Expert Panel Urges U.S. to Begin Direct Talks with N. Korea
(Sen. Daschle news conference, advisory memorandum March 5) (2760)
Former top U.S. officials urged the Bush administration to drop its
multilateral approach for resolving the nuclear weapons crisis with
North Korea and to begin direct talks with officials in Pyongyang
instead.
During a news conference March 5, Senate Minority Leader Thomas
Daschle (Democrat of South Dakota) discussed the findings of a panel
of prominent experts advising Senate Democrats on national security
issues. Daschle said the advisors, known as the National Security
Advisory Group, were offering the Bush administration recommendations
"based on a clear-eyed assessment of our national security interests."
The National Security Advisory Group, formed earlier this year,
includes: William Perry, chairman and former Secretary of Defense;
Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of State; Sandy Berger, former
National Security Advisor; Ashton Carter, former Assistant Secretary
of Defense; and Michelle Flournoy, former Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense.
In a memorandum released the day of the news conference, the National
Security Advisory Group emphasized the need for direct U.S. talks with
North Korea.
"China, Russia, and others can play an important role in pressing
North Korea to comply with the NPT (Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty)
and accept the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspectors,"
the memorandum said. "But issues at the very heart of American
security cannot simply be outsourced to China, Russia, or the United
Nations. North Korea itself maintains that only the United States, as
the leading power in the region and the world, can address its
security concerns, and that these concerns are the source of its
nuclear program. Our allies and friends in the region also urge direct
talks."
At the same time, The National Security Advisory Group said the United
States "should not give in to blackmail, but neither should it be
frozen into paralysis."
According to the group, "The objective of negotiations should not be
simply to return to the status quo ante, but to achieve a more
comprehensive curb on North Korea's nuclear ballistic missile programs
than ever before, backed by extensive verification and international
monitoring."
The advisory group also recommended that the United States offer North
Korea assistance for weapons elimination, as it has done to the states
of the former Soviet Union under the Nunn-Lugar Program.
Following are the texts of Senator Daschle's statement at the March 5
press conference and the memorandum produced by The National Security
Advisory Group.
Following first is the text of Daschle's statement:
(begin text)
STATEMENT BY
SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER TOM DASCHLE
ON NORTH KOREA
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 2003
Good morning. We have come here today to discuss the escalating crisis
in North Korea -- a situation we believe we cannot afford to ignore as
we confront the threat posed by Saddam Hussein.
For the past several months, we have watched North Korea take one
dangerous step after another. Each step brings North Korea closer to
possessing scores of nuclear weapons. Each step brings the region
closer to a nuclear arms race. And each step brings us closer to a
world where terrorist groups like Al Qaeda get their hands on nuclear
weapons. And while Democrats and Republicans stand united in our
opposition to North Korea's provocative acts, I and many of colleagues
have argued this is not enough. Given the magnitude of the stakes, we
have repeatedly urged the Administration to get off the sidelines and
face up to this developing crisis.
Unfortunately, in spite of the high stakes, the White House continues
to sit back and watch, playing down the threat and apparently playing
for time. But time is not on our side. In the words of Brent
Scowcroft, President George Bush's national security advisor, "...if
we do not act now, our options will only get worse."
Earlier this year, we announced the formation of the National Security
Advisory Group to the Senate Democratic leadership. This group,
consisting of some of this country's most distinguished and
experienced national security experts, was established to assess
national security issues and provide our Leadership with their insight
and recommendations. The situation unfolding in North Korea is
precisely the kind of problem we were thinking of when we created the
body, and we're grateful for the chance to draw on their direct
first-hand experience with North Korea and their wisdom during this
tense time. We are pleased that William Perry, chairman of the group
and former Secretary of Defense; Madeleine Albright, former Secretary
of State; Sandy Berger, former National Security Advisor; Ashton
Carter, former Assistant Secretary of Defense; and Michelle Flournoy,
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense are here today to
personally provide their suggestions on how to defuse the current
situation.
Before turning to my colleagues and the representatives of the group,
let me express my heartfelt appreciation for all that Dr. Perry and
his colleagues have done. This report demonstrates that their service
to the public did not end when they left their public service jobs.
Their recommendations are based on a clear-eyed assessment of our
national security interests. I hope the Administration follows their
advice.
(end text of Daschle statement)
(begin text of memorandum)
MEMORANDUM
FROM: The National Security Advisory Group*
TO: Senate Democratic Leadership
SUBJECT: The Loose Nukes Crisis in North Korea
DATE: March 5, 2003
A RAPIDLY UNFOLDING CRISIS
North Korea's move to unfreeze its plutonium program at Yongbyon
presents profound dangers to U.S. security. It poses the specter of
nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorist groups and rogue nations. It
is a massive failure for U.S. counter-proliferation and
counter-terrorism policies. This crisis will unfold within the next
few months. It can only be forestalled by U.S. leadership.
