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02 February 2000

Text: Bereuter Feb. 2 Speech on Asia and U.S Security Policy

(U.S. must sustain, enhance security commitment to region) (5600)
The U.S. security commitment to the Asia-Pacific region must be
"sustained and enhanced" to maintain stability in the region as well
as further U.S. national interests, according to Rep. Doug Bereuter,
chairman of the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and
the Pacific.
Bereuter outlined his views on the U.S. role in the Asia-Pacific
region in a broad-ranging speech given February 2 to international
scholars and policymakers attending a day-long event in Washington,
D.C. sponsored by the East-West Center and the Woodrow Wilson Center.
(The U.S. Congress established both think tanks in the 1960's.)
The U.S. security presence, Bereuter said, "is welcomed as a
stabilizing and relatively benign influence in the region by virtually
all the Asian nations," with the exception of North Korea. The United
States, he said, must increase its focus and augment its resources to
defend its economic interests, expand commercial opportunities and to
ensure American competitiveness in the region. Bereuter also urged the
creative utilization of bilateral, regional, and multilateral
approaches in advancing in the region America's fundamental principles
of democracy, pluralism, and human rights.
Bereuter said he ranks the Korean Peninsula "as the most dangerous
tinderbox on earth."
"We should err on the side of caution by treating North Korea's
advances with appropriate skepticism and by sending Pyongyang frequent
and consistently strong and unambiguous messages about our commitment
to South Korea's security and peace on the peninsula," he said.
Bereuter characterized the future of U.S.-China relations as
"uncertain." "China is, or almost certainly will be, our competitor --
both militarily and economically, and we should respectfully treat
China as such," he said.
U.S. issues of concern regarding China -- such as proliferation, human
rights, espionage, and unfair trade -- need to be addressed "by the
appropriate means in the appropriate fora -- not, for example, in the
annual congressional debate and vote on a presidential decision to
extend Normal Trade Relations," he said.
"I remain hopeful that this year we can replace this frustrating
annual ritual with a clean up or down vote on permanent NTR for
China," he added, noting that opponents to permanent Normal Trade
Relations "have yet to propose any responsible or rational alternative
that benefits the United States."
Following is the text of Bereuter's remarks, as prepared for delivery:
(begin text)
Asia and U.S. Foreign and National Security Policy
Doug Bereuter, Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
February 2, 2000
Good Afternoon. The topic Lee Hamilton and Bob Hathaway asked me to
speak on, "Asia in U.S. Foreign and National Security Policy in the
Next Millennium" certainly constitutes a daunting task. However, I
will take a modest stab at it in the limited time we have here today,
highlighting just a few areas: The solid foundation we have through
our alliances with Japan, Australia and Korea, and what I see as the
principal challenges facing us in North Korea, China, Indonesia, India
and Pakistan.
I see the Asia-Pacific region, with over one-half of the world's
population, as one in which we, as Americans, undoubtedly will face
many new challenges. Permit me, for the record, first state what
should be obvious to most American and Asian observers: the United
States plays a very important and positive role in the overall
security of east and southeast Asia -- and in certain other parts of
Asia. Our presence is welcomed as a stabilizing and relatively benign
influence in the region by virtually all the Asian nations in the
region, including, I believe, at this state, by China. In fact,
perhaps the only country in Asia that does not welcome America's
interest and commitment to the region is North Korea. But for the
United States to continue to play an important role in Asia, we must
to some degree rely upon on -- and further strengthen -- the stable
alliances and friendships we have in the area.
The most important of these alliances is with Japan. Our relationship
has grown strong and rather comprehensive. Looking at the economic
relationship, too, for example, in one area, namely trade, Japan ranks
third only to Canada and Mexico as the largest single-country market
for U.S. exports. Indeed, 20% of all U.S. agricultural exports go to
Japan, meaning that Japan is a larger agricultural export market than
the 15-countries of the European Union. Japan is also one of the
largest sources of foreign portfolio capital and of foreign direct
investment in the U.S. Likewise, the United States is the largest
source of foreign portfolio capital and direct investment in Japan.
