Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

1. The Committee General Report serves to inform members about the major issues in Alliance defence policy each year, in order to facilitate discussion and debate among members, both in the Assembly and in their home capitals. This interim spring report will attempt to frame the debate; the final version in the autumn will probe these questions in greater detail.

2. In the few events that the Committee has organised thus far this year, it has become clear that the issue of National Missile Defense (NMD) in the United States poses considerable risks and challenges for NATO and the transatlantic relationship. While some in the American foreign policy elite have been discussing NMD for several years, most Europeans and Canadians had little sense of the growing political consensus in the United States for developing NMD. During the Committee visit to Washington in February and the Committee meeting in Brussels a few weeks later, it became apparent that there is a wide divergence of views on either side of the Atlantic, a divergence that must be addressed before it threatens a transatlantic rift. As a result, this report will focus most of its attention on NMD.

3. NMD, of course, is not the only issue confronting NATO. It should not be forgotten that just one year ago, NATO was in the midst of the first military conflict of its history, waging an air campaign against Serbia in order to reverse the terror and killing being perpetrated upon the Albanian majority of Kosovo. The lessons of that conflict are still fresh, and while last year's General Report addressed the initial lessons of Kosovo, this year's report will examine the more detailed analysis that has been undertaken since then. Several countries have recently released official reports on the conflict, as have some leading defence analysts. This interim report examines some of those; the final report will provide a more detailed analysis.

4. In the meantime, other important issues continue to proceed. Relations with Russia, strained a year ago over Kosovo, are improving, while those with Ukraine remain good. Further enlargement is not imminent, but the 2002 summit meeting looms on the horizon, along with the decision on whether to admit additional new members. And within NATO, its European members are working to develop a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) at the same time that the European Union takes its first steps into the defence and security field through its nascent European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

A. US NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

1. US government policy on NMD

5. Few Europeans and Canadians paid much attention in July 1999 when US President Clinton signed into law the National Missile Defense Act, a bill that declared that it is "the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense System capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack". The act had been endorsed by overwhelming majorities in both houses of Congress.

6. Despite this wide support in Congress, many Americans remain sceptical about NMD. Those sceptics falls into three main groups: 1. Arms control advocates, who worry that NMD could lead to US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), leading to an end of strategic arms control and a nuclear arms race; 2. Atlanticists, who fear that European opposition to NMD will create an irreparable rift within the North Atlantic Alliance; 3. Budget hawks, who believe that NMD is a waste of money because it is too expensive and unlikely to work.

7. As outlined by Clinton Administration officials in briefings to this Committee, the NMD system under consideration would defend US territory against a limited ballistic missile attack launched by a rogue state, with North Korea the initial consideration. While it would be capable of intercepting a "few tens" of missiles, it would not be able to defend against an all-out Russian missile attack, preserving the "mutual assured destruction" that ensured strategic stability throughout most of the Cold War. The system being discussed here is not the space-based Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars", proposed by the Reagan Administration, which would have relied on lasers in space and other high technology to create a shield over the United States to defend against a Soviet attack during the Cold War.

2. The potential rogue nation threat

8. As noted above, the Strategic Defense Initiative of the late 1980s was the first effort by the United States to construct a NMD system. The current US NMD policy has evolved since July 1998, when a commission headed by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld concluded that the ballistic missile threat to the United States was greater than had been reported in a 1995 National Intelligence Estimate. One month later, a satellite launch attempt by North Korea failed, but underscored the new threat. While the third stage of that Taepo Dong 1 rocket did not ignite, it did fly over Japan and suggested to American analysts that North Korea was close to developing a missile that could deliver small payloads at least 5,500 kilometres. The latest National Intelligence Estimate, published in September 1999, states that North Korea is close to testing a more capable, two-stage Taepo Dong 2 rocket that "could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload to Alaska and Hawaii, and a lighter payload to the western half of the United States. A three-stage Taepo Dong 2 could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload anywhere in the United States".

9. At a briefing to the Committee in February, William Schneider, a member of the Rumsfeld Commission, explained that technology proliferation had changed since the end of the Cold War. Dr Schneider said that: 1. The technical information on nuclear weapons has been widely disseminated; 2. Most technology needed for weapons of mass destruction and missiles was commercially available (for example, from the satellite launch industry); and 3. A community of nations who want missiles (including North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Syria) are working together, selling technology and missiles in exchange for money or raw materials, like uranium. As a result, he said, nations who want to obtain ballistic missiles can purchase them from rogue states that do not operate under the strategic constraints observed by the superpowers during the Cold War.

10. American officials and experts say that Iran and Iraq could also test a missile capable of striking the United States in the next 15 years. They also emphasise in briefings to European Members that such a capability could also threaten Europe, which is geographically closer to those countries than the United States. In addition, Libya and Syria are believed to be seeking a missile capability that could prove capable of striking Europe, but US intelligence analyses do not foresee those countries having the capability to strike the United States in the next 15 years.

