27 January 2003
Threat of Aggression Comes From North Korea, Not U.S., Bolton Says
(U.S. won't reward North Korea's "bad behavior") (6310) The threat of aggression in the Asia-Pacific region comes from North Korea's communist rulers and not from the United States, according to Under Secretary of State John Bolton. In a January 24 interview with Japanese news company NHK at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, Bolton noted that it was the Pyongyang regime of Kim Jong Il, which has "nearly a million men under arms, and an incredible concentration of conventional and weapons of mass destruction" along the demilitarized zone between North Korea and the Republic of Korea. "If anybody needs assurances of non-aggression, the rest of us need those assurances from North Korea," Bolton said. The U.S. diplomat discounted the idea that Pyongyang was responding to being named as part of an "Axis of Evil," noting that the communist regime's uranium-enrichment program, began "at least five years ago." That program, Bolton said, began "well before" President Bush assumed the presidency in January 2001. It also demonstrates the extent to which the Pyongyang regime is committed to getting nuclear weapons, he added. Bolton said he thought that Pyongyang "badly miscalculated," when they announced their program in October of last year. The United States, he said, is not going to follow the communist regime's "blackmail playbook." The United States, Bolton emphasized, is not going to "reward their bad behavior." North Korea's communist government has to dismantle both its uranium-enrichment program and its plutonium-reprocessing program before there is "any possibility of a new relationship with the United States." While the United States doesn't have any intention at present to seek sanctions against Pyongyang for its nuclear weapons program, Bolton pointed out that the United Nations Charter does provide for the U.N. Security Council to impose sanctions on North Korea, if it refuses to comply with its treaty obligations. "The disposition of this matter lies largely in North Korea's hands," Bolton said, noting that the communist regime should see how isolated its position is on this issue. Were Pyongyang's communist rulers to take "concrete steps to give up their nuclear weapons program, a lot of possibilities would emerge." He warned that if Pyongyang remained defiant, "then this matter will continue to grow more serious." The U.S. diplomat said no one wanted military action on the Korean peninsula. "President Bush has been very clear on a number of occasions that we have no intention to invade North Korea," Bolton said. Turning to Iraq, Bolton reiterated President Bush's message to the United Nations General Assembly in September that, in the end, Iraq will not have weapons of mass destruction. The choice of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, he suggested, was whether the Baghdad regime would arrive at that point peacefully or, "we'll have to take other action." Noting that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein has defied the U.N. Security Council for 12 years, Bolton said the United States thinks "it's time to bring this matter to a conclusion." In response to a question about the U.S. approach to Iraq and North Korea, Bolton said the United States had the same policy objectives regarding the two regimes. The United States, he said, is seeking the "elimination of the weapons of mass destruction programs in both countries." Because circumstances are different in the two countries, he said, "The particular policy roots that we're following are different." With the Baghdad regime of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, Bolton said, the United States has pursued a policy for 12 years to resolve the issue by peaceful and diplomatic means. "In the case of North Korea, we believe that a diplomatic solution is still possible, and we are pursuing it very vigorously," Bolton said. "The policy objective in both cases is the same -- the elimination of these very dangerous programs of weapons of mass destruction," Bolton said. Following is a transcript of the January 24 interview of Under Secretary of State John Bolton with NHK at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo: (begin transcript) Under Secretary of State John R. Bolton NHK-TV Interview (2 parts) January 24, 2003 U.S. Embassy Tokyo, Japan 5:00 p.m. local time (Interview by First Correspondent) QUESTION: Mr. Under Secretary, thank you very much for joining us. You have just toured China, South Korea, and now you are here in Japan. What is your perception about the tension surrounding the North Korean nuclear development program in the region? U/S BOLTON: I think that we're quite concerned, obviously, about North Korea's aggressive pursuit of nuclear weapons, but I think it's important to try and keep this in perspective. There is still ample time for a diplomatic solution, and North Korea's effort to turn this into a crisis, and particularly to turn it into a bilateral crisis with the United States, is not something that we have to accept. So while our diplomatic activity is quite intense, and we are committed, as President Bush has directed us, to find a peaceful solution, we're not going to play this to