Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

1. The United States is currently conducting research on a major defence system aiming at building up a limited "National Missile Defense" system (NMD) which is intended to protect the entire country from limited attacks by intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) armed with nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads. Such attacks with a limited number (up to a few tens) of missiles, would primarily comprise either a small accidental or "unauthorised" launch from a nuclear power or a deliberate attack from a hostile emerging missile state that might acquire ICBMs. This last threat - focused on Iran, Iraq, and North Korea - has emerged as the primary argument for a near-term NMD deployment.

2. On 19 July 1999 President Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Act stating that "it is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorised, or deliberate)". The Act contained an amendment asking the president to base his ultimate decision not only on the question of technological feasibility, but also on three further considerations: an assessment of the threat facing the United States, the costs of the proposed system (affordability) and its impact on national security (progress in achieving arms control objectives, including revisions to the ABM Treaty).

3. A decision on deployment has not yet been reached, but is expected for June 2000. However, following the failure of the second NMD interceptor test on 18 January 2000, when a kill vehicle sent into space on a booster missile failed to collide with a dummy warhead launched from 4,300 miles away,1 an increasing number of policymakers, including senior Pentagon officials as well as influential Democratic and Republican Congressional leaders, have urged President Clinton to defer a decision on NMD to the next administration. Governor Bush has announced publicly that he would not criticise Vice-President Gore during the election campaign if the deployment decision were left to the next administration.2

4. Whether or not the actual decision about the deployment is delayed, it is clear that the United States is facing an extremely important decision in the near future with profound implications for the transatlantic alliance, for US-Russia relations and future arms-reduction talks. In particular, the intention of the Clinton administration to pursue deployment of a NMD system on the basis of the current test results has the potential danger of putting into question the Alliance consensus on future security and defence policy. This preliminary report, which will be amended later this year for presentation at the NATO PA annual session in Berlin, aims at discussing the central political issues connected with NMD.

5. To understand the current development, it is important to briefly review previous efforts to force the deployment of a National Missile Defense system. There has been a ballistic missile defence programme in the US Department of Defense (DoD) for decades. NMD is part of the third wave of ballistic missile defence projects. The first, called Safeguard, was initiated in 1967 and in 1975 led to the activation of 100 nuclear-tipped interceptors at Grand Forks, North Dakota. However, after operating for six months, the complex was shut down due to its high running costs and limited effectiveness.

6. In 1983 President Reagan revived the missile defence issue with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), dubbed as Star Wars by its critics. The ambitious project was intended to render all nuclear weapon missile delivery systems "impotent and obsolete" through space-based directed energy weapons. After seven years the programme was abandoned, having cost approximately US$40 billion, while producing only modest scientific results.

7. After President Clinton's election (on a mainly domestic agenda) in 1992, he soon faced internal political pressure from the Republican opposition, accusing him of not taking threats to US national security emanating from rogue states seriously. Republican congressional leaders have tried to make President Clinton's defence strategy a political issue, first in their Contract with America in 1994 and 1995, and then as the leading defence issue in the 1996 presidential campaign.

8. In reaction to congressional demands, the national missile defence research efforts were upgraded in 1996. The US Defense Department's policy shifted from a technology-demonstration effort, whose goal was to develop the technology of NMD system elements, to a deployment-readiness initiative which has sought to develop the components for an integrated missile defence system which could be deployed within a few years. Consequently, missile defence funding has steadily climbed.

9. Hence, plans for NMD have become a key part of the overall US defence strategy in the future. However, it is important to point out again that, compared to former missile defence initiatives, US officials emphasise that NMD is a limited system. It is not designed to provide the United States with full protection. Rather, it is intended to counter a "few to a few tens" of warheads with complex countermeasures launched from rogue states, e.g. North Korea, Iran, Iraq or Libya. The system is not designed to protect the United States from a massive attack by a major nuclear power. US officials emphasise that such a missile defence system would raise wholly different policy, technology, and arms control issues.

10. The NMD initiative has also become known as the "3+3" programme: three years of development would be followed by a three-year deployment effort, leading to an operational capability in 2003 (should a decision be reached in the year 2000). Because of technological difficulties the experts of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), which is responsible for managing, directing, and executing the Ballistic Missile Defense Program within US Department of Defense (DoD), recommended to slow down the pace of development. As a consequence, the target goal for operability has been postponed to the year 2005.

