ASSEMBLY OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
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Document 1590 |
5 November 1997 |
The state of affairs in disarmament (CFE, nuclear disarmament)
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REPORT (1)
submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee (2)
by Lord Newall, Rapporteur
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Part 4 (5 parts)
IV. Nuclear arms reductions and nuclear disarmament
(i) Introduction
(ii) The START Treaties
(iii) The reasons for Russia's reluctance to ratify the START II Treaty
(iv) The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
(v) Prolongation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(vi) Nuclear arms reduction in Europe
(vii) Are Russia's nuclear forces deteriorating?
IV. Nuclear arms reductions and nuclear disarmament
(i) Introduction
The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and dismantling of the Soviet Union have radically changed the political landscape and, as a corollary, the way in which nuclear armaments are perceived. Now that the massive-scale threat has ceased to exist, nuclear weapons have lost their immediate military function which was based on east-west confrontation. They may not seem appropriate to meet the new challenges of the post-cold war period.
At the same time the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War have directed international attention to the new dangers of proliferation, with nuclear anarchy threatening to replace the nuclear order of the cold war. Major efforts are still under way with a view to reducing nuclear arsenals and preventing further proliferation.
The countries of Latin America, south-west Asia and southern Africa have pledged never to develop or use nuclear weapons. The nuclear powers for their part have considerably reduced their arsenals and demonstrated their commitment to continuing along the road towards disarmament by approving the prolongation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Yet we are far from living in a denuclearised world. Indeed, Russia and the United States are still each keeping more than 3 500 strategic nuclear warheads operational and will hold as many again in strategic reserve. Even if the START II Treaty is ratified, proliferation may continue and tactical nuclear weapons are still excluded from any reduction treaty. Moreover, not only has Russia not reduced, it has even strengthened, the role of nuclear weapons in its defence concept. The world's fifth declared nuclear power, China, remains totally aloof from the disarmament process and is even in the process of modernising and expanding its nuclear arsenal.
Nuclear armaments have always had an important role as a political instrument. During the cold war they were symbolic, within the Alliance, of the absolute guarantee by the United States of security in Europe, while France and the United Kingdom used the possession of nuclear weapons to assert their national sovereignty. Nuclear armaments remain a key component of western security, even if they are considered to be the very last bastion against the resurgence of major conflicts. If Europe wishes to build a European defence identity, the nuclear dimension will necessarily be part of the debate.
Doubts about the significance and ultimate purpose of nuclear armaments are gaining ground among the political classes. The fragility of the nuclear consensus is all the more worrying given that the new strategic role of nuclear weapons remains to be defined.
Thus it may become increasingly difficult to justify nuclear armaments. There is a strong possibility that the five-yearly NPT review conferences and annual meetings of the preparatory committee will turn into a quasi standing tribunal in the focus of media attention at which nuclear countries will have to justify themselves to non-nuclear countries. The Group of 21 and countries like Australia, New Zealand and Sweden, will not tire of calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons and will make skilful use of the various UN fora such as the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to promote this aim. While Russia, China and non-declared nuclear countries such as Israel, Pakistan and India are unlikely to let themselves be swayed by such demands, the role and utilisation of such weapons has become an issue in many western countries for whom a world without nuclear weapons is not a wild fancy. The question of whether such weapons serve a useful purpose is once again very much on the agenda.
(ii) The START Treaties
In the light of these new developments, the United States and Russia realised that their nuclear armaments levels were too high and this prompted them to negotiate agreements on strategic nuclear armaments reductions. The START I and START II Treaties were the result of these negotiations.
The first START Treaty was signed in Moscow on 20 July 1991 by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev after more than six years of negotiations. The Treaty made provision for a reduction in nuclear forces to no more than 1 600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 6 000 treaty-accountable warheads, of which no more than 4 900 may be deployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles by the end of the treaty implementation period on 5 December 2001. It cut back considerably on intercontinental ballistic missiles and their associated launchers and charges, on the launchers for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and their warheads, and on heavy bombers and their weapons systems, including long-range nuclear cruise missiles.