North Korea's tempo. QUESTION: The big question is North Korea's intent. North Korea has stressed that they are not seeking to make nuclear weapons. Do you believe that? U/S BOLTON: Certainly not. We know for a fact that North Korea has an ongoing program to enrich uranium to create weapons-grade uranium that can be used to produce nuclear weapons. They have been pursuing this program in violation of the Nonproliferation Treaty and the Agreed Framework for at least five years. In addition, they have recently unsealed the plutonium reprocessing facility at Yongbyon to put them in a position to begin reprocessing the spent fuel rods there that would give them weapons-grade plutonium. North Korea has been pursuing nuclear weapons since 1955. Their actions that they have kept clandestine until we discovered them and their actions since late December all show just how seriously they are pursuing nuclear weapons. Their recent declaration that they were withdrawing from the Nonproliferation Treaty, but only to produce electricity, is just nonsensical. If they were serious about not producing nuclear weapons, they would rejoin the Nonproliferation Treaty, stop the reprocessing facility at Yongbyon, and stop their uranium enrichment program. QUESTION: Why do you think they have decided to acknowledge that they have started a new nuclear program at this time? U/S BOLTON: It's been a matter of intense speculation for us why they admitted the program. One possibility is that they realized we had uncovered what they were doing and that they drew the wrong lesson from the negotiations over the Agreed Framework back in 1993-94. They may have felt that if the uranium- enrichment program has been discovered that they would put it out on the table and see what we'd be willing to pay in response to their blackmail to stop the program. I think they badly miscalculated, because we're not going to go through their blackmail playbook. We're not going to reward their bad behavior. They have to dismantle both the uranium-enrichment program and now the plutonium-reprocessing program before there is any possibility of a new relationship with the United States. QUESTION: President Bush named North Korea as one of the "axis of evil" countries. Do you think they are afraid about the U.S. policy of seeking preemptive strikes towards countries that are seeking weapons of mass destruction? U/S BOLTON: The threat of aggression in this region does not come from the United States. It comes from North Korea, which has nearly a million men under arms, and an incredible concentration of conventional and weapons of mass destruction along the militarized zone. If anybody needs assurances of non-aggression, the rest of us need those assurances from North Korea. It's just not a credible notion that somehow the North Koreans have been responding to the "axis of evil" or any statements by our administration. As I mentioned a moment ago, the North Korean uranium-enrichment program, as far as we know, began at least five years ago. So that goes well before President Bush was even elected, and it shows the extent of North Korea's commitment to obtaining nuclear weapons. That's what we all are really concerned about. QUESTION: So now you are seeking to put this matter to the Security Council. You had just said in the press conference that the IAEA Board is likely to pass a resolution, probably soon. When is that? U/S BOLTON: We had hoped to have a resolution before the end of the month of January. We still think that's possible. It's important that the IAEA Board of Governors be unanimous on that point, and you know there have been two previous resolutions since November by the IAEA. So we've been proceeding in a very deliberate and prudent fashion. We're not rushing the IAEA, but we do think that the clear violation by the North Koreans of the Nonproliferation Treaty amounts to a threat to international peace and security, and according to the IAEA statute they are required to refer that matter to the Security Council. So that's an appropriate thing to do, and that's what we've been seeking. QUESTION: So when do you see the matter being put to the Security Council? U/S BOLTON: I remain optimistic it's going to be in the very near future. The question is getting agreement by all the key parties on the Board of Governors. I'm optimistic that will come in the near future. Then it will be up to the Security Council to decide on what its next steps will be. QUESTION: So in about a week or two? U/S BOLTON: I'm optimistic that we can make it within that time frame, yes. QUESTION: And what measures are you going to seek there? U/S BOLTON: I think the first thing that's important to do is to show to the North Koreans, perhaps through a presidential statement at the Security Council, just how seriously the rest of the world takes their ongoing efforts to get nuclear weapons. I think it will be a further demonstration of how isolated they are and how worried the rest of the world is about this course that they've taken, but also a way for the Council to show that we will not submit to blackmail and we will not allow the North Koreans to get away with keeping these nuclear weapons. QUESTION: Do you have sanctions in mind? U/S BOLTON: We don't have any intention at the moment to