Kelly Says U.S. Would Welcome a New Relationship to North Korea
(James Kelly before House International Relations Committee Feb. 13)
(2260)
Despite growing tensions, the United States would still welcome an
opportunity to forge a new relationship with North Korea, says James
Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific
affairs.
At a February 13 hearing before the House subcommittee on Asia and the
Pacific, International Relations Committee, Kelly said: "We want North
Korea to understand that the United States stands ready to build a
different kind of relationship with it, once Pyongyang eliminates its
nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner, and
comes into verifiable compliance with its international commitments."
He outlined U.S. desires to pursue a "bold approach" with Pyongyang
which would entail "political and economic steps to improve the lives
of the North Korean people" and to move the U.S.-North Korea
relationship toward normalcy.
What derailed the U.S. plan was "the discovery that the North had for
several years been pursuing a covert uranium enrichment program for
nuclear weapons, in egregious violation of its international
obligations," he said.
"North Korea appears to be considering taking further provocative,
escalatory actions. If the North reverses course, and gives up its
nuclear weapons program in an open, verifiable way, we may again
consider a bold approach," Kelly said.
U.S. requirements, Kelly said, for resuming efforts toward better
relations are: the verifiably and irreversibly dismantlement of North
Korea's nuclear weapons program and compliance with its international
obligations.
"Despite Pyongyang's rhetoric, North Korea's nuclear program is not
just a matter between the DPRK and the United States," Kelly said.
"Pyongyang's behavior affects international security and the global
nonproliferation regime. Many other countries, our friends and allies,
have important equities in the resolution of the North's nuclear
threat."
The United States, he said, has proposed multilateral talks with North
Korea and remains prepared to engage in those talks.
Following is the text of Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly's
prepared statement before the House International Relations
subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific February 13:
(begin text)
Prepared Statement of James A. Kelly
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
House International Relations Committee
"A Peaceful Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Issue"
13 February 2002
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me
to discuss the Administration's approach toward achieving a peaceful
resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.
I appreciate this opportunity to continue our ongoing discussion of
this important topic. Much has happened since I last came before you,
with Under Secretary Grossman in closed session on January 8. We value
your advice and appreciate the Committee's deep interest.
I'll outline the nature of the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear
weapons programs, Administration policy with respect to the DPRK, and
how we are working to achieve our non-proliferation objectives.
The Threat of North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Programs
North Korea's nuclear program and ambitions are a long-standing
problem, certainly for over 20 years. The US has been concerned about
North Korea's desire for nuclear weapons and has assessed since the
early 1990s that the North has one or possibly two weapons using
plutonium it produced prior to 1992.
North Korea has moved rapidly in recent weeks to unfreeze key elements
of its graphite-moderated plutonium production program, which had been
frozen under the 1994 Agreed Framework agreement between the U.S. and
North Korea.
The DPRK has removed the monitoring equipment the IAEA installed at
its Yongbyon nuclear complex; expelled the IAEA inspectors resident
there; announced it would resume operations at such facilities as its
5 megawatt reactor and at its spent fuel reprocessing plant; and on
January 10, announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. On 21 January, the Vice Minister of Power
and Coal Industries announced Yongbyon would be able to generate
electricity within a few weeks and that preparations were being
stepped up. North Korea claims, we believe disingenuously, that "its
nuclear activity would be limited to peaceful purposes...at the
present stage."
If North Korea reprocessed the roughly 8,000 spent fuel rods it had
stored under IAEA supervision under the Agreed Framework, it could
recover enough plutonium to produce several additional nuclear
weapons.
That would present a most serious proliferation concern. The DPRK has
a demonstrated record of selling missiles and missile technology to
such countries as Iran, Pakistan and Yemen. Missiles and conventional
arms are an important source of hard currency earnings, and the North
could try to sell fissile material, when it has more of it, to
non-state actors or rogue states.
The North's plutonium program is not the only concern. For several
years, North Korea has also been pursuing a parallel path to nuclear
weapons through the production of highly enriched uranium. This
program violates the Agreed Framework, the Nonproliferation Treaty,
its IAEA safeguards agreement, and the Joint North-South Declaration
on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea's uranium enrichment efforts continue to progress, and we
recognize that any North Korean nuclear weapon (whether made from
enriched uranium or plutonium) represents a grave security threat.
Last summer we concluded that Pyongyang had moved from R&D to
construction of a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade
uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully
operational--which could be as soon as mid-decade.
Administration Policy with Respect to North Korea
As President Bush and Secretary Powell have said repeatedly, we seek a
peaceful, diplomatic solution with North Korea.
President Bush stated during his visit to South Korea last year that
the United States has no intention of invading North Korea. However,
the President has also made clear that all options remain on the table
for addressing this situation.
Meanwhile, the United States continues to be concerned about the
innocent people of North Korea, and doing what we can to help them.
The U.S. is the world's largest donor of food assistance to the DPRK.
Since 1995, we have provided 1.9 million metric tons of food, valued
at $620 million. For the 2002 World Food Program (WFP) operation in
North Korea, the United States contributed 207,000 metric tons of
food, valued at $82.4 million, over half of what the WFP actually
received last year. With better crop production in 2002-2003, the WFP
has reduced its appeal for North Korea. The U.S. will be a significant
donor again this year although the amount that we will provide has not
yet been determined.
