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12 October 1999

Text: Statement of William Perry on U.S. North Korea Policy

(The Policy Review finds "a unique window of opportunity") (3390)
If the United States fails to persuade North Korea to remove the
threat of long-range missiles through dialogue and a significant
improvement in relations, then the United States must be prepared to
protect its interests and those of its allies by containing that
threat, said William Perry, special advisor to the President and the
Secretary of State on North Korea policy.
In October 12 remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Perry presented his "Review of
United States Policy Toward North Korea," which he conducted at the
request by President Clinton. Among the findings in the report:
-- Whereas the allied forces surpass the DPRK (Democratic People's
Republic of Korea) militarily, the introduction of nuclear weapons can
upset deterrence in the region.
-- Whereas the DPRK regime has complied the 1994 Agreed Framework and
has not produced fissile material at Yongbyon, ending the freeze of
nuclear facilities at and near Yongbyon will offer North Korea an
opportunity to obtain nuclear weapons.
-- In the face of DPRK firings of long-range missiles, the Agreed
Framework lacks necessary support from the allies.
-- North Korea's lingering economic affliction had had little effect
in undermining the DPRK regime.
Based on these findings, Perry said, two policy alternatives are
available to the United States and its allies.
The first and better one, he said, is to normalize relations gradually
as the DPRK relinquishes its nuclear weapons programs. The other one,
in case North Korea fails to do so, is to take necessary actions
against North Korea to contain the threat.
Perry said that since the second alternative will be "expensive and
dangerous," the United States must seek the first option.
Perry noted that the United States should recognize that North Korea
may send "mixed" signals in response to the U.S. proposal, and that
the United States must stand steady and persistent in the face of
provocations.
In light of high stakes the Republic of Korea and Japan have, Perry
stressed, the support of the allies is vital to any successful policy
toward North Korea.
Despite some suspicious moves in North Korea, Perry said, his May 1999
trip to Pyongyang regained a sense of optimism by fostering contact
with senior North Korea officials, reaffirming the principles of the
nuclear restraint established in the Agreed Framework, and exploring
DPRK's intentions on normalization and abandonment of its nuclear
warhead programs.
The year 1999, he said, poses "a unique window of opportunity" to
begin a path to normalization.
Following is the text of Perry's testimony:
(begin text)
Testimony before
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs
By Dr. William J. Perry
Special Advisor to the President
 and the Secretary of State
October 12, 1999
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you and
other Members of this Committee to discuss my review of U.S. policy
toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
I also want to express my thanks to President Clinton for the
confidence he expressed in me when he requested that I take on this
review. I remember well the serious crisis in the summer of 1994, when
I was Secretary of Defense, over the North Korean nuclear program at
Yongbyon. That crisis raised the very real prospect of a horribly
destructive war on the Korean Peninsula, a prospect averted by
negotiation of an Agreed Framework freezing nuclear operations at
Yongbyon. I thus approached this assignment with a full awareness of
its seriousness.
In early September I sent to the President a classified report of my
recommendations and findings, which I understand was forwarded to the
Hill the week of September 13th. As you well know, this report took
many months to prepare, and I want to convey my appreciation to
Congress personally for its patience in what has been a difficult and
complicated process. Since you and other Members had a prominent role
in the creation of this policy review, I am especially gratified to be
here today to speak for the record about my review.
Circumstances Leading to the Review
Mr. Chairman, for more than 45 years since the end of the Korean War,
the Korean Peninsula has had not peace, but an armed truce. The DPRK
maintains an army of over a million men, most of whom are deployed
near the border. These forces are deterred by Republic of Korea and
U.S. forces which are only half the size of North Korea's forces, but
are well trained and equipped, and are backed up by the highly ready
American forces in Japan, Hawaii, Alaska, and the West Coast of the
United States. As a consequence, deterrence is strong, and peace has
been maintained on the Peninsula for the last four decades.
