Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

DATE=04/30/2003

TYPE=ON THE LINE

NUMBER=1-01322

TITLE=NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA

INTERNET=Yes

EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY 619-0038

CONTENT=

THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE

Host: North Korea's nuclear threats. Next, On the Line.

[music]

Host: The United States has rejected North Korea's offer to shutter its nuclear weapons factories in exchange for a raft of concessions and U-S aid. President George W. Bush said North Korea was "back to the old blackmail game." U-S Assistant Secretary of State, James Kelly had met in Beijing with North Korean and Chinese officials to discuss how to put an end to North Korea's nuclear weapons program. But at the talks, instead of trying to ease tensions, North Korean negotiators ratcheted them up. They declared that the communist regime of Kim Jong-Il not only possesses nuclear weapons, it might begin to sell the weapons around the world. The U-S is still pursuing diplomacy but will not be blackmailed, said Secretary of State Colin Powell.

[Powell actuality]

"We do not want to see nuclear weapons on the peninsula. We seek a peaceful solution to the international community's serious concerns about North Korea's nuclear weapons program. . North Korea must also come to understand that we will not be threatened. We will not respond to threats. We look for a way forward that will eliminate this threat and put North Korea on a path to a better future, a better future that would provide a better life for its people."

Host: Can North Korea be persuaded to dismantle its nuclear program? I'll ask my guests: Carl Gershman, president of the National Endowment for Democracy; Gordon Chang, lawyer and author of the book, "The Coming Collapse of China"; and Ellen Bork, deputy director of the Project for the New American Century. Welcome and thanks for joining us today. Carl Gershman, how did the talks in Beijing go, about as expected, worse than expected, better than expected?

Gershman: Oh, I think they went about as expected. I think the secretary's right in making a connection -- although he didn't really go into it very deeply -- a connection between the threats that North Korea makes and the nature of the regime. And I think the more we can focus on the nature of the regime, I think the better we'll do. This is probably the worst regime in the world. It's a regime, as the president said not too long ago, that is starving its own people to eliminate people or things who are not loyal to the regime. It's a regime which maintains a gulag which it doesn't admit exists. And it tries to hide it from the rest of the world, a gulag that is responsible for the deaths of maybe as many as 400,000 people. And [it] probably has 200,000 people in the prison camp system today -- which is really very close to a death camp system -- which it doesn't admit exists. And it's a regime which has produced a growing refugee problem. Actually, China itself is in violation of international law in sending these refugees back to North Korea, either being sent to the gulag or actually to be executed. They should be recognized as refugees and be treated as such under international law. So you have a whole series of problems here that the regime is responsible for and until you really get at the nature of the regime, you'll never solve the problem. The nuclear problem is simply just a by-product of the nature of the system.

Host: Well, Gordon Chang, if the problem here is the regime itself and the very nature of the regime, what's the point of negotiations about the nuclear program per se?

Chang: Well, I agree with Carl, but I think the problem is that if you look at North Korea's neighbors, for various reasons they do not agree or they do not cooperate with a program of regime change, at least at this point. You have China, South Korea, and to a lesser extent, Japan -- all with varying interests and different perceptions. So I think there has to be a period when everyone's perception comes together and realizes that the regime should end. But that's going to take probably some period of diplomacy and I think that essentially North Korea will really show how bad it is again and then we will see perceptions converge and it's then, I think, that we'll be able to do something about the problem.

Host: Well, Ellen Bork, was anything accomplished by having these negotiations?

Bork: Possibly the only thing that was accomplished was showing that this agenda of talks, for no particular purpose is not likely to be productive. I agree with both my colleagues here that that regime change is something that has to be developed in connection with our allies. But the first thing that has to happen is the Bush administration has to arrive at a coherent position of its own. And I think these talks, if anything, show that there's a lot of dissention within the Bush administration, possibly even some dishonesty among different parts, as some reports have show.

Host: Can you give some specific examples at all?

