ASSEMBLY OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
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Document 1590 |
5 November 1997 |
The state of affairs in disarmament (CFE, nuclear disarmament)
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REPORT (1)
submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee (2)
by Lord Newall, Rapporteur
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Part 2 (5 parts)
II. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and its adaptation
(i) The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE Treaty)
(ii) Other commitments related to the CFE Treaty
(iii) The CFE-1 A Agreement
(iv) The 1996 Review Conference in Vienna
(v) The Flank Document Agreement
(vi) The OSCE summit meeting in Lisbon
(vii) The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and security between NATO
and the Russian Federation
(viii) The present CFE-adaptation negotiations in Vienna
II. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and its adaptation
(i) The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe (CFE Treaty)
On 14 November 1990 in Paris, the 16 member states of NATO and the 6 member states of the Warsaw Pact signed the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. This Treaty, which entered into force on 17 July 1992, established a balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels. It contained comprehensive provisions for transparency and information exchange backed up by a verification regime which would make it impossible for an aggressor to launch a surprise attack and begin a large-scale offensive.
The CFE Treaty operates through agreed and verified limits on five systems of heavy military equipment, in particular tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, known collectively as Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE). In accordance with the Treaty, States Parties have mostly reduced their weapon holdings to bring them down to agreed levels. The Treaty area is divided into four zones and, to prevent an excessive concentration of conventional weapons systems in central Europe and the flank region (4), there are limits on the number of TLE items which may be held in any one zone.
On 14 June 1991, the Soviet Union entered into two accompanying commitments - one legally binding and one political. The first details of the Soviet reduction obligation related to equipment of treaty-limited types in naval infantry and coastal defence forces. The second agreement committed the Soviet Union to destroy more than 14 500 pieces of military equipment of treaty-limited types east of the Ural Mountains, a region outside the Treaty area of application. This political commitment resulted from NATO concerns about Soviet military equipment moved out of the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) application zone of the Treaty during the negotiating period prior to signature.
The Treaty includes unprecedented provisions for detailed information exchanges, on-site inspections, challenge inspections, and on-site monitoring of destruction. NATO has established a system to cooperate in monitoring the Treaty. Parties have rights to monitor the process of destruction without quota limits. A Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information stipulates an annual exchange of mandated data that helps ensure verification of compliance with the Treaty.
A Protocol on Inspection details procedures for verification. Inspections are conducted routinely during the (indefinite) duration of the Treaty; they focus on "objects of verification" (e.g. military organisations), and are conducted at "declared sites" (e.g. military facilities). These OOVs and sites are listed in each information exchange.
After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the former Warsaw Pact states concluded a legally binding agreement at Budapest, in spring 1991, allocating the equipment entitlements of the Central and East European Group of States Parties. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, eight of the former Soviet Union successor states - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine - had territory covered by the Treaty provisions and thus became Treaty members. They negotiated the allocation of weapon entitlements among themselves and the resulting Tashkent Agreement of 15 May 1992 set out agreed individual ceilings. These allocations and the rights and obligations of the new States Parties were recognised by all Treaty members at their extraordinary meeting in Oslo, on 5 June 1992. Also, when the Czech and Slovak Republics became separate States Parties, on 1 January 1993, their accession to the CFE Treaty was approved on 5 February 1997 and details of the division of the obligations of former Czechoslovakia were formalised accordingly.
The weapons reduction process imposed by the CFE Treaty required 25% completion by November 1993, 50% by November 1994, and 100% by November 1995, after which the CFE limits were to be fully implemented.
Although all the States Parties made efforts to destroy or disable their equipment as provided for in the Protocol on Reductions, it was noted that by the 16 November 1995 deadline, several states had not fulfilled some treaty obligations.
Russia had the greatest number of liabilities. In the area beyond the Urals, it had destroyed only one third of its liabilities in conventional armaments and equipment. The unresolved dispute with Ukraine over the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the status of the Sevastopol base had caused delays in the destruction of infantry and coastal defence equipment. Liabilities beyond the Urals are not subject to verification but at the CFE Treaty Review Conference in Vienna in May 1996, Russia stated that it would demonstrate that all holdings on its territory had been destroyed or rendered militarily unusable. Russia also made other specific pledges to meet its destruction obligations and Western teams were given the task of verifying that it had abided by the terms of those pledges (5).
