude and appreciation to
your four predecessors this year and to the Special Coordinators
for their untiring efforts. We hope that their endeavors will
result in a work program which can make a meaningful contribution
towards enhancing international security and stability.
I also want to thank Mr Vladimir Petrovsky, the
Secretary-General of this Conference, Mr Abdelkader
Bensmail, his Deputy, and all the Secretariat's staff for their
unfailing effective and professional contribution to the work of
the Conference.
Mr President,
In February 1996, when I had the privilege of addressing this
Conference for the first time, I stressed the need for an early
conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Since then, the
adoption of the CTBT by the UN General Assembly and the signing
of the treaty by an overwhelming majority of states have provided
confirmation of the world community's long-standing desire for
nuclear test explosions to cease once and for all. Regrettably,
these hopes were dashed by the recent nuclear tests by India and
Pakistan. Both countries claim that they acted in pursuit of
their national security interests and did not violate any legal
obligations incumbent upon them. They did, however, act contrary
to the worldwide trend towards the nonproliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, blatantly ignoring the security concerns of
other countries.
At the same time, these developments dramatically underline the
fact that although the Cold War has ended, we cannot consider the
international security situation to have fundamentally improved.
There is rather an urgent need for determined action to maintain
the nonproliferation regime and to make the disarmament success
of the past irreversible, thus providing a solid basis for
further disarmament efforts.
Mr President,
It is clearly evident that progress has been uneven in the field
of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation:
• On the one hand, the effective implementation of
START I ahead of schedule, as well as further significant
reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals agreed upon at
START II and envisaged for future START III
negotiations do open up a positive perspective. In addition, the
unilateral reductions carried out by two other nuclear countries
are encouraging. I should particularly like to welcome the recent
decision by the British Government to further reduce its nuclear
forces. Furthermore, the increasing number of ratifications of
the CTBT are positive signals. I am glad to announce that the
Federal Republic of Germany will submit its ratification
instrument to the UN Secretary-General next month.
• On the other hand, the Russian Federation has yet to
ratify START II, effectively hampering the process of
nuclear disarmament.
• And finally, the nuclear weapons programs announced by
India and Pakistan represent a particularly bleak development,
which seriously undermines both the process of nuclear
disarmament and the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Mr President,
It is imperative that developments with regard to nuclear weapons
continue in the right direction. In line with UN Security Council
Resolution 1172 and numerous other declarations, it is
essential that the following steps be taken:
First, all member states of the NPT should reaffirm in
word and in deed their commitment to this important Treaty and
strongly oppose any attempt to undermine it. This also means that
there can be no recognition – de jure or de facto
– of any new emerging nuclear weapon states. Germany notes
with appreciation Brazil's recent moves to ratify both the NPT
and the CTBT.
Second, India and Pakistan should desist from embarking on
the path of nuclear weaponization. Our experiences in Europe have
shown that in an arms race no one can really win. Part of the
increased stability reached in Europe over the last decade can
rather be ascribed to consistent policies of disarmament and
confidence-building. At present we note with concern developments
in South Asia, which contrast sharply with the political goals
and values we support.
Third, the Governments of India and Pakistan should
reiterate and confirm that they are prepared to introduce strict
export controls on nuclear material and missiles and enact the
relevant legislation and legally-binding administrative
regulations in their countries. This legislation should be in
line with existing export control regimes and its application
should be sufficiently transparent for the international
community.
Fourth, the unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing
declared by India and Pakistan, although a first positive step,
are not sufficient. They must be made irreversible by
legally-binding commitments. We urge both states to sign the CTBT
without preconditions and without delay.
Fifth, negotiations should be started rapidly on a Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). An FMCT would be the next logical
step on the road to the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear
weapons, as set out in the declaration on "Principles and
Objectives" of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.
Such a treaty would make no distinction between nuclear weapon
states and non-nuclear weapon states. It would have to be
universally applicable and constrain all parties equally. Thus it
would constitute a major contribution both to nuclear disarmament
and nuclear nonproliferation. In fact, nuclear disarmament cannot
be made effectively verifiable and irreversible without
addressing the problem of fissile material production and
stockpiles. In this context, we welcome the unilateral steps and
bilateral agreements by nuclear weapon states to stop further
production of fissile material and to apply IAEA safeguards to
excess material.
Germany calls on this Conference to agree to establish during
this session an Ad Hoc Committee based on the Shannon report and
the mandate it contains. We ask India and Pakistan to join such
agreement. We know that there are differences of view on certain
substantive issues. But these differences should not hold up
agreement on setting up an Ad Hoc Group. They should rather be
settled during negotiations. For their duration India and
Pakistan should consider a moratorium on the production of
fissile material.
Sixth, the process of nuclear disarmament must proceed
with the ultimate goal of completely eliminating nuclear weapons,
as set out the "Principles and Objectives" of 1995. The
primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament lies with the
nuclear weapon states, in particular those with the largest
arsenals. In this context, Germany remains convinced that
continuation of the START process is the realistic avenue for
nuclear disarmament, and urges that the next necessary steps are
taken without further delay.
