03 January 2003
North Korea's Neighbors Want End to Its Nuclear Arms Program
(Boucher says U.S. won't use food aid for political reasons) (6040)
The United States is not alone in its concern over communist North
Korea's nuclear weapons programs, according to State Department
Spokesman Richard Boucher.
In a January 3 briefing at the State Department, Boucher noted that
South Korea, Japan, Russia and China also wanted to see "an end to
North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, uranium enrichment programs."
Boucher told reporters that it was important that Pyongyang understand
that there must be "a verifiable dismantlement of these programs."
He said the United States would be consulting with its allies Japan
and the Republic of Korea on how to achieve a peaceful resolution to
the situation the following week when representatives from Seoul and
Tokyo arrive in the United States for a trilateral meeting to
coordinate policy regarding North Korea.
In response to a reporter's question regarding Pyongyang's call for a
non-aggression pact between the communist regime and the United
States, Boucher said the issue was not one of non-aggression.
"The issue is whether North Korea will verifiably dismantle these
nuclear enrichment programs, or this nuclear enrichment program,"
Boucher said.
Both President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell, he observed,
"have said on a number of occasions that we have no intention to
invade North Korea, we have no hostile intent towards Pyongyang, and
we are seeking, like others, a peaceful and diplomatic resolution to
the nuclear issues."
However, Boucher added, the United States has made it clear that the
Bush administration is not going "to enter into negotiations in
response to threats or broken commitments and we are not going to
bargain or offer inducements to North Korea to live up to the treaties
and agreements that it has signed."
In the January 2 State Department briefing Boucher said the United
States would continue to provide food aid for the North Korean people,
and that the Bush administration doesn't intend "to curtail food for
political reasons.
"The United States has been the largest donor of food aid to the
programs that supply food to the North Korean people," Boucher said,
"We would expect to continue to supply food for those programs."
When the United States has its new budget, he went on, "we'll consider
what the amounts might be in the coming year."
He also said the United States is concerned about the monitoring of
shipments of food aid to the communist regime. "Any food we provide,
we would want to be able to work with the World Food Program and the
North Koreans to make sure it gets to the people who deserve it and
who need it," said Boucher, "And we've asked questions about the
monitoring of food aid that have not been responded to by the North
Koreans."
Following are excerpts from the January 2 and January 3 State
Department briefing on North Korea:
(begin excerpt)
(begin excerpt from the January 3 briefing)
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing Index
Friday, January 3, 2003
12:55 p.m. EST
BRIEFER: Richard Boucher, Spokesman
NORTH KOREA
-- North Korean Nuclear Program/US Consultations with Allies
-- North Korea's Call for Talks/Non-Aggression Pact
-- Reported South Korean Offer to "Mediate" between US and DPRK
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
FRIDAY, JANUARY 3, 2003
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
12:55 p.m. EST
MR. BOUCHER: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I don't have any
statements or announcements. I would be glad to take your questions.
QUESTION: May we look at Korea again today where -- from where there
were reports suggesting that the US has to compromise in order to stop
North Korea's nuclear program? You have a meeting coming up. Are you
entering it in a compromising or open-minded view or something?
MR. BOUCHER: First of all, the meeting is with our allies -- with
Japan and South Korea. We coordinate with our allies. We coordinate
very closely on all the various aspects of policy and things that we
have to do together. I think it is clear from our consultations and
from the statements that are being made that all the allies and other
interested countries like China and Russia want to see an end to North
Korea's nuclear weapons programs, uranium enrichment programs,
specifically, that they have admitted.
How to achieve this, how to proceed down this path peacefully --
because we are all committed to a peaceful resolution -- is the
subject of our consultations. So we will be seeing the Japanese, the
Koreans, next Monday and Tuesday in a trilateral meeting. We will have
further discussions when Mr. Kelly goes out. I can also tell you that
Under Secretary Bolton will be out there later this month, as well, to
talk to the Japanese, the Koreans and the Chinese about this issue.
So it is a matter of ongoing consultation and coordination with a
number of governments to try to achieve a peaceful resolution. But
what is important is that North Korea understands that it all begins
with a verifiable dismantlement of these programs.
