Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

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QUESTION:  Can you wrap up what's going on about North Korea to this morning, particularly (inaudible) about North Korea?  It seem that IAEA postponed their executive board.  China is reluctant about -- to bring this issue to the north, to the UN Security Council.  What is the current situation right now?

MR. BOUCHER:  I don't think it's quite the moment to try to wrap it all up.  We do think the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors needs to report the issue to the Security Council.  That's one of their responsibilities under their charter, and certainly the issue, as it affects international peace and security, is something the Security Council needs to have on its plate. 

There was no meeting specifically scheduled.  There was discussion of having a meeting soon.  We still expect there will be one.  But it was not postponed because it wasn't -- nothing was agreed on or scheduled at any point. 

I don't want to try to characterize positions of other governments, but I would remind you that Under Secretary Bolton, when he came out of Beijing, said that he heard no objection to moving from the IAEA to the Security Council with this.  Obviously, there are many more members of the IAEA Board of Governors, and we're in consultation with the others, with other members of the Board of Governors, both out there and directly through capitals.  And we'll continue to work on that and move forward.  We want to see a meeting soon that can move it -- report it from the Board of Governors to the Security Council.

QUESTION:  Are you in contact at all with the Board of Governors --

MR. BOUCHER:  I don't know that we're in contact with every single one, but certainly we're in touch with many.

QUESTION:  The Iranians?

MR. BOUCHER:  Not that I know of in any particular sense, although I'm sure our mission in Vienna is having contacts with a variety of governments.

QUESTION:  Okay.  Deputy Secretary Armitage, in Moscow, he once again brought up the idea of a less than formal treaty non-aggression pact.  And just in quest of the elusive answer on this, he said -- is it correct that Washington would be prepared to "document" such a statement, such a promise, in the context of having less than a treaty?

MR. BOUCHER:  That's what he said.

QUESTION:  I know.

MR. BOUCHER:  And that's what the Secretary said before, I think.

QUESTION:  So the answer is yes?

MR. BOUCHER:  The answer is yes, that's what he said. 

QUESTION:  Now, what does that mean?  Does that mean you put it down in like -- write him a letter or --

MR. BOUCHER:  I think if you read what Deputy Secretary Armitage said, he said there might be ways to document this that we would be prepared to do so, but neither he nor the Secretary have tried to specify how that might be done.

QUESTION:  Are you actively exploring that through your partners?

MR. BOUCHER:  What we're exploring is how to get, first, North Korea to understand it needs to take -- needs to dismantle these programs and return the seals and the monitors and reverse its course with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

We're exploring how to pursue a peaceful solution on that basis.  We're in touch with members of the Security Council, P-5, other interested countries like Japan, Korea, Australia, the European Union, the United Nations.  We've been getting the readouts from their meetings.  We've -- I think I mentioned the other day the Secretary has talked to Kofi Annan about Maurice Strong's meetings.  He's talked to Alexander Downer about the meetings that the Australian team had when they were out there.  So we're keeping up on those.

The South Koreans are now having meetings as well, and I'm sure we'll be talking to them and getting rundowns from what the North Koreans say. 

We'll look at all that.  We're interested in pursuing a peaceful solution.  But we need to make sure that North Korea will dismantle these programs and reverse course with the IAEA. 

QUESTION:  But what I'm wondering is, Under Secretary Bolton also discussed this idea the other day in Beijing and used the phrase of putting it on paper.  You know, "If we want to put it on paper, I'm sure we can find some way.  Diplomacy can find a way to do that."  And I'm wondering if this is one of the elements of the talks with your allies on it, if you're actually discussing this possibility with them?

MR. BOUCHER:  We're not negotiating with our allies.  We're talking to our allies about how to get North Korea to dismantle these programs, about how to get North Korea to reverse course with the IAEA. 

Terri.

QUESTION:  Change of subject?

QUESTION:  Can I follow up on North Korea? 

MR. BOUCHER:  Okay.

QUESTION:  The Chinese Foreign Ministry said though, hinted that the most important party is the other state.  They actually used the phrase that there is only one key to one lock, or something like that. 

Why don't you agree on one-on-one negotiations?

MR. BOUCHER:  We have made clear we are prepared to talk to North Korea.  We have -- we know people who are talking to them and reporting back to us.  We also have a New York channel that remains open.  So it's not a matter of talking to North Korea.  We're willing to talk to North Korea.

But North Korea needs to understand, as well, that we're not the only ones.  The international community has expressed itself.  The Chinese, the Russians, the Japanese, the Koreans, the European Union, the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors have expressed themselves on North Korea's withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty, on North Korea's breaking the seals and expulsion of the monitors, on North Korea's nuclear enrichment programs. 

So these are things of concern to the entire international community, and we do not intend to substitute ourselves for the entire community.  But we do, at the same time, recognize we're willing to talk to North Korea.

The Secretary, I think in an interview the other day, mentioned that you can have bilateral discussions, multilateral discussions, or bilateral discussions in a multilateral context.  I mean there are certainly ways of doing both.  But I think, first of all, we're willing to talk, but, second, North Korea has to understand that this a matter -- these are matters of serious concern to a lot of people in the international community that need to be resolved.

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