But five years ago, we narrowly avoided a military conflict with North
Korea over its nuclear program. The DPRK nuclear facility at Yongbyon
was about to begin reprocessing nuclear fuel, which would have yielded
enough plutonium to make about a half-dozen nuclear bombs. We believed
that the introduction of these nuclear weapons could upset the
deterrence posture on the Peninsula, and we were within a day of
imposing severe sanctions.
North Korea said that it would consider the imposition of these
sanctions as an act of war. Although some argued that this was only
rhetoric, it could not be dismissed. We therefore undertook a detailed
review of our war contingency plan, and the U.S. began preparations
for sizable reinforcements to our troops in the ROK. In the event of a
war, we were confident of a clear allied victory, but not without high
casualties on all sides.
Fortunately, that crisis was resolved not by war, but by a diplomatic
agreement known as the Agreed Framework. The 1994 Agreed Framework
provided for a freeze of nuclear facilities at and near Yongbyon, to
be followed in time by the dismantlement of those facilities. Today
those nuclear facilities remain frozen. That result is critical for
security on the Peninsula, since during the last five years those
facilities could have produced enough plutonium to make a substantial
number of nuclear weapons. The dismantlement of those nuclear
facilities awaits construction of less proliferation-prone light water
reactors called for in the Agreed Framework, and completion of that
construction is still several years away.
About a year ago we appeared to be headed for another crisis like the
one in 1994. U.S. intelligence had reported the construction of an
underground site at Kumchangni, North Korea, which was believed to be
large enough to house a reactor and a reprocessing facility.*
Additionally, the DPRK was pursuing the development of two
longer-range missiles, the Taepo Dong I and Taepo Dong 2, which would
add to an existing No Dong ballistic missile arsenal capable of
reaching all of Japan. The Taepo Dong I and Taepo Dong 2, which could
reach targets in parts of the United States, as well as Japan, aroused
major concern in both countries, because it was believed that these
missiles could have warheads employing weapons of mass destruction.
This concern came to a head a year ago, when North Korea flew a Taepo
Dong I over Japan in a failed attempt to launch a satellite. This test
firing provoked a strong reaction both in the U.S. and Japan, and led
to calls for a termination of the funding which supported the Agreed
Framework. But if the Agreed Framework were to be aborted, there is no
doubt that the DPRK would respond with a reopening of the Yongbyon
nuclear facility. And this in turn would put North Korea in the
position of producing the plutonium that would eventually allow them
to weaponize these missiles.
During this turbulent and dangerous period last fall, President
Clinton decided to establish an outside policy review as called for by
the Congress. President Clinton asked me to head this effort, and I
agreed, believing that the time had come for a serious, solid review
of U.S. policy toward the DPRK. Much had changed in the five years
since we had resolved the last crisis with the signing of the Agreed
Framework, and I believed that the stakes had become even higher --
for Americans, for Koreans, and for the Japanese.
The Review Process
Mr. Chairman, as you know, a policy review team, led by myself and
working with an interagency group headed by Ambassador Wendy Sherman,
Counselor of the Department of State, was formally tasked in November
1998 by President Clinton and his national security advisors to
conduct this extensive review. The review lasted approximately eight
months, and was supported by a number of senior officials from the
U.S. government and by Dr. Ashton Carter of Harvard University. We
were also very fortunate to have received regular and extensive
guidance from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
National Security Advisor and senior policy advisors.
*A subsequent site visit in May removed this particular concern 
Throughout the review I consulted with experts, both in and out of the
U.S. government. As you are aware, I made it a special point to come
here to the Capitol to give regular status reports to Members on the
progress of this review and looked forward to the comments I received
on the ideas that my North Korea policy review team and I were
developing. I also exchanged views with officials from many countries
with interests in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula, including
our allies, the ROK and Japan. In Beijing, I spoke with high-level
Chinese officials. I met with prominent members of the humanitarian
aid community. I saw large and small groups, during formal and
informal settings, talked with people by phone and received a wealth
of written material, solicited and unsolicited. Members of the policy
review team held meetings with many other individuals and
organizations as well. In addition, I traveled to North Korea this
past May, as President Clinton's Special Envoy, to obtain a first-hand
understanding of the views of the DPRK Government.