President Bush has stressed we will continue to provide humanitarian
assistance to the people of North Korea, and that we will not use food
as a source of political leverage. North Korea does impose uniquely
onerous restrictions on distribution, which prevent us from having
full confidence that the food we provide is going to the people who
actually need it. And we must balance out the needs of the over 80
other countries to which we are providing food aid. We will factor
these considerations in to decide exactly how much aid to give North
Korea this year.
We want North Korea to understand that the United States stands ready
to build a different kind of relationship with it, once Pyongyang
eliminates its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and
irreversible manner, and comes into verifiable compliance with its
international commitments.
In fact, in consultation with South Korea and Japan, the United States
was ready last summer to pursue a bold approach with Pyongyang.
That approach would have entailed political and economic steps to
improve the lives of the North Korean people and to move our
relationship with the North toward normalcy, if North Korea also
addressed issues of concern to us.
What derailed it was the discovery that the North had for several
years been pursuing a covert uranium enrichment program for nuclear
weapons, in egregious violation of its international obligations.
North Korea appears to be considering taking further provocative,
escalatory actions. If the North reverses course, and gives up its
nuclear weapons program in an open, verifiable way, we may again
consider a bold approach.
Achieving our Non-Proliferation Objectives
We have made clear exactly what North Korea must do to address
concerns over its development of nuclear weapons: verifiably and
irreversibly dismantle its nuclear weapons program and come into
compliance with its international obligations.
Despite Pyongyang's rhetoric, North Korea's nuclear program is not
just a matter between the DPRK and the United States. Pyongyang's
behavior affects international security and the global
nonproliferation regime. Many other countries, our friends and allies,
have important equities in the resolution of the North's nuclear
threat.
That is why the 35 member nations of the Board of Governors of the
International Atomic Energy Agency last month unanimously deplored
DPRK moves to unfreeze its plutonium program. In that resolution, the
IAEA Board called on the DPRK to comply on an urgent basis with its
safeguards obligations and to cooperate with the Agency to
re-establish surveillance at the Yongbyon nuclear complex.
The agency further announced that it is at present unable "to exercise
its responsibilities under the safeguards agreement, namely, to verify
that the DPRK is not diverting nuclear material to nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices...."
North Korea subsequently further escalated the situation by rejecting
the IAEA resolution, announcing its intention to withdraw from the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and suggesting that it may resume
flight testing of long-range missiles. Should North Korea take such
steps and advance its nuclear capabilities further, it will only
isolate itself and force the international community to consider a
strong response.
Yesterday, the IAEA Board of Governors found the DPRK to be in further
noncompliance with its safeguards agreement and reported this finding
to the UN Security Council by a vote of 31 in favor, with 2
abstentions. We look forward to taking this matter up at the UN
Security Council in the coming days.
To achieve our non-proliferation objectives on the Korean Peninsula,
we are working closely with South Korea, Japan, Russia, China, the EU,
Australia, and other friends and allies to make the North understand
the consequences of its dangerous and provocative actions.
We have proposed multilateral talks to North Korea and remain prepared
to engage in those talks.
Secretary Powell is leading this diplomatic approach, and is daily
engaged with officials of the ROK, Japan, Australia, China, Russia,
and many other governments who, without exception, share our objective
that the Korean Peninsula remains free of nuclear weapons.
Consultations with South Korea have been especially close.
We are looking forward to a very close and effective working
relationship with President-elect Roh and we will continue to deepen
and strengthen our alliance with the ROK.
The President called President-elect Roh Moo-hyun on December 20 to
congratulate him on his victory. They agreed to meet in Washington
some time after Mr. Roh is inaugurated on February 25, and intensify
consultations in the interim by exchanging envoys. Accordingly, I
traveled to Seoul in January as the President's envoy, and
President-elect Roh sent National Assemblyman Chyung Dae-chul to
Washington February 4-5 to meet with senior administration officials.
President-elect Roh has stated emphatically that North Korea's nuclear
weapons program and recent actions at Yongbyon are unacceptable.
China and Russia share our goal of a non-nuclear Korean peninsula.
They have called on North Korea to observe its international
obligations fully and to remain in the NPT.
We are also consulting with our KEDO partners -- South Korea, Japan
and the EU -- about KEDO's future, including the fate of the light
water reactor project. In the meantime, the Administration has asked
Congress to appropriate $3.5 million in FY03 to fund the U.S.
contribution to KEDO's administrative account, should we decide it is
in our national interest to do so. No part of that funding would go to
heavy fuel oil shipments, which the KEDO Executive Board suspended in
November, or to light water reactor construction. But the ability to
make our contribution to the administrative account will give us
flexibility in working with our KEDO allies to achieve our shared
non-proliferation goals. Given the fluidity and seriousness of the
current situation, this flexibility is important.
North Korea in the past has said it wanted to transform its relations
with its former enemies.
The President is holding out an unmistakable opportunity to do so.
But, the North will need to eliminate its nuclear weapons program and
to change its behavior on other important matters such as human
rights, address the issues underlying its appearance on the State
Department list of states sponsoring terrorism, its weapons of mass
destruction programs, the proliferation of missiles and
missile-related technology, and its conventional force disposition in
order to realize that opportunity.
Channels of communication remain open.
For its part, the North must be willing to act in a manner that builds
trust.
While we will not dole out "rewards" to convince North Korea to live
up to its existing obligations, we remain prepared to pursue a
comprehensive dialogue about a fundamentally different relationship
with that country, once it eliminates its nuclear weapons program in a
verifiable and irreversible manner and comes into compliance with its
international obligations.
Thank you for this opportunity to discuss this important issue with
you today. We will continue to work closely with the Congress as we
seek a diplomatic solution with respect to North Korea.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
