07 January 2003
Excerpt: U.S. "Willing to Talk" to North Korea
(State Dept. spokesman discusses U.S., South Korea, Japan talks) (1920) The United States said that it is "willing to talk" to North Korea about its responsibilities to the international community for meeting nuclear safeguards obligations, but said it continues to refuse to join in negotiations over the terms of those obligations. The statements came in a joint U.S.-South Korea-Japan statement issued January 7 following two days of talks in Washington among officials of the three countries, and in subsequent comments from the State Department. State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, responding to reporters' questions after release of the joint statement, said the portion on possible U.S.-North Korea talks "is an unconditional offer to talk to North Korea about how it can meet its international obligations." He said the U.S. willingness to talk does not mean it now is willing to negotiate with North Korea. "We have said all along we were opposed to any kind of negotiation. We were opposed to paying again for the same agreements that have been reached before. We were opposed to 're-bargaining the bargain,' -- and other phrases like that -- to make clear we are not going to negotiate to get North Korea to come into compliance. And that remains the position. We are not going to provide any quid pro quos for North Korea to live up to its existing obligations. But North Korea needs to make clear that it will live up to its obligations, that it will undo the steps, that it will end these nuclear programs, and we are willing to talk about how North Korea can do that." Pressed on whether this amounts to a change in the U.S. position on talks with North Korea, Boucher said "I do not think I want to try to characterize it. I say this is a position -- this is the position of the United States Government -- that we are willing to talk to North Korea about how they can meet their obligations. I think it is quite a clear statement. It is an indication of our willingness to resolve this peacefully. It is an indication that we are willing to discuss how North Korea can meet those obligations. But it does adhere to one position that we have had, to the same position that we have had, that we are not going to renegotiate the terms, renegotiate or pay again for North Korea to live up to obligations it has already undertaken." Following are fuller excerpts from the Boucher briefing: (begin excerpt) QUESTION: How do these two days of talks change things? MR. BOUCHER: I think what you see in this statement is a review by the three countries who have been working together on North Korea issues for a long time of the elements that need to be seen for there to be a peaceful resolution of this. This lays out the need for North Korea to come into compliance with its obligations, to eliminate its nuclear weapons program, to undo the measures that they have taken with regard to their nuclear reactors, but it also makes clear that there is no security rationale for the steps that have been taken. It makes clear that we have no plans to -- and no intention to -- invade or attack North Korea. And it makes clear that that the basic premises of the progress that has been seen on the peninsula need to be respected: The Basic Agreement from 1991 and the Agreement on Denuclearization of 1992. And it makes clear, finally, that the prospects of discussions and then of real progress in North Korea's relations with the outside world are there if North Korea is willing to abide by its obligations. So what you have is, I think, the outline, the elements, the pieces brought together of saying that there is a way to solve this peacefully. And in the view of this group, and we think, others in the international community, that these are the things that need to be done to solve this peacefully. QUESTION: Richard, it would appear from the two, I think, most important sentences in this statement, or the two most recent that you guys are now willing to talk directly to the North Koreans without them first coming back into compliance with their obligations. Is that correct? MR. BOUCHER: That is correct. I will remind what the President said yesterday. He said we will have dialogue. We have had dialogue with North Korea. He said talking is one thing but we expect people to honor obligations. In a somewhat more formal sense, I would say, that is what this statement does today. QUESTION: But, did, but -- am I not correct in thinking that prior to what the President said yesterday and what this statement says now, is that you had been opposed to any kind of dialogue until the North came into -- came back into compliance with its agreements? MR. BOUCHER: We have said all along we were opposed to any kind of negotiation. We were opposed to paying again for the same agreements that have been reached before. We were opposed to 're-bargaining the bargain,' -- and other phrases like that -- to make clear we are not going to negotiate to get North Korea to come into compliance. And that remains the position. We are not going to provide any quid pro quos for North Korea to live up to its existing obligations. But North Korea needs to make clear that it will live up to its obligations, that it will undo the steps, that it will end these nuclear programs, and we are willing to talk about how North Korea can do