11. The September 1999 National Intelligence Estimate states that countries that might develop missiles capable of striking the United States would view them "more as strategic weapons of deterrence and coercive diplomacy than as weapons of war". In other words, a rogue state would use the threat of a nuclear missile attack on the US homeland to deter the United States from taking a given action. For example, Administration officials say that a decision to take military action against Iraq to reverse the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 would have been more difficult if Iraq had had nuclear missiles that could have struck the United States. As a result, a rogue state would need only one successful test before being able to threaten use of a missile.

3. Structure of a limited NMD system

12. As briefed to this Committee by US officials, a limited NMD system would consist of 100 ground-based interceptors based in central Alaska that would be designed to intercept a "few tens" of incoming missiles. The system would rely on a hit-to-kill principle; that is, it would attempt to launch an interceptor so as to physically strike an incoming missile, destroying it in flight. Incoming missiles would be tracked in flight by a new radar system to be built in the Aleutian Islands, at the far western tip of Alaska. To detect launches, the system would rely on intelligence satellites and on improvements to several early-warning radar systems, including those at Thule, Greenland, and Fylingdales, United Kingdom. (Some Members of the Committee have expressed concern that using European radar stations could put British and Danish citizens at risk from an adversary hoping to attack the NMD system by hitting these stations.) The system would be co-ordinated at the North American Aerospace Defense headquarters at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado.

13. If the decision to deploy NMD is made this year (see below), plans call for 20 interceptors to be operational by 2005, with all 100 in service by 2006. A possible second phase could include a second NMD site, probably in North Dakota, and additional early-warning and tracking radars and a Hawaii-based communication centre. The additional 100 launchers in North Dakota, the site of the initial US anti-ballistic missile site permitted under the ABM Treaty, would provide additional protection against missiles from Iraq or Iran around 2010 or 2011.

4. Testing, deployment and cost

14. A test of the proposed NMD system in October 1999 proved successful, as an interceptor launched from a missile range in the Marshall Islands, located in the Pacific Ocean, destroyed an ICBM that had been fired from California, some 7,000 km away, after 20 minutes of flight. A follow-on test in January 2000 failed, however, when the interceptor came within 100 feet of the test missile, but did not destroy it. That failure was blamed on an obstruction in the cooling system for the heat sensors that are supposed to guide the interceptor as it approaches the target missile. A third test, planned for April 2000, was postponed until late June because of the time needed for scientists to assess why the January test went wrong.

15. The Pentagon now plans to complete a technical evaluation of the NMD system by the end of July 2000. President Clinton is expected to use that evaluation to decide by the end of October 2000 whether to start construction on the Alaska sites in Spring 2001. That evaluation will be based on four criteria: 1. Whether a long-range ballistic missile threat to the United States exists; 2. Whether an effective NMD system is technically feasible; 3. Cost; 4. The overall strategic environment, including the impact of NMD on arms control objectives.

16. Because of the hurried nature of that schedule, several prominent Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, including Senators Joseph Biden, Gordon Smith, and Chuck Hagel, have urged the president to defer the decision until his successor takes office next year, which would push back the initial deployment date to 2006. Your Rapporteur shares their view for the reasons that are outlined below. But some Democratic officials are concerned that NMD could become a political issue in this year's presidential campaign because the presumptive Republican nominee, George W. Bush, has declared he will build a NMD system as soon as possible, a position that enjoys wide support among the Republican majority in the Congress. President Clinton may believe that deferring the decision could be used against his vice-president, Al Gore, who hopes to succeed him.

17. Budget estimates for development and deployment of the NMD system described above are more than $13 billion through 2007. Outside estimates range as high as $16 billion for acquisition costs, with operating costs totalling as much as an additional $16 billion over 20 years. President Clinton has requested $10.5 billion for NMD in his latest budget, covering the six years 2001-06.

B. EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO NMD

18. Most European and Canadian members of the Committee first paid serious attention to this issue in February 2000, when the Committee visited Washington for its annual meetings with American officials and defence experts. Most striking was the American attitude that NMD was now a question of "when, rather than if". The Committee meeting later that month in Brussels drove home that conclusion. An Administration official outlined a system to defend against a couple dozen missiles, while Members of Congress articulated their desire for an even more robust system.

19. European and Canadian concerns and doubts about NMD centre around five areas: 1. Doubts about the actual rogue nation threat; 2. Questions about the technical feasibility of a system; 3. Questions about the cost-effectiveness of NMD; 4. Concerns about the international consequences of a NMD deployment, including the effects on China and a possible nuclear arms race, as well as the effect on arms control in general and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in particular; and 5. Concerns about divergent threat perceptions between a United States protected by NMD and a Europe that remains vulnerable.