JAPAN
In terms of national security cooperation, I would say that our
relationship with Japan is excellent and even stronger than it was a
few years ago. One of the most important matters related to Asian
security is something that has almost totally escaped public attention
in the United States -- the successful renegotiation of the "Defense
Cooperation Guidelines." This agreement clarifies and expands Japan's
role in helping maintain peace and security in Northeast Asia. It sets
forth in sufficient detail what we can expect from Japan if fighting
erupts on the Korean peninsula. The Guidelines chart a course for a
Japan which is much more confident and secure about its own future.
Today, it is impossible to overstate Japan's importance to the U.S. in
Asia. Japan is host to about half of the 100,000 uniformed personnel
that the United States maintains in Asia and the Western Pacific.
Yokosuka (pronounced as "Yokuska" by Americans), Japan, is the only
overseas "homeport" for a U.S. aircraft carrier task force. With the
recent agreement to move the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station in
Okinawa to a less populated part of the island, this growing irritant
in local relations now, it would seem, is being addressed -- at least
on an interim period of some duration. In terms of export controls and
arms sales, Japan has the same status with the U.S. as that which we
have with our NATO allies. Now, too, Japan has decided to invest and
participate in the U.S. theater missile defense program, a decision
that was no doubt prompted by North Korea's missile tests.
Given this crucial and powerful U.S.-Japan relationship, I believe
that, unfortunately, Japan has not received the attention it deserves
from the Clinton Administration. This is probably best exemplified by
President Clinton's highly publicized June 1998 visit to China which
he made without the customary and expected stop in Japan. This was
commonly perceived as a snub in Japan. At present, our relationship
continues to be marked by a sense of drift. Even though Japan is,
indeed, our most important ally in Asia, the U.S. strategic dialogue
with Tokyo lately has been all too limited. The appearance --
certainly to influential Japanese -- is that the Clinton
Administration has no clear vision of what role it really wants Japan
to play in Asia and world affairs. Consultations tend to be pro-forma
and meetings scripted. Current U.S. decision-makers consequently have
a poor understanding of what Japan's leaders are genuinely thinking,
making it all the more difficult to interpret security and economic
decisions in Tokyo. However, I believe that, overall, this appearance
of indifference is both temporary and unintentional. With the proper
attention by the Administration, and with obvious support from the
Congress, I believe that our bilateral relations on all fronts
(defense, political, economic) will and must continue to be
strengthened, even though trade conflicts may grab the headlines from
time to time.
AUSTRALIA
The other very important strategic ally for America in Asia is the
country in the region with which we have our deepest friendship --
Australia. Given that "our cousins Down Under" do not have the same
constitutional constraints as Japan regarding the deployment abroad of
military forces, Australia has unfailingly joined the U.S. in
protecting our mutual national security interests around the globe,
including combat in Korea, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf. Just as
importantly, Australia, unlike some of our European NATO allies, has
responsibly taken the initiative to provide stability and security in
its own neighborhood. This is best exemplified by Australia's primary
leadership role with the INTERFET force in East Timor.
I envision a strengthening of both Australia's regional role and
US-Australian relations in the years to come. Our alliance with
Australia and, in reality with its people, does not always elicit much
attention, but it is one of America's crucial strategic partners.
Indeed, there are things that Australia can do to promote American
interests and our mutual interests that the U.S. cannot do for itself.
Some are obvious; others are best left undescribed. We should pay more
attention to this friendship with the Australians and do more to show
our appreciation of this special relationship.
"THE KOREAS"
A third strong pillar of support for U.S. national security interests
in Asia remains the Republic of Korea. Forged in blood during the
Korean War, our special relationship has gradually evolved from that
of American guardianship to one that today reflects a relatively more
balanced defense alliance. In fact, given the highly unpredictable and
seemingly reckless nature of the xenophobic regime in Pyongyang, I
continue to rank the Korean Peninsula as the most dangerous tinderbox
on earth -- yes, equal to the Middle East. Working closely and
cooperatively with South Korea and Japan, we need to do a better job
of lessening North Korea's threat without succumbing, as we are doing
increasingly, to Pyongyang's brazen foreign aid extortion schemes.