Bork: I just read a Reuters report saying that the State Department received information in New York on March 31st, I believe, that North Korea had made another threat about reprocessing its fuel rods and that this was closely held within the State Department. Whether or not that's true, I certainly can't say, but it does appear that there is not a coherent position from the administration about talks or about any other instruments of pressure that we could bring to bear on North Korea. I was optimistic before this set of talks that the administration was slowly extricating itself from a long pattern of acquiescence to North Korea by bolstering conventional deterrence, by seeking cooperation from allies on cutting off sources of revenue to the regime. I'm now pretty disappointed. I think this set of talks looks like it was really an effort to give China a bouquet for having made some limited efforts to pressure North Korea, and really wasn't part of a serious overall plan.

Chang: If we go back to your initial question of "Did these talks go as expected?" I think that we agree from our perspective, the American perspective, they didn't produce anything and we didn't expect it. But perhaps the Chinese had higher expectations of what could occur. And so, they tried to bring parties together and as Ellen says, we tried to give them a bouquet. And essentially the North Koreans sort of rained on their party. And I think that's going to cause some tensions between Beijing and Pyongyang. I think Beijing is a little bit upset with what happened, so probably their expectations were dashed.

Host: Carl Gershman, there were a lot of news reports that Chinese officials took the North Korean provocations in these negotiations to be something of a slap in the face, given that China was organizing these talks or hosting them, rather. Does this change how China approaches negotiations with North Korea?

Gershman: Well, I think it might. And I think if what we can look forward to over the future is irresponsible and provocative behavior by North Korea leading to perhaps a gradual, growing consensus that this regime is not a normal regime and that ultimately, you can't do normal business with this regime. This may stimulate China to realize it's got a real problem there. You have Russia, you have Japan and then ultimately, you have South Korea. The problem with South Korea is it has been wedded to a Sunshine Policy in which it doesn't want to have any problems with North Korea, which leads to a policy of virtual appeasement. At the recent meeting of the human rights commission in Geneva, South Korea would not even support the human rights resolution on North Korea because it doesn't want to do anything which might in some ways destabilize the North Korean government and to raise human rights issues is seen to be destabilizing.

Host: Now to what extent is South Korea's reluctance to do anything that would confront North Korea born of a fear that North Korea is willing to do the kind of attack that would destroy Seoul with the artillery that's along the border?

Gershman: Well, there probably is that fear, but I think a more underlying fear is the fear of collapse. I mean they really are very nervous that a collapse in North Korea would disrupt the economic progress that South Korea has made, that it would put a lot of new costs, new burdens on South Korea in the way that West Germany bore a lot of costs trying to absorb East Germany. But I think the president was right when he said, you know, you do the right thing in this kind of a case. You don't ignore -- you don't prop up a system which is fundamentally [corrupt]. You know, this is a kind of an evil system if you think that they are murdering their own people, they're imprisoning people, they're starving people in the way the Soviets got rid of the Kulaks in the 1930s, a potential opposition group -- you just kill them, you eliminate them. You know you can not do normal business with a regime like that over a long period of time. You've got to ultimately face the problem. I think the economic burden that South Korea would bear by a collapse in the North is exaggerated. I think there will be a lot of international support to help cushion the collapse. I don't think North Koreans are going to flee the country if they're not being murdered by remaining in the country and if there's some economic support to help them begin to develop a better life.

Host: Ellen Bork, is there any likelihood in the near future of an economic or political collapse in North Korea?

Bork: I think it's entirely unpredictable. And I don't know whether they could collapse of their own accord or if other international pressures could force a collapse. But I have to say, I take Carl's point that this is a regime that really can't be tolerated and a large part of the international community's posture towards it has been to accept the continuation of the Kim Jong-Il regime. And I think that is something that has to be rethought immediately. And yes, the international community would have to come forward to ease any collapse and deal with any humanitarian fall-out. I don't think any American would disagree with that.

Gershman: I would go beyond that. It's not just accepting the regime. It's actually propping it up. That's the problem. You don't solve the problem by propping up a regime that essentially cannot, not only cannot solve the problems: the economic problems, the suffering, but actually contributes to it, actually exercises the oppression of its own people as a matter of policy and ultimately this is not a situation that can prevail for a long time without causing all sorts of international crisis.

Host: Gordon Chang, is North Korea through its provocations going to be able to extract from other nations more support to prop up its failed economy.