-- The fuel rods apparently being moved at Yongbyon contain 5-6
nuclear weapons' worth of weapons-grade plutonium. They are now being
put out of reach of both IAEA inspectors and the possibility of U.S.
airstrikes -- for the first time since the Agreed Framework of 1994.
North Korea is also restarting its reactor, allowing it to produce
plutonium for several more bombs within a year. The plutonium program
is the most urgent problem; the uranium enrichment program that North
Korea recently admitted to conducting in violation of several
international agreements will not result in significant quantities of
fissile material for years.
-- The United States has successfully prevented North Korea from
obtaining plutonium since 1989, when North Korea is suspected of
reprocessing (extracting plutonium from spent reactor fuel rods)
enough plutonium for one or two bombs. Had North Korea's plutonium
program not been frozen during this period, by now it could have
produced a large nuclear arsenal. This nonproliferation success is in
danger of being lost.
-- North Korea is suspected of possessing as much as one or two bombs'
worth of plutonium since 1989. But if North Korea obtains five or six
more bombs, it will have a usable arsenal for threatening the U.S. and
its allies, and it might sell some of its nuclear weapons or materials
to others in the belief that it would still have enough left over for
its own needs.
-- The issue is not Iraq versus North Korea. It is whether we can
afford to put North Korea on the back burner while we focus on Iraq.
The answer is no. Indeed, the threat posed by North Korea's recent
moves with its nuclear program in some ways is far more immediate.
Saddam Hussein's Iraq is believed to be nowhere near to producing
fissile material for nuclear weapons, let alone 5-6 bombs' worth.
GRAVE DANGERS FOR U.S. SECURITY
Failure to forestall North Korea from "going nuclear" with serial
production of plutonium weapons would imperil U.S. and international
security in several ways, any one of which would amount to a serious
threat to U.S. national security.
-- Once it has a handful of bombs, North Korea might sell some of them
-- or the plutonium to make bombs -- to other proliferators or
terrorists. Those bombs could show up at some point in any city in the
world. North Korea has a proven record of selling its weapons
technology indiscriminately.
-- If the North Korean regime collapses as a result of its economic
and political failures, its nuclear weapons could be commandeered,
diverted, or sold in the chaos of a transition to a new government.
-- Possession of nuclear weapons might embolden North Korea to
miscalculate that by threatening nuclear use against the U.S. and its
allies, it had tipped the balance of deterrence on the Korean
peninsula, which would make a destructive war there more likely.
-- A nuclear North Korea would cause South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and
other non-nuclear powers in the region to reconsider their own nuclear
programs, which the United States has successfully prevented through
several decades.
-- If North Korea -- a small, impoverished, communist country --
successfully defies the international norm against nuclear
proliferation embodied in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
particularly without robust efforts by the United States to prevent
it, that norm and treaty regime would be critically weakened.
CURRENT ABSENCE OF A COHERENT U.S. APPROACH
The Bush administration has not developed a strategy for heading off
the developments at Yongbyon immediately, and time is not on our side.
-- The situation at Yongbyon has progressively and rapidly
deteriorated, as North Korea has successively withdrawn from the
Agreed Framework, expelled international inspectors, apparently moved
plutonium-containing fuel rods, and restarted a nuclear reactor.
-- U.S. options are narrowing. By moving the fuel rods, North Korea
has put them out of reach of both inspectors and the possibility of
U.S. military action. Once it reprocesses the fuel rods, it can
fashion five to six nuclear bombs from the plutonium within weeks.
The National Security Advisory Group is concerned that, while the U.S.
military has maintained a two-theater capability throughout the 1990s
to deal simultaneously with crises in the Persian Gulf and the Korean
Peninsula, our civilian leadership is not paying sufficient attention
to the nuclear-weapons situation developing on the Korean peninsula
while we move to disarm Iraq of its chemical and biological weapons.
In the absence of a coherent, articulated strategy for dealing with
North Korea's nuclear threats, the United States might inadvertently
have given North Korea and the world several serious misapprehensions
about our interests and intentions. We may be leading North Korea and
others to believe that:
-- North Korea obtaining nuclear weapons is not a serious and urgent
threat to the security of the U.S. and its allies. As North Korea
prepared to unfreeze Yongbyon in December, Secretary of State Powell
declared that the situation was "not yet a crisis."
-- Reprocessing does not cross a U.S. red line.
-- Going nuclear will guarantee safety from the United States and will
only result, as President Bush put it in his State of the Union
message, in "isolation." North Korea is already the most isolated
country on earth.
