13 August 2004
Burden on North Korea to Advance Six-Party Process, Powell Says
Secretary calls for serious action to replace promises
North Korea must take tangible steps to demonstrate that it is seriously committed to working with its neighbors to resolve the impasse over denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, according to Secretary of State Colin Powell.
Speaking to Japanese reporters in Washington August 12, Powell said negotiations over the last 18 months among the six nations most closely involved in the issue -- China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, North Korea, and the United States -- have produced a consensus on goals. But he said the burden is now on North Korea to take action to move the process forward.
"[W]e want to help North Korea but we are not prepared to start putting real benefits on the table in response to a promise to do something," Powell said.
Powell noted that the United States has provided security assurances to North Korea, and other countries participating in the six-party negotiations have made commitments to provide food and fuel assistance.
"[W]e believe we need to see some progress. We need to see some things actually happen that shows absolute seriousness on [North Korea's] part," the secretary said.
"We showed flexibility," he continued. "All five of the six members -- and you know which ones I mean -- showed flexibility." Powell called on North Korea to respond to proposals made by its negotiating partners in the last round of talks, which concluded in June.
Asked if the situation in North Korea could be resolved over the next year in an incremental process comparable to recent efforts in Libya, Powell demurred. "I am Secretary of State, but not a fortune teller," he said.
"I would like to see the issue resolved within a year," he added. "I just don't know if it will be possible."
Powell emphasized the need to conduct negotiations in a way that serves the interest of each member in the six-party talks.
"The North Koreans want to feel safe," he said, adding that the United States has "no hostile intention" toward North Korea. "But it has to begin with North Korea removing this danger to the region, this danger of nuclear weapons."
Powell acknowledged that North Korea would need outside assistance if it agrees to dismantle its nuclear program. "I think the IAEA would have a role to play and all of the other parties to the six-party talks would have a role to play," he said.
Any denuclearization agreement, however, would have to be "totally irreversible," Powell stressed, and "in the context of the entire program" -- including "an acknowledgement of not only the previous programs of plutonium but the enriched uranium programs as well."
Only in that context, would the United States be "willing to assist with the cost of removal, destruction and total elimination of the programs," Powell said.
The secretary responded to questions on several other topics, including potential permanent member status for Japan on the United Nations Security Council; the creation of an East Asian economic community; and the effectiveness of U.S. economic sanctions against the military regime of Burma.
Following is the State Department transcript of Powell's interview:
(begin transcript)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
August 13, 2004
INTERVIEW
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell
Roundtable with Japanese Journalists
August 12, 2004
Washington, D.C.
(3:30 p.m. EDT)
SECRETARY POWELL: Well, it's a great pleasure to see you all. And in the interest of time, I will just make myself available to your questions, in whatever order you would like to ask them, if you have worked that out.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Thank you very much. My question is on North Korea. Libya voluntarily give up -- decided to give up its WMD program. But it took nine months to relinquish it and an additional several month, several month to actually dismantle the program, and the North Koreans have not even acknowledged (inaudible). Do you think it's possible to (inaudible) North Korea (inaudible) one year from now?
SECRETARY POWELL: I don't know. I am Secretary of State, but not a fortune teller. (Laughter.) I would like to see the issue resolved within a year. I just don't know if it will be possible. I do know, though, that we have made progress over the last year and a half by getting all of the parties in the six-party talks to acknowledge that the mutual goal is the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, even North Koreans agree to that.
What we are discussing now is how to go about it in a way that serves the interest of each member in the six-party talks. The North Koreans want to feel safe, and that they will not be attacked or invaded by the United States. And we have said that repeatedly. We have no desire or intention to attack or invade North Korea. We have no hostile intention toward North Korea.
The President has said many times that he is concerned about the North Korean people and he would like to see if it is not possible for the international community to help them, not to invade them, but to help them. But it has to begin with North Korea removing this danger to the region, this danger of nuclear weapons. And I think the six-party talks have shown some progress.
These things take time, necessarily. As you noted, it took a long time with Libya, but Libya came to a very sound conclusion. Libya said, "What are we getting for this? We spent a lot of money on chemical and nuclear programs. And does anybody like us any better? Are we getting investment? The rest of the world is globalizing. The rest of the world is going into the Internet age, and we sit here with our health care system deteriorating, with all kinds of other things that are not favorable to us, so maybe we should get rid of this." And that's what they chose to do.
We have described this example to the North Koreans. The North Koreans always respond saying, "We're not Libya." Well, we know you're not Libya, but you should make the same kind of assessment. And if you have a program that is not serving a particular purpose, then maybe it's time to think about how we could more rapidly get rid of that program and deal with that program.