Ratification of the START I Treaty was delayed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and by the Supreme Soviet dissolving itself on 26 December 1991. On 1 October 1992, the US Senate agreed to ratify the Treaty pending final settlement of the provisions for its application by four newly independent republics (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine). Russia ratified the Treaty on 4 November 1992 but held up the exchange of the instruments of ratification until Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan had subscribed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and made arrangements for implementation of the Treaty. For the purposes of the NPT, Russia took over from the USSR as the state with a nuclear weapons holding (Lisbon Protocol, 23 May 1992). The START I Treaty was ratified by Kazakhstan on 2 July 1992, by Belarus on 4 February 1993 and by Ukraine in November 1993. Notwithstanding the complications in implementing the Treaty owing to the economic, technical and political problems involved in repatriating Ukraine's nuclear arsenals to Russia, the Treaty has already resulted in a substantial reduction in the number of strategic weapons. On the occasion of the 15th session of the Russian-American Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), which took place in Geneva in May and June 1997, it was declared that the implementation of the START I Treaty was "ahead of schedule" (11).
The START II Treaty was the subject of "common agreement" at the Bush-Yeltsin summit on 17 June 1992 and provided for a two-thirds reduction of strategic force levels as against those which existed at the beginning of the 1990s. It was signed on 3 January 1993.
Besides the considerable quantitative reductions foreseen by the Treaty, its most important component from the American standpoint was the elimination of all land-based strategic ballistic missiles with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). Under the Treaty, the production and deployment of MIRV missiles would be banned as of 1 January 2008 and all the launchers of such missiles, including those used for training and tests, would have to be destroyed or converted into single-warhead missile launchers.
This complied with an American demand making strategic stability contingent on a concerted reduction of surface-to-surface multiple warhead missiles which it considered to be the most destabilising weapons in the nuclear arsenals.
There are two exceptions to this rule which take account of Russia's particular situation and should facilitate the reconstruction of its strategic potential, the backbone of which is its surface-to-surface MIRV missiles.
First of all, all Minuteman 3 missiles (three warheads) and 105 of the 170 SS-19 missiles (six warheads) may be maintained, provided that they are converted to single-warhead missiles. Furthermore, 20 launchers remain available to both parties in order to put spacecraft into orbit, and the Russians are authorised to convert 90 SS-18 missile silos to house missiles carrying warheads of the SS-25 type. The configuration of the new silos will be such that they cannot be used in the future to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles. Inspections will provide firm guarantees in this respect.
The START II verification procedure, involving a wide range of remote-sensing and on-the-spot observation techniques, will ensure that commitments are complied with. However, almost two years elapsed before the entry into force of the START I Treaty on 5 December 1994, and it was only in 1995 that the START II ratification procedure started. The American Senate ratified the Treaty on 26 January 1996 and ratification by the Duma in Russia is still posing problems (see next chapter).
The signing of the START II Treaty in Moscow on 3 January 1993 was hailed as a decisive breakthrough on the nuclear disarmament front and its entry into force was to be the first step in a process of transforming relations bet-ween the two protagonists of the cold war. Once it had been completed, the security of Russia and the United States would no longer depend on holding gigantic arsenals that had to be regularly modernised but would rather result from a pro-cess of "cooperative denuclearisation", with the ultimate aim of establishing strategic parity at sufficient levels of armaments. However, it has to be admitted that these promises have not been kept and that strategic arms reductions are still a far cry from the aims of the START negotiators.
The dissolution of the USSR and the problems connected with eliminating strategic armaments deployed on the territories of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan have delayed entry into force of the START I Treaty, which in turn means that ratification of the START II Treaty, which was the next step in the procedure, could only enter an active phase at the beginning of 1995.