QUESTION: Excuse me. Mr. Bolton is going to those three countries?
MR. BOUCHER: Yes, Mr. Bolton is going to those three countries after
Assistant Secretary Kelly.
QUESTION: Right to South Korea and China?
MR. BOUCHER: And China. I am not exactly sure if I have -- I do not
think I have Kelly's itinerary yet -- Assistant Secretary Kelly -- but
he will be out in the region in the next week or so. Then after that,
later in the month of January, Under Secretary Bolton will be in South
Korea, Japan and China.
QUESTION: Someplace in this mix the South Korean president is coming
here, I think next month. Let's see -- the president-elect.
MR. BOUCHER: The president-elect. Yes, I am not exactly sure when,
frankly. They have talked on the phone, remember.
QUESTION: Bolton is this month?
MR. BOUCHER: January.
QUESTION: Okay.
QUESTION: Richard, two things that are both basically related. What
does the US make, if anything, of the North Koreans' latest suggestion
or statement that they are willing to talk if you guys are willing to
sign a non-aggression pact? And two, what is your reaction, if you
have any, to the South Korean president-elect's offer to mediate
between the US and North Korea?
MR. BOUCHER: I think the reaction to both is pretty much what I just
said. The issue is not non-aggression. The issue is whether North
Korea will verifiably dismantle these nuclear enrichment programs, or
this nuclear enrichment program. The President and the Secretary have
said on a number of occasions that we have no intention to invade
North Korea, we have no hostile intent towards Pyongyang, and we are
seeking, like others, a peaceful and diplomatic resolution to the
nuclear issues.
We have also made clear we are not going to enter into negotiations in
response to threats or broken commitments and we are not going to
bargain or offer inducements to North Korea to live up to the treaties
and agreements that it has signed. So, as I said, the issue is whether
North Korea will verifiably and visibly dismantle its nuclear weapons
program that violates previous commitments.
QUESTION: It's hard to -- can I ask one thing quickly?
MR. BOUCHER: Now, the South Korean side of things -- we have been
working very closely with the South Koreans. We have shared concerns
regarding North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons. We have noted, in
particular, South Korean Foreign Ministry statements that North Korea
must scrap its nuclear weapons programs.
South Korea and others are making this point in their dialogues with
North Korea. North Korea must understand that the international
community is in an agreement that its actions are a challenge to all
responsible nations. So that is the point that's being made by the
South Koreans in their discussions, and we think that point should be
made by them and others as they hold those discussions.
QUESTION: But are you guys willing to entertain their offer of -- is
this something you will be discussing?
MR. BOUCHER: I do not think there has actually been a particular offer
of that sort at this point. Certainly, to the extent that anyone has
contact with North Korea as the South Koreans do, as the Japanese and
others do, the Chinese and Russians, we believe it is important for
them to make this point -- that as the South Korean Foreign Ministry
has said, it all begins with North Korea ending these programs.
QUESTION: Just one quick clarification. It's hard to tell from here,
from afar, and also I know if it went through translation, but there
are accounts in which the South Korean News Agency is speaking of a
swap and exchange of halting the program in exchange for a security
agreement. I don't know if security is different from non-aggression,
and I don't know, frankly, when the Secretary rules out a
non-aggression treaty, being a very formal thing, and on the other
hand, we've said a lot of words that sound like no intent to attack
them, is there something in between that can be worked with?
MR. BOUCHER: I do not know. I do not want to speculate. There is -- I
agree with you -- a lot of speculation in the press. Some of it by
people named, some of it unnamed people, saying 'well, maybe this,
maybe that, this idea, maybe that idea.' I am sure people are
presenting ideas and we will discuss ideas with others in the next
week or so and as we continue our consultations.
I think for the United States, it is very clear. This is, I think, a
position that is held by others who are looking for a peaceful
resolution. We are not willing to bargain or negotiate over
commitments that have made before. We are looking for North Korea to
visibly and verifiably dismantle its nuclear programs and we have no
intent to invade the North. Those things are quite clear in terms of
our policy. Now, how to achieve those goals is something that we will
be discussing with these other governments.