But the North Koreans want to be safe. They want to believe that if they didn't have this program, that the United States would not invade them. We're not going to invade them with this program or without this program. It's not our intention or the purpose we serve. South Korea wants to be safe. Japan wants to be safe from the threat of nuclear weapons in the region, and both China and Russia realize that this is destabilizing to have this kind of program in the region.
So we all have a mutual goal, denuclearization of the Peninsula, and everybody is looking at their own individual needs in order to move forward. How long it will take, I don't know. The agreed framework in 1994 didn't happen all of a sudden, it took time. It took a lot of time and a lot of interlocutors, and a lot of meeting -- meetings before the agreed framework was arrived at, and it was a flawed agreement.
And so, we want a good agreement. And we want an agreement that serves the needs and the purposes of all of the parties, and the President is looking for and hoping for a political and diplomatic solution.
QUESTION: I understand the U.S., the United States, has supported Japan's membership in the UN Security Council as a permanent member. In the case, what is your view about the Article 9 of the Japanese constitution says that there are obstacles that, you know, (inaudible) that Japan's participation when it comes to (inaudible).
SECRETARY POWELL: Well, as you know, Secretary General Annan has a group studying the United Nations now, a group of very distinguished individuals, Mr. Brent Scowcroft is the American who is on this group, and I hope that they will come up with ideas that would allow all of us to examine the right composition for the Security Council. Is this current form, the right form, or should it be expanded? Should it have different tiers of membership within the Security Council? But we certainly have been supportive of Japan's interest in becoming a member of this major body within the general -- within the United Nations, the Security Council.
Article 9, of course, is something that the Japanese people feel very, very strongly about, and it really comes out of the World War II experience. And it is something that I think was encouraged by the Americans at that time. And so, we understand the importance of Article 9 to the Japanese people and why it's in your constitution. But at the same time, if Japan is going to play a full role on the world stage and become a full active participating member of the Security Council and have the kinds of obligations that it would pick up as a member of the Security Council, then Article 9 would have to be examined in that light.
But whether or not Article 9 should be modified or changed is absolutely, entirely up to the Japanese people to decide because it is in your constitution, and the United States would never presume to offer an opinion. The only opinion that counts in this regard is the opinion of the Japanese people, as they express their collective will, as to whether they wish their constitution changed or not.
Our security obligations with Japan are well known because it's documented in our mutual defense agreements.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, last month, in Jakarta, ASEAN Plus 3 discussed establishing so-called East Asia community. What is your view on that? I mean, I understand that your last -- I mean, the former administration, the former Bush Administration --
SECRETARY POWELL: Former Bush Administration?
QUESTION: Former Bush Administration, proposed the idea of establishing a so-called East Asia economic focus.
SECRETARY POWELL: Mm-hmm. We believe that the various Asian bodies, whether it's the Asian Regional Forum or ASEAN, or if you talk about economic issues, APEC gives everybody an opportunity to express views and find programs of mutual benefit that they can use to go forward into this 21st century globalizing world.
The United States understands that there may be some reasons that people have for going into other kinds of formats, such as ASEAN Plus 3. We just hope that as our friends in Asia look at these alternatives or these other formations, they're free to participate in their sovereign countries. We would hope they would only do so if it did not, in any way, damage the relationship that the United States has bilaterally with our friends in the region and that we have within the ASEAN Regional Forum framework.
And that's why I go to Jakarta every -- or to the ASEAN meeting every year and I sing. (Laughter.) But it's an important -- it's an important body because it brings all of us together in the United States. It is the major large Asian forum that the United States plays a part in, and it is becoming more than just an economic discussion in our ARF meetings, it is also now dealing with security and terrorism, which affects economics.
So, we are not yet persuaded of the need for these other arrangements, but sovereign nations are free to choose what they do, but don't choose it in a way that undercuts the very, very fine and strong relations that we have, that the United States has with each and every one of our friends in Asia.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, back to North Korea. Is the Nunn-Lugar program something that can be applied to North --
SECRETARY POWELL: The what?
QUESTION: Nunn-Lugar. Can that be applied to North Korea? If North Korea decides to dismantle its program, would you give them money and expertise to jointly sort of dismantle, the way we did that in the Soviet Union?
SECRETARY POWELL: I don't know whether it would be under the Nunn-Lugar framework, but certainly if North Korea moves in this direction we understand that outside resources would be needed to help North Korea. I think the IAEA would have a role to play and all of the other parties to the six-party talks would have a role to play.
QUESTION: In money and expertise? Would the U.S. give them --
SECRETARY POWELL: Yeah, mm-hmm. You know, under the Agreed Framework we had experts who were monitoring things in North Korea, as was the IAEA, but I think just as we did with Libya in helping to remove the burden that it had of these programs, we would certainly help North Korea.
