The Visit of South Korean President Kim Dae Jung
A Senior State Department Official
Thursday, July 1, 1999
SR. STATE DEPT OFFICIAL: Good morning. Thank you, Charles.
As you know, President Kim Dae Jung is coming tomorrow for a visit that I would characterize as short but sweet. The two presidents have a very good, close relationship. Having participated in the previous meetings between them, I have every expectation that this meeting will be of a similar suit and will just further extend their personal friendship as well as their extraordinarily close working relationship.
In terms of the schedule itself, it's quite straightforward. They'll begin with a lunch, and then there will be a smaller meeting immediately thereafter.
In terms of the focus of the trip, I would say that I would expect there to be three broad areas of discussion. That's not to say that this is a strictly limited agenda, but conceptually, obviously, a very large part of the discussion will focus on events in North Korea and how we work on a variety of North Korean issues, pursue the various negotiations that are under way, as well as simply sharing assessment of the situation on the Korean peninsula, particularly in the North, between them.
A second section, I think, would relate to the economy of South Korea and the particularly the president is looking forward to hearing Kim Dae Jung's assessment of the economic recovery that appears to be well under way in the Republic of Korea. One of the big success stories this year is that Korea seems to be leading the pack in emerging from the crisis. But at the same time President Kim has also made it very clear that he feels there are additional steps that need to be taken structurally in order to solidify and strengthen Korea's reforms, and I'm sure President Clinton will be interested in hearing about that. So the second piece is economic.
And the third piece will be regional, and in there I think many things will come up. Obviously, President Kim will want to report on his recent trips to both China and Russia, as President Clinton will be interested in that. I think they will also discuss the efforts that the two countries have taken to try to strengthen democracy in the Asia Pacific region and elsewhere in the world. And as you know, this is an area of, you know, particular closeness between the two presidents, in terms of shared values. President Kim Dae Jung has a long track record, dating back to his days as an opposition leader, as a, you know, key supporter of democracy and human rights, and has been very active in the Asian field since becoming president. So I think they will discuss democracy issues, as well. And I would assume that President Kim would want to know from President Clinton, you know, some assessments that we would have, particularly about U.S.-China relations. So I imagine a lot will get covered in that last session, as well.
But overall, I think this will be a very cordial high-level discussion focusing at the realm of ideas. I don't, you know, view this in any way as a contentious set of meetings, but rather a continuation of a process; you know, the third high-level meeting between these two figures as presidents.
MR. SILVER: Okay. Well, with that, are there any questions? (Pause.) Please wait for the microphone and identify yourself and your news organization.
Q The last time you spoke at the Heritage --
MR. SILVER: Excuse me --
Q -- Mike LaVallee (sp) from CBS-Tokyo Broadcasting System.
The last time you spoke at the Heritage Foundation, you had mentioned about North Korea's missile program and that it would be dire consequences if they decided to make another test. Yesterday, Dr. Campbell at the Pentagon mentioned that preparations have been noticed and are under way.
Could you give us a little more of an idea of how much preparation has been under way and approximate time frame of when you might expect a test that can give us --
SR. STATE DEPT OFFICIAL: No. I am afraid not, that I am really not going to comment on intelligence matters. I don't think that is appropriate. I also don't think it is the key issue.
The key issue is really the policy. It requires a political decision to test another missile. And the point that I made, the point that President Kim Dae Jung made last week in his interview in the Washington Post, the point that all our negotiators have made to North Korea and the point that Dr. Campbell reiterated yesterday, is that, if there is another missile test, it will have serious consequences. I believe the word we have used ,or at least the one I have used, is "serious," as opposed to "dire." I'll leave you to speculate as to what the difference is.
But I think the more serious point is obvious, that we believe that, you know, another missile test would be destabilizing, and that we believe it's not in the interests of the countries of the region, and that we believe it's absolutely imperative that North Korea understand that in advance, which is why we have stated, you know, on so many occasions at so many levels that there would be consequences.
MR. SILVER: You have one over here.
Q Ben Barber of the Washington --
MR. SILVER: One minute, please. We'll get you a microphone.
Q Thanks. Ben Barber of the Washington Times. We'd like to know a little bit about what Mr. Perry is going to recommend or what his report's going to contain. And the State Department is very reluctant to disclose any of this, or Mr. Perry's side. Do you think that he is going to recommend easing of the trade embargo?
SR. STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: The State Department is not reluctant, it's unwilling to disclose. (Laughter.) As is the rest of the U.S. government.
Seriously, there have been six months of effort put into this report, and there's no way I'm going to scoop Dr. Perry while he finalizes his recommendation. Sorry. I just cannot be more forthcoming than that.
MR. SILVER: Take one from the back. Okay.