QUESTION: But that commitment -- if you're referring to the '94
commitment -- was not a commitment to end all programs. Don't you want
more than what the US got in '94? Are you just trying to restore the
'94 commitment or do you want a broad statement --
MR. BOUCHER: No, the '94 commitment -- I mean, we -- first of all,
there was a commitment in '94 that was to end its nuclear weapons
programs. That is our view of the Agreed Framework. Certainly nothing
in the '94 agreement would, in any way, permit the North Koreans to go
ahead and find another way of making nuclear weapons.
QUESTION: Right.
MR. BOUCHER: And we have said very clearly that this program to enrich
uranium for nuclear weapons is a violation of the Agreed Framework, of
the South Korea-North Korea Denuclearization Agreement, and of North
Korea's commitments to the International Atomic Energy Agency
frameworks. So it is a violation of multiple commitments. And the
point is that they have to respect those commitments.
QUESTION: Richard, please explain to us your objections to this
non-aggression pact bit. I mean, I understand that you say it's
irrelevant and redundant, but that isn't the same as saying -- that
isn't, in itself, it seems to me, a reason to reject their request for
one. It isn't -- I mean, since you're saying you have no hostile
intent, it doesn't rule out a concession of any kind. So why do you
not -- why are you so unwilling to go along with it?
MR. BOUCHER: I think, Jonathan, the question is: Is that the issue or
not? And it is not the issue.
QUESTION: It's the issue to them, so --
MR. BOUCHER: Slow down. That is not the issue. The issue is not
non-aggression. Our policy on that has been made clear. The President
has made it clear. We and others have been seeking a peaceful
solution. It does not start by saying 'well, let's go back, let's rush
back to the bargaining table and start giving away things, whatever
their value, whatever their importance, in exchange for North Korea
agreeing to abide by commitments it's previously made.' Our intention
is -- we have no intention to sit down and bargain again to pay for
this horse again, as it has been put very bluntly by Jim Kelly and
others. We are not entering into a negotiation on something extraneous
or that is not the issue in order to get them to commit to something
that they have already committed to.
QUESTION: Okay, can I just try again, then?
MR. BOUCHER: I will try again, too.
QUESTION: What is the difference between saying we have no hostile
intent and coming to a non-aggression pact with North Korea? What is
the difference? Why is one a concession, whereas the other is not?
MR. BOUCHER: The issue is not coming or not coming to a pact. The
issue is whether or not you allow yourself to be -- whether you put
yourself in a negotiation to get the North Koreans to agree to
something that they have already agreed to and they have already
violated. We have no intent to 're-bargain' this bargain. The North
Koreans made a commitment and we want to see that commitment
respected. That is where it all starts, that is what the South Korean
Foreign Ministry has said where it all starts, and that is what
various others have said as well.
Sir?
QUESTION: What is your reaction to Charles Krauthammer's suggestion
that you go along with Japan's developing nuclear capacity if North
Korea does not --
MR. BOUCHER: I don't have any particular comment on that suggestion. I
do not know that Japan has any particular program in that regard.
Sir?
QUESTION: Well, I just wanted to make sure I understood you in your
answer to Jonathan. Is you have no intent to re-bargain the bargain,
i.e. the Ninth, the Agreed Framework. That's what you're talking about
there?
MR. BOUCHER: Yes, it is re-bargain --
QUESTION: Re-bargain the meeting.
MR. BOUCHER: -- to renegotiate the basic commitment that has already
been negotiated that North Korea will not pursue nuclear weapons
programs.
QUESTION: So, are you -- so, in other words you're not willing to give
the North Koreans anything at all in exchange for them going back --
them returning to -- they have to point the ground, well, that's a bad
word -- .
MR. BOUCHER: They have to verifiably and visibly dismantle these
programs.
QUESTION: The starting point before you'll enter into any kind of
discussion or --
MR. BOUCHER: Negotiation or -- yes.
QUESTION: Okay, that's all I needed.
MR. BOUCHER: That is what we have said again and again and again.
Back there?
QUESTION: A follow-up on the commentary and story. Is it being
considered at all to either sell Japan or North -- South Korea nuclear
weapons or technologies or they can do it themselves? Is that being
considered?
