U.S. Envoy Says North Korean Uranium Program Remains Stumbling Block
Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee: Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Interviewer: Robert McMahon, Deputy Editor
February 15, 2008
The denuclearization deal signed by North Korea on February 13, 2007, marked its first anniversary stalled over Pyongyang’s lack of a full declaration of its programs. The envoy leading the U.S. effort in the Six-Party Talks, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill, says the dismantling of the Yongbyon reactor remains a positive sign of cooperation. But he says a chief problem at this stage is getting North Korea to admit to any past uranium-enrichment efforts as well as to dealings with third parties like Syria. North Korean officials are prepared to say they have no enrichment or export programs under way, but that is not sufficient, Hill says. “We really do need to know what all went on before, if it stopped, when did it stop.” In response to criticism of the negotiating process by the U.S. human rights envoy, Hill said rights issues will eventually become central to the talks.
We’re about six weeks past the deadline for North Korea to declare its nuclear activities and at the one-year anniversary of the denuclearization deal. In some circles it’s seen as stopped in its tracks or even off the rails. Should we expect to see a declaration from North Korea in the near future?
In order to go forward, we’re going to need to get a declaration. A declaration is part of what is called Phase Two, and it’s called for very explicitly in the agreement, including in the October [2007] agreement. So the North Koreans know they have to provide a declaration. The problem is not that they’re not willing to provide a declaration. The problem is they don’t want to give us a complete and correct one. And we don’t want to accept something that’s less than complete, less than correct.
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Copyright 2008 by the Council on Foreign Relations. This material is republished on GlobalSecurity.org with specific permission from the cfr.org. Reprint and republication queries for this article should be directed to cfr.org.
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