(iii) The reasons for Russia's reluctance
to ratify the START II Treaty
The START II Treaty has stirred controversy within Russia's political classes and parliament. Many politicians and experts consider that it constitutes a threat to Russian security. For instance, the Director of the geopolitical and military forecasting centre in Moscow, Alexei Arbatov, has pointed out that the START II Treaty means destroying surface-to-surface intercontinental MIRV missiles which are the core of Russian strategic forces, while the United States is authorised to maintain its Trident 2 sea-to-surface ballistic missiles which also constitute a counter-force capability. Given that Russia does not possess sea-to-surface systems equivalent to the Trident and that its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) fleet is more vulnerable than that of the United States to anti-submarine warfare techniques, the dismantling of its surface-to-surface MIRV missiles would deprive it of a counter-force capability.
The second element of the debate concerns the financial consequences of the Treaty. The Russians claim that it is expensive to destroy nuclear warheads and that there is pressure on their financial resources. Moreover they are obliged to restructure their strategic arsenal in order to comply with the obligations of the START II Treaty, and to replace, at an exorbitantly high cost, their SS-18 and SS-19 missiles with single-warhead SS-25 missiles. In order to maintain an armaments level compatible with the final ceilings of START II, Russia would have to produce and deploy nearly 500 new surface missiles at a rate of 80 or 90 a year until 2008. At the moment it deploys about ten a year and is unlikely to exceed this limit. Furthermore the maintenance costs for additional mobile surface-to-surface missiles would be six times higher than those of the surface-to-surface intercontinental missiles that they would be replacing.
Finally, according to the most optimistic forecasts, Russian GDP will grow by 25 to 30% over the next five years and military budgets will hardly exceed the level of 20 billion dollars. Since one third of that sum will have to be spent on improving the situation of Russian army personnel, the amount of money available for converting the strategic arsenal is likely to be insufficient.
Military experts contend that the START II Treaty will not only emasculate Russian strategic forces but that their response capability will also be weakened by the concomitant development of an American anti-missile defence system. Their observation that six of the eleven radar that used to be available to the USSR are now outside Russian territory, while the Krasnoyarsk radar would have to be dismantled, is a point that must be taken on board in any assessment of the balance of power. In the same vein, Admiral Rudolf Golosov has remarked that one cannot ignore the vulnerability of Russian strategic forces to strikes by high-precision conventional weapons such as the Tomahawk cruise missiles that the Americans have already deployed on ships and submarines. Moreover, as the Russians see it, parity must be based on a qualitatively equivalent strategic capability on either side, and on the possibility of responding effectively to an offensive attack by enemy forces.
These difficulties shed uncertainty on the ratification of the START II Treaty, although some people have pointed out that the cost of the operation could be offset by later savings on strategic forces running costs. An unofficial esti-mate of the cost of implementing START I sets the figure at 30 billion roubles, to which must be added a further 7 to 10 billion roubles for START II. However, the cost of maintaining the strategic forces would be brought down from its present level of 20 billion roubles per year to 15 billion, once the agreed reductions had been implemented.
In order to assist Russia with the implementation of the START Treaties, the United States has established a financial programme bearing the same name as the Nunn-Lugar amendment. The prevailing attitude in Russia, however, is one of scepticism, given that the funds are meted out very sparingly and that the main beneficiaries are American consultants and service companies.
Another area of concern for the Russian leadership is the possible American deployment of an antimissile defence system to protect the national territory. Indeed, the Republican opposition has expressed approval for such a pro-ject, and the fact that the date of deployment of the hypothetical NMD (2003) coincides with that of the planned completion of the reductions under START II only aggravates Russian fears of an erosion of their response capability by the end of the disarmament process. Furthermore, while accepting the legitimacy of setting up a system of defence against theatre missiles under the ABM Treaty, the Kremlin authorities are concerned that the performance of high-velocity anti-missile missiles will constitute a threat to their strategic missiles. This explains their insistence upon a clear dividing line between theatre missile defence systems, which would be authorised, and strategic missile defence systems, which would have to comply with the restrictions of the ABM Treaty.
