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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

SLUG: 3-778 North Korea
DATE:
NOTE NUMBER:

DATE=8-28-03

TYPE=INTERVIEW

NUMBER=3-778

TITLE=NORTH KOREA

BYLINE=DAVID BORGIDA

DATELINE WASHINGTON

CONTENT=

INTRODUCTION

Jon Wolfsthal, deputy director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace discusses North Korea's nuclear program and the ongoing talks being held in Beijing.

MR. BORGIDA

And now joining us here in our studio, Jon Wolfsthal, Deputy Director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace here in Washington. Mr. Wolfsthal, thanks for joining us.

MR. WOLFSTHAL

My pleasure.

MR. BORGIDA

An interesting dynamic at these talks, because now the North Koreans apparently, some people say, are startling their colleagues by announcing their intention to declare themselves I guess a nuclear weapon state. Now, this has obviously been the topic of conversation there, but to flat out make this declaration there on this end of the second day, or apparently as the third day is about to begin, is an interesting development. What do you make of it?

MR. WOLFSTHAL

Well, negotiating with the North Koreans -- I've done it myself -- is not an easy game, and they clearly are looking to strengthen their hand. The nuclear card is the only card they can play negotiating with the United States and the outside world, and so they're looking to make that position as strong as possible by saying, if we don't get our way, if things don't go well, we might test a nuclear weapon, we might declare ourselves a nuclear state.

It's still not clear that they actually have nuclear weapons, although at this point we have to assume they have some basic nuclear capability. But I think it reminds us of why these talks are so important and why they need to succeed. Because if they don't, the situation in the region could get much worse much more quickly.

MR. BORGIDA

Let me mine your experience. And since you've brought it up, I feel like I have to ask you about it. I've heard this from a number of people over the years, U.S. diplomats who have negotiated with the North Koreans. Can you give us a sense of why you say they are interesting to negotiate with and talk to? Do you have an example or something you might have on your mind?

MR. WOLFSTHAL

There are a number of things that always make it interesting. One is you recognize that, in the United States, if we negotiate and we don't get a good deal, we might get fired, we might have to change jobs. In North Korea, if you negotiate poorly, you probably end up in a concentration camp or dead. So these people are under tremendous pressure. And they don't have much leeway. It's not an independent society where people have the ability to think on their feet. They're reading talking points that have been given to them by their superiors and they implement them without question.

So while there is some sympathy for the North Koreans when you negotiate with them, you also recognize that you have to watch every word very closely, that they try and knock you off balance very quickly with these very outlandish statements, but you also have to look to see what are the variations on their position. Because in my view the North Koreans are interested in a deal, and we have to try and pick out the nuggets amongst all of the rubbish that comes out with it.

MR. BORGIDA

Okay, if they're interested in a deal, can you give us a framework around which a deal might develop?

MR. WOLFSTHAL

Sure. The United States and North Korea I think have been very clear about what they're after. The United States wants a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula. Above all, we want them not to have nuclear weapons or the ability to produce them. North Korea has said what they want is some assurance that they can rely on that the United States is not going to attack them. Most people believe that North Korea wants nuclear weapons to deter an attack from the United States or South Korea.

And so what I view as a likely outcome -- not from these talks but down the line -- is an exchange of commitments, where North Korea commits itself to disarm and the United States commits itself to a process that will eventually give North Korea some legal assurances that it won't be subject to attack. Then of course the hard part is -- the devil is in the details -- about how do you orchestrate this dance, who goes first, what does North Korea give up, and then what do we give up, and how do you time it.

MR. BORGIDA

And all of that is obviously very problematic, all of these minute details. Is it a success in some ways, as viewed by analysts like yourself, if we move on to a second round of talks?

MR. WOLFSTHAL

Well, it's a sign of how bad things have gotten over the past couple of years, that if we do agree to sit down again we have a successful set of talks. Under regular circumstances I would say that yes, if we agree to meet again, we're doing well.

The problem is that every day North Korea is getting closer to either building a nuclear arsenal or increasing that arsenal. Right now the clock is ticking on North Korea's nuclear program. And so unless the Bush administration can get a freeze on that program in the near term, I think the time we have to talk is actually rather limited. And over the next couple of months, if we don't see progress, the United States and its allies may have to turn to much more punitive measures.

MR. BORGIDA

We're not hearing a lot, as we wind up our time, about the famine situation inside North Korea. Is it still as bad as we heard about a year ago?

MR. WOLFSTHAL

The system has essentially already collapsed. People in the administration are saying, well, if we push them, they'll collapse. In many ways, the state has already failed. There are hundreds of thousands of people who are below the malnutrition level. And the Bush administration has pointed to the fact that this is a humanitarian nightmare, and one of the reasons we're prepared to deal is because we feel not for the leadership but for the people. And it adds one more element to the side of people that say we should negotiate and try to help them.

MR. BORGIDA

Well, let's all hope that we can continue these talks and, in some ways, maybe there can be some kind of a framework for an agreement in Beijing and carrying on beyond that. Jon Wolfsthal, Deputy Director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace here in Washington. Thank you for joining us.

MR. WOLFSTHAL

My pleasure.

(End of interview.)

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