DATE=12/7/1999
TYPE=BACKGROUND REPORT
TITLE=YEARENDER: U-S/NORTH KOREA
NUMBER=5-44922
BYLINE=STEPHANIE MANN
DATELINE=WASHINGTON
INTERNET=YES
CONTENT=
VOICED AT:
INTRO: The United States and North Korea, once
battlefield enemies and still ideological adversaries,
are working toward normalizing relations. This is the
result of a U-S policy review conducted during the
past year. Correspondent Stephanie Mann looks at how
U-S policy toward Pyongyang has changed and what that
may mean in the coming months.
TEXT: The United States and North Korea were on
opposite sides of a bitter war in the 1950's. Since a
truce in 1953, an atmosphere of distrust has kept the
two countries on the brink of hostility.
// OPT // The United States has more than 35-thousand
troops stationed in South Korea. And most of North
Korea's one-million-strong army is deployed near the
border with the South. // END OPT//
Washington and Pyongyang reached an agreement in 1994
that halted North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
But the United States and other governments recently
suspected the North was secretly continuing its
efforts to make nuclear weapons.
In 1998, North Korea test fired a medium-range missile
that flew over Japan, prompting new fears about North
Korea's intentions. There were also signs North Korea
was developing long-range nuclear-capable missiles.
Given this atmosphere, the Clinton administration
launched a policy review, looking for a new way to
deal with North Korea. Former Defense Secretary
William Perry led the study and presented his
conclusions to the President.
Mr. Perry says the level of U-S and South Korean
deterrence is strong but could be undermined by North
Korean nuclear weapons. He says no weapons-grade
nuclear material has been produced at Yongbyon in
North Korea since the 1994 agreement, but that could
easily change. And he says the success of the 1994
accord would be in jeopardy if North Korea develops
long-range missiles.
Mr. Perry says his final conclusion is that the North
Korean government is not on the brink of collapse.
So, he says the United States and its allies must deal
with Pyongyang the way it is, not the way they wish it
would be. Mr. Perry says Washington must try to
engage Pyongyang.
// PERRY ACT ONE //
The first alternative is that if North Korea
will forego long-range missiles, as well as
nuclear weapons, then we should be prepared, we
the allies, should be prepared to move step by
step in a reciprocal fashion to normalization -
normalization of political relations,
normalization of economic relations.
// END ACT //
On the other hand, Mr. Perry says if Pyongyang is not
willing to remove the threat of nuclear weapons and
long-range missiles, the United States and its allies
must act to contain those threats.
// PERRY ACT TWO //
I am confident that pursuing talks with North
Korea seriously and creatively is a good idea,
but . I cannot be confident that this process
will actually lead to a peaceful peninsula.
Therefore, the United States should keep its
powder dry. In particular, we should make no
reductions in military readiness during the
course of these talks.
// END ACT //
At a Geneva meeting in October, the two sides agreed
to work toward normalizing relations, and each made a
concession. Washington agreed to ease economic
sanctions against North Korea, and Pyongyang promised
to suspend missile testing.
Korea specialist Scott Snyder says that created the
right atmosphere for dialogue, because either party
can reverse its concession if it is not happy with the
talks.
Mr. Snyder, a research fellow at the United States
Institute of Peace, expects negotiations will take a
long time to make noticeable progress. The next step
is for a high level North Korean delegation to come to
Washington, but the date has not been set.
A Korea specialist at the Institute for Defense
Analysis, Katy Oh (Kongdan Oh), says the new approach
continues the Clinton administration's engagement
policy on a more comprehensive, less piecemeal basis.
Ms. Oh says the policy revision was needed.
// OH ACT ONE //
It was necessary simply because after the
Taepodong missile test of August 1998, Japan was
very upset and (South) Korea was uncertain, and
the U-S also. Not only the Congress, but
overall the U-S policymakers and a lot of think-
tank experts, including myself, were wondering
what was going on between North Korea and the U-
S. There was a need to re-examine it.
// END ACT //
Ms. Oh says William Perry's new approach involves
reciprocity - the idea that rapprochement should be
based on each side meeting certain conditions. But
instead of handling each aspect of relations on a
case-by-case basis, Ms. Oh says the United States has
offered North Korea what she calls a package deal.
// OH ACT TWO //
We will try to normalize relations with you, and
we will try to help you with economic aid and
even food aid, and also agricultural long-term
structural aid, and technological aid. We
include all that. But at the same time, we
expect you to put in your own package that you
will not test, sell, and (be) involved in
missile development and weapons sales, as well
as continuing the nuclear agreement in full
force. In that case, your package and our
package can be swapped. And that is the new
element.
// END ACT //
Scott Snyder says the policy approach suggested by Mr.
Perry has strengthened U-S strategy. But he says it
does not yet deal with the problem posed by the huge
numbers of conventional weapons deployed on both sides
of the demilitarized zone.
// SNYDER ACT //
In other words, are we over-emphasizing nuclear
and missile questions and giving North Korea
unnecessary leverage that would be better
directed at the conventional military balance
and attempts to address that question?
// END ACT //
Mr. Snyder also says fundamental differences between
the two countries' political ideologies and economic
systems are bound to complicate the negotiating
process.
// REST OPT //
Before relations can be normalized, Mr. Snyder says
some changes may have to occur in the basic nature of
the two countries and their attitudes toward each
other. For example, he says, if Pyongyang moved
toward a less totalitarian system of government, the
prospect for normalized relations would be further
enhanced.
Mr. Snyder says the state of North Korea's economy may
also influence the progress of talks in the coming
months. He notes in recent years North Korea has been
in economic decline and that may have prompted its
willingness to cooperate. Now, Mr. Snyder says there
are signs its economy may be stabilizing, and he
wonders if that will make Pyongyang more difficult to
deal with in international negotiations. (SIGNED)
NEB/SMN/RAE
07-Dec-1999 13:12 PM EDT (07-Dec-1999 1812 UTC)
NNNN
Source: Voice of America
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