NATO enlargement may also jeopardise ratification of the Treaty. Russia will have to adopt special measures to accommodate the fact that 80% of its strategic potential will be within the range of NATO bombers and that the credibility of its nuclear response capability will be limited by the planned START II reductions.
In conclusion, the Duma has laid down two conditions for ratifying the START II Treaty:
(i) the allocation of sufficient resources for the reconstitution of a credible deterrence within the framework of the Treaty;
(ii) strict compliance with the spirit and letter of the ABM Treaty, which means drawing a clear dividing line between theatre missile defence systems and strategic missile defence systems.
In order to adapt the rate of reductions to Russia's economic circumstances, the deadlines were recently prolonged by five years following an agreement concluded between Russia and the United States on 26 September 1997.
On that date, the United States agreed to push back the effective date of the START II Treaty by five years, thereby clearing the way for negotiating a further reduction of strategic arsenals in the framework of a START III Treaty. The agreement signed with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia allowed the United States to develop missile defence systems not exceeding a speed of 3 km/second under the 1972 ABM Treaty. Such systems include Theatre High Altitude Area Defence Systems.
(iv) The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
On 24 September 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature in New York. This Treaty imposes a total ban on the explosion of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in space, under water and under the ground. It takes over the main provisions of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, prohibiting the carrying out of "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion" and urging each party "to prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control". Each party must furthermore refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in such explosions (Article I). In recognition of the difficulty of such an undertaking, it was further stipulated that should the Treaty not take effect on the third anniversary of its opening for signature, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with whom the Treaty is deposited, would convene a conference at the request of the majority of states already having deposited their ratification instruments, and attended by them, at which it would be decided by consensus which measures could be adopted, in compliance with international law, to speed up the ratification process. This procedure would be repeated each year in the hope of persuading recalcitrant countries to accede to the Treaty. Threshold countries could resist international pressure, as indeed they did when they opposed the NPT. However, a CTBT signed and ratified by a large number of states would be an international reference even before its entry into force. As is the case for other arms control agreements, there is provision for a state wishing to withdraw from its obligations, but only in the event of extraordinary circumstances which jeopardise its supreme interests. The party wishing to withdraw must in that case give advance notice of its intentions and justify its course of action. Russia announced that it would withdraw from the Treaty in order to carry out tests if it had no other means at its disposal of checking the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons. Such interpretations of a country's "supreme" interests could lead to arbitrary decisions outside of international verification procedures.
In order to ensure implementation of the Treaty and organise a framework within which signatory states can consult and cooperate with each other, a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation is to be established in Vienna. It is to be composed of the Conference of Participating States, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat. The Executive Council, which is to play a leading political role in the decision-making process, will be composed of 51 members from six different geographic regions. The Technical Secretariat will consist of a Director General plus the requisite scientific, technical and other staff.
The international monitoring system responsible for checking compliance with the Treaty will include seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasonic equipment. The system will be supported by an International Data Centre attached to the Technical Secretariat. The syn-ergy between these different technologies will make it possible to verify activities below the power of one kilotonne, which is the seismic de-tectability threshold that was adopted.
On-the-spot international verification can be called for with regard to any state carrying out suspicious and non-justified activities. Such a request must be backed up by information collected by the international monitoring system, by any relevant technical information obtained by means of national verification systems in accordance with the generally recognised principles of international law, or by a combination of both.
Ten years after entry into force of the Treaty, a conference of signatories will be convened in order to examine its mode of operation and effectiveness. The Conference of Participating States, the main body of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation, will hold regular annual meetings to review any points, questions or problems within the scope of the Treaty. A preparatory committee comprising representatives of all signatories will be responsible for preparing CTBT implementation and for organising the first session of the Conference of Participating States. It will have international organisation status.