Q Carol North (sp), TV Asahi of Japan. On Michael's earlier question, could you go over a little bit more how President Clinton and Kim Dae Jung would approach the issue of North Korea? Will they issue a new statement, or would they be expected to -- this is specifically regarding another missile test and the consequences. How are going to discuss that issue?
SR. STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Well, I think it's going to be a very straightforward discussion on the merit about, you know, our assessment of what's happening, our assessment of what can be done, you know, to try to deal with the -- I think what can done to try to persuade North Korea not to go forward with another test and to have some discussions, you know, beyond that if they do test, you know, how to respond to it. But I think that this is basically discussion, you know, between the two countries on the level of substance right now rather than necessarily the basis for a major public initiative tomorrow. This is more part of the rather intense close coordination that we've had on this issue not just with the ROK, but I would say trilaterally, including the government of Japan.
MR. SILVER: Okay, we have a question here, and then we'll go here.
Q My name is Nagoshi, Jiji Press, Japanese wire service. Could you specify a little bit more about the very serious consequences if North Korea will have nuclear test? What kind of actions concretely are you going to take in that case?
SR. STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: I'm afraid that I'm not going to speculate on that for one reason, that this is one of the subjects that the two presidents are going to discuss tomorrow, and I wouldn't want to anticipate the outcome of the discussion. But also, this is an ongoing process that I mentioned is a trilateral one that also involves the government of Japan, and I think that, you know, I can't go beyond what I've already said, that the obvious point that there will be severe consequences if this takes place, but we are still coordinating with our allies on the specific details.
MR. SILVER: We have a question up here.
Q My name is Chin of Munhwa Ilbo in Seoul, Korea. Are you concerned that there might be an arms race because of South Korea's desire to have longer-range missiles? There was an article in the Times today about that. And also, are you concerned in any way that South Korea is not interested in joining the TMD, if that comes into being in Asia?
SR. STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Well, on the second part, I think that simply is a South Korean decision, you know, in terms of whether or not they decide to procure that. But your question is way ahead of developments on the ground in the sense that, as we've indicated on many occasions, these systems are themselves years off from being completed, from being tested, from being -- you know, knowing that they're workable, and so forth. So this is not an imminent decision for the government of Korea, for any other government in the region, given where we are in the current state of development on, you know, the TMD systems, particularly the upper tier that people are focusing on.
In terms of the first part of the question, I think that the basic priority of both the United States and the Republic of Korea is on the diplomatic side, meaning trying to deal with the North Korean missile threat, not by counter proliferation, but rather by persuading the North Koreans to cease pursuing these capabilities.
As you know, we have had several rounds of missile talks with the DPRK over the past several years. It is a very high priority to get those negotiations resumed. We hope that will happen sooner, rather than later. And one of the express purposes of that is to try to make progress on the missile issues, which involve threats to, not only the ROK, but also to Japan, to U.S. forces in both those countries.
MR. SILVER: Let's go to Carol.
Q (Briefer's name omitted) -- I have sort of a multi --
MR. SILVER: For the record, could you just tell us who you are?
Q Oh, I am sorry. Carol Giacomo from Reuters.
SR. STATE DEPT OFFICIAL: Even if you are a living legend. Yes? (Laughter.)
Q (Briefer's name omitted) -- oh, sorry.
The trilateral talks that took place last week, can you say that they also focused on trying to devise a coordinated response to North Korea, if there is a missile test? And when is Perry's report expected out?
And U.S. officials in recent days have said they were waiting for a North Korean response to what former Secretary Perry presented to them on his trip. Have you gotten any indications, publicly or -- or do you see any public indications so far, or have you gotten any private indications, that the North Koreans are at least favorably disposed towards what he presented?
SR. STATE DEPT OFFICIAL: The trilateral talks covered a range of topics, not just limited to the obvious issue of missiles, although that obviously is a subject of concern. I would like to preserve the tradition, which we have had in these trilateral talks, of not having significant disclosure about the specifics because these are really our main working-level venues for trying to interact on a trilateral basis to come up with recommendations for our more senior officials. And I don't think it's helpful to get out there and characterize it in much more detail than that. But I wouldn't want you to leave with the impression that this is a meeting solely to deal with missiles. In fact, this is an ongoing process that, you know, I expect to continue well into the future. In fact, it started years ago and has recently been intensified, you know, in the wake of developments.
On the Perry report, we have put expected time frames so many times that I'm reluctant to do so again, other than to say that my genuine expectation is soon, not -- you know, "soon" being defined as something "reasonably imminent," not meaning, you know, "well off." But I really don't think it's helpful to give you a target and then miss the target and give you another target. You know, we've been through that many times this year. But it's being worked on intensively by Dr. Perry.
And the third one was?