11. Currently, the system would consist of the following components:

• ground based interceptor missiles employing an exo-atmospheric kinetic-kill vehicle (KKV) using infrared seekers to home in on its target. These interceptors based in Alaska would be able to defend the entire United States from a ballistic missile attack of limited sophistication and scope;

• an X-band phased array radar (that is, ABM radars), based at Shemya in Alaska, which are either collocated with the NMD site, or deployed elsewhere;

• upgraded versions of five existing ballistic missile early warning radars (based in the United Kingdom, Greenland, Alaska, California and Massachusetts) in order to track incoming warheads and cueing information to the X-band tracking radars;

• a Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)-High satellite network being deployed to replace the existing Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites would provide initial detection of missile launches;

• a battle management and command, control and communication system based at the North American Aerospace Defense headquarters at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, which will integrate sensor data for tracking and allow human control.

12. A "preliminary" architecture released by the BMDO in March 1999 described the NMD system as being deployed in three phases:

13. The first phase of deployment is planned for 2005, and consists of 20 ground-based interceptors at a single site either in central Alaska or at Grand Forks, North Dakota. This system would be capable of defending the United States against a launch from "a few tens" of North Korean warheads and against limited attack of a few warheads launched from the Middle East. Phase two is currently scheduled for 2010 and would increase the number of interceptors at the site to 100. The third phase would occur in around 2015 and may consist of up to 125 interceptors at the existing NMD site, and possibly an additional 125 at another site. More compressed deployment times have also been suggested, with 100 interceptors deployed by 2006, and the remainder of the second and third phase deployment occurring by 2010.

14. The acquisition cost for the first stage of the NMD programme has been estimated at US$10.5 billion. The total 20-year life-cycle cost (research and development, acquisition, and operating costs) has been estimated at between US$18.4 billion and US$28.3 billion, depending on when and where the system is deployed. Cost estimates for the succeeding phases are much higher. Since 1993, the Clinton administration has already spent almost US$7 billion on National Missile Defence. In addition, President Clinton earlier in 2000 authorised a legislative addition for US$2.2 billion to pay for NMD cost overruns during the next five years.

15. So far, however, the technological progress of the system has been riddled with delays and failures. In 1998, a panel of defence experts headed by Larry D. Welch, a former Air Force Chief of Staff, describes the compressed development schedule as a technological "rush to failure". The so-called Welch Report concluded that the programme was plagued by inadequate testing and management lapses as well as a hardware shortage. The panel doubted that the US government would have sufficient technological information to make a reliable decision.

16. The panel reiterated its conclusion in November 1999,3 arguing that the capability of physically hitting an incoming ballistic missile through an interceptor had only been successfully demonstrated twice, in comparison with at least eight failures.4 The failure of the intercept test on 18 January further reinforces the report's findings. Pointing to the technological problems, the panel suggested delaying the deployment decision from summer 2000 to 2003.

17. Other American scientists, like Theodore A. Postol and George N. Lewis from MIT, doubt that the system can work at all.5 They argue that, assuming the basic components of the system can be made to work, the real-world effectiveness of the National Missile Defense system will depend primarily on its ability to cope with unexpected circumstances and, in particular, with measures taken by adversaries to defeat it. They criticise the Pentagon for failing to conduct realistic tests when successfully testing key components of national defence in last October during a so-called "hit-to-kill" interceptor test.

18. From the beginning, the United States has developed countermeasures that can be used with its strategic missiles, and any country capable of producing or obtaining both ICBMs and weapons of mass destruction would be able to produce or obtain effective countermeasures. Thus, if the United States deploys a national defence system, it must anticipate that any ICBM launched against the United States will be equipped with countermeasures. For example, one way to foil the system would be to launch enough ICBMs to simply overwhelm it. A less expensive and more feasible option would be to devote some of each missile's payload to lightweight countermeasures designed to confound defensive missile systems.