1. Doubts about the threat

20. In briefings about NMD in Washington and Brussels, members of this Committee were generally unconvinced that North Korea or another rogue nation would be able to strike the United States with an intercontinental ballistic missile carrying a nuclear warhead in the near future. North Korea is a failing state that has experienced widespread famine; it is implausible that such a backward state would be able to develop ballistic missile technology and nuclear warheads that could threaten the United States. In addition, North Korea in September 1999 agreed to an indefinite moratorium on its missile programme in advance of negotiations with the United States. And even if the North Korean missile programme is as advanced as is feared, there is the separate question about that country's ability to place a nuclear, biological or chemical warhead atop a missile, particularly given the freeze in North Korea's nuclear programme.

21. Still, one must acknowledge the possibility that the North Korean missile and nuclear programmes are more advanced than these facts would seem to allow. After all, the Soviet Union showed that a communist dictatorship is uniquely positioned to exploit its economy for the benefit of its military, at the expense of basic necessities for its citizens. At present, however, American officials have not yet made their case that the threat from North Korea, not to mention Iran and Iraq, is as serious, imminent and credible as they maintain. Your Rapporteur looks forward to additional discussions with US officials to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to back the claims of a near-term rogue nation missile threat upon which NMD is predicated.

2. Questions about technical feasibility

22. Even if North Korea tomorrow proved capable of hitting the United States with a ballistic missile carrying weapons of mass destruction, it is unclear whether the technology exists to intercept a missile. The failure of the January 2000 test reinforced the scepticism of many Europeans about whether an NMD system will ever be effective. Proponents of the system will argue that the failure was due to a minor flaw that can be fixed and that the test went as planned until the final seconds; however, a failure for whatever reason means that a missile will not be intercepted. The results of the first two tests do not yet prove that a NMD system is technically feasible, but the results do show that it may be possible to develop such a system with additional research and testing. One might ask, however, why the United States is in such a rush to deploy such a system.

23. An independent NMD review panel, led by retired Air Force General Larry Welch, noted that the US government and its contractor, "continue to underestimate the challenge of reliably performing exoatmospheric HTK (hit to kill)". The report criticised the programme's emphasis on calendar deadlines, rather than performance milestones, for making decisions about whether to go ahead with deployment, and it states that a "demonstration of readiness to deploy" a NMD system "will not come until 2003 at the earliest".

3. Questions about cost-effectiveness

24. As noted above, official estimates of the cost of the initial-phase NMD system are $13 billion through 2007 for acquisition alone. Proponents will argue that a system that saves even one American city from nuclear attack will easily justify its cost, an argument that assumes that an NMD system will work and that there exists an adversary irrational enough to launch a ballistic missile at the world's strongest military power. Opponents will point to other uses of that money that they would argue could provide greater security against a nuclear attack; for example, increasing programmes that employ Russian nuclear scientists so they are not tempted to share their expertise with aspiring nuclear powers.

25. In addition, a NMD system will not protect the United States against the most likely nuclear, biological or chemical weapons threats it faces. State-sponsored terrorism using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is more likely than the use of an intercontinental ballistic missile to deliver WMD to a target in the United States. Some experts have noted that a small nuclear device could be concealed in a suitcase or placed aboard a ship that sails into New York harbour far easier than it could be placed atop an ICBM. The sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway graphically illustrated the kinds of WMD threats that rogue states and terrorists are more likely to use. NMD would not prove effective in such a case.

26. Finally, it is unclear whether NMD is the most effective way to dissuade potential nuclear powers from launching a ballistic missile attack on the United States. For decades, Moscow and Washington have possessed the capability to annihilate each other in a nuclear exchange. From these capabilities arose the theory of nuclear deterrence; in short, a nuclear power will not strike another nuclear power because it is vulnerable itself to a devastating counter-attack. The proponents of NMD fail to explain convincingly why deterrence, which proved so effective at deterring a Soviet attack, is no longer applicable to lesser powers whose own capability to strike the United States is in doubt.

4. Arms control and proliferation

27. One of the greatest European concerns about US deployment of a NMD system concerns the effects of such a decision on arms control and proliferation. While the deployment of a NMD system with 100 interceptors would not significantly hinder Russia's nuclear deterrent, which consists of about 6,000 nuclear missiles, it would have an effect on China, which currently has about 20 intercontinental ballistic missiles that could reach the United States. The easiest way for China to overcome a NMD system would be to build enough missiles to overcome the system. While such an arms build-up would burden the Chinese economy, it would be a logical path for Beijing if it is concerned about its deterrent capability. But given the geopolitics of Asia, this easily could lead to fear in India, which cited China as the main factor in its decision to test nuclear weapons. An Indian arms build-up could lead to a similar response in Pakistan, India's long-time rival. And a Chinese arms build-up would be particularly worrisome at a time when tensions over Taiwan are growing. The potential for a new nuclear arms race is the most troubling aspect of the US NMD plan, a fear that US officials have done little to dispel.

