Text: Sen. Lugar Backs Resumption of Bilateral Talks with N. Korea
(Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman's remarks March 6) (1000)
Senator Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, called on the Bush administration March 6 to resume a
bilateral dialogue with North Korea in order to manage "the potential
for miscalculation that could lead to a deadly incident or broader
conflict."
"We must be creative and persistent in addressing an extraordinarily
grave threat to national security," Lugar (Republican from Indiana)
said at a committee hearing concerning North Korea's revived nuclear
weapons program.
Lugar said the North Korean violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework has
made it necessary for the United States to develop a new approach in
order to defuse the present "volatile and unpredictable" situation.
Lugar dismissed some analysts' claim that any dialogue with North
Korea would be seen as a reward for nuclear blackmail.
"I do not believe we have the luxury to be this absolute," he
countered.
The March 6 hearing included presentations from a number of experts
from the U.S. research and academic worlds.
The Bush administration has insisted that bilateral talks will not
take place between the United States and North Korea until the
Pyongyang regime halts its nuclear weapons program.
Following is the opening statement of Chairman Lugar at the March 6
Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing:
(begin text)
Opening Statement by Chairman Lugar
Hearing on North Korea
Date: 3/6/03
Today the Foreign Relations Committee again turns its attention
towards North Korea. On February 4, the Committee held a hearing to
review issues surrounding weapons of mass destruction on the Korean
Peninsula. That same week we welcomed Secretary of State Powell, who
addressed many questions related to North Korea. Last week, the
Committee considered the issue of global hunger with specific
reference to North Korea. Our primary goal at this hearing is to
explore the possible structure and objectives of diplomatic engagement
between the United States and North Korea.
The events of the last several weeks have confirmed and reconfirmed
how volatile and unpredictable the situation on the Korean Peninsula
has become. The North Korean regime has taken highly provocative
actions towards the United States and its neighbors. All of us remain
concerned about the potential for miscalculation that could lead to a
deadly incident or broader conflict.
North Korea is a foreign policy problem that requires immediate
attention by the United States, thoughtful analysis about our options,
and vigorous diplomacy to secure the cooperation and participation of
nations in the region. Compared to most nations, our information on
North Korean decision-making is scant. The actions of the North Korean
regime and the military often stray from a course that we perceive as
consistent with rational self-preservation. But we must not be
deterred in our pursuit of valid analysis. We must avoid simplistic
explanations of North Korean behavior. Today, to the degree possible
in a public hearing, we will undertake the timely challenge of
thinking through our diplomatic options.
In 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the "Agreed
Framework" -- the agreement under which North Korea was to shut down
its nuclear facilities in return for shipments of heavy oil and the
construction of two light water nuclear reactors. Since 1994, North
Korea has engaged in activities that clearly violate the terms of the
Agreed Framework. Specifically, the pact stipulates that North Korea
should freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities.
This suspension of activity was to be monitored by the International
Atomic Energy Agency. North Korea also was required to store the 8,000
fuel rods removed from its five megawatt reactor "in a safe manner
that does not involve reprocessing in North Korea." Based on
intelligence information and the acknowledgments of the North Korean
regime, however, we know that Pyongyang is taking active steps to
implement a nuclear weapons program.
The Clinton Administration had hoped to secure a freeze of North
Korea's nuclear program and to prevent it from producing nuclear
weapons grade plutonium. It also intended that the Agreed Framework
would be the basis for ongoing contacts with Pyongyang. But these
goals have not been realized, and circumstances require the United
States to develop a new approach.
The Bush Administration has been reluctant to agree to a bilateral
dialogue with North Korea until the North Korean regime satisfies U.S.
concerns over its nuclear program. The Administration has instead
focused on proposals for multilateral talks involving North Korea and
other countries. Multilateral diplomacy is a key element to any
long-term reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. But it is
vital that the United States not dismiss bilateral diplomatic
opportunities that could be useful in reversing North Korea's nuclear
weapons program and promoting stability. We must be creative and
persistent in addressing an extraordinarily grave threat to national
security.
While some American analysts oppose any dialogue with North Korea,
especially in the wake of extraordinarily provocative events, I do not
believe we have the luxury to be this absolute. The risks are too
immediate and the stakes are too high. The United States must maintain
military preparedness and should not tolerate North Korea's nuclear
weapons programs. But the mere initiation of a bilateral dialogue,
with American authorities concurrently consulting with the South
Korean government, does not compromise our national security
interests.
In that regard, today's hearing is based on the presumption that some
engagement must eventually occur between the United States and North
Korea. Our witnesses have been asked to provide their perspective on
the Agreed Framework and on how multilateral and bilateral diplomacy
between the two countries could be structured. They each bring
substantial expertise to the Committee, and I am grateful that they
have joined us today.
I once again welcome Ash Carter, Co-Director of the Preventive Defense
Project at Harvard University. In addition, I am pleased to introduce
Arnold Kanter, a Principal and founding member of the Scowcroft Group,
and Robert Einhorn, Senior Adviser of the International Security
Program at CSIS.
(end text)
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