Belarus, which failed to meet an April 1996 and a November 1997 deadline, was declared to have completed its reductions as of 1 January 1997. Minor problems were reported regarding Ukraine, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Georgia. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have long failed to declare their equipment holdings and accept any formal destruction liability. By the official deadline for the destruction process, Armenia had surplus armoured combat vehicles while Azerbaijan claimed that it could not account for some 700 TLE items lost to rebel forces in Nagorno-Karabakh (6). For some years now the two countries have been rearming more or less officially and sometimes in violation of the ceilings set by the CFE Treaty (and confirmed by the 1992 Tashkent Agreement). In the case of Armenia, the Russian Federation has been its largest supplier, sometimes in excess of all inter-state agreements and even without the official permission of the government, which is tantamount to acknowledging that such transfers of equipment have not been notified, as they should be under the rules binding on the signatories of the CFE Treaty. According to Armenia, Azerbaijan is receiving equipment from Ukraine not all of which has been the subject of a declaration as the Treaty also requires.
All these questions were discussed and recommendations were made in both the Joint Consultative Group and at the 1996 Review Conference in Vienna. The JCG was urged to resolve implementation issues in parallel with the CFE adaptation negotiations in Vienna.
As mentioned above, settlement of the problem of the Russian Federation and Ukraine sharing the Black Sea Fleet was a factor that blocked full application of the provisions of the CFE Treaty. It should be noted that the signature on 31 May 1997 of the Treaty of friendship, cooperation and partnership between the two countries has, in principle, resolved this issue. Russia undertook to hire the installations necessary for the fleet's operation, in Sevastopol and other areas of the Crimean peninsula, for a period of 20 years. Ukraine took control of about 18% of the original fleet, i.e. about 162 ships of all types
By the end of 1996, more than 51 300 items of treaty-limited conventional weapons equipment had been destroyed or permanently converted to non-military use in order to meet reduction liabilities. In addition, another 9 900 items were notified by Russia for destruction or conversion beyond the Treaty area of application, and the States Parties notified another 2 400 items as voluntarily reduced below their specified limits. Over 2 700 on-site inspections had been conducted. These inspections, conducted by representatives from both groups of states, examined weapons destruction events, as well as sites or areas reported or suspected to contain military equipment.
A detailed survey of CFE ceilings, liabilities, reductions and holdings is given in Appendices I and II (7).
In accordance with Article XVI of the CFE Treaty, the States Parties established a Joint Consultative Group (JCG) in order to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Article XVI provides a full catalogue of subjects to be dealt with in the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, which is composed of representatives from all 30 CFE States Parties.
The JCG takes decisions or makes recommendations by consensus. It holds sessions twice a year in Vienna, with each session lasting four weeks unless otherwise agreed. In practice, the JCG has been in virtually continuous session ever since late 1990. It has, among other things, negotiated a number of agreements to facilitate and ensure the implementation of the CFE Treaty. Altogether, it can be noted that the JCG has played an essential role in the implementation of the CFE inspection and reduction regimes, including the development of standard inspections, notification forms and new, streamlined arrangements for equipment destruction. At pres-ent, the JCG is negotiating CFE adaptation.
(ii) Other commitments related
to the CFE Treaty
Three politically binding declarations were agreed to when the CFE Treaty was signed on 19 November 1990. These commitments consolidate the provisions of the Treaty.
(i) Declaration by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the Personnel Strength of German Armed Forces.
In this unilateral declaration, the Federal Republic of Germany pledged to reduce the personnel strength of the armed forces of a united Germany to 370 000 within three to four years of the entry into force of the CFE Treaty.
(ii) Declaration of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe with Respect to Personnel Strength
In order to facilitate follow-on negotiations as called for in Article XVIII of the CFE Treaty, which led to the CFE-1A Agreement on 6 July 1992, the Parties to the Treaty agreed not to increase the peacetime personnel strength of their conventional armed forces in the region during these negotiations.