The Treaty, which has unlimited duration, will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of the instrument of ratification of all the states listed in its annex, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature. The annex contains a list of 44 states which participated in the Conference on Disarmament on 18 June 1996 and in the preparatory work for the 1996 session, and which possess nuclear power stations or research centres. The "threshold" states are included in the list because they match the stated criteria.
On 10 September 1996, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the CTBT as negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament and instructed the UN Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for governments to sign the Treaty. The decision was adopted by 158 votes for, 3 against (India, Bhutan and Libya) and 5 abstentions (Cuba, Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria and Tanzania). Nineteen delegations from UN member countries were absent or not authorised to vote due to late payment of their dues to the Organisation. To date, 146 countries have signed the Treaty. The ratification process has started, but none of the five superpowers has ratified it yet.
India has announced that it does not subscribe to the planned Treaty and will not participate in the envisaged monitoring system. It does not consider the Treaty to be a step towards universal nuclear disarmament. Moreover, it considers that the terms of the Treaty are unacceptable in that they impinge on its sovereign right to decide, in light of its national interests, whether or not to accede to it. Pakistan approved the Resolution but specified that it would only sign the Treaty if India did likewise. The procedure which was followed, unprecedented in the history of the Conference on Disarmament, will certainly have an impact on the future of the Conference.
The international community's main concerns about nuclear tests relate to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the race for a qualitative improvement of nuclear arsenals and radioactive contamination of man's environment.
These days it is possible, with no prior testing, for any state with its own technology base or with sufficient financial resources to acquire the technology to manufacture relatively simple atomic fission systems. However, by imposing a test ban on all signatories, the CTBT may strengthen the NTP, since it rectifies a major imbalance between the rights and obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear states. This balance cannot be appreciated until all threshold countries have officially acceded to the CTBT.
Testing is necessary not only to modernise the first two generations of nuclear weapons, but also to develop "third generation" nuclear weapons, which aim for a new degree of perfection in the nuclear fission and fusion techniques used, with a view to providing such weapons with special effects.
Thus an end to nuclear tests will be beneficial in terms of arms control in that it will prevent any substantial qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons. A test ban will also make it highly unlikely that completely new and unforeseen phenomena will arise in the nuclear weapons field.
On 15 May, then on 17 August 1995, China performed two underground nuclear tests, its 42nd and 43rd since 1964, on the Lop Nor site in Xinjiang province. These tests were condemned by the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia as well as by Australia, Japan and South Korea. China has now developed a new intercontinental ballistic missile, the Dongfeng 31, with an estimated range of 8 000 km, which means that it is capable for the first time of reaching Europe and the east coast of the United States. France carried out six nuclear tests from 5 September 1995 onwards in Mururoa, in order to check the security of its deterrent force. The third explosion, detonated on 28 October, had a force equivalent to 110 000 tonnes of TNT. The French tests were criticised by New Zealand, Australia, the Pacific states, Japan, Russia and the United States.
(v) Prolongation of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
The representatives of the 175 signatories of the NPT, which was signed in 1968, met from 17 April to 12 May 1995 in order to review and prolong the Treaty. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom) unanimously adopted Resolution 984 providing for assistance to non-nuclear states which might be victims of a nuclear attack. The United States and the United Kingdom announced that they would stop the production of plutonium and of uranium enriched for military purposes. The decision to prolong the Treaty indefinitely was taken on 11 May by 175 of the 178 signatories of the NPT. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kiribati and Taiwan were absent from the Conference. Three documents were adopted. The first imposed additional obligations on member states, including nuclear disarmament, and called on all parties to put an end to nuclear tests once and for all in 1996. The second established a disarmament monitoring procedure. The third, at the initiative of 14 Arab states, called for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East and the accession "without exception" of all states of the Middle East to the NPT. In order to obtain an unlimited prolongation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the nuclear powers agreed to several obligations. Inter alia they specified - and to a large extent harmonised - their "negative security guarantees" and pledged to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against those countries which did not possess such weapons. Strong pressure is currently being brought to bear in the framework of the Geneva disarmament negotiations to move from these unilateral commitments to the stage of a more legally binding multilateral agreement.