28. In addition, Russia would worry about the "breakout" potential of a limited NMD system; that is, the ability that the United States might have to rapidly expand NMD so as to counter the Russian nuclear deterrent. American officials have not adequately addressed this concern. While some might argue that a complete "Star Wars" defence against thousands of missiles is technologically impossible, other NMD proponents argue for precisely such a system to be deployed ultimately. Again, the logical response to a potential adversary's missile defence system might be to increase one's own missile arsenal, so as to be able to overwhelm NMD.

5. Divergent threat perceptions

29. Many Europeans have noted that a United States protected from a limited missile strike would be likely to view security threats differently than its European allies, which would still be vulnerable to a missile attack. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has expressed a fear that this divergence in threat perception could lead the European allies to question the American commitment to guarantee European security with all means at its disposal.

30. American officials respond that NMD will allow the United States to be more active in defending its friends and interests worldwide. According to their logic, a potential adversary with the ability to hit US territory with a nuclear missile could persuade the United States not to intervene in a far-off conflict, so as not to put the American population at risk. They cite the example of the Persian Gulf War and ask how the United States might have responded had Iraq had nuclear missiles capable of striking the American homeland. However, if the United States has a NMD capable of intercepting that adversary missile, the argument goes, it would retain freedom of action in defending its interests and allies. Some Europeans, including Members of this Committee, agree. One Member has noted, "A protected United States is good for Europe". In addition, the United States has promised to share its Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) technology with its allies in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, enabling a common regional response to a regional threat from countries like Iraq (see below).

C. ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

1. Background

31. The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Systems was signed between the United States and the USSR on 26 May 1972 . The treaty obligates the parties not to build a nation-wide defence system against strategic ballistic missile attack. The original 1972 treaty permitted each country to deploy two missile-defence sites of 100 interceptors each; one to protect a missile site, the other to protect the country's capital, within a radius of less than 150 kilometres. A 1974 protocol amended that provision to one site each. The United States chose to build its site at Grand Forks, North Dakota, but that site was operated for less than a year before being shuttered in 1975. The Soviet Union built a site to defend Moscow.

32. When the USSR dissolved in 1991, the only operationally-deployed ABM system was at Moscow, while a number of its early warning radars and an ABM test range were located outside of Russia. A 1996 Memorandum of Understanding established that the parties to the ABM Treaty are the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Some proponents of NMD in the United States have argued that the ABM Treaty is no longer in effect because the Soviet Union no longer exists; however, the Clinton Administration maintains that it has authority to recognise successors to a treaty. Another agreement related to the ABM Treaty was signed in 1997 by the United States and Russia and defines a technical demarcation between Theatre Missile Defense systems (see above), which are permitted under the treaty, and NMD, which is not. Likewise, it has not been ratified.

2. Amending the ABM Treaty

33. Three aspects of the ABM Treaty clearly must be amended to permit construction to begin on the proposed NMD radar and interceptor sites in Alaska:

1. The 1974 protocol limiting the United States to one site in North Dakota must be amended to permit a new site in Alaska, consisting of radar and interceptor installations that are more than 150 kilometres apart.

2. The prohibition on a national ABM system must be amended to permit a system that can defend the national territory against a limited attack.

3. An amendment is needed to permit the United States to use its five early warning radars for an ABM system, including a change on the restriction against using components outside of the national territory (two of those radars are located in the United Kingdom and Greenland).

34. In addition, it may be necessary to amend a section of the treaty that prohibits non-ABM components from being given an ABM capability; this because plans call for commercial rocket boosters to be used in the NMD system. The provision exists to prevent stockpiling of ABM components by declaring that they have other uses. The proposed second phase of the US NMD plan would require additional amendments to permit construction of additional radar tracking stations and a satellite tracking system.

35. Should Russia fail to agree to the necessary amendments, there may be irresistible pressure on the Clinton Administration to withdraw from the treaty. This is particularly troubling given the tight time frame involved. The treaty calls for six months' notice to be given before a country withdraws. That leaves only a few months this year to negotiate with Russia before notice of withdrawal would have to be given in Autumn 2000, six months prior to the start of construction in Spring 2001. This is another reason that President Clinton should defer the decision on deployment until his successor takes office next year.

3. Russian views on ABM amendments

36. Russians consider the ABM Treaty to be a "cornerstone" of strategic stability which cannot be amended. They worry that a missile defence shield could neutralise their arsenal of long-range nuclear-armed missiles. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin denounced the October 1999 test, saying that "this test is a step that runs counter to the 1972 ABM Treaty in which article 1 bans the very creation of a basis for such defence. These actions by the US in effect undermine the key provisions of the ABM Treaty with all the ensuing negative consequences, the responsibility for which will rest with the United States".