(iii) Declaration of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe with respect to Land-Based Naval Aircraft
The mandate under which the CFE Treaty was negotiated expressly includes all conventional armaments and equipment permanently based on land in the ATTU area. The Russians adamantly opposed counting their land-based naval aircraft (LBNA) as coming under CFE aircraft ceilings, since US and other Western carrier-based aircraft would not be counted. It was finally agreed that a political commitment would cap LBNA separately outside the Treaty.
According to this declaration, each group of states commits itself to hold no more than 430 LBNA combat aircraft in the CFE zone, of which no more than 400 may belong to any one state. It also bans the subordination of attack helicopters to land-based naval forces.
(iii) The CFE-1A Agreement
In Article XVIII, the CFE Treaty called for a continuation of negotiations on conventional armed forces with the same mandate and in order to "conclude an agreement on additional measures aimed at further strengthening security and stability in Europe and [...] including measures to limit the personnel strength of their conventional armed forces within the area of application". These negotiations were wound up on 6 July 1992 with the conclusion of an agreement called CFE-1A whose implementation began on 17 July 1992.
CFE-1A constitutes a political commitment by its signatories to limit and, where applicable, reduce the personnel strength of their conventional armed forces. In contrast to the CFE Treaty, CFE-1A is not a legally binding agreement and thus not subject to ratification by parliaments.
The core of the CFE-1A agreement is a "ceiling" on the military personnel of each participating state within the CFE Treaty's area of application. Each participating state determined its own ceiling, taking into consideration its national defence plans and security interests. These numerical ceilings were not subject to negotiation among the participants, although the levels were open to discussion prior to adoption of the agreement. In general terms, the CFE-1A limitation applies to land-based military personnel in the area of application.
The CFE-1A agreement also provides for a broad, detailed exchange of information on the military manpower of the participating states. In general, information provided for most categories is broken down to show the strength of individual units at the level of brigade or regiment and higher.
To further enhance security and promote transparency among the participating states, the CFE-1A agreement includes three stabilising measures, requiring the notification of significant increases in unit strength, call-up of reserves or resubordination of units.
(iv) The 1996 Review Conference in Vienna
Article XXI.1 of the CFE Treaty provides for periodic review conferences, the first to be held 46 months after its entry into force and at five-year intervals thereafter.
The first CFE Review Conference was held from 15 to 31 May 1996 in Vienna. This conference dealt in particular with an examination of the implementation of the limitation and reduction provisions of the Treaty and with an assessment of the application of its verification and information provisions.
The most important results of the Review Conference were:
- the signature of a Flank Document Agreement to the CFE Treaty (see Chapter VI);
- the decision to start the process of adapting the CFE Treaty to the new security situation in Europe by defining the "scope and parameters" of Treaty adaptation as a matter of priority. The final objective of its adaptation was to permit the CFE Treaty to sustain its key role in the European security architecture;
A progress report on the intermediate results of this adaptation process, including recommendations on the way forward was to be considered at the OSCE summit in Lisbon in December 1996.
It should be pointed out that the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact challenged many of the premises which had been the basis of the CFE Treaty. Parties to the Treaty can no longer be divided into a NATO and a Warsaw Pact group, cold war arms concentration in central Europe has lost its meaning, the zone system is less relevant and the Treaty may have to be opened to new parties. Moreover, Russia has grown increasingly worried about the prospect of NATO enlargement, pointing out that the ratio of Russian to NATO forces has changed considerably to NATO's advantage.
In preparing the scope and parameters document for the Lisbon agreement, Russia proposed a large number of subjects for the negotiations to adapt the CFE Treaty. Its many proposals included a revision of the group structure with a system specifying national levels, regulation of the status of conventional armed forces stationed on foreign territory, revision of regional limitations and the possibility of using armed forces for peacekeeping purposes. Central European countries were particularly keen on adapting the Treaty to their expectations regarding future membership of NATO. NATO's approach was rather cautious and limited because it wanted to respond to Russian demands but at the same time have enough room for manoeuvre. It was keen to maintain the integrity of the Treaty, but was prepared to review the group structure and consider voluntary accession by other states.
