IAEA 10 June 1994
BRIEF SELECTIVE CHRONOLOGY REGARDING SAFEGUARDS IN
DPRK
1. Comprehensive safeguards agreement with DPRK entered into force
on 10 April 1992, permitting verification that all nuclear material
and all nuclear facilities in the DPRK were used exclusively for
peaceful purposes and assessment of whether the initial declaration of
material and facilities (received on 4 May 1992) is complete and
correct. The DPRK declared holdings of plutonium of less than 1 kilogram.
2. During 1992 the Agency's analysis of samples from the reprocessing
plant indicated inconsistencies that led the IAEA to conclude more
plutonium exists: whether grams or kilograms is unknown.
3. In late 1993/early 1993 the Agency requested access to and samples
from two non-declared sites which were apparently related to nuclear
waste. This was declined and the DPRK declared the sites to be non-nuclear
and military.
4. The matter was referred to the Security Council in Spring 1993.
The Council endorsed the Agency's position, urged DPRK to co-operate,
urged the Director General to seek consultations with the DPRK and urged
Member States to seek to promote a solution.
5. On 12 March 1993 the DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from
the NPT.
6. During 1993 the US especially had many contacts with the DPRK aimed at
finding some settlement which would take account of security concerns of
the DPRK and seek full nuclear transparency on the part of the DPRK.
7. The DPRK declared on 11 June 1993 that it "suspended the effectuation
of its withdrawal" from the NPT.
8. On February 15 1994, after lengthy talks with the IAEA, a detailed
understanding was reached with the IAEA about conducting inspections
that the Agency requested - with the exception of the two non-declared,
apparently waste related sites.
9. An inspection was performed in March 1994, but was blocked on very
important points in the reprocessing plant.
10. The Agency reported the matter to the Security Council which
endorsed the Agency's request.
11. After further talks between DPRK and other States, the DPRK
accepted Agency inspection of the points earlier blocked. These
inspections have been performed and analysis of the results will
be available in due course.
12. At about the same time, the DPRK informed the Agency that it
intended to refuel the 5 MW Experimental Nuclear Power Reactor,
loaded in 1986 and operated since 1987. The Agency immediately informed
the DPRK that - as it had told DPRK authorities already in
February 1993 - it wished during such refuelling to select a number
of fuel rods, segregate them from the others, secure them so that they
would not be replace by others and examine them. This was requested
because an examination of the rods might show how long they had been
in the reactor. This presupposes availability of a representative sample
of rods and knowledge of exactly where they had been located. If it
were found that some or all the rods in the reactor had been there for
a shorter time than eight years, that there could exist non-declared
nuclear material, spent fuel, or perhaps plutonium and waste.
13. The DPRK first ignored the IAEA'S request to select a sample
of rods and stated that the Agency could verify that the discharged
fuel would not be diverted. Later it answered that such selection and
segregation was incompatible with the DPRK's "unique status".
14. When the discharge of fuel continued without agreement and the
Secretariat saw the possibility of this particular path to verifying
the DPRK's nuclear inventory closing, it reported the situation on the
Security Council and the Board of Governors.
15. As communications between the Agency and DPRK indicated that DPRK
was ready to consult about the issue of inspections, the Agency sent
officials for talks to the DPRK. They explained again the urgency
of the measures requested by the Agency and met again complete rejection
of the measures because of DPRK's "unique status".
16. At this stage, when already well over half of the fuel in the reactor
had been discharged, the DPRK described a method which it claimed would
enable the Agency in the future - after they had reached a package agreement
with the Unite States and abandoned its "unique status", prevented a valid
future examination which could have confirmed or negated its claim that the
fuel which has now been discharged was the first fuel in the reactor and
that no earlier fuel had been taken out for possible reprocessing and
plutonium separation. The Agency is not saying this has been the case,
but it cannot exclude it.
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