(vi) Nuclear arms reduction in Europe
By comparison with the cold-war situation, the numbers of nuclear weapons in Europe have been substantially reduced. Russia has withdrawn from the European theatre all the tactical nuclear weapons belonging to the former Soviet Union, and the United States now only has 150 B-61 nuclear gravity bombs left in Europe. The United Kingdom is in the process of dismantling its WE-177 bombs, while France has decided to scrap all its ground-to-ground nuclear systems.
The new geopolitical realities in Europe have considerably reduced the likelihood of a conflict involving nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.
Atlantic Alliance members have adapted their defence arrangements to the new reality. Nuclear forces have been scaled down and restructured from a conceptual and operational point of view. The doctrinal differences of the cold war have practically disappeared and the three Alliance nuclear powers are in agreement over the broad thrust of nuclear deterrence. The United States, the United Kingdom and France regard nuclear weapons more than ever as political instruments within the framework of deterrence based on a smaller arsenal. Their functions are limited to counterbalancing nuclear arsenals elsewhere in the world and offering a supplementary option to dissuade possible proliferants from using NBC weapons. To compensate for any inadequacies in nuclear deterrence in the face of rudimentary NBC arsenals, the three powers are seeking ways of conventionalising the lower stages of deterrence by deploying high-precision conventional weapons with high-powered explosive charges which are capable of producing satisfactory results, without the undesirable effects of their nuclear counterparts.
Despite the reductions, the West's deterrence system has survived the end of the cold war. NATO's collective potential still consists of American and British nuclear weapons. The United States still maintains 150 sub-strategic weapons in western Europe. These symbolise the Allies' nuclear solidarity and maintain the strategic coupling between Europe and the United States. The United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece and Turkey have the installations and infrastructure to accommodate American nuclear weapons.
The United Kingdom has now abandoned its WE-177 nuclear bombs. It intends to rely solely on submarine-launched ballistic missiles and thus will be the only nuclear power whose deterrent force is made up of a single component. The British Navy is in the process of modernising its fleet of submarines by acquiring four "Vanguard" class vessels. The submarines are equipped with Trident missiles whose accuracy, range and flexibility are far superior to those of their Polaris predecessors. Because of these characteristics, Trident can be used for both substrategic and strategic missions. The number of nuclear warheads on board each submarine will be reduced from 128 to a maximum of 96.
France has also abandoned the Hades missile and medium-range ground-to-ground missiles. Its deterrent force will in future be based solely on submarine and air components. Under the nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine programme, France is to commission four "Triomphant" class submarines, with the first coming into service around 2005. Each submarine will be equipped with 16 M-45 missiles carrying 6 nuclear TN-75 warheads. The M-51 missile, fitted with a new nuclear warhead, is to replace the M-45 from 2010. The airborne component consists of three Mirage 2000N squadrons and two Super Etendard Navy flotilla, equipped with medium-range air-to-ground missiles (ASMP). From 2000, these aircraft will be phased out and replaced by Rafales. From 2008, the ASMP-Plus will take over from the ASMP. It will have a range of 100 km at low altitude and 500 km at high altitude (as against 80 and 300 km for the ASMP).
On 26 July 1994, France and the United Kingdom decided that the joint Anglo-French Committee on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine, established provisionally in October 1992, should have permanent status. The Committee, which brings together senior civil servants from the French and British Foreign and Defence ministries, has made a comparison of the two countries' attitudes to the role of deterrence, nuclear doctrines and ideas, anti-missile defence, disarmament and non-proliferation.