19. So far, the technical feasibility of missile defence has not yet been demonstrated convincingly. However, the Pentagon is inclined to submit its "deployment readiness review" this summer. Whatever its outcome, and despite technological difficulties, it seems likely that the United States will sooner or later deploy missile defence. Already in 1998 Jaques Gansler, then Under-Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, told Congress that the question was no longer whether the United States "will" deploy missile defence, but "when".

20. Any evaluation of the possible consequences of NMD needs to include an assessment of the rationale behind NMD. As Mr Slocombe, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, points out, NMD aims

• to protect US homeland from a ballistic missile attack from rogue states;
• to preserve US freedom to respond to regional crises; an
• to remove rogue state coercive leverage that would result from holding US population hostage to missile attack;

21. Other US officials point out that NMD is also designed to protect the nation against an "unauthorised" or accidental launch by a major nuclear power (e.g. China and Russia).

22. The results of the findings of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (the so-called Rumsfeld Report) of July 1998 and the recent Cox Report on the nuclear capabilities of China have especially given rise to concerne in the United States. The Rumsfeld Report played a pivotal role in the American discussion as its findings generated a strong momentum in favour of NMD. The report estimates that so-called "rogue-states", like North Korea and Iran, could develop an ICBM within a five-year period. Similarly, the Report on the National Intelligence Council (September 1999) concluded that during the next 15 years the United States would "most likely face ICBM threats from Russia, China and North Korea, probably from Iran and possibly from Iraq". Recently, William Cohen, the US Secretary of Defense, has added Lybia, which as he said has chemical capabilities and is seeking to buy long-range missiles, to the list of possible rogue states.

23. Indeed, some states have made considerable progress recently in mastering the technical obstacles of long-range ballistic missiles. For example, in August 1998 North Korea launched a three-stage missile known as the Taepo-dong 1, and there are reports that a longer-range Taepo-dong 2 missile is being developed. The range and capability of the missile tested surprised many, even in US intelligence circles. North Korea's ballistic missiles were not expected to reach the 4,000-6,000km range until 2000-4, yet it is known that with a light warhead of 100-500kg a Taepo-dong could reach beyond 6,000km. North Korea might one day be able to use the Taepo-dong 2 to strike Alaska or might be able to modify it to deliver small payloads to other parts of the United States.

24. Further, while North Korea has not participated in meaningful missile proliferation talks for over two years, it has become the world's largest supplier of ballistic missiles and related technology7 - primarily to Pakistan, Iran and Syria. Although missile exports were one of the few ways North Korea could obtain hard currency, its government has shown some willingness to trade its missiles for a prize. In particular, the close (and secret) military co-operation between North Korea and Pakistan gives rise to concern. Although the full extent of North Korea's assistance to Pakistan's nuclear development programme remains unknown, North Korea is believed to have contributed to the development of Pakistan's Ghauri missile through secret bilateral military technological co-operation.

25. Apparently, North Korea - which is the primary cause of concern and justification for NMD - sees its missile capability as the last trump card in its strategy of luring Washington into talks over the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea. In this light, North Korea might hope to receive more concessions by using nuclear blackmail. However, it has to be considered that long-range ballistic missiles are difficult - and very costly - to design, develop, deploy and/or conceal. Rogue states that want to threaten or attack the United States could surely do so with less complex and less costly systems or methods, such as terrorist attacks.

26. Another argument in support of the deployment of a US national anti-missile defense system lies in references to the possibility of accidental or unauthorised launches of intercontinental missiles, as stated above. However, the experience of the use of missiles accumulated during the course of many years has made it possible to formulate an extraordinarily safe system which makes it possible to prevent such abnormal situations: since the end of the 1950s there has never been any such instance of unauthorised or accidental launches.

27. A final argument put forward by the United States is that the existence of such a system will facilitate the end of the process of proliferation of missiles and missile technology. However, the history of the emergence of ballistic missiles in a whole series of states shows that their development has been stimulated not by the absence of an NMD system in the United States, but by the frictions that have existed in certain regions for many years.

28. While the discussion in the United States has been going on for a number of years now, the non-US members of the Alliance have so far mainly ignored this issue. However, this has begun to change within the last year, and NMD will be one of the most important issues, not only for US security policy but for the Atlantic Alliance as a whole.