seek sanctions, but I think, certainly, that is one of the options that the U.N. Charter provides for the Security Council, and I think that's something that at some point the Council might have to consider. It really underlines what I think is a very important point here, and that is the disposition of this matter lies largely in North Korea's hands. If they were to take concrete steps to give up their nuclear weapons program, a lot of possibilities would emerge. But if they remain defiant, if they remain in violation of their international commitments, if they keep up their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, then this matter will continue to grow more serious. QUESTION: I wonder whether or not you predict North Korea will resume missile tests in the future? U/S BOLTON: They have threatened to resume missile tests. I think they would be very ill advised to do that. It would simply make this a more serious matter. I think it's one of the reasons that their neighbors in the region - in South Korea and in Japan - are so concerned about what the North is up to. Japan obviously has no hostile intent towards North Korea, and yet North Korea's missiles are capable of reaching Japanese cities. Especially containing nuclear warheads, they would be an extraordinary danger to the innocent civilian population here. If North Korea thinks that by threatening and blackmailing other states it's going to be rewarded, however, I think that's a big mistake. We are committed - strongly committed - to a peaceful resolution of this problem, but it's not going to be through submitting to blackmail. North Korea needs to understand that very clearly. QUESTION: It must be a very big point for thinking how to act towards North Korea, because the repercussions of war with North Korea would be so grave. U/S BOLTON: Well, it's not in our consideration at all. No one wants military action on the Korean Peninsula, and President Bush has been very clear on a number of occasions that we have no intention to invade North Korea. Our objective is to get the matter resolved peacefully. But that requires action by the North Koreans, and it's one reason that we've been in very close consultation with the government of South Korea and the government of Japan to show that we're united for that proposition, and why all three of us in separate channels have been in consultation with China and with Russia, whom we hope can exert - because of their historical relationship with North Korea - we hope they can exert influence on Pyongyang to back off this very dangerous course of action. QUESTION: The United States-North Korean relations have been based on the 1994 Framework Agreement. Do you now consider the agreement nullified? U/S BOLTON: The North Koreans have said that, and Secretary Powell said, "When one side says an agreement is nullified, that pretty well means it's nullified." The North Koreans violated the fundamental basis of that framework, which was that they were going to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons. For at least five years, in a covert fashion, while all of us were focused on the plutonium facility at Yongbyon, they were over here enriching uranium in a way that they hoped we wouldn't find out. When there is such a fundamental breach of an agreement, it really shreds North Korea's credibility. QUESTION: So whatever happens in the future will not be based on the Framework Agreement. I was wondering, we have the cooperation with North Korea in building the light water reactor. Is the construction going to continue, or do you prefer a coal-fire plant instead? U/S BOLTON: Well, I think it's not appropriate at this point to talk about any kind of concrete steps for the North. I think it's very unlikely the reactors will ever be completed. Given North Korea's history with radioactive material, I'm not sure that we want to be in a position of trusting them to do the right thing for some considerable period of time. I don't think it's appropriate to look at specific quid pro quos of energy for this or food aid for that or something like that. What we see as the way to proceed toward a new arrangement is for a substantial transformation of North Korea's behavior. The verifiable dismantling of their nuclear weapons program. When they begin to behave more like a normal state, then certainly the United States and I think Japan and others will be more willing to treat them like a normal state. But the first step lies with a change in North Korean behavior. QUESTION: So how do you go about bringing that about? First the United States said that it ruled out any talks until North Korea's nuclear ambitions were gone. And then you softened your tone, saying that perhaps a package with energy and humanitarian aid with a written document to guarantee their security of non-aggression may be offered if they abandon their nuclear program. It's very confusing, because the United States has said something very, very hard-line and then softened. So what kind of approach are you going to be taking? U/S BOLTON: I don't think we've really changed our position. I think we've said consistently that we have no objection to talking to the North Koreans to explain to them how to come back into compliance with their international obligations. We've