None of us, I think, can accurately predict what North Korea will do
in the future. However, it probably is safe to predict that future
DPRK-precipitated confrontations and crises are nearly inevitable.
Thus, we should err on the side of caution by treating North Korea's
advances with appropriate skepticism and by sending Pyongyang frequent
and consistently strong and unambiguous messages about our commitment
to South Korea's security and peace on the peninsula.
Former Secretary of Defense William Perry was appointed by the
President to make policy recommendations regarding North Korea. As you
probably know, he proposed a two-pronged approach. The first prong
would be engagement. If the DPRK chooses this route, it could expect
increased trade and the gradual elimination of sanctions. If, however,
Pyongyang chooses the path of confrontation, Dr. Perry recommends that
North Korea be met with firmness, resolve, and increased military
strength.
I believe that Secretary Perry has once again performed admirable
service to the nation, and that his basic policy recommendation is
sound. I am, however, somewhat concerned that this Administration is
so committed to its policy of engagement that few types of DPRK
provocations would be deemed sufficiently odious to cause the
Administration to conclude it must take the second path. If, for
example, the North were to resume its flight testing of ballistic
missiles, I believe the Congress would overwhelmingly interpret this
as a rejection of engagement. Only time will tell whether the
Administration would agree.
You may be aware that I was part of a Speaker-designated Republican
task force that examined the threat posed by North Korea. The report
concluded that the DPRK's conventional military capability has
declined in recent years but that significant evidence exists to
strongly suggest that an undeclared nuclear weapons development
program continues. I believe that intuitively most sophisticated
American observers of North Korea acknowledge that probability. In
addition, North Korea's ballistic missile capabilities have increased
markedly, with the initial testing of the three-stage Taepo Dong
missile. Because North Korea has historically not conducted extensive
testing like we do before weapons deployment and because the DPRK is
perhaps the most unconstrained proliferator in the world, this poses a
security threat that extends far beyond Northeast Asia. While the task
force did not offer specific policy recommendations before adjourning
the first session of the 106th Congress, despite the desire of certain
Members to do so, I believe you can anticipate legislative efforts in
the coming year -- soon. The chilling suspicion that crosses the mind
is that the North Koreans are only stringing us along -- buying time
-- until they are able to deploy these Taepo Dong missiles tipped with
weapons of mass destruction which can threaten not only South Korea,
of course, but also all of Japan and even parts of the United States.
CHINA
Ranked right after the very real and dangerous security threat posed
by North Korea, I believe that the greatest challenge to the United
States and our overall national security interests in Asia may well
eventually be posed by China. That is not certain. However, I believe
it is clear that China intends to be the preeminent regional military
force and it will be a powerful economic and political player
globally. Given a whole range of factors, I must characterize the
nature of our future relations with China to be most uncertain. It is
premature to view China as an enemy or adversary, though we could make
it our adversary if we adopt a policy of trying to isolate and
ostracize China as some in the U.S. and in China do advocate by word
or actions. China is certainly not accurately described as "a
strategic partner." However, China is, or almost certainly will be,
our competitor -- both militarily and economically and we should
respectfully treat China as such. It is certainly still possible for
the U.S. and China to have a complementary or at least largely
compatible future relationship.
Unfortunately, while Sino-American relations are increasingly
problematic, they are not a zero-sum game, as some effectively would
characterize them. Our relations are complex and comprehensive and
will only become more so in the future. Our concerns continue to
multiply in scope and gravity: espionage, both illegal and highly
questionable campaign contributions, threateningly asymmetrical
military modernization, weapons proliferation, abortion, human rights,
Tibet, Taiwan, and unfair trade, among others. However, I believe each
of these issues needs to be addressed by the appropriate means in the
appropriate fora -- not, for example, in the annual congressional
debate and vote on a presidential decision to extend Normal Trade
Relations (or NTR) to China or granting it permanent NTR for Chinese
accession to the World Trade Organization.