(v) The Flank Document Agreement
Soon after the entry into force of the CFE Agreement, both Ukraine and Russia complained that they had problems with the implementation of the Article V limitation on Treaty Limited Equipment that can be located in the flank area of a country.
In September 1993, the representative of Ukraine pointed out to the Joint Consultative Group that it considered the flank limits imposed upon it completely unjustified. He noted that this would force Ukraine to ensure the defence of one quarter of its territory with only 17% of its available tanks, 7% of its armoured combat vehicles and 22% of its artillery. It should be noted that at the time Ukraine also needed to confirm and emphasise its sovereignty and that the flank limits would also oblige it to abandon existing infrastructures and build new ones at considerable cost.
Soon afterwards, the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, wrote to all NATO leaders requesting the removal of Article V of the CFE Treaty. His main reasons were: the drastic changes that had occurred in the political situation on the continent, the increased turmoil along Russia's borders, and the complex economic and social problems the Russian Federation was contending with owing to the redeployment of massive numbers of troops from eastern Europe. President Yeltsin also observed that the two districts constrained by Article V (Leningrad and North Caucasus) comprised over half the territory of European Russia, and that the restraints laid down were discriminatory as they were not imposed in a similar fashion on any Western state.
Russia also had other important considerations. As a result of the implosion of the former Soviet Union, the North Caucasus Military District had been transformed from a rear area into a border district. Moreover, Russia noted a rising threat to stability on its southern flank, due to such factors as independence movements within its borders and Muslim fundamentalism at its borders.
While the United States and the United Kingdom in particular were prepared to react positively and constructively, others were less enthusiastic. In particular, Norway and Turkey, which both border the flank area, initially opposed any compromise on the flanks. Turkey strongly believes that Russia maintains imperialist ambitions in the Caucasus region and is the prime mover behind hostilities in Georgia as well as behind the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. An increase in Russian forces in the flank area would also reduce the warning time available to Turkey and Norway and thus run counter to their security interests. Finally, these countries argue that a change in the CFE Treaty or its overall demise could pave the way for a renewed European or regional arms race due to new tensions brought about by the end of the cold war.
The United States, showing understanding for the problems facing Ukraine and Russia, made great efforts to conclude an agreement which was finally signed at the CFE Review Conference in Vienna on 31 May 1996.
In the Flank Document Agreement, certain territory has been removed from the original flank zone, resulting in a "map realignment" which reduces the size of the zone. Additional constraints are imposed upon equipment in the areas removed from the flank zone and additional transparency measures apply to both the flank zone and those areas removed from the flank zone.
The Flank Document Agreement allows the Russian Federation the right to utilise "to the maximum extent possible" the CFE Treaty provisions that allow temporary deployment of equipment within and outside its territory, to be achieved through free negotiations and with full respect to states' sovereignty. In addition, the Russian Federation has the right to utilise "to the maximum extent possible" the reallocation of current quotas for equipment, to be achieved through free negotiations and with full respect for sovereignty of the States Parties involved. In addition, Russia must lower its force levels in the region so that its equipment holdings in the old and new flank zone meet all CFE obligations by 31 May 1999.
The Baltic states, which in the autumn of 1991 had decided to dissociate themselves from the CFE regime, were not pleased with the Flank Document Agreement which allowed Russia to raise its ceiling for armoured combat vehicles in the Pskov enclave from 180 to 600. They deplored the fact that security in their region was diminished through an increased military presence near their borders.
On 8 April 1997, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Moldova announced their intention not to ratify the Flank Document Agreement, arguing that in their view the text legitimised the presence of Russian forces in the former Soviet republics. But in the end they did ratify it, under considerable United States pressure, thereby enabling the Flank Document Agreement to come into force on 15 May 1997.
(vi) The OSCE summit meeting in Lisbon
In the context of the OSCE summit meeting in Lisbon on 2 and 3 December 1996, the 30 CFE states agreed on a scope and parameters document. This document contains the terms of reference for negotiations to adapt the CFE Treaty to the political and military changes that have occurred in Europe since the Treaty was signed in November 1990.