Q Have you gotten any indications that the North Koreans --
SR. STATE DEPT OFFICIAL: Yeah. Yeah, yeah. Quite frankly, as I think we've indicated, you know, in the briefings on the Perry trip itself, having spent, you know, six months coming up with our own thoughts that Dr. Perry took to them, we didn't really expect the North Koreans to turn around on a dime and give us their response back. And that would have been completely out of character with the way the North Koreans negotiate, across the board, in any of their negotiations with us or others, and they have lived up to that. They have not, you know, come back with anything that I would consider a response to the Perry report. But I assume that this is under intense consideration, you know, back in Pyongyang. I certainly hope so.
MR. SILVER: Okay.
Q Sharon Bains (sp), AFP. Back to the question the gentleman over there asked about South Korea possibly launching a satellite or a missile. How could the United States persuade South Korea not to do so? And how worried is the United States that they could do so? This is pursuant to the report in the New York Times this morning.
SR. STATE DEPT OFFICIAL: I really, you know, don't want to get into the business of commenting on the New York Times report itself, simply to say that we have had an ongoing series of discussions with the South Koreans on the whole question of missiles, the North Korean missile threat, and how to respond to the missile threat. And that, as I've indicated previously, I believe the heart of the issue really is not in terms of a military response, the heart of the issue is in terms of coming to grips with the North Korean missile program, which is what we're attempting to do in diplomatic channels, the negotiations that I described.
MR. SILVER: Let's go over here.
Q Jeong-woo Kil, Joong-Ang Ilbo, Korea. The missile issue again. Let me reconfirm the U.S. government position at this time on missile issues. And to my understanding, to U.S. government is not acceptable any kind of North Korea's missile test under any circumstances. Is that correct?
SR. STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: We have made it very clear that we believe that, you know, the acquisition of long-range missile capabilities is destabilizing, and we have warned North Korea that a missile test of any such system would have serious consequences. I don't think I could be any clearer than that.
Q Any kind of missile means including satellite, to their accusation.
SR. STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: We have talked about long-range missiles, obviously, you know, I think that's quite obvious. But beyond that, we have indicated that the problem with the satellite issue is the satellite is simply the payload, it's what launches the satellite and whether there is any conceptual difference between a satellite-launched vehicle and a long-range missile. And so from our point of view, it is the vehicle and the range that is the most serious thing, and that's why we have focused on it. And so we do not think simply labeling something as a satellite makes the issue go away.
Q Can you remind me what steps, measures the U.S. government has taken before and after the India and Pakistan's missiles tests?
SR. STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: I'm afraid not. That's sort of off my beat -- the India, Pakistan thing. You'd have to get that from one of my colleagues, I just don't have it in my head. But it should be available information if you talk to the South Asia Bureau.
MR. SILVER: Okay, let's go here.
Q Takashi Sakamoto from Yomiuri Shimbun, Japanese newspaper.I understand the U.S. government has been waiting for the response ofNorth Koreans towards Dr. Perry's proposals.Can you wait for the response from the North Koreans indefinitely, ordo you have some kind of time frame in your mind?
Another question is that Japanese officials and politicians have been indicating that Japan might take unilateral measures, something like suspension of all of KEDO funding, if North Koreans tested another Taepo Dong I or II missile. U.S. government does not mind ifJapanese government takes that kind of unilateral measures?
SR. STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: On the first part, I think it'sobviously a matter of common sense that proposals don't last forever,but there is no firm deadline attached to it. That's not, you know, Idon't think a particularly product way to say you have to respondwithin X days or X weeks. But over time, as circumstances change oractions change, you know, things can become less relevant. So the hope is that North Korea will consider the message that Dr. Perrybrought. And, you know, I reemphasize Dr. Perry went not as anegotiator, as he said repeatedly, but rather to share some of histhoughts as he works on this report. And I would hope that the North Koreans would share their thoughts back sooner rather than later.
I think you have misstated a bit the Japanese governmentposition, because in fact we have been in very close consultationswith Japan about possible responses, you know, about the whole missileissue. And the point is, well, you know, Japan reserves the right, asdoes every other government, to take whatever steps it deemsappropriate in response to an attack. But I think a major effort'sbeing made by the government to coordinate with others, and I thinkthat coordination activity will continue.
MR. SILVER: We had a question over here. The front row, please.We have time for many two or three more.
Q I'm Erin Basir (sp) with Radio Free Asia. (Name omitted)-- two questions: Is there concern in the U.S. administration thatalthough the United States and our trilateral allies have made theirposition clear on North Korean behavior on missiles and proliferationthat the message really isn't getting through to the top levels of theNorth Korean government or that they are simply not taking thisseriously enough to, you know, take appropriate measures to respond tothat.That's my first question.
