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REPORT ⁽¹⁾

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee ⁽²⁾

Part 3 (5 parts)

III. The United Nations Disarmament Conference in Geneva

The United Nations Disarmament Conference has been meeting in Geneva since 1979. There are 61 UN member states participating in the negotiations, which are based on the principle of consensus.

At its 1997 session which lasted from 20 January to 10 September, the following issues were on the Conference agenda:

• cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;
• prevention of nuclear war, including all related matter;
• prevention of an arms race in outer space;
• effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
• new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons;
• comprehensive programme of disarmament;
• transparency in armaments;
• consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate for submission to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Conference's report to the UN General Assembly mentions that throughout the session, intensive consultations were conducted with a view to reaching consensus on the programme of work. It then declares that it was not possible to establish any negotiating mechanism on any of the substantive items on the agenda. A large number of states which were not members of the Conference were invited to participate in its work. Since 1982, 20 states have applied for membership of the Conference. Given that the present consensus rule may increasingly cause problems with expanded membership, special coordinators have also been appointed to look into the question of the expansion of membership and the improved and effective running of the Conference.

A number of delegations submitted a proposal for a mandate for an ad hoc committee to start negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe and envisaged the creation of working groups to negotiate: (a) as a first step, a universal and legally-binding multilateral agreement committing all states to the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons; (b) an agreement on further steps required in a phased programme with timeframes leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons; and (c) a convention on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices taking into account the report of the special coordinator on these items and the views relating to the scope of the Treaty. The Conference did not reach the consensus required for a decision on this subject.

The Conference on Disarmament appoint-ed a special coordinator to conduct consultations about a possible mandate on the issue of anti-personnel landmines. In an initiative to force a breakthrough in the deadlock in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, a conference held in Oslo in September 1997 and attended by delegates from 106 countries, prepared the text of a treaty on the total ban, use, production, storage and transfer of anti-personnel mines, to be adopted in Ottawa in December 1997. The so-called "Ottawa Process" was initiated by Canada in order to exert pressure on the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to make some pro-gress on this subject. Russia and China, which are among the main manufacturers and exporters of anti-personnel mines did not participate. President Yeltsin declared on 10 October 1997, however, that Russia supported the objective of a ban on anti-personnel mines and that it wanted to see the signature of such a treaty.

The United States took part in the conference but did not agree with the final draft text because it did not obtain satisfaction on three conditions it had set. Its first condition was that anti-personnel mines at the border between the two Koreas would not have to be removed for another nine years. It further demanded a waiver on the use of anti-personnel mines connected with anti-tank mines and a clause to the effect that in the event of aggression, a country would be able to withdraw from the treaty after six months. It also wants self-destructive "smart mines" to be excluded from the negotiations.

A NATO-sponsored workshop in Moscow in July 1977 on "advanced research and tech-nologies for detection and destruction of buried/ hidden anti-personnel landmines" brought toge-ther an international group of experts in order to initiate collaborative research efforts. At this conference, it was stated that multi-sensor systems currently in use have proved inadequate under some conditions, especially in steep and hilly regions, areas with dense, resistant vege-tation, and regions affording natural and artificial camouflage. In addition, it was noted that the de-gree of metallic content in targets varies, creating difficulties in sharing meaningful data concerning the effectiveness of mine detectors, and efforts to set international testing and operating standards for mine detectors have been stymied by differing national standards.

A proposal was made to re-establish the ad hoc committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, but the Conference did not reach consensus on this issue.

It will not be easy to start negotiations on this subject in the Conference on Disarmament. A number of developing countries are demanding a direct link between such negotiations and a binding obligation on the nuclear states to destroy all their nuclear weapons. The nuclear states are not willing to meet that requirement. On the other hand, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States have already declared a moratorium on the production of fissile materials. On 23 September, Russia and the United States concluded an agreement under which the United States would provide money and assistance to convert Russia's most recent plutonium production sites into uranium production sites before the year 2000. They also agreed to limit their stockpiles of plutonium. The idea of negotiating the so-called "cut-off" treaty was launched in 1993 as a logical sequel to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In particular, India and Pakistan are now strongly opposed to the start of negotiations - having failed to oppose the start of negotiations on a CTBT, they discovered later on that once the procedure had started, it could not be stopped. It finally led to the adoption of the CTBT by the UN General Assembly and its deposition for ratification.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and/or their Destruction which was signed by 165 states, has now been ratified by almost 100 states and entered into force on 29 April 1997. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is based in The Hague (Netherlands) and became operational on 29 April 1997, is monitoring the implementation of the Convention. Accor-ding to the Convention, chemical weapons are to be eliminated by the year 2007.

The United States Congress ratified the Convention in April 1997. With a stockpile of around 30 000 metric tonnes of unitary chemical weapons agents, the United States is actively involved in large-scale destruction operations. Russia, which has the world's largest officially declared stockpile of 40 000 metric tonnes of chemical weapons agents, ratified the Convention at the beginning of November 1997. In doing so, the Russian Duma also adopted legislation establishing a system for periodic reports to it on the status of the chemical weapons stockpile and financial and environmental issues, as well as on conversion of the chemical facilities to other uses. The main problem which had delayed ratification was the high cost of the chemical demilitarisation programme, for which Russia expects concrete contributions from other states. The total cost of the destruction of Russia's chemical weapons stockpile is estimated at between $3.3 billion and $5 billion ⁽¹⁰⁾. Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States are already involved in programmes for the destruction of Russian chemical weapons. Following ratification, Russia will now be able to participate in the second session of the Conference of States Parties to be held in The Hague on 1-5 December 1997. This international conference will also discuss and decide the future of the che-mical weapons inspection system. Russia's rati-fication is also considered important because it may trigger ratification by other countries. Iran deposited its instruments of ratification just before Russia.

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