said also we're not going to negotiate with them in a way that rewards bad behavior. I think it's very important that people understand that this is not a conflict between the United States and North Korea. We have no designs on North Korea. We care deeply about the starving people that are so oppressed by the Kim Jong Il regime, but what we care about is eliminating the threat of their nuclear weapons program. That's the principle focus of our interest. QUESTION: So may I make it clear, there will be no incentive for North Korea to abandon their nuclear program? U/S BOLTON: We are not going to succumb to blackmail or go through their blackmail playbook. That's absolutely right. QUESTION: You said a bold initiative or a complete transformation of their behavior is needed. Secretary Powell has been talking about a new arrangement. What is the principal thinking behind the U.S. policy for a new arrangement? U/S BOLTON: Well, really the idea is President Bush's, to say that this pattern of trying to deal with North Korea, as revealed by the failure of the Agreed Framework and other failed negotiations, should lead us to try a dramatically different approach, which is basically to say to North Korea, "If you will change the way you go about doing business on a fundamental basis, we're prepared to change the way we deal with you on a fundamental basis." And that's a very broad conceptual approach. If the North Koreans are willing to entertain that, then I'm sure we'll be willing to follow through on it. But we have reached a point, because of this dogged pursuit of nuclear weapons, where the time for rhetoric really is overtaken by the need for them to act. What they need to do is dismantle that nuclear weapons program. QUESTION: Are you going to ask for a reduction of conventional weapons as well? U/S BOLTON: I think since the summer of 2001, we've said that the disposition of conventional forces on the peninsula is a matter of concern. Why does North Korea have a million troops near the Demilitarized Zone? The United States has thirty-seven thousand troops in all of South Korea. It's an important force, but it's obviously not one that threatens the North. Why do they have that concentration of forces? Why do they have artillery aimed at the civilian population of Seoul? I think those are all things that are worth discussing. QUESTION: Okay, I'd like to switch to Iraq now, which is another big problem. The inspectors' reports are coming out on Monday, January 27th. What is the significance of that date? U/S BOLTON: We are awaiting the inspectors' reports. We've been in touch with them, and of course they've made some public comments. I think a couple things are very clear. First, the inspectors will not be able to certify that Iraq is in compliance with Resolution 1441 and the earlier U.N. resolutions that require that its weapons of mass destruction be eliminated. It may be that the inspectors will ask for additional time, and we will certainly consider that carefully. But I think, as the President and his senior advisors have said in recent days, really we're coming to the end of this process. The President was very clear back in his speech to the General Assembly in September and in subsequent remarks that we already know how the story in Iraq will end. At the end of the story, Iraq will not have weapons of mass destruction. Now, you can choose to get to that end in a peaceful fashion by voluntarily meeting its obligations under the U.N. resolution, or we'll have to take other action. We hope that's not the case. It's our troops that are most at risk, and if there were any peaceful way to disarm Iraq, that would be our preference. But after twelve years - twelve years - of Iraq defying the Security Council, we think it's time to bring this matter to a conclusion. QUESTION: You said that the inspectors are most likely to ask for more time. How much more time will the United States give Iraq to cooperate? U/S BOLTON: We want to see what the inspectors have to say. Their public remarks have indicated that they're likely... QUESTION: The inspectors have said that maybe a few more months. U/S BOLTON: I think I'll wait for their definitive report, and I don't think there's any decision that the President has made in terms of timing. But it's not a question, it seems to me, of thirty days or sixty days. We've been waiting for twelve years, and another few days at the end doesn't change the fundamental fact that for twelve long years Saddam Hussein has defied the United Nations Security Council and refused to eliminate his weapons of mass destruction. So unless there is some indication of a personality change that's going to make a difference in the next few days, I think we have to acknowledge the history that we've seen, that his regime is wedded to weapons of mass destruction. QUESTION: What is going to be the benchmark in judging that he has not complied with the Resolution? U/S BOLTON: We have very substantial information about Iraq's ongoing programs in chemical and biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and long-range missiles. I think that at an appropriate time, as part of making our case to the Security Council and to the international community as a whole, that we're prepared to share some of