MR. BOUCHER: No, no, no, and no to the follow-up, as well.
Sir?
QUESTION: You said that our policy is clearly stated, but another one
that's been clearly stated in recent months is the preemption -- that
the US will not allow threats to gather, but will take action to stop
them. Why does that not particularly apply here with North Korea?
MR. BOUCHER: Preemption, and particularly military preemption, is not
necessarily a first choice for policy makers. The first choice for
policy makers is to deal with the issue and to deal with this issue
peacefully with the help of others in the international community, to
work together with the nations that have influence on North Korea and
influence on North Korea's future aspirations. That is the policy
choice that has been made, and that is the policy that's being
pursued.
QUESTION: Richard, when you say you have no intention of attacking
North Korea, what's the time frame on that commitment? I mean, is that
(inaudible) --
MR. BOUCHER: When the President said it in South Korea, he did not
make any --
QUESTION: -- or you might change your mind tomorrow?
MR. BOUCHER: When the President said it in South Korea, I do not think
he put any time frame on it. You can look up his original words if you
want.
QUESTION: Richard, you said the phrase "no hostile intent." Those same
words are contained in the US-North Korean Joint Statement of October
12th, 2000, when Marshal Jo was here and met with Albright and others.
Do you consider that document still to be valid?
MR. BOUCHER: I do not think this administration has ever tried to take
a formal position on that document, but as I said, the Secretary and
the President made clear we have no intention of attacking the North
and no hostile intent as regards the North. That is the policy of this
administration.
QUESTION: Sir, do you guys regard that the North's offer for talks in
exchange for a non-aggression pact with the United States as an
attempt by them to split the South Koreans from -- to deal directly
with only the United States, as they have long wanted to do, and to
take the South Koreans and also the Japanese out of the equation?
MR. BOUCHER: Well, you know, two days ago, the question was being
asked: 'Are they trying to split South Korea off and deal only with
the South Koreans and not with the United States?' And today, you're
asking: 'Are they trying to split South Korea off and deal only with
the United States and not with South Korea?'
The point is that we, the South Koreans, the Japanese, the Chinese and
the Russians have been working very closely on this, particularly
closely with those allies in the neighborhood -- the Japanese and the
South Koreans. However you want to interpret one statement one day or
another statement another day from the North Koreans, the fact is we
coordinate very closely with our allies. We are all in this together,
we are all working together, and we all have very similar and
consistent points of view.
QUESTION: And that coordination, has it, in the last day or so,
involved any secretarial-level discussions?
MR. BOUCHER: He has certainly been in close touch with our people and
others who are interested in the situation out there, but he has not
called --
QUESTION: He hasn't called the Russians, Tang or --
MR. BOUCHER: Well, he talked about it in his -- he talked to Foreign
Minister Papandreou, new head of the European Union, and they talked
about North Korea. And I can't remember to what extent it has come up,
for example, in his conversations with Kofi Annan in the last day or
two. But North Korea has certainly been a subject of discussion with a
number of the foreign leaders that he has been in touch with. .
(end excerpt the January 3 briefing)
(begin excerpt from the January 2 briefing)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
THURSDAY, JANUARY 2, 2003
12:50 p.m. EST
BRIEFER: Richard Boucher, Spokesman
INDEX:
NORTH KOREA/SOUTH KOREA
-- Trilateral Coordination Oversight Group
-- Continuing Concerns Over Nuclear Weapons Program
-- International Efforts to Find Diplomatic Solution
-- Food Aid Shipments to North Korea
MR. BOUCHER: Second is to tell you that the Trilateral Coordination
and Oversight Group will meet in Washington on January 6 and 7. Senior
representatives from the United States, South Korea and Japan will be
here to discuss further coordination of our policy on recent North
Korean nuclear developments and other issues. This is part of a
continuing process of very close and cooperative consultations among
the three countries.
QUESTION: What level is that?
MR. BOUCHER: Jim Kelly on our side; Lee Tae-shik, Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Trade from South Korea; and Mitoji Yabunaka,
Director General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs Bureau of Japan.