29. Given the different views on both sides of the Atlantic, the emerging debate over National Missile Defense can have the potential for causing a major crisis in the transatlantic partnership. This is particularly the case if the Allies approach this issue with (mis)perceptions rather than with facts and a clear sense of priorities. However, the forthcoming discussion also provides an opportunity to build a common consensus on how to tackle a major security challenge of the future.

30. Of course, there is no monolithic view within the Alliance on the US effort to research and deploy NMD. However, most Allies raise two basic concerns:

1. The effects NMD will have on future arms control talks and the relations with Russia and China.

2. The consequences NMD could have for the security and the cohesion of the Alliance.

A. POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF NMD FOR ARMS CONTROL

31. The Allies argue that serious consideration should be given to the effect which NMD will have on broader arms control efforts. First of all, they fear that the ABM Treaty, which is seen as a cornerstone of strategic stability and transatlantic security, is in danger of being rendered meaningless.

32. The ABM Treaty contains various limitations to prevent Russia and the United States from building a foundation for a nation-wide defence. In the Treaty's first article, each promises "not to deploy ABM systems for a defence of the territory of its country and not to deploy a base for such a defence...". A protocol signed in 1974 permits both countries to build a regional shield for the defence of part of its territory, one centred on the national capital and the other on an ICBM basing area. Each site could be equipped with no more than 100 ABMs. Under the 1974 protocol, the United States opted only to field missile defences to protect strategic missiles in North Dakota, while the Soviet Union opted to maintain a single site to defend Moscow. While the United States decided to dismantle its ABMs the Russian defences around Moscow have been maintained and modernised.

33. The rationale behind the ABM Treaty is that it enforces the idea of Mutual Assured Destruction: both the United States and Russia continue to rely on nuclear deterrent policies based on deploying large numbers of nuclear-armed missiles ready for immediate launch. In other words, the United States and the Soviet Union would deliberately remain vulnerable to an attack by the other's strategic nuclear forces.

34. The maintenance of the ABM Treaty is also the basis for a continuation of nuclear disarmament talks in the context of the START process, as US Allies argue. This process aims at reducing the nuclear arsenal and attaining transparency of tactical nuclear weapons. However, if the ABM Treaty is devaluated, the START process is also likely to be in jeopardy, as Russia's policy options indicate (Russia's reactions will be explored in detail in the following chapter).

35. Some Allies also fear a backlash for the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference, scheduled to begin on 24 April 2000. Negative ramifications for the review conference seem feasible. The non-nuclear-weapon state signatories to the NPT are likely to be watching their security erode along with that of the three great competing powers. Some states may choose to withdraw from the treaty while others may choose to stay. The final version of this report will discuss the impact of NMD on the NPT in detail.

36. Further, there has been disappointment over the result of the Conference on Disarmament which were stalled in 1999, partly because of American plans for NMD. A compromise negotiating agenda seemed close to agreement when the conference concluded for the year, except for US opposition. The compromise agenda would provide conference sub-committees to deal with key outstanding issues such as the proposal by the United States and other countries for a "fissban", a proposed agreement to halt further production of nuclear material to make weapons, the proposal for talks relating to further nuclear reductions, and a Chinese proposal to begin talks on agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space (PAROS). However, no agreement could be reached since the proposed compromise for a Geneva conference work plan required agreement to all three agenda items, and the United States opposed the third agenda item and - along with Britain, China, France and Russia - also the second.

B. NMD AND THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE

37. Obviously, the transatlantic discussion over the importance of a national missile defence reflects different threat perceptions: in the eyes of most Europeans, the demise of the Soviet threat and emerging "low-level" regional conflicts, i.e. Bosnia and Kosovo, press for the need to develop their own forces. In contrast, the Americans perceive that their territory might become a prime target for rogue states. Further, while the United States urges the Europeans to increase their contribution to the protection of Western interests worldwide, the latter complain that they have less to say in Washington now that Europe is no longer the front line in a superpower struggle.