In Germany, Alliance nuclear weapons were regarded in the past as essential for protecting national territory but, at the same time, as symbolic both of a threat to the nation's existence in the event of east-west conflict and of its dependence on other powers - contrary to the United Kingdom or France where nuclear weapons were felt, on the whole, to be an instrument of national independence and political power in international relations. The major debate that deployment of "Euro-missiles" aroused in Germany showed that even under Soviet threat, consensus on deterrence could not be taken for granted. When the Berlin Wall fell and Germany was reunited, nuclear weapons became even more difficult to justify in the eyes of many Germans. The security agreement signed between France and Germany in December 1996 represented a step forward: the German Government stated that it was ready to "enter into a dialogue on the function of nuclear deterrence, in the context of the European defence policy" (12). The Franco-German axis was to be the basis of European defence. Germany's participation is therefore essential to it and could bring about that of other European countries. Moreover, the two countries have already established close cooperation in the field of conventional weapons and have, in the Defence Council, an institution where consultation on nuclear matters could take place on a regular basis.
Although the United Kingdom, as a nuclear power, is in quite a different position to Germany, the Anglo-French Committee held the mirror up to what Franco-German dialogue could be. At the start of any consultation, there must be a search for a consensus on the role of nuclear weapons in European security.
(vii) Are Russia's nuclear forces deteriorating?
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia was confronted with the challenge of carving out a place for itself that allowed it to fill the void left by its predecessor and regain its position in the world.
Uncertainty as to the future role of the armed forces in a Russia no longer involved in global confrontation with a strategic adversary, combined with a substantial reduction in the defence budget, brought about a decline in the political and social status of the army, which could only lead to tension and discontent among the military. Material considerations are also tending to make the situation worse. Low wages or delays in their payment, the lack of decent housing for officers' families returning home from abroad, particularly from Germany, notwithstanding the fact that that country financed the building of thousands of homes in Russia, were circumstances that were exploited by a variety of political forces seeking to take advantage of anger and disappointment felt within the army.
Some of the military have taken advantage of the situation to increase their influence in the political domain. Such was the case in Moldova where General Lebed, who had command of the Russian army units there, conducted policies of his own in defiance of the Government. It was also the case in Georgia, where Russian soldiers set themselves up as the defenders of Russia's geostrategic interests.
Although it would seem that Russia's proposals directed towards encouraging convergence between its own and European and Atlantic security and defence structures, and improving the quality of its involvement in the decision-making processes are having some success, there is still a possibility that Russia will come to feel increasingly isolated, which cannot be in anyone's interest.
The fear of isolation and of being sidelined by European institutions, an abiding distrust of NATO and dissatisfaction with the latter's enlargement into central Europe, together with a desire for greater recognition by the West, explains Russia's reluctance to dismantle its nuclear arsenal.
After lengthy discussions, NATO and Russia have finally reached agreement on setting up enhanced cooperation within the framework of the Founding Act signed in Paris on 27 May 1997. The fact that Kremlin leaders have just approved a massive security plan setting out Russia's role in the 21st century is greatly to be welcomed. This represents a new military doctrine purporting that the major threat for Russia comes not from enemies beyond the country's borders but from social and economic problems within them. The successful involvement of Russian troops in IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia, and the fact they performed well there, therefore proves that the present dilemma is one that can be resolved.
Notwithstanding these positive developments, it should be noted that the Russian armed forces are still deeply demoralised. The Chairman of the Defence Council, Mr Yuri Baturin, complaining of inadequate funding, has stated that: "if things continue as they are now for another two years, we are likely to end up with a navy without ships, an airforce without aircraft and a defence industry incapable of producing up-to-date weapons", while the former Defence Minister, Igor Rodionov, has warned against the risk of headquarters losing command of their armies: "Russia could soon reach a threshold beyond which its nuclear missiles and systems will be out of control".
