Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

DATE=8/25/03

TYPE=INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT

TITLE=RICHARD BUSH

NUMBER=3-775

BYLINE=DAVID BORGIDA

DATELINE=WASHINGTON

CONTENT=

/// EDITORS: THIS INTERVIEW IS AVAILABLE IN DALET UNDER SOD/ENGLISH NEWS NOW INTERVIEWS IN THE FOLDER FOR TODAY OR YESTERDAY ///

Delegates from four countries the United States, Japan, Russia and South Korea have gathered in China to discuss North Korea's nuclear program. Richard Bush, Director of the Northeast Asian Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, offers insight into the talks in Beijing.

MR. BORGIDA

Now joining us from the Brookings Institution here in Washington, D.C., Richard Bush, Director of the Northeast Asian Policy Studies Program there. Mr. Bush, thanks for joining us today.

MR. BUSH

It's a pleasure to be with you today. Thank you for having me.

MR. BORGIDA

You've been with us many times before, Mr. Bush, and so let's get right to the heart of what appears to be a key component of at least the pre-discussion atmosphere, and that is a minimizing of expectations. All the diplomats apparently are saying, or suggesting, at this point that we shouldn't be expecting too much to come out of this. What's your take on all this?

MR. BUSH

I don't find this surprising at all. This is the beginning of a very long grappling with some very tough issues. This is the stage where the United States and North Korea will state pretty much their maximal position. They will not be interested in making concessions right away because they want to probe how strong the other side is.

In addition, this will be the first time that Russian, South Korean and Japanese diplomats will be participating in these negotiations, and so both we and the North Koreans will want to try and convince them of our point of view.

MR. BORGIDA

Now, this is the first time that Russia has officially taken part in negotiations over this nuclear standoff. You and I have talked before about the importance of the China card in this equation. Tell us about what makes Russia so important in all this.

MR. BUSH

My interpretation is that Russia's presence is an effort to balance off the participation of South Korea and Japan. Japan certainly was perceived by North Korea to be in our camp. South Korea is kind of in the middle. I guess that Pyongyang wanted to have Russia there because they thought that Moscow would be more inclined to take their point of view and support them.

MR. BORGIDA

Would it be a success, Mr. Bush, if all the sides agreed to talk some more when this is done by the end of the week, or would that just be a signal that they're really struggling?

MR. BUSH

Because of the conflicted nature of the issues, if there was agreement to have another round and do so within a finite period of time, a month or two, I would score that a success.

MR. BORGIDA

But what about if the United States and North Korea have these on-the-side, bilateral talks, Mr. Bush, would you see that as a healthy thing, and would you see that as a sign of some progress?

MR. BUSH

It depends a little bit on what happens there. I think that North Korea feels that it needs those kinds of bilateral encounters to save their face and to prove their point -- that the United States is really the key actor here.

The anxiety from the American point of view is that North Korea will say one thing in these private conversations that is very alarming to us and then say something else to everybody else. We would prefer that most of what North Korea says be for everybody to hear.

MR. BORGIDA

How do you negotiate in that kind of an atmosphere, Mr. Bush, if there is the kind of distrust that you've just suggested in talks like that, with one side possibly suggesting one thing to another and another side interpreting it another way? There does seem to be a sense that you might not be able to trust the North Koreans at this stage.

MR. BUSH

I think the United States has very little confidence or trust in North Korea. What you do in that situation I think is first work very hard to have the other parties in this negotiation on your side as much as you can.

I think there is a need for the United States to try and reassure North Korea that we do them no harm, try and reassure North Korea that if they do give up their program of weapons of mass destruction, there are benefits to be gained, and a very different relationship with the United States. If we can convince them of that, then we're liable to see progress.

MR. BORGIDA

And for the sake of some editorial balance, Mr. Bush, would it be fair to say that, at least from Pyongyang's point of view, that they might not trust the United States and South Korea for example, and what would be their concern?

MR. BUSH

They have very little trust for the United States. Their concern is that we do wish to do them harm, we want to bring down their regime. That is partly a misinterpretation of U.S. intentions, but it is I think real as well. And one hopes that through reassurance from the United States, through encouragement from China, South Korea and Russia, they can be brought around to sort of taking a chance on a different kind of relationship, a different approach that does not require nuclear weapons.

MR. BORGIDA

Richard Bush over at the Brookings Institution here in Washington, thanks so much for your time.

NEB/