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Reducing or Eliminating Nuclear Arms?

Dr. Ruediger Hartmann, Comissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament, Bonn, Germany

Contribution to the International Conference on "Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Enhancing the Tools of the Trade", Washington, 9-10 June 1997 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

Mr. Chairman,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me express my thanks to the organisers of this conference. It is timely, it targets the right problems. I have accepted with pleasure the invitation to participate in today's panel.

The heading to our discussion seems to suggest a dilemma. Indeed, in recent months we witnessed an impressive array of appeals for the total elimination of nuclear weapons: for example the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, the Report of the Canberra Commission, the appeal by over 50 generals. On the other hand, the first number of "The Economist" of this year had a clear imperative on the title page: "Don't ban the bomb" - supported by a host of serious arguments.

But is there really a choice between eliminating and reducing? How should elimination be achieved, if not by way of continued reductions? The argument can only be about gradual versus radical reduction.

The role of nuclear weapons in modern strategic thinking is shrinking. Their numbers are declining. Almost everybody agrees that if we had not inherited huge nuclear arsenals from the Cold War, there would be little sense in building them now. So I see a broad consensus on the need for further continuous reductions - indeed the USA, Great Britain, France and also Russia have substantially reduced their nuclear arsenals in recent years.

There is general agreement on the final goal: total elimination of nuclear weapons. The language of the NPT and the "Principles and Objectives" adopted at the review conference 1995 are explicit. The problem therefore is not the goal but how to approach it and what it involves. Although we cannot assume that with the elimination of nuclear weapons apocalyptic violence will disappear from earth, we may hope that without nuclear weapons the world should be safer.

What we need above all is a clearer anderstanding of the technical, political and financial problems of a world without nuclear weapons.

Let me propose three theses:

1. A world without nuclear weapons does no longer require stocks of fissile materials for explosive purposes. They would present the imminent danger of a relapse into nuclear weapons building. Only the physical non-availability of bomb-grade material can provide some assurance that a new nuclear weapon cannot be assembled in a very short time span. The philosophy of non-proliferation would apply to all states, particularly to today's threshold and Nuclear Weapon States. Weapons-grade-plutonium for which there is no non-military purpose would have to be eliminated or converted. Presently, world inventories of weapons grade plutonium are estimated at roughly 250 metric tons . We are only beginning to tackle the problem of disposing of plutonium from nuclear disarmament. All we know at this moment is that it will require substantial investments and running costs,- and that the campaign will probably take decades.
2. A world without nuclear weapons would have to be a world with a far reaching, intrusive inspection- and verification-regime which would have to be universal. Any loophole could start a new arms race. The controlling agency would have to verify a total ban on nuclear weapons, and the IAEA could become the nucleus. But at the moment, I see little chance of a universal nuclear control regime being accepted. Furthermore, the organisational and financial problems involved would be gigantic. We know how difficult it is to detect a programme for the production of weapons of mass destruction if a government systematically chooses to keep it secret; North Korea and Iraq have taught us a lesson here.
3. Nuclear weapons are, as one eminent thinker once labelled them, "great equalizers". They may offset imbalances in conventional categories or with regard to other weapons of mass destruction. It is obvious that a world without nuclear weapons would have to be a world with a stringent regime on conventional arms as well - perhaps something along the model which we have developed in Europe through the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) with its comprehensive verification and inspection system. Any state facing a potential adversary with a major advantage in conventional power would otherwise feel tempted to resort again to the "great equalizer".

   The Canberra Commission has outlined some very useful practicable steps to undertake. It may be true, as the report says, that the possession of nuclear weapons by some states stimulates other states to acquire them. But I remain sceptical about the reverse of this argument: If states give up their nuclear weapons completely, the stimulus for some rogue state to acquire such weapons would not disappear. In a world without nuclear weapons the main nuclear risk would be the potential of an undetected breakout.

Mr. Chairman,

I conclude that nuclear disarmament will continue to be a long and uncertain process. The disposition of existing weapons stocks and the related stocks of fissile materials for military purposes will take a time which nobody can assess accurately today - not only for political, but also for very simple technical and financial reasons.

What then would be appropriate steps forward?

1. The NPT remains the basis for all nuclear disarmement efforts.
2. We should take the necessary steps to implement the CTBT.
3. A cut-off treaty is the logical follow-up to the CTBT. It remains an absolutely indispensable precondition not only for further nuclear disarmament, but also for meaningful dispositioning of existing stocks of weapons plutonium.
4. We need to get START II ratified and implemented. We also need to follow up resolutely on the perspective of START III as it has been promised at the Helsinki summit.
5. We need a clear commitment of the other three nuclear powers as to when and under what conditions they will participate in nuclear disarmament.
6. Factual, not recognised nuclear weapon states will eventually have to accede to the NPT.
7. The development with regard to nuclear Weapons Free Zones complements efforts about nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmement.
8. Steps are necessary with regard to tactical nuclear weapons. There exist significantly more nuclear warheads for such delivery systems than for strategic ones. Beyond the unilateral declarations of President Bush and Presidents Gorbachev and Yeltsin respectively there is no commitment in this field. Yet in many ways they pose greater risks than strategic nuclear weapons: Psychological and physical barriers against their use are lower, some warheads have already exceeded their designed life span, there is a disquieting margin of error in all available estimates as to quantities and dislocations. Particularly from a European point of view it is clear that more transparency, preferably involving some monitoring or verification elements, is needed.
9. We need a reliable, preferably verifiable data base about what exists in terms of nuclear weapons including tactical nuclear weapons and related materials. The further you reduce them, the bigger in relative terms grows the significance of errors and omissions.

   Exchange of data that are until now classified and systematic building of confidence through more tranparency are important steps. To eliminate nuclear weapons with some confidence, it is essential to know exactly how many of them have been produced, where they are and how many have already been destroyed.

These, Mr. Chairman, are practical steps to reflect about. It seems to me that they could now form the focus of our discussions.

Let me sum up: Elimination is not a concept opposed to reduction. Reduction is rather the only practicable way to approach elimination. It is in my view irrelevant to discuss whether and when we will reach this distant goal. We should devote all our efforts to continued, steady progress in this direction. We have covered an impressive stretch of that way. We know, a long, arduous path still lies ahead. Let us move on, step by step, cautiously avoiding disasters - and not expecting sudden miracles.