Food Program Chief Urges More Monitoring of Aid to North Korea
(Feb. 25 remarks to Senate Foreign Relations Committee) (1290)
The distribution of food aid in North Korea needs closer monitoring,
says James Morris, executive director of the World Food Program (WFP).
Testifying February 25 before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, Morris said that during the eight years the WFP has been
operating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), WFP
staff "have literally spent thousands of hours trying to convince
North Korean officials of the wisdom of a more transparent monitoring
regime."
"Monitoring has been a concern of all our major contributors, not just
the United States," he said. "There has been progress, but it has only
been in the last few months that a very clear signal has gone out to
the DPRK Government from the United States, as the principal donor,
that meeting WFP's normal monitoring standards is essential. We hope
that signal will produce more movement because the humanitarian
situation remains grave."
Despite the need for closer monitoring, Morris said, "[w]e have
reasons to believe that most food is getting through to the women and
children who need it."
The most compelling reason for continuing food aid to North Korea, he
said, is that a follow-up nutrition study completed last year by
UNICEF (originally known as the United Nations International
Children's Emergency Fund, now called the United Nations Children's
Fund) shows significant improvement in the nutritional status of
children there since the first study was done in 1998.
According to the follow-up nutrition study, the proportion of children
underweight (weight-for-age) has fallen from 61 percent to 21 percent
since 1998. Wasting, or acute malnutrition (weight-for-height), has
fallen from 16 percent to 9 percent; stunting, or chronic malnutrition
(height-for-age), has dropped from 62 percent to 42 percent.
Following is an excerpt on North Korea from Morris' testimony before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee February 25:
(begin excerpt)
TESTIMONY OF JAMES T. MORRIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR WORLD FOOD PROGRAM
HEARING ON "THE STATE OF THE WORLD REPORT ON HUNGER, FROM AFRICA TO
NORTH KOREA"
FEBRUARY 25, 2003
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Submission to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on North Korea
North Korea presents the most politically troubling and frustrating
food crisis in the world today. On the one hand there is continuing,
desperate need. But, on the other, no government in history has ever
made normal food aid monitoring so very difficult. Hungry people who
cannot help themselves have a right to food; but donors providing that
food have a right to know it is getting to those hungry people.
Over the eight years of the food aid program in the DPRK, WFP staff
have literally spent thousands of hours trying to convince North
Korean officials of the wisdom of a more transparent monitoring
regime. Monitoring has been a concern of all our major contributors,
not just the United States. There has been progress, but it has only
been in the last few months that a very clear signal has gone out to
the DPRK Government from the United States, as the principal donor,
that meeting WFP's normal monitoring standards is essential. We hope
that signal will produce more movement because the humanitarian
situation remains grave.
Last fall, lack of resources led WFP to cut the rations of 3 million
North Koreans, mostly children and the elderly. In 2002 some 37
percent of planned distributions had to be suspended. Reviving
donations will not be easy. Japan remains averse to contributing food
aid because of the issue of kidnappings and the targeting of North
Korean missiles. The United States has pulled back in response to
reports of diversions it found credible began to surface. South Korea
will likely remain committed to food aid, but perhaps most will
continue to be unmonitored and outside the scope of the United
Nations.
Where do we go from here? Well, first, it is critical for the
Committee and the Bush Administration to understand precisely where we
are with the North Koreans on monitoring. It would be wrong for me to
depict the regime in Pyongyang as totally uncooperative. Over the
years the number of WFP staff permitted has steadily risen and
monitoring site visits were up 25 percent last year. Nevertheless,
there remain serious problems:
-- We have received approval for satellite communications from
Pyongyang and our sub-offices, but not permission to use the sat
phones we imported;
-- We have access only to 85 percent of the population, even though we
are quite certain there are needy people in counties where we are not
permitted to enter;
-- We do not have random access to feeding sites, though the notice
time we must give for visits has been reduced;
-- We are not permitted to have native Korean speakers, though some
WFP staff are studying the language,
-- And finally, we do not have a complete list of beneficiary
institutions, though one was promised in August of 2001.
So you will get no argument from WFP that the Government of North
Korea has given us the same level of monitoring access we have in our
other food aid operations. They clearly have not. I raised these
issues personally and forcefully with North Korean officials, as did
my predecessor on numerous occasions.
Under these circumstances, why have we continued to provide food
there? While we cannot guarantee there have not been food aid
diversions -- we have reasons to believe that most food is getting
through to the women and children who need it. The most compelling is
the recently released follow-up nutrition study. The first nutrition
study done by UNICEF, WFP and the North Korean Government in 1998
showed catastrophic damage, especially to children. The nutrition
survey released last week shows notable progress, though I would
caution that the stunting rate is still extremely high.
-- The proportion of children underweight (weight-for-age) has fallen
from 61 percent in 1998 to 21 percent in 2002
-- Wasting, or acute malnutrition (weight-for-height), has fallen from
16 percent to 9 percent 12
-- Stunting, or chronic malnutrition (height-for-age), has dropped
from 62 percent to 42 percent.
Our emergency operation for 2003 calls for 512,000 mt of food at a
cost of $200 million. As in the past, we will continue to target those
most at risk -- the youngest children, pregnant and nursing women,
caregivers in children's institutions, some of the elderly. These
total more than 4 million people. We also plan to reach another 2.2
million North Koreans, for shorter periods of time in the agricultural
lean season, through food-for work projects.
While the size of our intervention this year is about 15% smaller than
last year's plan in part because of a better harvest, it is vitally
important we continue or we risk losing many of the nutritional gains
made in past years -- there will surely be more stunting and
malnutrition among child bearing women and children.
I visited our operations in DPRK late last year. I traveled to food
insecure regions far from Pyongyang, talked to our staff and the
people we assist, and observed how our programs have really made a
difference. I would only put forward my personal appeal -- if millions
of young children are to avoid lasting mental and physical damage from
chronic hunger, we have to ensure that food aid continues. But we must
all work together hard on accessibility, accountability and
transparency -- even if the political climate warms. The problems are
too great for us to throw up our arms and go home, as a few aid
agencies have, abandoning some of the most malnourished women and
children in the world.
(end excerpt)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