QUESTION: Also on North Korea --
SECRETARY POWELL: I think it's important for me to say, though, it has to be done in the context of something that is totally irreversible and it has to be done in the context of the entire program, all aspects of the program, and there has to be an acknowledgement of not only the previous programs of plutonium but the enriched uranium programs as well.
So, in that context, and that's the six-party context, certainly the United States would be willing to assist with the cost of removal, destruction and total elimination of the programs.
QUESTION: Also HEU program? So if North Korea continued to deny its HEU program at the next round of six-party talk, are you going to shift your forecast to the nonproliferation regime, such as PSI? I am wondering at what point would the U.S. decide to take this issue to the UN Security Council.
SECRETARY POWELL: No, no decisions have been made. We are far from that kind of action at this point. There are other aspects to North Korean behavior that we don't like: selling of weapons, selling of knowledge of weapons, counterfeiting of money; there are drug trade issues that we have with North Korea. So there are many other aspects to their policies that we are disapproving of.
But with respect to the enriched uranium program, we believe that the evidence is solid that they have done work in this program on this kind of technology and we don't see how we could get a complete solution to the nuclear question without getting questions answered with respect to the enriched uranium program. When we confronted them with the information that we had that they had such a program, they were distressed but then they acknowledged it. They said so. We do, yes. And they have acknowledged it subsequently and they have also denied it subsequently. So sometimes they say they have it and sometimes they say they don't have it. Sometimes they say, well, that was just a tactic we used in negotiations and sometimes they say it was not a tactic, we do have it.
And so it's difficult to read them. Since it is difficult to read them, I think we have to insist that all parts of their program, plutonium and enriched uranium, have to be part of any agreement. When the Agreed Framework was entered into, it was clearly for the purpose of denuclearizing the peninsula, but everybody thought it was only a plutonium denuclearization at Yongbyon and we discovered in the last several years that they had been working on enriched uranium. And so we can't go down that road again. We cannot be put in a position -- the world cannot be put in a position -- of knowing of an enriched uranium program and not having it as part of the denuclearization process.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, also thank you so much for (inaudible) appreciate it. I want to follow up my colleague's question about North Korea. In last round of six-party talks in Beijing you made a initial and a complete proposal.
SECRETARY POWELL: Mm-hmm.
QUESTION: If they made a commitment of dismantlement of the whole nuclear weapons programs, they can get some benefit and (inaudible) participate the HEU (inaudible) supply and (inaudible) but United States is not willing to do that and the North Korea now (inaudible) the United States to do some action, action for action. Do you have any, you know, flexibility to show some kind of symbolic gestures to North Korea to move the process forward just like a, such a teeny, small dollar value contribution or transportation or (inaudible)? Otherwise, and also, HEU issue -- it's -- United States proposal it's a total commitment of the old nuclear weapons. So commitment not including HEU, it's a nonstarter for United States?
SECRETARY POWELL: How can we have a total commitment if it doesn't include the enriched uranium part of the program? Now, with respect to North Korean desires, what we have said is that we want to help North Korea but we are not prepared to start putting real benefits on the table in response to a promise to do something. We have seen this kind of tactic with the North Korean negotiators in the past. Now, some of our colleagues in the six-party talks are willing to put forward fuel and maybe other help to the North Koreans. Some of our party -- our colleagues are putting forward food now. We have made a contribution through.
But we believe we need to see some progress. We need to see some things actually happen that shows absolute seriousness on their part before we would be willing to contribute support or resources to North Korea.
This should not be something that is holding up progress. Since other members of the six-party talks have said they would put something up front to assist North Korea with its fuel and energy needs, that should be enough. The United States has said up front as we start down this road we will provide assurances with respect to our lack of a hostile intent and our assertion and statement that we have no plans to invade or attack, and this will all be part of an agreement that we will enter into over time.
But the burden, frankly, in my judgment, is on North Korea to make a move, not constantly for people to come back to the United States and say, well, you made a good move at the last six-party talks, you showed a great deal of flexibility, you put down a clear statement of what you need, all of your other colleagues in the six-party talks thought that this was a significant move on the part of the United States, but the North Koreans are not happy so please make another move. No, this is not the way to negotiate with them. We showed flexibility. All five of the six members -- and you know which ones I mean -- showed flexibility and it really now is up to the North Koreans to take back that proposal, which they did, to Pyongyang, to study it carefully, to analyze it -- that's what I expect them to do -- and then to come back the next working group session or the next plenary session and respond to the proposal and we will be prepared to respond to the proposals that they put down.
So the six-party talks are serving the intended purpose of bringing all of the countries in the neighborhood, plus the United States, together. We have made some progress. All six nations are committed to denuclearization of the peninsula. All six nations know that the North Koreans require assistance. All six nations are agreed in principle that some sort of security document will be appropriate at the right time. So we have made progress, but these things take time.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. My question is regarding (inaudible) Major Jenkins. This issue is a difficult issue. First of all, at the same time there are separate idea in Japan how to resolve this issue. I am wondering, I know that United States position has not changed, especially DOD attitude still very strong. How are you going to deal with this issue? Do you have any good idea to make everybody happy or are you considering (inaudible) still considering to put him to jail still?