37. Vladimir Yakovlev, commander-in-chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, said in October 1999 that US actions have the potential to upset strategic stability. He warned, "if the United States throws out the 1972 ABM Treaty, they will effectively become the culprit for a disruption of the process of limiting nuclear weapons". In September 1999, the former Head of the Duma Defence Committee, Roman Popkovich, called efforts to amend the ABM Treaty "unacceptable", although he added that if the US makes its proposals for building a new anti-missile system more transparent, then the changes could be discussed.

4. Alliance views on ABM amendments

38. The issues relating to NMD were debated at the December 1999 NATO defence and foreign ministerial meetings in Brussels. Although several Allies share US concerns about the threat from the rogue states, most if not all allies disagree on whether the NMD is the right way to address this threat. Britain and France are concerned with the perspective that other nuclear states such as Russia and China will respond to the US NMD system by enhancing their nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. This, of course, would undermine their own nuclear weapons. "We must avoid any questioning of the ABM Treaty that could lead to a disruption of strategic equilibrium and a new nuclear arms race", said President Jacques Chirac of France. Other NATO members are watching developments before taking a position.

39. Defense Secretary William Cohen promised that Allies' views would be taken into consideration before President Clinton takes a decision on whether to proceed with the NMD system. Your Rapporteur appreciates the efforts that the Clinton Administration has made to meet with this Committee, particularly the February briefing in Brussels by Assistant Secretary of Defense Edward Warner III.

5. START II and START III

40. START II, which is intended to reduce deployed Russian and US strategic arms down to a level of 3,500 warheads was signed by the US and Russian presidents in 1993. In January 1996, it was ratified by the US Senate. However, it has not yet been ratified by the Russian parliament. As a result, both sides remain bound by the START I limits of 6,000 nuclear warheads each.

41. New Russian President Vladimir Putin has called for START II ratification, believing that the treaty is still in Russian national interests. However, other Russian officials and experts have cautioned against moving too quickly on that treaty, citing concerns over NMD and the failure of the US Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Another problem for Russia is that START II calls for Russia to replace several hundred multiple-warhead missiles with new, single-warhead missiles --- a cost that the struggling Russian economy can ill afford.

42. Despite Russian failure to ratify START II, both countries have begun preliminary discussions about a future START III Treaty. US policy currently is to delay official negotiations until Russia ratifies START II. The initial outlines for START III call for both sides to reduce their arsenals to between 2,000 and 2,500 warheads, a level that would not require Russia to build new missiles. Recently, Russia has proposed that START III entail much deeper reductions, down to a level of 1,000 to 1,500 warheads for each side. Some observers believe that the Russian desire for deep cuts in START III and the US desire for modifications to the ABM Treaty could provide the basis for a "grand bargain" on strategic arms control. According to this idea, proposed by Ivo Daalder of the Brookings Institution in Washington, both sides would agree to cut their arsenals to 1,000 to 1,500 over time. In return, Russia would agree to ABM amendments needed for deployment of a limited NMD system that would not threaten Russian strategic deterrence.

43. This grand bargain could provide the way out of this potential minefield. While it is still not clear that a NMD system is in the interests of the United States and the Alliance, it is abundantly clear that the ABM Treaty contributes to stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. Any effort to maintain the core of the ABM Treaty should be welcomed, as should any effort to reduce nuclear arsenals from Cold War levels to a threshold that maintains minimal deterrence.

D. THEATRE MISSILE DEFENSE

1. US TMD efforts

44. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the use of short-range ballistic missiles by Saddam Hussein against Israel and Saudi Arabia saw the concept of Theatre Missile Defense emerge as a major issue to be tackled by the United States and its allies. TMD is a system designed to intercept ballistic missiles having a range of 80 to 3,000 kilometres. Among NATO Allies, the United States has been at the forefront in TMD efforts, which are an essential part of US defence plans. The main US objectives for TMD are the protection of forward-deployed US and allied forces and population centres against adversaries armed with Theatre Ballistic Missile (TBM) and the strengthening of US security relationship with allies, as well as discouraging the proliferation of ballistic missile technologies and WMD.

45. The four main pillars of the overall Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) architecture in US and NATO strategy include attack operations, active defence, passive defence and battle management/command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (BM/C4I) . Thus, TBM systems (NMD) constitute just the active defence pillar. Currently, the US is working on over half a dozen TMD programmes:

52. "Operation Allied Force" was NATO's largest military intervention in its history. The Allies' efforts, culminating in the 78-day air campaign, resulted in the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army from Kosovo. This chapter highlights some important lessons that analysts have drawn from the operation, both with respect to possible future operations as well as concerning the interoperability of the Allied forces.