38. As a consequence, many Europeans fear that there is a danger of decoupling the United States from Europe helping to create a "Fortress America" mindset among Americans. NMD might trigger or strengthen unilateralist tendencies in the United States. Emphasising that NATO was founded to counter a common threat to all members of the Alliance, most European partners would prefer to discuss NMD in a NATO framework, i.e. among its 19 members, and take a joint decision to ensure that NMD does not create a rift within NATO.

39. European Allies argue that the deployment of NMD might endanger the cohesion of the Alliance since NMD is in danger of producing different spheres of security. A US decision to deploy a national missile defence would pose a profound dilemma for Europeans. They could find themselves in a position in which the United States might be protected from a limited nuclear missile threat which would leave Europe vulnerable. Moreover, this could deepen the already large disparity in the way the transatlantic partners look at global strategy. How will the US policy be affected if the rogue states in question respond to an impending use of American force by threatening a strike not at the protected American soil, but at a European capital?

40. Furthermore, Europeans fear negative consequences for the relations with China. At present, China has only 15 to 20 long-range nuclear missiles capable of hitting the United States. Although NMD is intended to defend against rogue states, and not Russia or China, Beijing fears that the US plans might render the deterrent effect of its small arsenal meaningless. Like the Russians, they have expressed doubts that the United States is building a shield just against rogue state missiles. Therefore, China might see the need to increase its potential of nuclear missiles which could trigger an arms race in South-East Asia. This, clearly, would neither be in the interest of the Alliance as a whole nor of the United States.

41. Apart from these general concerns, some Allies have specific arguments why NMD should be opposed, at least at its present form. Originally, France voiced the strongest concern among the US Allies about missile defence plans. With its own nuclear arsenal, France has long relied upon mutual deterrence and has not tried to develop a missile defence system. From its point of view, the smaller French deterrent will be perceived as even smaller in relation to Russia's deterrent, particularly if the Russians build more ICBMs as a result of US plans. As Alain Richard, the French Defence Minister, said, France "does not know how to evaluate the side effects of missile defences", adding that "we need much more information and consultation within NATO before any realistic decision about deployment can be made".8 However, this statement seems to reflect the willingness to co-operate with the United States rather than to unequivocally oppose it, as has been the case so far.

42. The Canadian government, too, has displayed some discomfort with NMD. Traditionally Canada has been both one of the staunchest and closest allies of the United States and a strong supporter of international arms control arrangements. The United States has already announced that it favours using the North American Air Defence System (NORAD), set up by the two countries in 1958 to detect and respond to a Soviet nuclear attack, as the command structure for NMD. Canada's interest in participation would appear compelling, since co-operation would ensure that Canadian soil is defended by the United States. On the other hand, since the end of the Cold War, Canada has been reluctant to oblige the United States on defence-related issues, for example when championing an international treaty to ban the use of anti-personnel landmines despite US opposition; taking a stance in the "no-first-use" dispute over NATO's nuclear doctrine; and by refusing to allow further testing of US missile on its soil. Officially, however, the Canadian government has not issued any declaration about taking part in NMD or not.

43. Denmark and the United Kingdom host infrastructure relevant to NMD, but their co-operation in up-grading facilities could not necessarily be taken for granted. In 1987, for instance, the Danish parliament decided not to oppose the up-grading of the United States early warning radar in Greenland, but stipulated that the radar should not be used as part of an ABM system nor in connection with the Strategic Defense Initiative.

44. Without exception, Russian reactions to US plans for NMD have been critical to negative. The Russian side does not accept the American rationale for the development and deployment of NMD. Russian experts claim that the deployment of an ABM system on a country's territory would only make sense if it were intended to counter Russia's strategic ballistic missiles. They - and also the Chinese - view that even a "limited" defence is in fact a system that is indistinguishable from one aimed at them, especially pointing out the fact that the upgrades of early warning radars (and the recent installation of a NMD-capable radar in Vardo, Oslo, practically on the Russian border) are exactly those needed for a national missile defence aimed at them. From their perspective, these radars can be used to spy out all military installations in their countries.

45. Further, Russia argues that the NMD initiative is an American attempt to alter the nuclear balance in favour of the United States. Given the current economic-financial, political, and conventional military weakness of the Russian Federation, its nuclear arsenal is regarded by many Russians as the only claim for world power status.