For these negotiations, it was agreed to retain all categories of TLE, the information and verification regimes and the area of application. The parties would discuss the evolution of the group structure and the possibility of other states acceding to the Treaty. They would also discuss a possible system of national limits for Treaty Limited Equipment, the development of redistribution mechanisms and provisions on zonal and aggregate numbers preserving the principles of zonal limitations and avoiding any destabilising accumulation of forces. The parties would also consider means to make sure that the Treaty functioned during crises and examine conflicts and rules for the involvement of forces in UN or OSCE peacekeeping operations and for temporary deployments which would exceed the agreed limits. Finally, it was agreed that the parties would address the possibility of including new or expanded categories of conventional weapons or equipment.
Negotiations in the Joint Consultative Group were to start in Vienna on 21 January 1997 and a progress report was to be submitted to the OSCE ministerial meeting in Copenhagen at the end of 1997. The scope and parameters document mentioned mid-1998 as a rough deadline for completion of the CFE adaptation negotiations.
(vii) The Founding Act
on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security
between NATO and the Russian Federation
When it became clear that its enlargement policy might easily resuscitate the antagonistic rhetoric of the cold war days, NATO realised that a substantial gesture had to be made in order to meet Russia's demand that it participate extensively in the Euro-Atlantic security discussion. NATO accordingly proposed the elaboration of what was called a "Charter" on its relations with Russia. After intensive negotiations on both form and substance, a Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation was signed in Paris on 27 May 1997. This Founding Act based relations between NATO and Russia on a number of principles and stipulated the creation of a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council with the aim of progressively building up trust, unity of purpose and the habit of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia. It enumerated a large number of areas for such consultation and cooperation.
In Chapter IV on politico-military matters, specific attention was paid to the importance of the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe for the broader context of security in the OSCE area. It was further stipulated that:
"NATO and Russia believe that an important goal of CFE Treaty adaptation should be a significant lowering in the total amount of Treaty-Limited Equipment permitted in the Treaty's area of application compatible with the legitimate defence requirements of each State Party. NATO and Russia encourage all States Parties to the CFE Treaty to consider reductions in their CFE equipment entitlements, as part of an overall effort to achieve lower equipment levels that are consistent with the transformation of Europe's security environment.
The member states of NATO and Russia propose to other CFE States Parties to carry out such adaptation of the CFE Treaty so as to enable States Parties to reach, through a transparent and cooperative process, conclusions regarding reductions they might be prepared to make and resulting national Treaty-Limited Equipment ceilings. These will then be codified as binding limits in the adapted Treaty to be agreed by consensus of all States Parties, and reviewed in 2001 and at five-year intervals thereafter. In doing so, the States Parties will take into account all the levels of Treaty-Limited Equipment established for the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area by the original CFE Treaty, the substantial reductions that have been carried out since then, the changes to the situation in Europe and the need to ensure that the security of no state is diminished."
Finally,
"The member states of NATO and Russia [reaffirmed] that States Parties to the CFE Treaty should maintain only such military capabilities, individually or in conjunction with others, as are commensurate with individual or collective legitimate security needs, taking into account their international obligations, including the CFE Treaty."
(viii) The present CFE-adaptation
negotiations in Vienna
In the negotiations which started in Vienna on 21 January 1997, Russia again made it clear that it was not pleased by the forthcoming NATO enlargement, which would expand one of the two blocs which had played such an important role in the negotiations and establishment of the CFE Treaty. It is indeed true that one of the objectives of the CFE adaptation process was to do away with the bloc-to-bloc approach.