The results of my review reflect the consensus that I saw emerge from
the team's countless hours of work and study.
In conducting this review, my policy review team and I have made a
number of findings and policy recommendations. Of course, you have
already seen the classified version of my report. However, I have also
submitted an unclassified version to the Committee for the record.
Rather than going through the report section by section, I would like
to call your attention here today to certain portions of my report.
Findings and Observations
Mr. Chairman, during this review, we came to a number of findings and
observations that supported our primary policy recommendations. Let me
highlight a few of these for the Committee.
First, the military correlation of forces on the Korean Peninsula
strongly favors the allied forces, even more than during the 1994
crisis, and I believe that this is understood by the DPRK. Therefore,
deterrence is strong, unless it is upset by the introduction of
nuclear weapons, especially nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles.
Second, there has been no production of fissile material at Yongbyon
since the Agreed Framework came into force, but that production at
this site could restart in few months if the Agreed Framework were
aborted. There is no doubt in my mind that ending the freeze at
Yongbyon remains the surest and quickest path for North Korea to
obtain nuclear weapons.
Third, a security strategy based on the Agreed Framework has worked
these past five years, but is unsustainable in the face of continued
DPRK firings of long-range missiles, since these firings undermine the
necessary support for the Agreed Framework.
Finally, we have determined that, while North Korea is undergoing
terrible economic hardship, these hardships are unlikely to cause the
regime to be undermined. We therefore must deal with the DPRK regime
as it is, not as we would wish it to be.
The Recommended Policy Alternative
After considering a variety of policy alternatives, the policy review
team decided to recommend a multifaceted strategy aimed at dealing
initially with priority U.S. concerns over DPRK nuclear weapons- and
missile-related activities. This alternative was developed in close
consultation with the governments of the ROK and Japan and has their
support at the highest levels.
This recommended alternative involves a comprehensive and integrated
approach to U.S. negotiations with the DPRK. In essence, we have
recommended that the allies establish two alternative strategies. In
the first, if the DPRK is willing to forgo its long-range missile
program as well as its nuclear weapons program, we should be willing
to move step-by-step on a path to a comprehensive normalization of
relations, including the establishment of a permanent peace.
Alternatively, however, if North Korea does not demonstrate by its
actions that it is willing to remove the threat, we must take actions
to contain that threat.
Containing a North Korean threat is expensive and dangerous, so
obviously the first strategy is preferred. But the United States
cannot unilaterally enforce the first strategy. The first strategy
requires continued support of the Agreed Framework by the American
Congress and the South Korean and Japanese parliaments, and I believe
that we will get that support, as long as the DPRK continues to
exercise restraint on long-range missiles as well as nuclear weapons.
Also, successful execution of either strategy requires full
participation of the governments of Japan and the ROK, and I believe
that we will have that full participation.
During the course of the policy review, the governments of the U.S.,
ROK and Japan have worked together more closely than ever before, and
I believe this tripartite cooperation will endure into the future, and
be applied to other problems in the region, as well. Indeed, this
close trilateral consultation is an extremely important result of this
review -- something that I am proud to have been a part of. And, of
course, the viability of the first strategy depends on full
cooperation from North Korea.
A May 1999 Trip to Pyongyang
To determine whether that cooperation would be something we could
expect, our policy team travelled to the DPRK late in May to explore
with the North Korean leadership our working concepts. We were
received in Pyongyang with courtesy, and held extensive and serious
discussions. And while we disagreed on many issues, the talks were
constructive and entirely without polemics.
Our visit had four goals. First, we wanted to make meaningful contact
with senior North Korean officials, to establish a base for future
discussions: That goal was achieved.
Second, we wanted to reaffirm the principles of the nuclear restraint
that had been established in the Agreed Framework. That goal was
achieved, with both sides reaffirming the principles of the Agreed
Framework. Critical to that agreement was the visit by an expert team
to Kumchangni, which established that this site was not suitable for
the installation of a nuclear reactor and reprocessing plant.