46. Russian officials have repeatedly stressed that the introduction of NMD would in their view violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. According to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs future American-Russian relations will to a significant extent depend on whether or not both sides can agree on further reduction of strategic nuclear armaments, whilst preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty.

47. US officials, like US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, have repeatedly emphasised that the ABM Treaty is central to US security objectives. Therefore, the Clinton administration seeks agreement from Russia to amend the ABM Treaty to permit a limited NMD prior to the deployment decision. At the same time, it has been made clear by US officials that if deployment is decided and Russia has not agreed to the required treaty changes, then the United States would be prepared to withdraw from the treaty: "The ABM Treaty also provides, of course, for right of withdrawal with six months notice if a party concludes it is in its supreme national interests," as Secretary of Defence Cohen has pointed out.9

48. Obviously, even a limited NMD system will violate the ABM treaty in several ways: already deployment of only the first phase of the planned NMD architecture (as described in paragraph 13) would infringe on the treaty in several way. First of all, since NMD is intended to cover the whole American soil it will obviously violate Article I. Second, Article III would be violated because it requires that the regional NMD system remains a single-site system. However, parts of the NMD system, like the X-band radar or the five early warning systems will be deployed far away from the interceptor site in central Alaska. The stationing of the early warning radars in Greenland and the United Kingdom will also violate Article IX which prohibits deploying ABM components in other countries. Deployment of the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)-High satellite network (envisioned for a later phase) would violate Article V which prohibits space-based components.

49. The more alarmist view of US intentions is reflected in Russia's new national military doctrine, approved by the Security Council of the Russian Federation on 4 February 2000, and it undoubtedly played a role in the modified provision about the possible use of nuclear weapons, where Russians rejected the principle of no-first-use of nuclear weapons.

50. Russia might refuse to make negotiated reductions to its nuclear forces. Russia has linked its implementation of the START I and START II nuclear reduction treaties to continued US compliance with the ABM Treaty. The chairman of the Duma committee for international affairs, Dmitri Rogozin, stated in early February 2000 that the Russian State Duma would consider the ratification of the START II treaty in linkage with the ABM Treaty related problems at the coming spring session of the lower house of parliament. Rogozin said that the Duma deputies would discuss the document, assuming that Russia would have the right to cancel its obligations under the START II Treaty should the US side violate the ABM Treaty. The committee took the decision to consider the START II problem "in package with ABM treaty related problems" at the end of January 2000. Mr. Sergeyev, Minister of Defence, added that ratification of the START II Treaty "will be one more serious factor discouraging the United States from withdrawing from the 1972 ABM Treaty".

51. The Duma still has not yet ratified the START II Treaty, but during preliminary discussions on a possible START III agreement Russia has shown interest in further reducing the number of existing nuclear warheads. While the New Security Concept of the Russian Federation, signed by Mr. Putin on 14 January 2000, puts a stronger emphasis on maintaining and strengthening the nuclear forces, it will be difficult for Russia to do so. In fact, according to estimates, Russia is currently unable to maintain more than 1,500 reliable warheads.

52. As stated, both sides are inclined to search for a compromise solution. At the moment, however, the disagreement between the two sides about the treaty remains as acute as ever. However, some Russian political leaders have occasionally hinted at a willingness to strike a compromise on this issue, allowing modest revisions of the treaty in return for concessions on Russia's nuclear missile deployments. Newly elected Russian President Putin's proclaimed desire to have the Russian parliament endorse the pending Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty, (START II), suggests that he may eventually seek some sort of bargain on the ABM issue.

53. In case the political will to preserve the treaty predominates on both sides - some US politicians have already urged the government to dismiss it readily - deployment of NMD as it stands now would require major changes to accommodate the planned NMD system. Even if Russia agrees to change the treaty, the question remains whether it will be possible to modify the treaty in such a way that it both allows the planned limited US NMD system while still retaining its benefits for arms reductions and security. The original goal of the treaty was to prevent a build-up of offensive forces. However, the Russians are likely to preserve (or even strengthen) large forces to maintain deterrence in the face of a US NMD system which has the potential infrastructure to develop into a much thicker defence system, in other words: one that is no longer limited.