QUESTION: Does that mean that Kelly --
MR. BOUCHER: And James Kelly is our Assistant Secretary of State for
South Asian --
QUESTION: Well, can I ask you --
MR. BOUCHER: -- for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. BOUCHER: I could talk or we could all talk at the same time, as we
wish.
Did somebody have a question?
QUESTION: Yeah. Kelly, unless he's going on a super jet, he couldn't
go out there and come back by --
MR. BOUCHER: Kelly will go to the region after this meeting.
QUESTION: Okay. Do you have any -- you're probably pleased with what
the unification minister of South Korea said, but in light of these
stories about the US and South Korea not being on the same wavelength,
he told North Korea to stop saber-rattling and take a "forward
looking" step to ease the crisis. I assume that's something you
welcome. And what about these reports there's something to align in
policy between the U.S. and South Korea?
MR. BOUCHER: I think, you know, don't be misled by the newspapers,
unfortunately. Watch what we've said, what we've done, what the
Secretary has said, what the Chinese have said, what the South Koreans
have said, what the Russians have said. Everybody has expressed their
strong concern about the nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Everybody has made clear that they have been prepared to take steps in
the relationships.
But let's remember how this happened. North Korea began a program some
years ago to second-track a nuclear weapons program of nuclear
enrichment.
While that was going on, the Japanese, the South Koreans, the
Americans, and others making clear that we were prepared to move
forward in the relationship. And unfortunately, despite direct talks
in August with the Secretary of State, or was it July, late July, and
then when Jim
Kelly went in September, the South Koreans admitted to this program
and have subsequently taken steps that violate their commitments under
various international agreements.
So we're at this juncture with, I think, everybody's agreements with
North Korea, including some of its international agreements having
been violated and widespread, I think, expressions of concern.
We and the new South Korean Government, as we have with the old one,
will coordinate very, very closely on this. We think that the South
Korean Government has made clear they want North Korea to respond to
the concerns that we share. I've seen a statement today from South
Korea and China saying that they have common concerns about nuclear
developments on the peninsula and want North Korea to respond.
So yeah, there are any number of statements, I think, that will lead
you to the conclusion that this is a matter of concern to the entire
international community. And as the Secretary said last Sunday on
television, North Korea is isolating itself. We are going to continue
to coordinate. We are going to continue to apply pressure and look for
a peaceful and diplomatic solution. But there should be no doubt North
Koreans are isolating themselves and they are already paying the
price.
QUESTION: Richard, you said that everybody has said they're prepared
to take steps. What have the Chinese done other than criticize weapons
development in North Korea?
MR. BOUCHER: No, I think what I talked about was the benefits
foregone; that various nations had been prepared to take steps with
North Korea to improve their relationships, but that those steps are
proving impossible because of North Korea's nuclear developments. And
I think the Chinese have made clear that they are as concerned about
nuclearization on the peninsula as anybody. We have not been asking
people to impose any kind of economic sanctions.
QUESTION: I don't know if you said this while I was out, but when
Kelly does go, have you said where he's going to go?
MR. BOUCHER: No, I haven't. And I don't have a date for you or exact
place, but he'll go out to continue the process of consultations and
working with our allies.
QUESTION: At a somewhat higher level than the TCOG? Is that -- I mean,
is that the -- I'm just trying to figure out why, if you're having
this meeting here with the usual suspects, why he would go there
immediately afterwards.
MR. BOUCHER: I think it's an ongoing process of consultation. It gives
us a chance to meet with people in capitals, in addition to the people
who come here. We can see other people when we go out there.
-- Assistant Secretary Kelly visited North Korea October 3-5.
-- Correction: North Koreans. QUESTION: And does that mean including
people who would be in the new -- in the incoming South Korean
administration?
MR. BOUCHER: Again, not having an itinerary, I don't have the meetings
yet.
QUESTION: Well, he will go to Seoul.
MR. BOUCHER: I assume, yes, he will go to Seoul.
QUESTION: But does that mean --
MR. BOUCHER: I can't -- the trip's not set up yet. I can't tell you
who he's going to be meeting with.
QUESTION: Well, the elections in Seoul. He touched on this himself.
You may have been away. The party that won ran on a platform
expressing some discontent with the relationship, North Korea aside.