Chang: Well, that's the great fear in Washington and in other places as well. We've had basically two decades of failed arms agreements with North Korea, so, you know, you have to ask the question: Why would they be successful now in getting the North to disarm? And I don't think there really is any reason. We have to go back to this whole issue that we have been propping up North Korea. We have humanitarian aid, or so-called humanitarian aid, and that is, we feed the people of North Korea so Kim Jong-Il doesn't have to. That means he can use his resources for his weapons programs. We don't provide fissile material to Pyongyang, so the question is why are we helping them? Because, we might as well with what we've been doing. And I think that we have to reevaluate all of our contacts with the regime as I've suggested. It's just so important that we do that because, if not, the suffering for the Korean people will just continue indefinitely.

Gershman: The real problem is that the food is not getting to the people who are starving. The regime doesn't allow the humanitarian groups even to monitor the assistance, so it actually goes to the military. And does not go to the people who are starving because they really want to get rid of the people who are starving, because they're classified as a disloyal part of the population.

Host: If the food is going to the military, Ellen Bork, what's the state of the military in North Korea at this point? Are they well-fed, are they well-armed? Are they an impressive force or is this turn toward nuclear weapons some indication that North Korea doesn't think that its rather large army is enough of a threat?

Bork: I couldn't tell you. I'm not a military analyst, nor do I have access to intelligence, but I think the combination of their enormous military forces, which the United States, I gather takes quite seriously, their conventional forces and their efforts to develop nuclear weapons are an attempt to put themselves -- I think they're devoted to regime survival, but I also think that analyzing their purpose in acquiring nuclear weapons isn't the most important thing as the U-S goes forward. I think what's much more important, is to find a way to confront that nuclear threat and diminish it and then for the international community to be able to operate from a position of strength against North Korea. And I think to this point we really haven't been doing that.

Host: How, Carl Gershman, does the international community get to that position of strength dealing with North Korea?

Gershman: Well, they have to first of all start recognizing that there's a problem. I mean, you know, if you go back, the nuclear issue has been recognized as a problem, but the nature of the regime is an issue that has been swept off the table. It's just not talked about. And it's not talked about for a lot of reasons. It was not talked about because the human rights organizations would never raise the issue. It was not talked about because it was seen, the human rights problems were seen as just one aspect of the political dispute between the South and the North which concern them but not everybody else. I mean, for the first time now, I think we have to put this issue of the nature of the regime on the agenda of the international community in a major way. And if that could be the outcome of these negotiations -- in other words, if you could get a consensus that these problems have to be alleviated, certainly the most severe problems: the famine, the starvation, the deaths of more than a million people, maybe as many as three-million people, the gulag, the refugee issue. If these issues could be put on the agenda, that they have to be changed. And if in the long-term they can get North Korea -- even if it's not sincere -- to agree to certain fundamental human rights principles -- but then the international community is going to really put the screws on North Korea and insist on compliance with these principles -- that would be a step in the right direction. Until now, that has not been done.

Host: Ellen Bork?

Bork: If I could just add that I think there is one glimmer of hope that the United States is beginning to think differently about North Korea and there was this publicized memo by Secretary Rumsfeld that mentioned regime change. I think regime change has become, gets a lot of attention for being a sign of aggression from the United States, but I think people really need to understand, the question is, who's against regime change in North Korea? And if in high circles in the administration people are now discussing the fact that for the first time in fifteen or twenty years the United States is prepared to look ahead to a totally different kind of North Korean regime, that's very good. And we ought to talk about that more openly as Carl says.

Host: Gordon Chang, with Ellen Bork bringing up this issue of regime change and the administration, you have a Bush doctrine, at least as it was applied to Iraq that would say that a nation that threatens to export weapons of mass destruction into hands that could include terrorist hands -- that there would be some kind of preemption against it. Where is the Bush doctrine with regard to North Korea?

Chang: Well, certainly there is a threat for a country that says it will not only test, but export nuclear weapons. But also, there's just a question of general self-defense. And I think North Korea really goes beyond the preemption issue to the self-defense issue because of what their capabilities are and what their intentions are. And we have to measure their intentions by what they've been doing in the past: by selling whatever they can, by trading, by acquiring technology, by exchanging it. So this is a real threat to the United States, certainly I think more of a threat than Iraq for instance. But at the end of the day, this is a self-defense issue, not a preemption issue.