54. If they decide to deploy NMD systems, the United States have to anticipate friction with Russia and China. NMD would give "an insurance policy" and would strengthen US positions in military balance, but on the other hand, as Mr. Roy of the State Department pointed out, Russia and China might regard a US "insurance policy" as being in "fundamental conflict" with their interests and decide to deploy more ICBMs, thus increasing "significantly...the quantitative threat to the United States".

55. In this context the Russians accuse the United States of putting on a coat of mail and then signing the START III Treaty to substantially reduce missiles and warheads. Moscow cannot reciprocate. But Russian policy makers perceive that they must do something, otherwise they fear that Russia's claim for world power status is mere rhetoric. There is only one way out of this situation: the pursuit of an independent nuclear policy by using and developing technological achievements in the sphere of evading ABM systems. Even considering the huge costs of such a policy, Mr Sergeyev backed the plan for establishing a combined main command of the Russian strategic deterrence forces, comprising the strategic missile troops, the nuclear submarine fleet and the strategic aviation. "Such a command is mandatory and I am ready to prove this with figures", he said. If such a command is set up, "Russia will remain a nuclear power without losing its conventional forces", Mr. Sergeyev said. Such a possibility is not far-fetched when one considers that some US officials are already talking of a two-site NMD deployment with probably 125 missiles at each location.

56. If the United States deploy NMD systems and if Russia were to respond by also developing and deploying such systems, this could trigger a new arms race. Moreover, some Russian experts have pointed out that, as some elements of the US ABM system may be stationed in space, the arms race will inevitably be extended there, too.

57. It has to be expected that - if the technological and financial requirements as mentioned above are met - the President and the Congress of the United States will decide to deploy NMD in the foreseeable future. NMD has received strong backing in congress and the executive and faces no major opposition within the US political establishment. Lawmakers from both parties have voted overwhelmingly for the Missile Defense Policy Act of July 1999. In addition, both candidates for the US presidential elections have announced their support for NMD. The Department of Defense has announced its intention to publish its deployment readiness report after the third test, now scheduled for late June.

58. Within the Alliance, the discussion on US plans for NMD has only been conducted in the context of NATO demands for an extended "Air Defence" to protect against missiles. During the Munich Security conference in early February 2000 the issue attracted greater public interest. The discussion on NMD is now embedded in a broader context of security issues including, among others, ESDP. While there are different views it can be assumed that a consensus can be reached not only within NATO but also with those countries which are EU but not NATO members. There are also differences of opinion between EU countries and the other European NATO countries. While substantial progress has been achieved in reaching consensus, many questions remain to be solved. Although the United States now welcome a greater European contribution to NATO, there has been uneasiness on the US side on the intentions and ramifications of ESDI.

59. It is true that the European NATO members have not given the threats emanating from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivered by ballistic missiles as much attention as the United States. At the 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels President Clinton had already voiced concern over the negative consequences of WMD proliferation and had asked the NATO partners to develop a common approach to counter these threats. As a result, NATO issued a common threat assessment in 1996 which basically was in line with American threat perceptions. But the European NATO members did not address the issue further whereas the United States continued to do so. Hence, European members need to address these issues with the same concern as the United States, especially as the old continent is much closer to two of the rogue states as identified by the United States.

60. It is doubtful whether a decision about the development and deployment of NMD can be reached this year. It is in the interest both of the United States and the Europeans to take sufficient time to carefully consider the consequences of deploying NMD and to ascertain which kind of system that adequately addresses the security needs of the whole Alliance and which might be the best way of proceeding. The postponement of the decision would provide Alliance decision-makers with the necessary time to better evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of NMD. It would also allow time to discuss existing differences and unresolved issues.

61. Firstly, the failure of the most recent "hit-to-kill" interceptor test in January has underscored that the technology is not yet sufficiently developed. Scepticism about the system's performance is widespread among both European and American experts.

62. Secondly, there is the risk that the introduction of NMD - at this point - might not strengthen, but rather weaken the security of the transatlantic Alliance as a whole. Any deployment of NMD would only make sense if it would significantly increase the security of the United States, and at least not lessen the security of its Allies. NMD should be designed in such a way that it increases both the security of the United States as well as the security of its Allies. NMD must not create two zones of different degrees of security.

