Dr. William Perry
U.S. North Korea Policy Coordinator and Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State
Interview on The PBS NewsHour by Margaret Warner
Washington, DC, September 17, 1999
QUESTION: Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Thanks for joining us.
DR. PERRY: Thank you, Margaret. It's good to be here.
QUESTION: The United States has had these sanctions on North Korea for nearly 50 years. Why lift them now?
DR. PERRY: It's because for the last 50 years, we have been not in a state of peace, we've been a state of armed truce. Five years ago, that armed truce almost turned into a military conflict. That conflict was resolved, that potential conflict was resolved with the Agreed Framework that dealt with the nuclear weapons. But the last year -
QUESTION: That's the '94 agreement?
DR. PERRY: That's the '94 agreement dealing with freezing their activities in nuclear weapons. Now, during the last year, a new crisis has arisen over the firing of the missiles, which is dramatized, I think, most by the test-firing of a long-range missile over Japan last August. This was a failed attempt to launch a satellite, but it did involve a long-range missile going over Japan. That has raised tensions in the area again, a new crisis. We are seeking ways of resolving that crisis as a first order of business.
QUESTION: How serious a threat, a security threat, is North Korea if something doesn't change in terms of US security or the security of our allies?
DR. PERRY: They have deployed more than one million men in their army, two-thirds of whom are very close to the border in North Korea. That is a formidable military threat. That has been deterred for decades by about half that many South Korean and American troops. We believe that deterrence is stable unless -- unless nuclear weapons and missiles are introduced. Therefore, we're trying to focus on not having the nuclear and nuclear weapons and missiles upsetting that deterrence.
QUESTION: Now, the North Koreans, in return for the easing of these sanctions, have agreed to freeze or not to test-fire any long-range missiles. What makes you think they plan to stick to this?
DR. PERRY: I should say, first of all, that this is just a small step on a larger agreement, which we can talk more about. But this particular step, which is suspension of missile testing and the easing of sanctions in each side, each case, is reversible. I have to say that there is a high level of mistrust in the United States and probably North Korea, and in North Korea relative to Americans.
And therefore, while we have in mind a comprehensive agreement, which is just a first step, we could not negotiate; we did not want to negotiate a package deal; but we're doing it a step at a time, and each time we take a partial step and they take a partial step, maybe we build trust enough that we can start moving farther down.
QUESTION: All right. Now, what happens if they don't stick to this -- even this small first step?
DR. PERRY: If they do not stick to it, in the policy review which I've conducted and given to the President and Congress, we lay out two alternatives. The first and preferred alternative is moving down a path towards normal relations with North Korea, of which this would be the first small step. If they are not willing to go down that path, if by their actions they demonstrate they're not willing to go down this path, then we have to take actions to protect our security interests.
QUESTION: Like what?
DR. PERRY: I could not and would not spell out in detail what those actions were, but I would suggest to you that it would take us back to the situation we were in, in June of '94, which was a dangerous military crisis, which obviously we want to avoid being in that position.
QUESTION: But you said this morning that in '94, the United States was within a day of, you said, increasing our forces in the region and imposing even tougher sanctions that you said would amount to an act of war. Is that the kind of thing you're talking about?
DR. PERRY: No. What I was describing then was how we were responding to the particular threat with which we were confronted at that time. So if we're confronted with a new threat, we would have a specific response tailored to that threat. And I could not spell out in detail what it would be; I would not want to spell out in detail what it would be.
QUESTION: Now, just -
DR. PERRY: But I should say we have many alternatives available to us in responding -- economic, political, as well as military.
QUESTION: I just want to make clear here, have you make clear, what this agreement does and doesn't do. It does not prevent them, does it, from either continuing to develop their weapons, say their missiles, or even selling missile or nuclear technology? It doesn't go to any of that.
DR. PERRY: This first step deals only with suspension of missile testing. What we envision as we move down this path, we envision North Korea becoming compliant with the so-called "missile technology control regime," going by the standards of that, and that would put restrictions not just on testing, but on development, production and export of missiles. We are not to that stage yet, but we envision going -- we would like to go to that stage.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, as you know, there are a lot of critics of both the '94 agreement and this one, and they who say that essentially, the United States has fallen into this pattern of sort of like serial blackmail. I mean, the North Koreans come up with a threat, we buy them off not to follow through; then after a while they come up with a new threat, we buy them off. What do you say to that? I mean, should the US reward that behavior, is I think the way it's posed?
DR. PERRY: Let me take the missile proposal in particular. I'm talking about only a small step at this time, but this small step -- what our action is are easing sanctions; it's not buying off; it is simply allowing trade in consumer goods between our two countries, which is just a normal relation between two countries. What we are seeking, though, is that that first step will lead to a full normalization of relations, both diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries. This is not buying off, this is a small step towards the normal relations.
QUESTION: But we wouldn't be doing this, would we, if they hadn't essentially taken a provocative step?
