Lugar Says Don't Rule Out Bilateral Talks With North Korea
(Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman March 12 remarks) (1090)
Multilateral diplomacy is the best approach to resolving the North
Korean nuclear situation, but bilateral talks are better than nothing
at all, according to Senator Dick Lugar (Republican from Indiana),
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Although the inclusion of North Korea's neighbors is a "key element to
any long-term reduction of tensions," Lugar said, the United States
must be "creative and persistent" in its diplomacy.
"It is vital that the United States be open to bilateral diplomatic
opportunities that could be useful in reversing North Korea's nuclear
weapons program and in promoting stability," Lugar said at a March 12
hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Lugar described a possible domino effect in Northeast Asia should
North Korea continue its nuclear weapons program. According to Lugar,
North Korea's neighbors would be forced to adopt new security
strategies, "perhaps including the acquisition or repositioning of
nuclear weapons."
"Security enhancements undertaken by any of North Korea's neighbors
will in turn change the calculations of the rest of the group," he
cautioned.
Following is the text of Lugar's remarks as prepared for delivery:
(begin text)
Dick Lugar U.S. Senator for Indiana
Date: 3/12/03
Lugar statement on North Korea
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Dick Lugar made the
following statement at today's hearing on the regional implications of
North Korea becoming a nuclear power:
Today the Foreign Relations Committee will examine the regional
implications of the changing nuclear equation in North Korea. This
will be the fifth hearing that we have held this year that has dealt
with issues related to North Korea. On February 4, we reviewed the
broad strategic implications of weapons of mass destruction on the
Korean Peninsula. That same week we welcomed Secretary of State
Powell, who addressed many questions related to North Korea. On
February 25, the Committee considered the issue of global hunger with
specific reference to North Korea. Last Thursday, we explored the
possible structure and objectives of diplomatic engagement between the
United States and North Korea.
We have devoted this concentrated attention to the Korean Peninsula
because of the enormous stakes for U.S. national security. The stakes
are high, in part, because North Korean pursuit of a nuclear weapons
arsenal will change the security calculations of Japan, China, Russia,
South Korea, and Taiwan. These are extremely important nations to the
United States. Japan and China are our third and fourth largest
trading partners. South Korea and Taiwan rank seventh and eighth
respectively. The cooperation of each of these countries is critical
to Northeast Asian security and the broader war on terrorism.
Given North Korea's extreme isolation, in past years it has been
tempting to de-emphasize its impact on Northeast Asia outside of the
Korean Peninsula. Commerce and economic development have moved forward
in the region almost without reference to North Korea. But the
continuation of North Korea's nuclear weapons program will force its
neighbors to adopt new security strategies - perhaps including the
acquisition or repositioning of nuclear weapons. Our analytic task
would be simplified if all of the security responses of Northeast
Asian nations were directed at North Korea like spokes connected to
the hub of a wheel. But security enhancements undertaken by any of
North Korea's neighbors will in turn change the calculations of the
rest of the group. The North Korean nuclear weapons program could
spark a Northeast Asian arms race that is fed by the interlocking
anxieties of each of its neighbors.
President Bush is working to construct a multilateral approach to the
escalation of nuclear activity by North Korea. Multilateral diplomacy
is a key element to any long-term reduction of tensions on the Korean
Peninsula. But it is vital that the United States be open to bilateral
diplomatic opportunities that could be useful in reversing North
Korea's nuclear weapons program and in promoting stability. We must be
creative and persistent in addressing an extraordinarily grave threat
to national security.
In reviewing the regional impact of North Korea's nuclear program and
also considering previous testimony before this Committee regarding
North Korea, many questions deserve close attention:
1. If North Korea does not abandon its nuclear program, will South
Korea, Japan and Taiwan eventually develop nuclear capabilities?
2. Given our lack of knowledge about North Korea and our inability to
verify operational details of their weapons of mass destruction
programs, how can we be certain that North Korea is not already
exporting plutonium or perhaps biological or chemical weapons
components?
3. There are recent reports that China has sold North Korea large
amounts of a chemical known as tributyl phosphate (TBP), which can be
useful in extracting material for nuclear bombs from spent nuclear
fuel. Although TBP also has commercial applications, is this sale
evidence that China is not fully engaged in helping achieve a peaceful
solution? How can we involve China as a positive influence on North
Korea?
4. How do calculations in China and South Korea about the possibility
of an abrupt collapse of the North Korean regime impact the ways in
which China and South Korea approach the North Korean crisis?
5. Russian officials have visited Pyongyang as part of their diplomacy
in response to the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. How can the United
States maximize cooperation with Russia on this issue?
6. In the event that North Korea does not agree to suspend its nuclear
weapons program and subscribe to full verification, how should our
security guarantees to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan be adjusted and
should we pursue a common theater missile defense for the region?
These questions only scratch the surface of the security challenges
that we face in regard to the Korean Peninsula. Currently, the United
States is deeply engaged in diplomatic efforts related to Iraq. But
simultaneously, we must be working with allies in Asia to develop an
effective strategy toward North Korea. The Committee looks forward to
the testimony of each of our witnesses as we continue our inquiry into
this critical problem.
First we will hear from Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, James Kelly. The second panel is composed of Ambassador James
Lilley, now with the American Enterprise Institute; Dr. Victor Cha,
Associate Professor of the Department of Government and the Edmund
Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University; and Dr.
Bates Gill, Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies.
(end text)
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Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