While China is a nuclear weapons state and is trying to modernize its
conventional forces, we should nevertheless be careful not to overrate
its capabilities. The China of today is certainly by no means the
Soviet Union of yester-year. China's approximately 20 liquid-fueled
nuclear missiles serve only as a deterrent force, and, though it is
modernizing, the People's Liberation Army is still a poorly trained,
third-rate, infantry-intensive force. Like China's state owned
enterprises, the PLA -- as a primary vanguard element of the Communist
Party primarily and the defender of the Chinese state faces very
difficult (and potentially radical) challenges as it tries to evolve
from a Maoist organization to a modern, advanced military force that
can project power in the region.
In light of the serious revelations of the Cox Committee, where I
served as a member (and here by revelations I mean what we actually
concluded and not what embarrassed critics say we said or implied that
we said), and based upon other events and information, I personally
have concluded that it is now necessary to fundamentally re-examine
American foreign policy towards China. Every facet of our relationship
needs to be re-evaluated. And, since the Chinese now have an enhanced
capacity to produce and weaponize a new generation of missiles with
more accurate and powerful weapons of mass destruction -- among other
dangerous weapons to which little attention has been drawn -- and here
is the important point -- in a much shorter time horizon than we had
anticipated, every action we take with respect to the Chinese must be
in both our longer term interest and our short-term interest. We no
longer necessarily have the luxury of the long lead-time (20-25 years)
we once thought rather certain. We cannot count on economic progress
and the inevitable positive changes deeper integration into the
international community economic progress will bring to China before
they have a new level of threat and regional intimidation capacity. We
can no longer afford to be somewhat relaxed about always promptly
defending our immediate interests because "time is on our side". We
cannot afford to be so careless and trusting that long-term benefits
will arrive in time. China is in evolution and its climb up the power
curve may be quicker than expected. Therefore, again, for emphasis, a
policy of responsible engagement must be centered on protecting and
promoting both our short- and long-term national interests on all
occasions.
Of course, opportunities for positive change will not occur in all
facets of U.S.-China relations at the same time. We should seize
opportunities that are in our short- and long-term national interest
when they arise. For example, the chance to make great progress on
trade problems with China and simultaneously advance economic reform
in China is present now available to us with the pending WTO accession
agreement. Congress needs to ensure that the United States benefits
fully from this milestone opportunity by providing China with
permanent Normal Trade Relations ( or PNTR) status as soon as
possible. It's a deal the President mistakenly said "no" to last
April.
At this time, given the fact that China is still negotiating its
bilateral agreement with the EU and its accession protocols with the
WTO itself, it appears that the earliest Congress would act is in
April and, hopefully, at least before June, which is the time the
President would have to issue the annual Jackson-Vanik waiver to
continue China's current NTR status for another year. Upon issuance of
the waiver, the apparently inevitable resolution of disapproval would
be considered by the House. I remain hopeful that this year we can
replace this frustrating annual ritual with a clean up or down vote on
permanent NTR for China. If President Clinton and his Administration
pull out all the stops and buck up the courage of House Democrats who
are intimidated by organized labor and if candidate Gore reverses his
current position to pander to labor before November, we should succeed
for America.
There will certainly be opposition to providing China with permanent
NTR, though opponents of PNTR in the U.S. have yet to propose any
responsible or rational alternative that benefits the United States.
Recall that with this agreement we give up nothing. This is an
export-oriented agreement in which China makes all the concessions. Of
course, it must be understood that opposition to China's accession to
the WTO is not limited to critics in the United States. I believe that
Premier Zhu Rongji and other leading economic reformers in Beijing see
the internal economic restructuring required by China's WTO accession
as necessary for sustaining economic growth and, therefore, maintain
relative social stability and the Communist Party's current and
absolute monopoly on political power. Clearly, they are taking a
gamble. Ultimately, I believe that just as economic reform and growth
laid the foundation for political liberalization in Taiwan, Korea and
elsewhere, Premier Zhu's initiatives, if successful, may mark the
beginning of the probably lengthy end of the Communist Party's
monopoly. Certainly, this latter possibility is a traumatizing
possibility for the hard-liners in the PLA and elsewhere in the power
structure. They are a powerful source of resistance to the pace and
scope of Zhu's economic reforms. Zhu is their ideological enemy.