The Chairman of the State Duma's Defence Committee, Lev Rokhlin, who as a General commanded Russian troops in Chechnya during the recent conflict, has warned President Yeltsin that Russia's nuclear forces are heading towards "extinction" because of lack of funds and maintenance. He stated that there was no money for the work to extend the life of the missiles that are on combat duty and have exhausted their guaranteed term of service, and the necessary funds were not being allocated for work on new types of weapons. Western sources have taken these warnings seriously, especially regarding a deter-ioration in vital command and control systems and in readiness and reliability (13).
Indeed, the frustrated and undisciplined Russian military undeniably represent a threat not only to their own government and their fellow countrymen, but are also a latent danger for neighbouring states and, in view of the presence of strategic weapons, a nightmare for the whole world.
The situation poses serious problems in terms of troop morale and desperation in the national defence industry, leading to a rise in crime and illegal trade, including widespread and potentially dangerous trafficking in armaments, not to mention nuclear components, which could complicate military reform and nuclear non-proliferation.
It is impossible to ascertain how many weapons are in circulation in the civilian sphere and whether they include tactical nuclear weapons. It is claimed that Russia still has some 10 000 such weapons in its possession (14). The former General, Alexander Lebed, accused the government of concealing the truth over the disappearance of more than 80 nuclear "mini weapons" which according to him had been unaccounted for since they were left behind in a number of former Soviet Republics (15). Experts have confirmed the existence of such "mini nukes", which are similar to the United States' nuclear demolition munitions, all of which were destroyed in 1991. Thefts of material used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, such as plutonium or enriched uranium, have already been noted.
The Russian Government has repeatedly declared that it is in full control of its nuclear arsenal and this assertion has been confirmed by United States security experts. It should, however, be noted that the export of military nuclear know-how through the emigration of nuclear experts from the territory of the former Soviet Union is a long-term risk.
The potential consequences of the existence of large quantities of nuclear waste and disused nuclear submarines have also begun to arouse major concern. The case of the Northern Fleet, analysed in the Bellona report (the Bellona report on the Northern Fleet was the first document to be banned in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union) is an excellent illustration of the problem. According to the report, there are at least 21 067 cubic metres of solid radioactive waste and at least 75 423 cubic metres of radioactive effluent in naval bases, shipyards and storage installations used by the Northern Fleet. More than 24 000 fuel rods and nine reactor cores are stored in temporary deposits. Of over 130 nuclear submarines that Russia has withdrawn from service, 88 belong to the Northern Fleet and 52 of them have been decommissioned, still with their load of nuclear fuel. Most of the installations used by the Northern Fleet are allocated on the Kola peninsula, affecting an area with a population of over 100 000 inhabitants. The largest temporary storage depot of irradiated nuclear fuel is Andreeva Bay, 40 km from the Norwegian border. Here, 21 000 irradiated fuel rods, equivalent to 90 nuclear reactors, are stored in very poor conditions. Serious leaks of radioactivity were detected in the 1980s. To a very large extent, the transport and reprocessing of nuclear waste do not comply with safety regulations and the situation is aggravated by a lack of funds for maintaining existing storage and pro-cessing plants, and for building safer, more modern installations. In 1994, only 35 % of the funds allocated were actually paid over to the Northern Fleet. The amounts received were basically used to pay the salaries of and provide social assistance to Fleet staff. Over the last two years, nothing whatsoever has been done to guarantee the safety of the nuclear waste.
Until 1991, Russia practised Arctic dump-ing of its radioactive naval waste. The one train used for transporting waste to the reprocessing plant at Chelyabinsk called at the ports only three times a year. Full containers of irradiated fuel have been stored in the open for years on end and accidents have occurred. In September 1996, a memorandum of understanding on cooperation on environmental matters was signed between the United States and Russian defence ministers following accidents of this nature.
For more information, please contact: Yves ROBINS, Press Counsellor
ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
43, avenue du President Wilson
F-75775 Paris cedex 16 France
Tel 331-53672200; Fax 331-47204543
E-mail:
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