Third, we wanted to explore whether the DPRK had interest in going
down a path to normalization. Was the North willing to create an
entirely new relationship with the United States and end the decades
of tension and strife between our two countries? That goal was
achieved in the sense that it was clear that they were interested, but
not clear that they were prepared to take that step at that time.
Fourth, we wanted to explore whether the DPRK was willing to forgo its
long-range missile program, and begin moving with the U.S. down a path
to normal relations. North Korean officials were not able to agree to
that goal while we were in Pyongyang. It was clear that they regarded
their long-range missile program as important, for reasons of
security, prestige, and, of course, hard currency. But, it was also
clear that they understood that these missiles were an impediment to
normal relations.
We explained that our ultimate goal was to terminate North Korean
missile exports and indigenous missile activities inconsistent with
MTCR standards, but that suspending long-range missile testing was the
logical first step. The answer to our proposition was not clear in our
Pyongyang meetings, but the DPRK subsequently agreed to follow-on
meetings to discuss this issue further.
Recent Developments
Three meetings have followed since then; the first two in Beijing and
Geneva were not conclusive. After the last meeting in Berlin, earlier
last month, the U.S. decided to take a small but positive step that
was consistent with the Agreed Framework, in order to improve the
atmosphere in our bilateral relations with the DPRK. The
Administration took this step with the understanding and expectation
that the North would suspend long-range missile testing while we
worked to improve relations. A couple of weeks ago, we learned of an
equally positive step by the North when it announced its unilateral
decision to suspend missile testing for the duration of our high level
discussions aimed at improving relations. It is my hope that this step
will lead to an even more concrete and public undertaking by the DPRK
in this area in the weeks ahead.
Still, I wish to be very clear -- much more remains to be done.
Nonetheless, we are started. And -- if we are unsuccessful in
persuading North Korea to remove the threat through cooperative
dialogue and a significant improvement in relations, then we must be
prepared to protect our interests and those of our allies and return
to a course to contain that threat.
However, I truly believe that will not be necessary. Instead, I
believe the step each side has taken can start a process to remove the
threat of armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. And that with this
threat removed, a better environment will be created which will make
all other problems easier to resolve, including bilateral issues
between the ROK and DPRK, and bilateral issues between Japan and North
Korea.
Concluding Thoughts
Mr. Chairman, please let me conclude with the following thoughts:
First, the approach recommended by the policy review is based on a
realistic view of the DPRK, a hardheaded understanding of military
realities and a firm determination to protect U.S. interests and those
of our allies. It is a flexible approach and does not depend on any
one set of North Korean intentions -- benign or provocative -- to
protect our interests.
Second, we should recognize that North Korea may send mixed signals
concerning its response to our recommended proposal for a
comprehensive framework and that many aspects of its behavior will
remain reprehensible to us even if we embark on this negotiating
process.
Third, no policy toward North Korea will succeed without the support
of our allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan. If tensions were to
escalate, the ROK would bear greatest risk; Japan has vital security
interests in Korea as well.
Fourth, considering the isolation, suspicion, and negotiating style of
the DPRK and the high state of tension on the Korean Peninsula, a
successful U.S. policy will require steadiness and persistence even in
the face of provocations. The approach adopted now must be sustained
into the future, beyond the term of this Administration. It is
therefore essential that the policy and its ongoing implementation
have the broadest possible support and the continuing involvement of
the Congress.
Finally, I wish to point out that a confluence of events this past
year has opened what my policy review team and I strongly feel is a
unique window of opportunity for the U.S. with respect to North Korea.
There is a clear and common understanding among Seoul, Tokyo, and
Washington on how to deal with Pyongyang. The PRC's strategic
goals--especially on the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons and
related missile delivery systems - overlap with those of the U.S.
Pyongyang appears committed to the Agreed Framework and for the time
being is convinced of the value of improving relations with the U.S.
The year 1999 may represent, historically, one of our best
opportunities for some time to come, to begin a path to normalization,
which after decades of insecurity, will finally lead to a Korean
Peninsula which is secure, stable, and prosperous.
(end text)