Furthermore, despite the highly publicized announcements that the PLA
has divested from its numerous business interests throughout China, in
reality the PLA remains closely involved with a significant number of
the inefficient and bankrupt state-owned enterprises which are
targeted for reform and privatization. How the PLA addresses and
adapts to the overall economic reforms as well as to its own internal
reforms will be an important development to watch. The questions about
their reactions certainly do contribute to the uncertainty in
Sino-American relations.
TAIWAN-CHINA
Perhaps not fully understood here in the U.S., especially I fear among
some of my colleagues in Congress, is the overwhelming fixation or
preoccupation Beijing has on the issue of Taiwan. If there is any one
issue that could bring the U.S. and China into armed confrontation in
the near future, it is Taiwan. This could have occurred in March 1996,
when, in the guise of military exercises, the PLA fired missiles that
landed in the waters off Taipei thereby resulting in the deployment of
two U.S. aircraft carrier task forces to the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan-PRC relations are particularly delicate at this moment because
of the presidential elections which will occur in Taiwan on March
18th. With three candidates in a virtual dead heat, there is no way to
predict the outcome. However, we need to be very concerned about the
possibility of one or more of the candidates, in desperation, playing
the "Taiwan independence card." We also need to follow Beijing's
response very closely in the aftermath to the elections, for the PRC
may well be tempted to test the new leader's resolve. There are too
many Sinologists who believe that the Chinese still plan an overt
response of some nature to President Lee's "state-to-state" comments.
Finally on this subject, it is important to remember that the Chinese
see the possibility or movement to independence in Taiwan as a threat
to their sovereignty -- not just in the Taiwan Strait confrontation,
but also in Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Hong Kong, and elsewhere
in China. In short, this is an issue that merits very careful
attention.
Yesterday, the House of Representatives considered and overwhelmingly
passed the controversial Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA).
Introduced by Representative Tom DeLay in the House and Senator Jesse
Helms in the Senate, the TSEA, as originally introduced, sought to
establish a much closer relationship between Taiwan's military and the
U.S. armed forces. Some of the provisions in the introduced draft
went, I felt, much too far, were ill advised and, in some cases,
unnecessary. For example, demonstrating an apparent lack of knowledge,
the legislation actually urged the United States to sell diesel
submarines to Taiwan. Now we don't make diesel submarines in the
United States and haven't for several decades. We no longer have the
capacity in this country and the U.S. Navy has every reason to resist
recreating such a capability. Diesel submarines, theoretically, might
be bought from current producers such as Sweden, Germany, the
Netherlands, France, Australia or Russia, but not from the U.S.
Similarly, the draft legislation would have mandated an even more
generous number of slots for the education and training of additional
Taiwanese officers. To do so, however, would have meant reducing the
level of training for our own military officers and those of other
countries, something that would undermine our own national security.
That provision also was altered in Committee as were a number of other
significant changes made to other provisions in the draft legislation.
INDONESIA
Let me now turn from Northeast Asia to concerns that emanate from
Southeast Asia. Conditions in Indonesia are very troubling. The
consequences of further economic and political collapse, including a
very real potential for the violent break-up of the country, are
extremely serious and would significantly impact regional stability
and U.S. national security in a most adverse way. The necessary and
painful economic reforms Indonesia must undertake would be daunting
even to a well-established democracy. Indonesia must boldly undertake
this action while at the same time, with the most minimal experience
and direction, undertake massive political reform.
Indonesia, perhaps the most ethnically, religiously, geographically
complicated country on earth now has seen serious disintegrative and
fratricidal ethnic religious forces emerge in several parts of the
country.