You know, sort of South Korea is the junior partner and the United
States is the big brother and sort of runs things. And there was a
suggestion maybe they want to address that situation and have a
stronger voice for South Korea.
Is that something the State Department thinks maybe was just campaign
talk or something that needs to be looked at?
MR. BOUCHER: I think, first of all, it's something that's probably
exaggerated. Second of all, we have seen new governments come in,
various allied and friendly governments and allied and friendly
countries, and we would expect to be able to work with this
government. It's a new government. It's a new generation of leadership
in South Korea. We very much look forward to working with them. We've
already had some initial contacts. The President, I believe, talked on
the phone with the new president, or the president-elect at this
moment -- I am not sure -- the president-elect at this moment.
And we really do look forward to working with them. We think that the
United States and South Korea have an alliance that's based on a
shared history, shared values, shared interests, and we've worked and
cooperated very closely to advance those shared interests.
Okay, we'll start in the back.
QUESTION: We can change the subject?
MR. BOUCHER: Yes.
QUESTION: Talking about -- any comments about this clash between the
U.S. forces and Pakistani forces in Pakistan border?
QUESTION: North Korea (inaudible).
MR. BOUCHER: Okay, let's do one more on North Korea.
QUESTION: That's fine.
QUESTION: Are you open to the suggestion from the Russians to have a
Russia-China states the U.S. approach on North Korea?
MR. BOUCHER: I hadn't seen that suggestion so I don't have any comment
at this point. Certainly we have, I think, made it clear that we are
interested in coordinating with other governments and we're looking
for a peaceful solution. And to the extent that anything might further
that, we would be willing to consider it.
QUESTION: Can I ask one more?
MR. BOUCHER: He's got one more back there, too.
QUESTION: Richard, you have not -- you're not going to cut off food
aid because that would be against humanitarian purposes of the United
States Government and the world community. You are cutting off oil and
it gets pretty cold in North Korea. Furthermore, North Korea said that
the reason they were returning to the nuclearization program was
because the oil was cut off.
Do you have any comment on that?
MR. BOUCHER: I think there are several things to note here and I think
we've noted them all before. The first is that the oil shipments were
stopped because they were being carried out under an Agreed Framework,
which North Korea itself said was nullified.
Second of all, that the prospect of electricity from these reactors,
or this reactor, restarting this reactor, is a very, very small
percentage -- I think it's two or three percent of potential
electricity. This is not a viable source of power for the North and
they would do much better by remaining in the agreement.
Third of all, the nuclear enrichment program began years ago, not in
this administration because of anything this administration did, but
even in the previous administration. So saying that they have to
pursue these nuclear developments because of this, that or the other
that happened in the last month or the last year, it just doesn't
coincide with the facts.
QUESTION: Could I, while we're on North Korea --
MR. BOUCHER: We're trying to get off it, but sure.
QUESTION: Well, one of the papers used as their hook for a North Korea
story today food, food aid. Could you just briefly, if you like, tell
us where things stand so far as food shipments?
MR. BOUCHER: The United States has been the largest donor of food aid
to the programs that supply food to the North Korean people. We would
expect to continue to supply food for those programs. When we have our
new budgets, we'll consider what the amounts might be in the coming
year. But at the same time, we've made clear that we do intend to
continue to provide food and we don't intend to curtail food for
political reasons.
We have also made clear that we are concerned about the monitoring of
food shipments. Any food we provide, we would want to be able to work
with the World Food Program and the North Koreans to make sure it gets
to the people who deserve it and who need it. And we've asked
questions about the monitoring of food aid that have not been
responded to by the North Koreans.
We have also made clear there are tremendous other demands on our food
aid budgets. But all that said, we do intend to continue to provide
food assistance and would hope to be able to work out arrangements to
monitor it properly.
QUESTION: Since we're all interested in communication or the lack
thereof, are you able to say how we made that point to North Korea?
MR. BOUCHER: I think we did it through the donors. I'm not sure if
we've done it directly. I will have to double-check on that and see.
QUESTION: Richard, are you saying that the World Food Program
distributes food without proper monitoring?