63. Thirdly, both the United States as well as its Allies should ensure that NMD does not lead to a worsening of NATO-Russia relations. It is welcomed that the Russian president and the NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, agreed to revive the strained NATO-Russia relationship during their Moscow meeting in February 2000. The NATO members will encourage the United States to come to an agreement with Russia (and China) before NMD is deployed. This is not an easy task, but it is important to explain to these countries that NMD would not lessen their security. So far, Russia is very much opposed to NMD since it believes that NMD poses a threat to its national security. In its eyes, NMD is a system that could rapidly be expanded and upgraded.

64. In this context, it is of vital interest to the Alliance to preserve the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability and transatlantic security. However, not only the ABM Treaty but also further progress in arms reductions are in jeopardy since the Russians link the implementation of START II and further arms reduction talks to a satisfactorily settlement of the dispute about the relevance and viability of the ABM Treaty.

65. Fourthly, it should not be in the Alliance's interest that NMD leads to a new arms race. The Chinese are equally opposed to NMD, since they perceive that even a limited NMD system would neutralise their relatively small nuclear capability. As a result, they might want to expand their offensive capabilities, following the Nuclear Age dictum that a good offensive beats any defence. This might trigger further arms races in South-East Asia. Any NMD deployment before an understanding has been reached with Russia and China might mean that neither the Russians nor the Chinese would agree to a cut-off in the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. After all, they may need these materials to expand their nuclear arsenals in response to possible upgrades in US missile defence.

66. Hence, even if NMD is a US decision, the US government should consider of vital interest to reach a consensus with its Allies. Apart from the possibility of creating two different zones of security, NMD will have an impact on the defence posture of the United Kingdom and France as both rely on (a limited number of) nuclear weapons as deterrents. Furthermore, parts of the system are to be deployed in European countries. As a side-effect, theoretically these countries - Denmark (Greenland), United Kingdom and Norway - might become targets for rogue states which try to circumvent the system by destroying the NMD parts located in their country.

67. Continuation of research into missile defence is necessary - and welcome - because the threats the Alliance faces today are real. Given the availability of dual-use technology, the only-partial success of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the rapid development of technology at decreasing costs, a scenario where a rogue state were able to threaten cities in Europe and North America with ICBMs armed with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons does not appear too remote. European participation in NMD research could also help to reduce the existing technological gap between the United States and its partners.

68. US plans to develop and deploy a credible and reliable defence against the threat posed by rogue states have initiated what could become a "healthy" - and useful - debate on how the member states of the Alliance can reduce the risks posed by rogue states. The Alliance needs to agree on common threat assessment and common strategy to counter the existing and future dangers. It is important to stress that Europe does not want to keep the United States vulnerable to ballistic missile attacks by a rogue state. It is equally important for the United States to reassure its European partners that NMD will not lead to a decoupling or the creation of two different zones of security. Finally, NMD is not a purely American topic, it is of eminent importance to the security of the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly can play a pivotal role in providing a forum for an open, frank exchange of views and analysis and reaching a consensus on these issues.

1. International Herald Tribune, 22 March 2000.

2. Jim Hoagland, "Some Sure Answers From Bush," The Washington Post, 19 December 1999

3. The Welch Commission Report on Reducing Risk in Ballistic Missile Defense Flight Test Programme (Report No.1, February 1998) and Report No.2, November 1999)

4. Note that the review panel completed its report before the successful intercept of an ICBM target on 2 October 1999 and before the failed intercept-test on 18 January.

5. See Georges N. Lewis, Theodore A. Postol and John Pike, "Why National Missile Defense Won't Work", Scientific American, August 1999, pp. 22-27.

6. The Honorable Edward L. Warner, III, Assistant Secretary for Strategy and Threat Reduction, February 2000.

7. See Frank Umbach, "World gets Wise to P'YongYang's Nuclear Blackmail", Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 11, No. 9 (September 1993), pp. 33-36.

8. International Herald Tribune, 28 February 2000

9. DoD News Briefing, 20 January 1999.