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Mr. Chairman,

At the meeting of the Board of Governors in February I reported on the reasons for my request of 9 February to the DPRK to grant the Agency access to certain specified information and locations in the DPRK. I made clear that the Agency had invoked its right under the Agreement to carry out special inspections only when other efforts to obtain clarity about the DPRK's nuclear programme had been found insufficient to give the information that is needed to verify the correctness and assess the completeness of the Initial Report submitted by the DPRK and when inconsistencies between that report and Agency measurements and analysis persisted.

Following its deliberations in February, the Board adopted, without a vote, a resolution (GOV/2636) which calls for the full and prompt implementation of the DPRK's Safeguards Agreement with the Agency. It calls upon the DPRK to co-operate fully with the Agency to enable the Agency to discharge its responsibilities under the Safeguards Agreement. The resolution also asks the DPRK to respond positively and without delay to the request of 9 February 1993 for access to additional information and to two additional sites. Such access was determined by the Board to be essential and urgent to resolve differences and to ensure verification of compliance with the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/403).

By operative paragraph 6 of the resolution, the Director General was requested to transmit the text to the DPRK, to continue dialogue with the DPRK with a view toward urgent resolution of the issues identified and to report again to the Board not later than a month from the date on which the resolution was adopted.

I had hoped very much that, by 25 March, I would be in a position to report on Agency access to additional information and to two additional locations as requested by the Board. I regret that events have rather taken us in the opposite direction from that requested by the Board.

The report now before you (GOV/INF/683) describes the developments which have taken place since the resolution was forwarded to the DPRK on 26 February. Attached to the report, are copies of the correspondence which has been exchanged with the DPRK authorities. It will be clear from all this documentation that, despite the Secretariat's endeavours to obtain full implemention of the resolution, no progress has been made.

I felt it necessary to request this meeting of the Board ahead of the one month limit set to report this situation to the Board. Rather than receiving confirmation from the DPRK about readiness to receive an inspection team, the Agency received information last week that the DPRK is withdrawing from the NPT - which has direct implications for Agency safeguards in the DPRK.

In addition, the Agency received on 16 March a telex from the DPRK Minister for Atomic Energy, stating that the DPRK "cannot receive Agency inspection teams."

It is with some sadness that I report this to the Board. About eleven months ago - 10 April 1992 - the safeguards agreement contained in INFCIRC/403 entered into force and there was a development toward nuclear transparency and - linked to that - detente. Today, regrettably, we have to note a development which reverses that trend. I know that all Members of the Board would want to consider the situation and, if possible, help to restore progress. The Secretariat shares that view and hopes that safeguards will again be fully used to create nuclear transparency and confidence. With good will and efforts by all concerned this might not be impossible to achieve, even though the prospects do not look very good today. The alternative evolution is not attractive to contemplate.

The most important reasons for the current situation and cures for it may not be found in Agency-DPRK relations. Let me say, nevertheless, on behalf of the Secretariat, that while it will insist upon the right of the Agency under the agreement with DPRK, as in other cases, to inspect locations which it has bona fide reasons to believe are nuclear-related, regardless of whether they are military, it will, of course, perform such inspections in a manner that may minimize legitimate security considerations.

At this point I should like to call the Board's attention to the fact that while the validity of the safeguards agreement with the DPRK contained in INFCIRC/403 is linked to the DPRK's adherence to the NPT, the obligations under both agreements remain fully in force for a period of three months after notice of withdrawal under Article X of the NPT. Full implementation of safeguards is obligatory during this period.

I would conclude by expressing the hope that before I am to report again to the Board by the end of this month implementation of safeguards in the DPRK will have resumed.