Gershman: And it's also a freedom issue. I just want to say, there is no regime more oppressive in the world today, no regime. I don't think you can, even Iraq under Saddam Hussein, I don't think was as oppressive as the North Korean regime is.

Host: Do you think there's any growing recognition that the threat that North Korea poses to its own people is of a piece with the threat that North Korea poses to other nations?

Gershman: I think that we're at the beginning of that. I think that's the fundamental insight. We're at the beginning of that. When we can really establish that connection in policy and then in perception, I think we'll be at the beginning of solving this problem. Because this regime, you can show the connection between the extortionist policies, which are all part of the policy of regime survival, because if they can threaten, they can get concessions. Maybe they can use the resources that they get through these concessions for survival. But that's not solving the problem. The fundamental problem is the threat that the North Korean regime poses to its own people. And I think really, we've got to save the North Korean people.

Host: Ellen Bork, spokespeople for the U-S, they respond to a lot of the language that comes out of North Korea not only from the negotiators, but also in official North Korean press as there being a sort of reliance on bellicose talk because it's always bellicose in this way. Is the threat of exporting weapons of mass destruction, exporting nuclear devices, is that part of this sort of bellicose posture or is that a real threat that they're in a position to be able to act on?

Bork: I think North Korea has a record of proliferation that is widely known. And it is also quite widely known that this is a source of revenue for them. So I don't think you really need their official press or media statements to rely on. I think this is documented.

Host: Gordon Chang, how would North Korea go about exporting nuclear weapons and could they do this without the U-S and other countries being able to know that they were doing it in a given instance to a given country?

Chang: We would have hints that they have a general program, because I'm sure that they would pick up some sort of a signal. But you don't really, you can't rely on being able to stop a particular instance. This is a country that sells, for instance, amphetamines, all sorts of illegal drugs, counterfeit American currency. The diplomats of North Korea do have contacts with the world's underworld. And so, I think that we would have a hard time catching them each and every time, which is really what we must do to stop them. We would have to catch them each and every time. And obviously the best thing to do is stop the threat in the beginning.

Host: Carl Gershman, the U-S has been trying to bring in other countries to join in having any kind of discussions with North Korea. It finally brought in China for this first round of discussions. But now, the issue of whether there could be any discussion at the U-N keeps coming up and North Korea says that any sanctions or any action by the U-N would be perceived as an act of war. What's going to happen with the U-N and North Korea?

Gershman: Well, I don't right now suspect that the U-N is going to take up this issue. I do think it is possible that you could get an expansion of the talks you had with China to bring in Russia, Japan and South Korea and have some kind of negotiation. That would be, from my point of view, if they could link that negotiation to the issue that I've raised, which is the nature of the regime, and have some kind of general agreement which will be followed up with real measures to try and enforce it. In other words, to get North Korea to agree to certain principles and to be able to monitor the food shipments and to deal with the problem with the refugees so you don't have people being sent back to their deaths, to really begin to open up the whole gulag system -- I think that would be a step in the right direction. And if you could get those issues on the agenda and some progress on those issues coming out of multilateral negotiations, I would push you in that direction. Otherwise, I don't have any real hope that negotiations would produce much.

Host: Gordon Chang?

Chang: But because negotiations really won't produce much, eventually this will go to the U-N when not only the United States, but other countries in the North Asia region begin to understand the negotiations are really folly. And at some point the U-N Security Council will have to consider this and then the issue is whether China will exercise a veto. And that's where it really gets interesting, because, I think at some point, every nation involved will come to the conclusion that the negotiations are really not producing the agreement that needs to be signed.

Host: Ellen Bork, we only have about ten or fifteen seconds left. What do you think on that?

Bork: I think I would advise the Bush administration to take negotiations as only one part of a comprehensive approach. And sure, negotiations are good, we've had nuclear standoffs with governments before and a wide range of instruments needs to be applied.

Host: I'm afraid that's all the time we have for today. I'd like to thank my guests: Carl Gershman of the National Endowment for Democracy; author Gordon Chang; and Ellen Bork of the Project for the New American Century. Before we go, I'd like to invite you to send us your questions or comments. You can e-mail them to Ontheline@ibb.gov

For On the Line, I'm Eric Felten.