53. In a report prepared for Sen. William Roth, head of the US Senate delegation to the Assembly, the Congressional Research Service found that "Damage inflicted on Serbian and Yugoslav forces may not have been a key factor in forcing the [Serbian] withdrawal". From the beginning, NATO ruled out the possibility of using ground forces in order to preserve Alliance cohesion and to minimise allied casualties (which proved successful, as NATO lost only two airplanes and had no casualties). While some allies contemplated the use of ground troops, it is unlikely that all 19 allies could have reached a consensus to launch a ground campaign. NATO relied on air-strikes and most of the time kept its warplanes above 15,000 feet. Furthermore, NATO restricted itself by limiting the range of targets it chose to destroy.

54. Militarily this strategy had some unfortunate consequences. Firstly, despite its best intentions to put an end to the atrocities conducted by the Serbs against the Albanian population, Operation Allied Force demonstrated that air power has only limited ability to prevent humanitarian abuses. The bulk of the atrocities against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo occurred after the air war commenced on March 24, demonstrating the failure of air power to halt mass murder and terror on the ground.

55. Secondly, until the last two weeks of the war, Yugoslav forces were able to successfully disperse their military troops and equipment in order to minimise the effectiveness of the air-strikes. NATO flew 37,225 strike and support sorties and destroyed or heavily damaged important strategic targets; for example, all Yugoslav oil-refineries and 75% of the petroleum reserves. However, the Yugoslav army remained largely intact --- "up to 85%," as NATO commanders conceded --- and was able to operate until the end of the campaign. It has now become clear that NATO overestimated its destruction of enemy tanks, artillery, and armoured vehicles.

56. Only when the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) --- a force of 15,000 to 17,000 troops at the end of the war --- put military pressure on the Yugoslavian army and forced it to respond to KLA attacks in the open field was NATO able to dramatically increase losses: A series of B-52 bomber strikes could inflict devastating casualties. Thus, NATO has to consider that there is no reason to believe that air power will be any more effective in preventing future humanitarian catastrophes like "ethnic cleansing" by determined ground forces. Even if air power can affect the behaviour of an adversary, in the end, only ground forces can shape the situation on the ground.

57. Only Slobodan Milosevic can say for certain why he ultimately decided to capitulate, but several factors were at work. First, the air campaign had escalated over the course of the conflict, becoming more intense and targeting assets in the heart of Belgrade that Milosevic may have viewed as more valuable to him. Second, the NATO allies maintained their unity throughout the conflict, dashing any hope that Milosevic had that he could outlast the Alliance and forge a split in its membership. Third, Russia made it clear that it would not unconditionally support Milosevic and that he had no choice but to seek a political settlement with NATO. Fourth, the KLA ground campaign forced Milosevic's army into the open, where NATO could attack it from the air.

58. NATO also needs to consider what its future adversaries may have taken from the way "Operation Allied Force" was carried out. In order to counter NATO's aerial advantages in future conflicts, some countries can be expected to disperse and conceal their military assets to evade detection and destruction by NATO air strikes.

59. The military effectiveness of the Kosovo-operation is one dimension to be considered. The other important aspect concerns the relation between the United States and its European allies and their ability to co-operate effectively in military intervention. The US Department of Defense Kosovo/Operation Allied Forces After-Action Report states that the operation was a success and NATO accomplished its mission. Nevertheless, the report is critical on some aspects of the operation which needs to be addressed if NATO wants to be prepared for future challenges.

60. First of all, NATO needs to improve on its political-military decision making process. Obviously, NATO's political-military command structure played an important role in the planning and execution of the operation. Reportedly, the command structure worked well. However, during the campaign, military leaders, like US Lt. Gen. Michael Short, commander of NATO air forces during the war, complained that politicians intervened at almost every stage in order to be able to approve target lists. The Netherlands' review of the Kosovo operation points out the problems caused by trying to wage "war by committee." General Short said he was close to resigning since the interventions limited the effectiveness of the air-strikes and slowed down the operation. Here, NATO faces a dilemma in the sense that it has to decide whether military efficiency imposes restrictions on interventions by political authorities or whether politicians are entitled to intercede at every stage of such a mission.

61. In order to avoid confusion and draw-backs in future situations of crisis-management the Pentagon report suggests that NATO improve on the following aspects: 1. Enhance NATO's contingency planning process for operations outside the NATO area; 2. Develop an overarching command-and-control policy and agree on procedures for the policy's implementation; 3. Enhance procedures and conduct exercises strengthening NATO's political-military interfaces.

62. Secondly, during the campaign profound problems of military interoperability arose. The Pentagon report confirms that "although experience in Operation Allied Force confirmed that the United States and our allies have made significant accomplishments working together, it also made clear that improvements are necessary." This critique has been confirmed by many military leaders who warned that NATO is in danger of becoming a "two-tiered" alliance.