MR. BOUCHER: The World Food Program has fairly extensive monitoring.
But we still have some serious concerns about the monitoring and some
of the stories we've heard. So questions of monitoring and access need
to be addressed, we think.
QUESTION: Richard, it wasn't quite clear from what you said. I wonder
if you can clarify. Is monitoring, adequate monitoring, a condition
for the continuation of food related to North Korea or is it just --
or is it really a separate issue that you want to --
MR. BOUCHER: As we consider what to do in coming years, how much to
give as we consider all the competing demands, certainly one of the
factors we have to take into account is how confident are we that our
food is reaching people who need it. So it's a serious concern that
needs to be addressed. Leave it at that.
You had one more?
QUESTION: When Secretary Kelly goes to South Korea, will he be
prepared to later acknowledge the Kim Jong-il authority as one part of
the bold --
MR. BOUCHER: First of all, the bold approach was what Jim Kelly laid
out for the North Koreans in September and said we have been prepared
to take that approach, but we can't as long as you're pursuing nuclear
enrichment. So let's not get confused over that, again, based on some
of the way it's been reported. This is an approach we had been
prepared to take, but he made very clear we can't take as long as
these nuclear programs exist.
The Secretary made clear over the weekend that we're not interested in
appeasement. We're not interested in rushing out to say can we give
you something more to stop something you should have stopped already.
So we had been prepared to move forward, but on the basis of respect
for previous agreements.
Okay. Now, were you going to go to North Korea or change the subject?
QUESTION: Well actually, I want to ask question. The president-elect
in the South called on U.S. to engage with North Korea, not to
isolate. Are you considering the engagement policy as a way out in the
future on this?
MR. BOUCHER: Again, we've had direct discussions with North Korea. The
Secretary of State met with the North Korean foreign minister during
the summer. Jim Kelly went out there in September. Remember, first
Assistant Secretary Kelly was going to go in July, but then there was
a ship incident which soured the atmosphere for any kind of talks and
we had to postpone it.
We went back and said we're willing to reschedule. Unfortunately, what
he had to do when he went out there was to say we were prepared to do
these things, but can't as long as you continue these programs. And
North acknowledged -- North Korea acknowledged those programs. So I
would say there are channels open, there are ways of communicating.
But at this point, we've made very clear that we're not prepared to
appease, we're not prepared to pay again for agreements that should
have been respected in the first place.
QUESTION: Well, I wasn't going to actually raise this but since you've
brought it up in the answer to the question before, is that -- is what
you said in your last question about the -- when you mentioned the way
it's been reported, is that the end of the issue for the State
Department, or have you contacted the outlet specifically to complain
about the way comments have been played on the front pages of --
MR. BOUCHER: Oh, I think we always try to clarify here and make sure
that everybody understands the facts.
QUESTION: Are you satisfied now that you've gotten your point out?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't go around writing letters all the time, no. I
made the point, I think.
-- Assistant Secretary Kelly visited North Korea October 3-5.
QUESTION: A quick question. The clarification that what you called
some papers said is a tailored containment policy toward North Korea.
MR. BOUCHER: Yeah, the Secretary talked about that over the weekend.
There's no policy or paper with a title like that. We don't have any
particular objection to the phrase. But just look at the strategy that
we've been following. Look at the course that we've been following, as
laid out by the Secretary and as carried out by the Secretary and
Assistant Secretary Kelly in cooperation with others. We're consulting
closely with friends and allies, those who have a strong interest in
the region. We are making clear, all of us, to North Korea that their
expectations as far as the rest of the world goes, their expectations
of benefits, will not be met if North Korea continues to pursue
nuclear programs on the peninsula.
We are maintaining, I think, a consistent pressure on North Korea to
make clear to them that we're not going to appease this kind of
action, we're not going to pay again. You know, all the things I've
been saying. We're going to maintain a consistent stance and that's
the strategy that we've been following in conjunction with friends and
allies. And the foundation of that is very close consultations with
friends and allies, and somebody thinks and pointed out that, you
know, Jim Kelly's been out there four or five times in the last few
months. And that will continue.
(end excerpt from the January 2 briefing)
(end excerpt)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