that information. This is not something that we're imagining. These are hard facts that have been brought to our attention that make it unmistakably plain that Iraq has substantial capabilities in weapons of mass destruction and it continues to seek those capabilities. All of that in flat violation of the Security Council's resolutions, and coupled with a very sophisticated and, unfortunately, a very successful program of hiding its weapons of mass destruction from the U.N. weapons inspectors. QUESTION: So when Secretary Powell says that the United States will have a very persuasive case by the end of the month, you have some intelligence reports that have not been shared with the inspectors that are quite convincing. U/S BOLTON: Absolutely. We have given some information to the inspectors to aid them in their work, but there is a lot of information that we have not shared, either in our previous public statements or to the inspectors, because of the importance of not permitting the Iraqis to engage in further deception and camouflage activities. But we recognize that we need to explain possible courses of action internationally, and I believe the President and his top advisors will be prepared to do that. QUESTION: So all along we have been talking about that they have not found a "smoking gun," but perhaps a lack of cooperation on the side of Iraq is reason enough to start a military attack. Let me just confirm. So there would be more than a lack of cooperation? U/S BOLTON: Yes, absolutely. This is not enough passive cooperation or not even enough active cooperation. What the Iraqis have been doing is exactly the opposite, an active campaign of disinformation, camouflage, concealment, denial and deception intended to prevent the inspectors from doing what their job is, which is not to play hide and seek all across Iraq. (Their job) is intended to verify the accuracy of the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The declaration that the Iraqi's filed on December the 7th, which was the last of several chances that they've had over a twelve-year period to file a complete declaration, contained many material omissions and misrepresentations. That's why Secretary Powell labeled it as a material breach of Resolution 1441, and why even that declaration shows that Iraq continues its efforts to conceal its WMD programs. QUESTION: Will the United States seek a second resolution at the Security Council to get a legal basis to justify military action? U/S BOLTON: No decision has been made on the subject of the second resolution, but I may say in terms of Security Council resolutions, we already have all of the authority that we need, going back to Resolution 687, the so-called "Ceasefire Resolution" in 1991. That was the resolution that brought the Persian Gulf War to a conclusion, on the basis of which Iraq was obligated to do a number of things, one of which - the most important of which - was see to the elimination of its weapons of mass destruction. So Iraq's failure to meet that obligation over a twelve-year period is in itself a material breach of the "Ceasefire Resolution", which gives authority under the original "Use of Force Resolution" 678, again. But even beyond that, they're in material breach of Resolution 1441, and in our judgment a second resolution is not needed. But as I say, no decision has been made on that. We will await the inspectors' report, and on the basis of the report and other considerations, make a decision in short order. QUESTION: But I would think that the United States would like to go as a multilateral international coalition with international backing, and so many countries in the Security Council have (raised) their voices against a quick military action, including France, Germany, and so many others - China also. Isn't the tide against the U.S., as far as international voices are concerned, at this moment? U/S BOLTON: I think, actually, in consultations we've had, there is a broad cross-section of nations that would support the use of force if a decision were made. I think once we lay out the case about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program, I think that will be convincing evidence to many other countries as well. It's a matter that if military force is used, there will be substantial international support for the United States. I think it's something that while we all hope to avoid, if the resolutions of the Security Council are to have any meaning, they have to be enforced. So there will be an effort, certainly, in the Council, but you will recall in the case of Yugoslavia in the late 1990s, where an effort was sought through the Security Council to gain authorization to protect the people of Kosovo, NATO, faced with vetoes in the Council, acted on its own. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the wisdom of that campaign as a political matter, as a matter of Security Council authorization, I think that's a clear precedent that in order to carry out the Council's will, whether there's a second resolution or not, we're in full regard to do so. QUESTION: But while the international community feels that it is becoming less compelling to use force at the moment, the U.S. military has been building up its forces in the Persian Gulf, and it has reportedly said that it will be ready by mid-February or the end of February to launch an attack. How long can the United States wait before it makes a decision? U/S BOLTON: I don't think we're operating under any deadline one way or the other, and I think that the build-up of military force is intended to be persuasive to Saddam Hussein, one more time, that we're serious about this. We hoped in the case of the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 to convince Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait, which he had invaded in August of 1990, and we hoped that the buildup of military force would convince him that he had no choice. He didn't get the signal then. Once again, we're building up militarily to convince him that he needs to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. I don't know what he will finally do, but this is about as persuasive a way as we can be, short of the use of military force. If we are not persuasive, then we'll be prepared to take whatever action the President decides upon. QUESTION: The strong, belligerent language that President Bush has been repeating towards Iraq makes us feel as though the United States has made up its mind already about going into military action. Is that the case? U/S BOLTON: No, I really don't think that's true. I think the question for many countries, perhaps particularly here in Japan, is how much do you care about the Security Council? For twelve years the Security Council has been passing resolutions, calling on Iraq to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction, and Iraq has persistently refused to do so. Now, the option at some point is to say that the Security Council has made itself clear, and we're going to take the necessary steps to carry out its resolutions. We have a choice - if we want the United Nations to be the United Nations or the League of Nations. That is something that if you value the Security Council, you should insist that its resolutions be honored. We're prepared to do that. We hope to do it with the approval of the Council and in a broad coalition, but we're prepared to do it with a coalition of like-minded countries, if need be, that will convince not only Iraq but everybody else that when we go to the Security Council, we're serious. QUESTION: One last question. We have been talking about North Korea and Iraq. What impresses me is the stark contrast between the policies toward each country. North Korea has said that they have a nuclear development program and they have many, many conventional forces and maybe perhaps other weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein says that they have no nuclear weapons and the inspectors have not been able to find a "smoking gun." Why is it that the United States is moving towards military action towards Iraq while stressing diplomacy with North Korea? U/S BOLTON: I think in both cases our policy objectives are exactly the same, and that is the elimination of the weapons of mass destruction programs in both countries. The particular policy roots that we're following are different because the circumstances in the two countries are different. We've had right now a twelve-year history with Iraq that has exhausted, by any reasonable person's definition, every opportunity to resolve this by peaceful and diplomatic means. As the President has said, it's now time to bring the matter to a conclusion. In the case of North Korea, we believe that a diplomatic solution is still possible, and we are pursuing it very vigorously. But there's no double standard here. The policy objective in both cases is the same - the elimination of these very dangerous programs of weapons of mass destruction. QUESTION: Okay, thank you very much. U/S BOLTON: Thank you. (Interview by Second Correspondent) QUESTION: I have some follow up questions on North Korea. I understand Secretary Powell mentioned there has been some progress made in terms of your relations with North Korea. Could you clarify that? U/S BOLTON: I think what Secretary Powell had in mind was that there are a number of diplomatic initiatives underway. Representatives from Australia have been in North Korea, the representative of the Secretary General of the U.N. has been there, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia has recently returned, and there are a variety of conversations of course in the inter-Korean ministerial dialogue. We've had discussions, Secretary Powell has had discussions with many of his foreign minister colleagues, and I think what he is expressing is our continued determination to seek a diplomatic resolution to the matter. QUESTION: After a couple months of verbal attack between the United States and North Korea, have you seen any change from the North Korean side? U/S BOLTON: I think particularly since they began to unseal the facility at Yongbyon to take the IAEA protections off and destroy the cameras, we've been quite concerned that the situation is growing more intense. I think it's important that we show a united front to the North Koreans, particularly South Korea, Japan and the United States, but really the international community as a whole. We think North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons is illegitimate and we want it stopped. QUESTION: North Korea recently mentioned resuming missile tests. Do you think it's possible for them to do that? U/S BOLTON: Certainly it's possible, but I think you have to bear in mind that North Korea's rhetoric is a finely honed art, and their propaganda skills are probably second to none. So they're in the mode now of trying to intimidate their neighbors and other important players. It's a form of blackmail and leverage. We're not going to succumb to it. If they're serious, there's a way to have conversations, and we've been looking at a number of mechanisms. We've been discussing taking this matter to the Security Council. But really what we want from North Korea is not rhetoric. We want them to dismantle their nuclear weapons program. If they do that, then there are all kinds of possibilities, as Secretary Powell has said, for new arrangements between the North and the United States. QUESTION: At the same time, I understand, you have a kind of military intelligence about, you know, not only intention or verbal talk from North Korea. Do you have any indication that North Korea is so serious about resuming missile tests? U/S BOLTON: I wouldn't want to get into intelligence matters, but we know that North Korea's the world's foremost proliferator of ballistic missile technology, and there are a variety of ways and places that they can test it that are short of an actual missile launch. That's not to say that their missiles are all that sophisticated, but in fact that's one of the mechanisms of terror by which they seek to intimidate others. Their missiles may not be entirely accurate, but when they're directed against innocent civilian populations as they are, they function not as military weapons, but as weapons of terror. It's that kind of intimidation we think is illegitimate. QUESTION: But at the same time the U.S. approach at this moment is consulting a multinational solution, and North Korea, in the meantime, is trying to get direct talks with the United States. Do you think the U.S. will start any kind of direct talks with North Korea before multilateral organizations make any decision? U/S BOLTON: It's certainly a change from the normal pattern where we're accused of being unilateralist here. We're trying to get this into multilateral channels, which I think is appropriate, because this is not a dispute between the United States and North Korea. This is really a dispute between North Korea and the rest of the world. That's why we think the Security Council is an appropriate place to consider this. We've said to the North Koreans we are prepared to talk to them, to explain what they need to do to come back into compliance with international obligations. But we're not going to bargain with them in a way that rewards bad behavior. QUESTION: Do you think North Korea will talk to you soon? U/S BOLTON: I think it's hazardous to make predictions about North Korea. Certainly, they know through their mission in New York, if they need to talk to us they know how to do it. We've had representatives from many friendly governments having discussions with them, as we mentioned a moment ago - the Australians and others, and certainly the government of South Korea. I think its critical that the international community, and especially the nuclear weapons states, the five permanent members of the Security Council, and South Korea and Japan in particular, stick together on this to show no daylight to the North Koreans so that they don't believe that there are gaps in the international community's resolve that they can exploit to their advantage. QUESTION: Is it possible for the U.S. to send a declaration or statement, as Dr. Armitage said, of not invading North Korea? Is it coming soon, or how long is it going to take? U/S BOLTON: I don't know about the timing. President Bush has said we have no intention of invading North Korea, and there is no higher authority or better assurance that we can give. As Rich Armitage said, if it would help to put that in writing I'm sure we can find some way to memorialize the President's commitment. But the President has been very clear about that. The real issue is not some dream about America's so-called aggressive intent toward the North. The real problem is North Korea's aggressive actions toward its neighbors in the region, and the highly militarized state of its population, what they call their "military first" policy, which is evident in the misery and starvation among the civilian population. That's really the sort of thing we ought to be concerned about: Why they have concentrated so much on the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction to the detriment of the poor civilians living there. QUESTION: So a bold new initiative will be coming soon? Or do we have to wait for a couple months or more? U/S BOLTON: This is not a question of time, really. I think it's important that we not be driven by North Korea's artificial schedule. What we'd like to see is not rhetoric from North Korea. We'd like to see action. We'd like to see them definitively and irreversibly dismantle their nuclear weapons programs, and if they start doing that then we'll see what happens. QUESTION: Thanks so much. U/S BOLTON: Okay, thank you. (end transcript) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