63. Indeed, the NATO air campaign over Kosovo in March-June 1999 highlighted a number of operational weaknesses that require urgent attention from NATO and its partner countries. The more important centre on deficiencies in command, control and information systems, secure communications, precision strike capabilities, air operations support, and mobility systems. Investment has to be made in enhancing or developing capabilities in areas like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), precision-guided weapons and electronic counter-measures, aerial refuelling and air transport.

64. These priority areas have been repeated elsewhere; the UK Ministry of Defence paper Kosovo: An Account of the Crisis for example, says in its initial lessons learned: "The priority lies in such areas as precision-attack weapons, secure communications and strategic movement assets. Interoperability of systems will, of course, be a key component".

65. Furthermore, the European countries have a particular problem in not having sufficient numbers of professionals, particularly specialists, in their armed forces to sustain a combined-arms offensive operation of a significant size. This is an assessment that places the viability of the European Combined Joint Task Force, and indeed the concept of a ESDI in question. Increases in European defence spending, or at least a radical reallocation of resources, along with genuine collaboration in defence procurement, are necessary.

66. The European allies are taking the lessons from Kosovo seriously. At a joint summit in July 1999, Italy and the United Kingdom called for an improvement of European military capabilities and cited the need for effective European defence procurement, which will include harmonisation of military requirements and collaborative arms procurement. The United Kingdom, France, Norway, and the Netherlands are at the fore of efforts to restructure forces for the new tasks and acquire the necessary equipment. For example, the UK's Joint Rapid Reaction Forces should be ready in 2001. The French, for their part, take exception to the Pentagon's criticism of the European performance and point out that in certain areas, like unmanned air-vehicles or air-to-air refuelling, European technology is ahead, as they emphasise in their defence ministry's post-Kosovo reflection paper Les Enseignements du Kosovo: Analyses et Références. Your Rapporteur will examine other analyses of the Kosovo operation as they are released this year and will offer a more detailed analysis in the autumn report.

67. Russia suspended its co-operation with NATO after the North Atlantic Council decided on 23 March 1999 to authorise NATO air strikes against strategic targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. While the Duma, or lower house of Parliament, officially ended co-operation with the Assembly a day later, the upper house, the Russian Federation Council, continued to participate in all Assembly activities.

68. In July 1999, the Russian government decided to resume its meetings with NATO in the framework of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) for the sole purpose of discussing interaction in KFOR. Russia sent 3,615 peacekeeping troops to Kosovo. Since July 1999, the PJC convened five times for this purpose. However, the new government of Russia under President Vladimir Putin has declared that it is seeking more co-operative relations with NATO. The Russian Ministry of Defence announced in March 2000 that Russia was ready to resume high-level contacts with NATO. Russia has also decided to resume meetings of the Permanent Joint Council at ministerial level. This is considered the first step toward unfreezing NATO-Russia relations in all aspects of the Founding Act. The Duma has not yet considered resuming its relations with the Assembly; however, the positive attitude of Mr Putin may well be reflected in a more co-operative Duma.

A. NEW RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE

69. The Security Council of the Russian Federation approved a new national military doctrine on 4 February 2000, which will replace the one adopted in 1993. Factors that influenced Russian thinking included:

1. the crisis in Kosovo made Russia believe that NATO could interfere in Russian internal affairs;

2. NATO's new strategic concept with provisions that enable the alliance to use force outside of NATO members' territory without UN consent;

3. the possibility of the Baltic states joining NATO;

4. US attempts to create a new NMD programme;

5. the threat posed by Islamist militants.

71. In January 2000, then-Acting President Vladimir Putin signed the new National Security Concept, which replaced the 1997 National Security Concept. The document only briefly makes a note of nuclear strategy, defining economic crisis and domestic social and political instability as the main threats to Russian national security. One change in the new document allows Russia to use nuclear weapons "in case it needs to repel an armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted or proved ineffective".

B. IMPACT ON NATO DEFENCE POLICY

72. According to NATO officials, the Russian new draft of military doctrine and new strategic concept "are not considered as particularly worrying". It is seen that Moscow is distancing itself from the "co-operative security" approach and from the strengthened co-operation policy with the West that prevailed in the 1990s. It is not surprising for NATO that new documents lower the nuclear threshold and no longer mention the "no first use" concept of nuclear weapons.

73. Even though the Alliance "is not particularly concerned" by the new Russian documents, some officials noted that the two documents have confirmed NATO's position to maintain its 30-year-old policy of "flexible response", which allows the alliance to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into a conflict, including in reply to an attack with conventional weapons. During its 50th anniversary summit in Washington in April 1999, however, the Alliance did agree to begin a process to review its entire nuclear policy in light of the "reduced salience" of nuclear weapons.

C. RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE

74. The executive branch of Ukraine has a consistent policy that partnership with the Alliance poses no threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity and instead is the key to independence and security. Even though the leftist Ukrainian parliament reacted negatively to the events in Kosovo and drew up several resolutions demanding that Ukraine cancel its accords with NATO and reverse its nuclear-free status, which it has held since 1991, President Leonid Kuchma responded to parliament's actions by saying that those resolutions "will under no circumstances affect those relations. We believe that we are implementing a balanced policy in our relations with NATO."

75. The NATO-Ukraine Commission never stopped its activity during the Kosovo conflict. The Commission meets once a month in Brussels to discuss the implementation of activities under the NATO-Ukraine Charter. Both NATO and Ukrainian officials highly assessed the joint activities in 1999, including the ongoing work of the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, activities of the NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv, and continuing co-operation within Partnership for Peace and Planning and Review Process, in retraining of retired military personnel, scientific and environmental affairs, and civil emergency planning. The NATO-Ukraine Commission met at the level of Foreign Ministers at NATO Headquarters in December 1999, where the Ministers endorsed a substantial range of co-operative activities for 2000, with a particular emphasis on such fields as military-technical co-operation, armaments and standardisation, economic and environmental aspects of defence-related activities, science and technology, and civil emergency planning.

76. Another important aspect of security is Ukraine's relations with Russia. President Leonid Kuchma said in his address to the Heads of diplomatic mission on 18 January 2000 that "our European future is inseparable from our strategic partnership with Russia". He added that a "strong democratic Russia is impossible without normal friendly relations with Ukraine. On a wider scale the state of Ukraine-Russia relations determines to a large extent stability and security in Europe".

77. The development of a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO has been ongoing since the 1996 Berlin Summit, but this effort has been given new momentum in the past year by the efforts of the European Union to develop its own Common Foreign and Security Policy. At its Helsinki summit in December 1999, the European Council underlined "its determination to develop an autonomous capacity [in the framework of its Common European Policy on Security and Defence] to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises". With the Headline Goal, member states committed themselves by 2003 to be able to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of 50,000 to 60,000 troops capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks; i.e. humanitarian and rescue tasks and tasks of military forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

78. British Prime Minister Tony Blair neatly summed up the challenge facing many of the allies: "We Europeans need to restructure our defence capabilities so that we can project force, can deploy our troops, ships and planes beyond their home bases and sustain them there, equipped to deal with whatever level of conflict they may face". An initiative by German Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping to create a European airlift command was endorsed by his government and France at the November 1999 Franco-German summit. This airlift command would exercise common management of European military airlift capabilities and would co-ordinate with civilian resources that might be utilised. The Netherlands is working with France to establish a similar European sea-lift command.

79. The EU has established interim bodies to oversee ESDP: the Political and Security Committee and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit on 1 March 2000, which is within the Council secretariat and under the responsibility of the High Representative, Javier Solana. Its mandate includes monitoring, analysis and assessment of international developments and events, including early warning on potential crises. A Committee for Civilian Crisis Management is to be set up at the Feira summit later this spring. The nucleus of the future Military Staff is taking shape with the detachment of military experts from member states to the Council secretariat.

80. Your Rapporteur notes the report of the Subcommittee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Co-operation by Wim van Eekelen that discusses ESDI in more detail. The final general report in the autumn will update the progress being made within NATO and the EU on ESDI.

81. With the admission of three new members to NATO last year, much of the Alliance's effort shifted to integrating the new countries into Alliance structures. As a result, the further enlargement of NATO has been moved to the back burner. Officials now point to a summit to be held in 2002 as the point at which a decision will be made on whether to offer membership to any of the nine Central European nations that have applied.

82. In the meantime, NATO has undertaken steps to assist those countries and other Partners for Peace. At the Washington Summit, NATO unveiled the Membership Action Plan (MAP), designed to help aspiring countries meet NATO standards and prepare for possible future membership. Through this programme, NATO gives advice, assistance and practical support to countries aspiring to membership. Under the MAP, aspiring members submit individual annual national programmes on their preparations for possible future membership. The programmes cover political, economic, defence, resource, security and legal aspects. The plan entails a focused and candid feedback mechanism on the progress being made, including both political and technical advice. A clearinghouse is co-ordinating assistance by NATO and by member states to aspirant countries in the defence and military field. Agreed planning targets for aspirants are being elaborated and reviewed.

83. While the substantive progress on enlargement through the MAP is real, there is a developing political sense that the next round is being delayed. It is understandable that NATO needs some time to assimilate three new members before admitting others, but this cannot continue for too long. NATO's open-door policy is an essential part of reintegrating the new democracies into Euro-Atlantic institutions. NATO must remain committed to the prompt admission of all qualified European democracies into the Alliance.