DR. PERRY: I think we would have normal relations with the country if they were not taking these steps; it's the other way around. It is the presence of the threat which holds us back from normalization of relations. We've told them, if you remove this threat, we can proceed and you can proceed towards more normal relations, and both countries will be safe and both countries would benefit. I say both countries --all countries in the region. Obviously, if the South Koreans and the Japanese are as much interested in this as we, if not more interested, and they have been full partners of ours as we have proceeded forward on this study and on this proposal.
QUESTION: Now, in your proposal, in your conclusions and recommendations, as you said you were proposing a rather comprehensive approach. What do you really envision? Do you envision totally normal relations between the US and North Korea, and what would that entail on each side?
DR. PERRY: Yes, we do envision normal relations. Let me give you an analogy of what it would be as we have now with Vietnam. Ten years ago, 20 years ago, it might have been unthinkable that we'd have had a normal relationship with Vietnam. But today, we do. That includes not only normal diplomatic relations, including an embassy -- an ambassador, but it also includes normal trade relations. We would certainly hope that that's where this would lead North Korea as well.
QUESTION: You said this morning something -- I want to get the exact quote -- you said we should not assume that this North Korean regime is going to collapse just because we've put pressure on it. What makes you conclude that?
DR. PERRY: People who have studied North Korea understand that it is going through a serious economic crisis right now. Hundreds of thousands of people have died from starvation, maybe more than a million. So it's a very serious problem, and therefore observers have said this regime is going to collapse. We don't have to deal with them; let's wait for them to collapse.
Now, I don't believe that we can count on that; I don't believe we should depend on that. It is a regime that has a very strong control. I do not condone or admire the regime, but I do recognize that it is very much in control in that country. And I think it would imprudent on our part to assume that this regime is going to collapse.
We have to deal with the North Korean government not as we wish they would be, but as in fact they are.
QUESTION: So how did you find, then, negotiating with them? You're one of the highest-ranking officials, or former officials, to ever go to North Korea and deal at this level.
DR. PERRY: I have read several books about negotiating with the North Koreans, I have been advised by people who have negotiated. I have expected polemics and fireworks, and we had none of that. With my principal interlocutor, First Vice Minister Kang, I had four meetings of three or four hours each, so we had long discussions in depth. They were straightforward, they were in depth, they were non-polemic and they were constructive. We disagreed on many, many issues, but the discussions were serious and straightforward.
QUESTION: Could you discern what, really, their long-range objective is, what they really want vis-a-vis the US?
DR. PERRY: I was there primarily to see whether they were truly interested in having a normal relationship with the United States; and while I believe there still are a good bit of tension in their country on that and disagreements of different officials in the country, I think that the answer to that is yes. And the question is whether they were willing to give up their missile program to achieve that, because they understand that that is an impediment to a normal relationship with the United States.
QUESTION: Now, how important do you think the missile and weapons programs are? As you know, some people have suggested one reason they've just developed this is just to have a bargaining chip.
DR. PERRY: No, I do not believe that. It is quite clear to me -- first of all, this is a real missile program, a serious missile program, it's not a potemkin village. Secondly, I believe that while they have many reasons for wanting this missile program, I believe their primary reason is security, is deterrence. Whom would they be deterring? They'd be deterring the United States. We do not think of ourselves as a threat to North Korea, but I fully believe that they consider us a threat to them and, therefore, they see this missile as a means of deterrence. They also sell the missiles to other countries and they get hard currency for that, and I'm sure that's not an unimportant factor, though I do not think it's the primary factor.
QUESTION: As you've said, there's a lot of distrust on both sides, but the image of the North Koreans that many in the US have is that they're erratic, suspicious, paranoid, untrustworthy. Did you find any of that, or do you think they're people we can do business with?
DR. PERRY: All of the discussions that I had with them, as I said, they were straightforward and constructive. Hard-nosed, and disagreeing on many issues, but straightforward and constructive. My own judgment is, I would not call them erratic or irrational at all. I think they have a very clear logic and a very clear rationale for what they are doing. We don't always understand that rationale; we don't always understand that logic, and therefore we consider it illogical.
QUESTION: Do you think just on the basis of this first step that we will see a lessening, for instance, of some of the provocative steps, both words and deeds, that they take vis-a-vis South Korea on and off, as they have?
DR. PERRY: If all we accomplish out of this is a suspension of missile testing, then I think this will have been a failure. What we hope is that that will be a first step towards not only a normalization of relations with the United States, but an easing of tensions in the region. Ultimately, ultimately, that must involve very constructive and very positive dialogue between North and South Korea. And if that does not happen, then we have not succeeded. We hope that this will create the environment which will facilitate the North-South dialogue which is so important.
QUESTION: But no promises? I mean, you're not -- you wouldn't be surprised to see further kind of hostilities of that nature?
DR. PERRY: I think that we have a long path ahead of us and I think there will be many bumps in the road, many bumps, indeed. But I also believe that for the last more than 40 years, we have lived with the threat of a war on the Korean Peninsula hanging over our head like a dark cloud. That cloud has not gone away yet, but it's starting to drift away. We are seeing the first stage of it drifting away, and that is devoutly to be hoped, to be wished.
QUESTION: All right, well, thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
DR. PERRY: Thank you, Margaret; it's good to talk to you.
(End of interview.)
[end of document]
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