-- Military action to head off these threats has been taken off the
table.
-- The United States does not stand firmly with South Korea in defense
against North Korea.
-- The U.S. believes its security can be adequately protected through
the interventions of others -- South Korea, Russia, and China.
-- The United States will not take action to deal directly with North
Korea on the crisis until North Korea halts is nuclear program,
whereas North Korea is accelerating its program.
-- The United States cannot handle more than one crisis at a time.
ATTEMPTING A NEW APPROACH, BEGINNING WITH DIRECT TALKS
The National Security Advisory Group cannot be certain whether North
Korea is willing to engage in meaningful diplomacy, or whether it is
determined to seek a nuclear arsenal regardless of what we do. That
can only be tested by talks. President Bush has stated that he seeks a
diplomatic solution to the North Korea crisis but has not suggested a
roadmap for talks. Our allies and friends in the region expect us to
try a serious diplomatic effort and will not be prepared to stand
firmly with us unless such an effort has been tried and failed.
An effective diplomatic approach will require immediate efforts in
parallel to repair relations with our ally, South Korea. We have lost
considerable leverage in dealing with North Korea over the past two
years by allowing our relationship with South Korea to deteriorate.
In the judgment of the National Security Advisory Group, the U.S.
should move immediately on a new and aggressive diplomatic approach
featuring direct talks with North Korea and incorporating the
following initial features:
-- Forge a common front with Japan and South Korea. Japan is the focal
point of U.S. policy towards the entire Asia-Pacific region, and no
U.S. strategy towards North Korea can succeed unless it is shared with
South Korea. In particular, the ROK can contribute greatly to
diplomatic success; it can undermine our diplomacy if it does not
agree with us; and without its participation more coercive approaches
to North Korea become unavailable in practice.
-- Propose direct U.S. talks with North Korea (direct talks mean that
U.S. and North Korean representatives are in the same room, though
representatives of other nations might also be present in the room at
the same time). China, Russia, and others can play an important role
in pressing North Korea to comply with the NPT and accept the IAEA
inspectors. Direct talks can and should be conducted in parallel with
efforts at the United Nations to raise international concern over
North Korea's nuclear moves; the UN has an important role to play in
holding North Korea responsible for complying with its obligations
under the NPT, and for providing the vehicle (IAEA) for verifying that
compliance. But issues at the very heart of American security cannot
simply be outsourced to China, Russia, or the United Nations. North
Korea itself maintains that only the United States, as the leading
power in the region and the world, can address its security concerns,
and that these concerns are the source of its nuclear program. Our
allies and friends in the region also urge direct talks.
-- Begin talks with North Korea with the firm objective of complete
and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons (both
plutonium-based and uranium-based) and long-range missile programs
nationwide. This objective includes, but goes beyond, all the
obligations contained in previous agreements made by North Korea.
-- Be prepared to begin these talks immediately, with the
understanding that as long as the talks are under way North Korea will
freeze all activity at Yongbyon (under IAEA supervision), and the U.S.
will refrain from any military buildup on the Korean Peninsula.
-- Articulate a red line. The United States should make it clear to
North Korea that it cannot tolerate North Korean progression to
reprocessing or any other steps to obtain fissile material for nuclear
weapons, and that we are prepared to take all measures of coercion,
including military force, to prevent this threat to U.S. security.
-- Offer to make a pledge to North Korea that the U.S. will not seek
to eliminate the North Korean regime by force if North Korea agrees to
the complete and verifiable elimination of its nuclear weapons and
long-range missile programs.
-- Offer assistance for weapons elimination, as the U.S. has done to
the states of the former Soviet Union under the Nunn-Lugar program.
-- Broaden talks over time to encompass other issues of deep concern
to the United States, such as conventional forces, avoidance of
incidents on the DMZ, and human rights; and to North Korea, such as
energy security and economic development.
-- Promote a gradual and conditional relaxation of tension. Within the
context of a shared diplomatic approach, South Korea and Japan should
be encouraged to expand their contacts with North Korea. Important
economic benefits to North Korea could result from these expanded
contacts, but if, and only if, North Korea curbs its weapons programs.
The U.S. should not give in to blackmail, but neither should it be
frozen into paralysis. The objective of negotiations should not be
simply to return to the status quo ante, but to achieve a more
comprehensive curb on North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile
programs than ever before, backed by extensive verification and
international monitoring.
* William J. Perry, chair; Madeleine K. Albright, Samuel R. Berger,
Louis Caldera, Ashton B.Carter, Wesley Clark, Michele Flournoy,
Alfonso E. Lenhardt, John D. Podesta, John Shalikashvili, and
Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, members.
(end text)
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Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