To date, I believe that President Wahid has exceeded most reasonable
and informed international expectations in guiding Indonesia in the
right direction and preventing its collapse. In my judgment, the U.S.
is correctly providing financial, technical and political support for
Indonesia in an effort to bolster these positive efforts. Yet, the
separatist attacks in Aceh, the religious riots in Ambon and Lombok,
and anti-Chinese pogroms that are occurring with increasing frequency
and levels of violence underscore how fragile and volatile the
situation is in Indonesia. Given the overall poor state of President
Wahid's health, the questions about the ability of Vice-President
Megawati to effectively succeed Gus Dur, and given the ambitions of
National Assembly Speaker and Islamic Movement leader, Amin Rais, it
appears to me that the armed forces will continue, by necessity, to be
the ultimate stabilizing force and will, if necessary, act if they
deem it necessary to ensure the secular integrity of Indonesia-- just
as they have done in the past.
The recent decision by an Indonesian government commission to charge
six top Indonesian generals, including General Wiranto, and their
militia surrogates for human rights abuses in East Timor certainly is
a strong, positive action we must acknowledge. While supporting the
investigation and prosecution of those military leaders responsible
for human rights violations in East Timor, Aceh and elsewhere has an
important bearing on U.S.-Indonesian relations. We must not allow this
set of issues alone to halt a proper engagement with Indonesia's
military or do crucial damage to our overall relations with this
important nation of over 200 million, as was the case with the
problems of East Timor. I strongly believe that previous
well-intentioned (but in some cases special-interest motivated)
congressional actions which were focused on East Timor, such as the
suspension of the International Military Education and Training (or
IMET) program and the denial to Indonesia of an E-IMET program which
was even more specifically aimed at human rights training, have
largely been counter-productive and have resulted in America losing
overall access and leverage in Indonesia, particularly with the
Indonesian military. That was recently made apparent by our limited
ability to influence and temper the military's actions in East Timor.
We should learn from these mistakes and appreciate the fact that
military education programs and other forms of engagement with the
Indonesian military (now called the TNI) substantially benefit both
our own military and our interest in promoting military reform and
professionalism. They clearly are in our overall national interest.
The need for responsible US-Indonesian military-to-military engagement
is even more crucial today because the TNI is already undergoing
significant changes as President Wahid has transferred reform-minded
generals and admirals into new positions of authority. For the first
time since the 1950s, Indonesia has a civilian defense minister; that
is a move we should applaud and do what we can to responsibly
reinforce. Indeed, responsible U.S. assistance and engagement can help
promote and shape these positive developments. Furthermore, in the
past, when the U.S. was required to suspend military assistance, our
Australian allies stepped into this role and cultivated close ties
with the TNI. However, as a consequence of Australia's intervention in
East Timor, these ties have become severely strained and will take
time to repair. If we leave a gap this time, there is no one to fill
it.
INDIA-PAKISTAN
Lastly, let me turn briefly to South Asia. It seems like a distant
memory, but just two short years ago the Indian and Pakistani Prime
Ministers met in Lahore. They solemnly promised to resolve all
outstanding differences, including Kashmir. Since that time, however,
there have been nuclear tests, the Kargil incursion, a military coup
in Pakistan, and, most recently, a terrorist hijacking. Rarely has the
hope of peace been dashed so decidedly.
I believe it is painfully clear to all that U.S. policy, designed to
deter nuclear proliferation and punish would-be nuclear powers, almost
certainly served a useful purpose, but ultimately it did not succeed.
This policy may have helped deter proliferation for many years, but
with the nuclear tests that time has passed. Laws that were enacted to
deter proliferation now limit our ability to engage in very important
ways with India and Pakistan to actually avoid nuclear confrontation.
I believe, for example, that the United States now should work closely
with India and Pakistan to better assure that the control of this
nuclear capability in their hands is as safe as possible. We have
fail-safe technology and experience with redundant command and control
systems, elements of which we can share, to ensure that inadvertent or
unauthorized nuclear launches do not occur. It is extremely important
for India and Pakistan to have such technology. Remember, for example,
that during the Kargil crisis there were widespread rumors in both
India and Pakistan of imminent nuclear attack by the other side. With
armies mobilizing and airplanes being lost, the risk of escalation was
very real. In such a situation, emergency inter-country communications
channels and secure command and control of nuclear assets are
essential. However, in general, we are prohibited by law from
providing this type of assistance. I have urged the Administration to
act on this matter, but they insist that their hands are tied.