The second question is, the North Koreans have always said thatthey are willing to talk about missile proliferation issues but theywill not talk about domestic missile development issues. Have you inyour private -- I mean, has the U.S. administration's private dealingswith North Korea seen any change in that position in recent times?
SR. STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: On the first one, I think that,without putting myself in the position of speaking for the NorthKoreans, something I neither can nor will do, but of course one has tobe concerned about the possibility that they either, you know, won'tget the message or, more likely, you know, they decide not to acceptit. The reason I make that distinction is simply that I think a sufficient number of high-level representations have been made about the consequences of another test that I find it hard to imagine that the senior leadership hasn't heard about our concerns. What they decide to do in response, obviously, is their decision, not ours, and I don't think anyone in the U.S. government takes North Korean decisions for granted. What we have to do is our job to make sure that they understand that there will be consequences, and we've done that rather clearly.
On the second part, you have accurately stated the North Korean position, but I would add two words, "thus far." And the question obviously is, you know, our goal is to get back to the negotiating table and the missile talks that I referred to earlier and to continue to pursue this discussion in an effort to, you know, persuade the North Koreans that it's in mutual interest to deal with both aspects of the missile problem -- exports and internal.
Q But have you detected anything that shows you that they will talk about that? I mean, they've refused, as far as I --
SR. STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: We won't know till they get back to the table.
MR. SILVER: Okay, let's go here. I believe you had a question?
Q My name is Miyasaka from Kyodo News. I have two questions.
First, a quick question: When Mr. Perry visited Pyongyang, Ithink that he invited first the deputy prime -- the foreign minister Kang Sokoju (ph) to come to the United States. Could you explainabout the status of this invitation?
And the second question is a follow-up to Mr. Satamoto's (sp)question about -- just last year, after August, you know, the pastmissile launching, the Japanese government asked the U.S. governmentto suspend the talks in New York, but the U.S. categorically deniedthis request.
And also, the Japanese government suspended the KEDO funding, 1billion funding -- this issue. But the U.S. government persuaded theJapanese government to go ahead with this project. And at that time,the U.S. official position is maybe -- I believe the framework is thekey -- (inaudible) -- foundation of the stability in the region.
And do you believe that after maybe second -- this missile test,U.S. still believes that -- I believe that the -- (framework ?) --should be maintained after second -- maybe a possible or potentialmissile test?
And if the Japanese government suspends the KEDO funding, U.S.will persuade the Japanese government to go ahead with this project?This is the second question.
SR. STATE DEPT OFFICIAL: Well, I am afraid you are trying to getme to speculate on both counts. I have nothing to add on the firstone concerning Dr. Perry's statement -- you know, trip.
On the second, I think -- let me come back to basic principles; that obviously, we have concerns about missiles. Those concerns are, I think, the same between the U.S., Japan and Korea. All three countries take this very seriously and that we have been discussing the issue intensively.
At the same time, I think all three countries also recognize that the nuclear issue is another grave security threat and that, you know, it's a difficult outcome to envision both an active missile program and an active nuclear program as an outcome that advances the national interests of any of these three countries. So obviously we -- you know, in the event -- and you seem to take it as a given. But in the event that there's a test, another test of along-range missile, I think we will try to coordinate a response that will seek to, you know, as much as possible preserve our national security interests and not lead to the rupture of the agreed framework. But other than that, we're going to have to, you know, continue to coordinate and see what is -- you know, it's going to depend on what we work out between the three countries trilaterally.
MR. SILVER: We have time for one more question. Let's take itfrom the back.
Q Xieng Weng from China Youth Daily. You just mentioned thatU.S.-China relations will be discussed at this summit. So is U.S.concerned about that the recent NATO bombing of Chinese embassy inBelgrade will have a(n) impact on Chinese cooperation on Koreanissues? A second question is, will U.S. use the TMD issue as aleverage to offer China to persuade North Korea not to have the secondtest firing of the missile? Thank you.
SR. STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: I will respond to the second question,since it relates to the subject of this briefing, which is that, as wehave said on many occasions, we believe the United States and Chinahave many shared interests when it comes -- with respect to the Koreanpeninsula in terms of the general desire to preserve the peace andstability on the peninsula and not to see a confrontation in terms ofwanting to see a nuclear-free peninsula. And I think we share aperspective that the acquisition of a long-range missile capability byNorth Korea would be destabilizing. And so we've had lots ofdiscussions with China about this subject. And, you know, the hope isthat China will in its own way discuss this with North Korea as welland, you know, indicate that going down this path could bedestabilizing.
MR. SILVER: Before I thank our guest, some people came in late.Let me remind you this has been a background briefing. Remarks are attributed to a senior State Department official.
Thank you, sir.
SR. STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Thank you.
END
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