When it appeared that negotiations in Vienna were close to deadlock, NATO countries made it clear that they were prepared to make unilateral reductions to their Treaty-allocated armaments ceilings that went further than those announced earlier. On 26 June 1997, NATO declared that it was willing to eliminate 80% of the armaments it is authorised to store. This involved materiel that the British, Americans and Germans could have kept in warehouses as reserves in the event of a major crisis. In all, NATO would be lowering its global weapons ceilings by 10%. This meant it would only have a right to 16 794 tanks and 17 372 artillery pieces, compared to 20 000 each for these two categories under the CFE Treaty. It would also have a right to 27 718 armoured combat vehicles, against 30 000 originally. The United States, the United Kingdom, France and Italy said they were willing to lower, on a national basis, the ceilings on weapons they could deploy within their operational units. France announced a drop of about 5% in its national land weapons ceiling; the United Kingdom made a similar offer for the categories of equipment covered by the Treaty (tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, helicopters and fighter planes). The United States agreed to a ceiling of 1 812 tanks (against 4 006), 3 037 armoured vehicles (against 5 372), 1 553 artillery pieces (against 2 492) and 404 helicopters (against 431). Italy would agree to an average 6% drop in its ceilings. However, these countries were not willing to reduce the number of fighter planes they can station in Europe (784). Earlier, on 14 March 1997, NATO had already declared that it did not foresee permanent or additional stationing of large fighting forces in new member states after its enlargement.
On 23 July 1997, the Joint Consultative Group, in which all 30 CFE States Parties participate, decided to adopt a number of basic elements for treaty adaptation. The most important was the decision to replace the bloc-to-bloc structure by a system which will set national and territorial ceilings for each country. National ceilings will determine the number of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) items each State Party is allowed to have in the Treaty's area of application. Territorial ceilings will replace the existing structure of zones. These territorial ceilings will cover the number of weapons of national forces and of foreign forces deployed or likely to be deployed in a specific country (the so-called stationed forces).
The CFE zone of application will no longer be subdivided into geographic zones with regional sub-ceilings; instead, according to Article 13 of the JCG's decision:
"The adaptation process will include consideration of the possibility of establishing specific stabilising measures, which might include measures of restraint or constraints in particular regions and areas of the Treaty's area of application, including central and eastern Europe, in order to prevent any potentially threatening build-up of conventional forces."
As regards stationed forces, it was also decided to "develop additional information requirements and measures of transparency in respect of stationed forces, including pre-notification of changes in the equipment holdings of a stationed forces unit".
Russia is determined to limit the possibilities for permanent stationing and temporary deployment of NATO forces on the territory of its member states. Discussions on this contentious issue have not yet led to a final settlement. As mentioned earlier, NATO had already declared on 14 March 1997 that it did not foresee permanent and additional stationing of large fighting forces in new member states after its enlargement, partly in order to allay Russian security concerns about NATO's expansion.
In connection with this declaration, however, NATO is proposing a "specific stabilising measure" which would freeze the territorial ceilings of a number of central and eastern European states at the level of national ceilings, thus restricting the capacity of these states to accept stationed forces. In NATO's view, this measure should not only apply to the territory of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, but also to parts of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Both Russia and Belarus strongly objected to being included in this measure and further discussion was postponed until a later date.
Russia has also complained that the air component has been omitted from NATO proposals on territorial limits, although it represents the main strike force of contemporary armed forces. NATO argues that it relies on the ability to increase air power as a deterrent in areas such as Turkey and it is not about to give this up (8).
No firm decision was taken on the flank issue. Some States Parties had proposed fully integrating the 1996 Flank Document Agreement of 31 May 1996 in the adapted CFE Treaty. Russia, with some support from Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania, argued however that the flank concept was outdated and that restrictions on the southern flank endangered Russia's ability to meet security requirements in the Caucasus. In particular, Turkey fiercely opposed any relaxation in the flank regime and further discussions on this were postponed.
The States Parties have decided to include in the adapted CFE Treaty provisions to allow a State Party to receive, with its express consent, forces on its territory that would exceed its territorial ceiling for notified military exercises or as temporary deployments, provided that both are consistent with the objectives of an adapted Treaty. It was also decided that any states requesting to accede to the adapted Treaty would be allowed to do so. Accession would take place on a case-by-case basis and would require the agreement of all the States Parties.
Russia is also demanding the inclusion of a sufficiency rule for military alliances with the aim of setting legally-binding collective ceilings for NATO as a whole, irrespective of the number of its members. In Russia's view, this could offer some protection against any further NATO enlargement.
For more information, please contact: Yves ROBINS, Press Counsellor
ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
43, avenue du President Wilson
F-75775 Paris cedex 16 France
Tel 331-53672200; Fax 331-47204543
E-mail:
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