Frankly, I find this answer doubtful, but if accurate they need to
clearly and aggressively seek a statutory change.
I am pleased that the Congress has been able to legislate a waiver of
the draconian sanctions that were imposed immediately after the
nuclear tests. Frankly, a prohibition on commercial loans and a "no"
vote in the IMF hurt American exporters and did nothing to resolve our
proliferation and security concerns. I am pleased to have had a hand
in lifting these sanctions together with a number of older, outmoded
prohibitions (i.e., the Pressler Amendment).
Let me say that, during my five year tenure as Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, I have tried very hard not to
play favorites. I have sought to treat both India and Pakistan on the
merits of their case or actions. I continue to believe that the United
States can, and should, seek to have a positive relationship with both
countries. Again, in this instance, our relations with either country
are not a zero-sum game. And, again, as with East Timor, I refuse to
play ethnic politics among factions in America.
On another related issue, there is currently a move by some friends of
India to legislate the placement of Pakistan on the State Department
Terrorist Countries List. Placing Pakistan on this list would mean
that we have totally cut off Pakistan -- that we thereby, effectively,
no longer seek to influence the course of events in Pakistan. I cannot
believe that such a move is appropriate or in the U.S. national
interest -- certainly not on the basis of the information available
and verified.
The United States continues to wield considerable influence in
Islamabad. We are able to encourage Pakistan's behavior in many ways.
Of course, our influence is not absolute. There no doubt will be
occasions when the leadership in Pakistan will not heed our warnings.
But at this point it would be irresponsible to lump Pakistan together
with the likes of North Korea, Sudan, Iraq, and Libya. (It is reported
that the Administration may want to remove North Korea from the list.)
Our policy should be to prevent Pakistan from becoming a true rogue
state. If Pakistan goes the way of Afghanistan -- adopting a
Taliban-style leadership -- the U.S. national interest would be
severely threatened (as would India's security).
Indeed, the challenges ahead for the U.S. in Asia are many and they
are complex: North Korea, China, Taiwan, Indonesia, India and
Pakistan. And, these are not all of the areas of concern. Undoubtedly,
there will be a similar number of economic security and competitive
challenges the U.S. will confront in Asia in the coming years.
However, we'll have to save such predictions and speculations for
another lunch!
Five years ago, when I held my first hearing as the new Chairman of
the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee, I stated in my opening remarks that we
should recognize and appreciate the extraordinary and growing
importance of the Asia-Pacific region to the United States and the
world community. After all, the United States is also a Pacific
country. Accordingly, our policies and actions should be guided by the
following three overall objectives:
1. The United States military and naval presence and security
commitment to the region must be sustained and enhanced both for the
purpose of regional stability and in furtherance of our foreign policy
goals and national interest.
2. The United States must better focus and augment its resources to
defend our economic interests, to expand our commercial opportunities,
and to ensure American competitiveness in the region.
3. Mindful of the American commitment to our fundamental principles of
democracy, pluralism, and human rights, we must creatively utilize the
most effective bilateral, regional, and multilateral approaches to
advance these principles in the region.
Maintaining -- indeed, strengthening -- our already close alliances
with Japan, Australia and South Korea is a fundamental factor in
achieving these goals. So, too, is building further upon the solid
foundation of friendship and cooperation already established with
Singapore, Thailand, and, eventually, again with New Zealand. I even
have some optimism about new possibilities to strengthen our
relationship and mutual benefits with respect to the Philippines.
Certainly, this region holds enormous importance and promise for the
United States. Our trade relations with Asia, our security relations
with Asia, and our political linkages with the region will greatly
influence the U.S. geo-strategic role in the 21st Century. We must
give these relations the high level of responsible, forward-looking
attention they warrant.
Thank you.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State)