that. QUESTION: So you're willing to go into a meeting with the North Koreans and say, "You have to do this, this and this." And that's the extent of the dialogue that you're talking about? MR. BOUCHER: We are willing to talk to them about how they can meet their obligations. QUESTION: But isn't meeting their obligations just a simple question of halting the enrichment program and bringing the IAEA inspectors back? I mean, isn't it obvious, or shouldn't it be obvious to the North Koreans what they have to do? And are you saying that you're willing to go to the North Koreans and tell them face-to-face the same thing that you've been saying for the past two months, three months now, that they have to come into compliance? I'm just trying to figure out what you mean by you willing to talk to the North Koreans about how they can meet their obligations. MR. BOUCHER: We have said before, and I think you see it in this statement, too. North Korea's relations with the entire international community hinge on its taking prompt and verifiable action to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons program and come into full compliance with its international commitments. That is what we mean by North Korea meeting its obligations. We are willing to talk to North Korea about how they can do that, about how they can promptly and verifiably dismantle the program and come into compliance with their obligations. QUESTION: But not, and I'll stop after this, you're not willing to talk to them right now about what benefits they may accrue by doing this? MR. BOUCHER: To some extent, we already have, in that when Assistant Secretary Kelly was in North Korea, he laid out for them what we called at the time "The Bold Approach," what we would still call the willingness to take a bold approach in our relations, to, as we say here, to follow a better path in the relationship. And then he said 'that's not possible because you have this nuclear enrichment program.' So we are willing to talk to them about the overall picture, but once again, we are not willing to provide a quid pro quo for them to meet their obligations. And really, North Korea has to be willing to meets its obligations for this to serve any particular purpose. ... it is clear that there would be discussions about how North Korea would meet its obligations even before they had finished meeting their obligations. Yes, Nicholas? QUESTION: You talked yesterday, about the Security Council. Would you want such talks to begin, or the first round of them to take place before the case goes to the Security Council? Do you think that's, that might help? MR. BOUCHER: Well, I do not know that the case will go to the Security Council. What the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors said yesterday is they have to undo the steps that they have taken on an urgent basis. They have to cooperate urgently to reverse those steps and were they to do that, there would be no reason to go to the Council. QUESTION: You mean think these talks might help prevent the issue going to the Council? MR. BOUCHER: The goal is not to bring an item or not to bring an item to the Security Council. The goal is for North Korea to reverse the course its set out upon, both in terms of nuclear enrichment, and in terms of breaking its obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency. We are willing to talk to North Korea about how they can do that. That is the process that we and others in the international community are engaged in. Terri? QUESTION: Do you consider that any different from the comments that you've made previously that we're willing to listen? North Korea can talk to us anytime we want -- anytime they want through the New York channels? I mean, is this really different from what you've said or do you feel that this statement is just expressing, perhaps, more willingness than you had previously? MR. BOUCHER: I do not think I want to try to characterize it. I say this is a position -- this is the position of the United States Government -- that we are willing to talk to North Korea about how they can meet their obligations. I think it is quite a clear statement. It is an indication of our willingness to resolve this peacefully. It is an indication that we are willing to discuss how North Korea can meet those obligations. But it does adhere to one position that we have had, to the same position that we have had, that we are not going to renegotiate the terms, renegotiate or pay again for North Korea to live up to obligations it has already undertaken. QUESTION: Does it indicate that you might make the first phone call this time? MR. BOUCHER: That we might what? QUESTION: The US may make the first call or whatever method you take, whereas before you were just waiting for North Korea -- MR. BOUCHER: Well, we have expressed our willingness to talk about these things. I have expressed it now. I was asked if we are going to find some other way of conveying that privately. I will have to check on that, but certainly we have expressed our willingness to talk about these things. QUESTION: That was the US. MR. BOUCHER: We will see how North Korea reacts. QUESTION: It's an unconditional offer to talk to North Korea? MR. BOUCHER: It is an unconditional offer to talk to North Korea about how it can meet its international obligations. (end excerpt) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