SECRETARY POWELL: He is a deserter from the United States Armed Forces and that's a fact. It's a fact that we can't change. And it's not the DOD position; it's the position of the United States Government. And he came out of North Korea and then went and spent some time in a third country, and then when his health situation was analyzed and it was made clear that he needed more sophisticated healthcare in Japan and he was moved to Japan, that also put him with his wife and children in a better setting; the United States made clear that we still viewed him as a deserter and that will not change, but he is a man who is now in need of medical care.
And so Japan knows that we have not renounced our desire to have him return to be dealt with in our military justice system, but for now his health is the important thing. And we are working with the Japanese Government and Mr. Jenkins is in touch with various people as to how he might deal with this matter in a legal sense. But we cannot set aside the fact that he is a deserter. We cannot set aside the fact that because he is a deserter we need to resolve this case at some point in the future. Right now, he is under medical care and that comes first. We are not pressing our case.
QUESTION: Two quick questions. What would the fate of the Uighur detainees at Guantanamo Bay be? Are they going to be given asylum here? We understand they're not going to be sent back to China. Are they going to be relocated to a third country?
And very quickly, democracy in Burma has not progressed an inch. There is no evidence that the U.S. sanctions on Burma have, in any way, in any significant way, affected the military junta. The national convention was held without the NLD participation. What more can the U.S. and the international community do?
SECRETARY POWELL: On the first problem, the Uighurs are a difficult problem and we are trying to resolve all issues with respect to all detainees at Guantanamo. The Uighurs are not going back to China, but finding places for them is not a simple matter, but we are trying to find places for them. And we are trying to find places for them, and, of course, all candidate countries are being looked at.
With respect to -- I'm sorry --
QUESTION: Burma.
SECRETARY POWELL: Burma. I'm disappointed that the Government of Burma has not moved in a positive direction with respect to democracy, with respect to letting Aung San Suu Kyi participate in her party, participate in the life, political life of Burma. I think Burma is missing a golden opportunity.
The United States has, perhaps, been the most outspoken country in the world on this subject, and we have not only been outspoken, but we have used what we can with our sanctions policy to express our displeasure to the Burmese Government. I do it at every one of my Asia meetings, I do it every year at the ASEAN Regional Forum, and rather than saying, "What more can the United States do?", what more can the rest of the international community do, because not all members of the international community have spoken out as clearly on this issue and have taken the actions they might take to put pressure on the regime.
And so we will continue to put pressure on the regime. We will not have a satisfactory relationship with Burma until this matter is resolved. And it is not enough to say, "Well, we have a roadmap to democracy," if it is not a real roadmap and if it doesn't allow pluralistic activities within the political system.
And as long as Aung San Suu Kyi is denied the opportunity to participate in the political life of Burma, and her party is so denied, then we will continue to speak out strongly and find out if there are any other levers one can apply against the regime.
QUESTION: So --
QUESTION: On Iran.
QUESTION: Yes.
QUESTION: So do you want Japan to withdraw? I mean, (inaudible), including Japan, to withdraw its business from Iran, because Iran has a dangerous nuclear missile programs?
SECRETARY POWELL: We would hope that as Japan examines its relationship with Iran, it would take into account, in any business transaction or any proposals that come along, the fact that Iran is not behaving in a responsible manner. The IAEA has found serious deficiencies in their program. The European Foreign Ministers 3, the three foreign ministers, entered into agreements with Iran, which Iran is not complying with. And it seems clear to us that Iran is trying to develop a nuclear weapon, and it is essentially saying to the international community, "No matter what you think, we're going to go ahead and build centrifuges and preserve the option of going further." I would hope that the Japanese Government and Japanese businesses would take this into account as they make judgments as to whether this is the place that one should be making investments in or doing this kind of energy business with.
Okay. Last one.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is it true that the recent visit (inaudible) that U.S. Government ask the Japanese Government, (inaudible), to call off the agreement regarding the government (inaudible) oil field. And (inaudible) recommended the Japanese Government to invest in a (inaudible)? Is this true?
SECRETARY POWELL: I don't -- I don't think all of that is true, no. (Laughter.) Thank you very much.
(Laughter.)
The Japanese Government knows our view and I think I'll leave it there. Thank you.
QUESTION: Thank you, Secretary, again. Thank you so much.
SECRETARY POWELL: Good to see you all. We'll do it again.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
This page printed from: http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2004&m=August&x=20040813140947AJesroM7.503688e-03&t=livefeeds/wf-latest.html
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
