• Military

• WMD Menu                           

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

DPRK to Approach Six-party Talks in Its State Interests

Korean Central News Agency of DPRK

    Pyongyang, November 1 (KCNA) -- It is the principled stand of the DPRK on the six-party talks to approach the talks and handle the issue related to them in its state interests, says Rodong Sinmun Monday in a signed commentary. The DPRK took the initiative of holding the six-party talks and has exerted efforts to make them successful prompted by the desire to make the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free, prevent a nuclear war and ensure lasting peace on it, the news analyst notes, and goes on:
    U.S. State Secretary Powell during his recent junkets to Japan, south Korea and other countries falsified facts, claiming that the six-party talks were put to a stalemate because of the DPRK's lack of efforts to participate in the talks. This indicates that his Asian trip was aimed to serve a sinister political purpose of convincing the international community of the U.S. willingness to further the six-party talks, shifting the blame for the delay of the talks on to the DPRK and putting collective pressure upon it under that pretext in a bid to bring it to its knees.
    The resumption of the six-party talks entirely depends on the U.S. attitude toward them.
    . Whether the U.S. renounces its hostile policy toward the DPRK or not is a determining factor of whether the six-party talks may prove successful or whether the DPRK-U.S. relations are pushed to those of acute confrontation The Bush group's claim that the DPRK will gain much for coming out to the six-party talks does not reflect its intention to lead the talks to any solution to the problem but is nothing but a crafty trick to attain sinister political and military purposes by employing a delaying tactics.
    The DPRK government's proposal for "reward for freeze" commanded approval of all the participants in the six-party talks at their third round as it was a just offer to settle the nuclear issue fairly, a proposal calling for compensation to the DPRK for its economic losses caused by the freeze of its nuclear power industry.
    The U.S. side, too, admitted this at the talks. However, no sooner had the talks been over than the U.S. asserted that there could never be any reward for north Korea's nuclear freeze, totally negating all the agreements and the common understanding reached at the talks.
    It even went the lengths of demanding once again that the DPRK scrap its nuclear program first, thus overturning the groundwork of the six-party talks.
    Clear is an aim sought by the U.S. in this behaviour. It wanted to give the American voters the impression that the government has exerted efforts for the solution of the nuclear issue in a bid to garner support for Bush in the presidential election just near at hand so that he might be reelected and, at the same time, lay the blame for the deadlocked six-party talks at the DPRK's door in case of their collapse in a bid to secure a pretext for preempting an attack on it.
    If the U.S. truly wishes a solution to the nuclear issue through the six-party talks and peace on the Korean Peninsula it should drop its hostile policy toward the DPRK and set forth a realistic alternative proposal to accept the principle of "words for words" and "action for action" and the offer of "reward for freeze".