Nevertheless, Mr President, it is our view that the other
members of this Conference should also be able to participate
actively in a substantive discussion on all relevant aspects of
the nuclear issue. A number of useful proposals have been made by
Japan, South Africa, Belgium and Canada which merit further
active consideration. We attach great importance to your
consultations, Mr President, which will hopefully prepare
the ground both for stand-alone cut-off negotiations and for a
mechanism which will allow a full discussion of all other issues
related to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.
At the same time, Germany welcomes the resumption of the work on
negative security assurances and is also advocating the
resumption of work on questions concerning outer space. Future
renewed discussions should reflect on possibilities of
channelling developments in space technology in a way which would
strengthen security and stability in outer space and avoid
destabilizing effects by means of confidence-building measures.
Mr President,
While the nuclear issue is of overriding importance for the CD at
this juncture, some other disarmament topics are of equally great
interest in a Geneva context. Allow me to briefly review them
with you.
Germany is strongly committed to the strengthening of the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention by means of a
verification regime. Preventing these heinous weapons ever being
used is a fundamental aspiration of mankind. Today we can say
that as a result of the endeavours undertaken, especially by the
EU, the Ad Hoc Group negotiations have reached a crucial stage.
The control of biological weapons could be within reach if an
intensification of the negotiations is agreed upon as soon as
possible.
A large number of important and complex issues remain to be
solved. But we are confident that the political will and
imagination necessary to develop an effective BW verification
regime exist. Germany will spare no efforts to contribute to this
objective and will give all her support to bring the negotiations
to a successful conclusion at an early date.
Mr President,
The CD in our view has long failed to adequately address
conventional weapons. One cannot ignore the fact that in recent
years an increasing number of sub-regional and internal conflicts
have taken place. in which small arms and light weapons as well
as anti-personnel landmines have become major tools of violence.
Their indiscriminate use against civilians in particular has been
cause for serious humanitarian concern.
Germany has consistently supported the goal of a complete ban of
APL. At the beginning of the Geneva Conference on
Protocol II of the CCW Convention in April 1996 Germany
unilaterally declared her renunciation of APL. We welcome the
upcoming entry into force of amended Protocol II following
submission of the 20th instrument of ratification.
But the complete ban envisaged by the Ottawa Convention remains
the most comprehensive and credible answer to the humanitarian
problems caused by APL. Germany has submitted its instrument of
ratification to the UN Secretary-General on July 23,
together with France.
The primordial task is now to make acceptance of the Ottawa
Convention or its objectives as universal as possible. We are
aware that a number of states, including some large military
powers and major regional powers with huge APL stockpiles and
significant production capabilities, have decided not to adhere
to the Ottawa Convention immediately. Many of them, however, have
expressed their willingness to contribute to the resolution of
the humanitarian aims of the Ottawa Convention by banning APL
transfers. Germany therefore strongly supports the establishment
of an Ad Hoc Committee on APL by the CD and an early start to
negotiations on a universal ban on APL transfers. We should like
to emphasize here that this agreement will have to be fully
compatible with the Ottawa Convention and that it must not
detract from its objectives.
Mr President,
Small arms and light weapons are the principal tools of violence
in the conflicts of our times; hundreds of thousands of people
are killed or mutilated by them every year. The international
community must respond as a matter of urgency by countering the
threat they pose to international peace and stability. Germany is
grateful for the assistance provided by the
UN Secretary-General to the Panel of Governmental Experts
under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Donowaki. We welcome
and endorse the panel's report and recommendations.
Germany advocates a twin-track approach, providing both for
reactive and preventive measures:
Reactive measures should aim at effectively collecting and
destroying surplus weapons in crisis areas, especially in regions
emerging from conflict. Germany supports the UNDC's work in
aiming to establish adequate guidelines on such practical
disarmament measures by spring 1999.
Preventive measures should in the medium to long term scale down
countries' stockpiles of small arms to a level that corresponds
to their legitimate security interest and, at the same time, dry
up the sources of uncontrolled supplies to crisis areas.
Germany supports the UN expert panel's recommendation of
convening an international conference on the illicit arms trade
"in all its aspects". In this context, regional
incremental approaches could serve as suitable stepping stones in
the direction of an international convention. The CD in our view
should review whether it could be of assistance in bringing about
this objective.
Mr President,
Transparency is another field in which global approaches can
provide an adequate response to global and regional security
concerns. In Europe we experienced during the Cold War that
political fears and tensions were able to grow as long as
military capabilities and activities remained cloaked in
excessive secrecy. The concept of transparency in military
matters developed and put into practice in the seventies and
eighties has largely contributed to making Europe more stable and
secure. Against this background, we advocate the CD's decision to
reestablish the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency and also its
consideration of a Code of Conduct on international arms
transfers.
Mr President,
I would like to conclude by saying that in spite of present
appearances the Conference on Disarmament continues to have an
important role to play in a world-wide context. Much work remains
to be done. Therefore procedural squabbles which hamper the
progress of active work should be overcome and linkages between
unrelated issues avoided. What we need is the political will for
action which will allow the Conference to contribute productively
towards making the world a safer place.
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