The White House Briefing Room
September 17, 1999
PRESS BRIEFING BY JOE LOCKHART The Briefing Room
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
_____________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release September 17,
1999
PRESS BRIEFING BY
JOE LOCKHART
The Briefing Room
11:50 A.M. EDT
MR. LOCKHART:
Let me read a statement by the President on North Korea which we
put out a few moments ago, for the benefit of those who would like to hear
it. Today the President announced his decision to ease some sanctions
against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea administered under the
Trading With the Enemy Act, Defense Production Act, and Department of
Commerce Export Administration regulations.
The United States is taking this action in order to pursue
improved overall relations with North Korea, support the agreed framework,
and as a result of U.S.-Korean discussions in Berlin September 7-12, 1999.
On the basis of these discussions it is our understanding that North Korea
will continue to refrain from testing long-range missiles of any kind as
both sides move toward more normal relations.
The easing of sanctions will allow most consumer goods to be
available for export to North Korea and will allow the importation of most
North Korean origin goods into the United States. To support this easing
of sanctions and the trade of goods, most personal and commercial funds
transfers will be allowed between U.S. and North Korean persons.
The relaxation of transportation restrictions will allow
commercial air and sea transportation between the U.S. and North Korea for
passengers and cargo, subject to normal regulatory requirements.
This easing of sanctions does not affect our counterterrorism or
nonproliferation controls on North Korea, which prohibit exports of
military and sensitive dual-use items and most types of U.S. assistance.
Statutory restrictions, such as U.S. missile sanctions will remain in
place. Restrictions on North Korea based on multilateral arrangements also
will remain in place, such as the Wassenaar arrangement.
Q What is the Wassenaar arrangement?
MR. LOCKHART: I'll get to that.
Q This is in the President's name, not yours -- this has your
name on it.
MR. LOCKHART: This is my name and I was reading it from me.
Q Oh, I thought you said it was a statement from the
President.
MR. LOCKHART: No, no. We have put that out and a fact sheet.
In a few moments Secretary Albright, and Dr. Perry, who is behind and has
been very helpful in formulating the policy with North Korea, will be at
the podium at the State Department and they can answer detailed questions.
Q This may be a question that will be better for them, but I
mean, broadly speaking, if you can put this in a little bit of context for
us. What kind of business climate is there over there? How easy is it
going to be for U.S. business interest to conduct relations with North
Korea? Are they ready to trade with us?
MR. LOCKHART: Well, I think that's better put directly to the
North Koreans, but I think, clearly, they have an interest in expanding
trade and economic development. And this -- I think you've put your finger
on what this is about. This is about trade and investment, not about
opening up other assistance, or loosening the restrictions we have based on
North Korea as a terrorist state. But I think businesses will have to make
decisions on the viability of the market. And from a legal and regulatory
framework, the restrictions that have been in place are now being lifted.
Q Joe, is there any reason why we should not view this as a
simple successful blackmail attempt? I mean, we're buying them off, in
effect, by agreeing to trade with them.
MR. LOCKHART: No, I think that's a grossly inaccurate way of
looking at this. I think you have to look at the importance of promoting
our relations with North Korea and the influence it has on the Korean
Peninsula. And I think it is vitally important to the stability of that
region that North Korea moves, and continues to refrain from the long-range
testing. I think, as the National Security Advisor told you all in New
Zealand, that would have a very negative impact on the regional stability
in the peninsula.
Q But given that, that said, why isn't it a blackmail attempt,
or a buy-off?
MR. LOCKHART: Listen, I think we impose -- we have sanctions
imposed that will remain. We have sanctions here that we're talking about
lifting, which is based on our, U.S., national interests in promoting
security in the region. And we believe that this step will promote both of
those.
Q What do you get in exchange?
Q What guarantees do you have that they'll adhere? What
guarantees do you have that they'll adhere to the test ban?
MR. LOCKHART: Well, this is a very conditional lifting of
sanctions. I think, as we've made it very clear, that if they resume
testing, that sanctions will be put back on.
Q But Joe, what's so confusing is, all they have to do is say,
well, gee, we're going to resume testing. And then you guys go through
another negotiations and they get something else out of you, in exchange
for something else. Isn't this just a game that you've played over and
over again?
MR. LOCKHART: I don't think so. I think, clearly, what I just
said is that we have moved to loosen the restrictions on trade and
investment based on our understanding that they will refrain from testing.
And they will see a reversal of our position if they resume testing.
Q But they haven't tested. All they did was threaten to test.
And look what they got for it.
MR. LOCKHART: No, I think if you look at your history, they have
tested.
Q Joe, given the fact that North Korea has posed a security
threat, why do we now have commercial relations with them, or will we have
commercial relations with them when we refuse to give that to Cuba, which
has not posed such a threat?
MR. LOCKHART: Well, we make decisions based on a case-by-case
basis, and it is the view of the President's national security team, and a
recommendation that the President has accepted, that this is in U.S.
interests to take this step, and also in the interest of regional security.
Q Joe, what value of trade and travel and banking transactions
do you expect?
MR. LOCKHART: Let me defer those sorts of questions over to the
State Department.
Q Joe, is there some kind of deal that they will not supply
any more missiles to Iran, Pakistan or other countries, if the U.S. will
lift these sanctions?
MR. LOCKHART: No. I think what we've talked about here is
what's written in the statement, and it's quite clear.
Q Joe, how are U.S. allies in that region taking this? Was
this run by the Japanese?
MR. LOCKHART: Oh, I think the Japanese and the Koreans have been
quite involved in this process, and are quite supportive.
Other subjects.
Q Joe, regarding the President's invoking of executive
privilege here in the case of the Puerto --
MR. LOCKHART: Let's stay on North Korea for a while.
(Laughter.)
...............
Q Just to clarify, when you talk about the North Korea
sanctions easing, are you saying that if North Korea launches any missile
tests, that this would cause a reimposition of sanctions, or is it simply a
long-range missile test? Or can you tell us about that?
MR. LOCKHART: Our understanding is that they will refrain from
long-range missile testing.
Q So they could do short-range --
MR. LOCKHART: Our understanding is they will refrain from
long-term, long-range.
Q This statement refers to "easing." Doesn't this amount to a
lifting? A lifting of the sanctions and you say --
MR. LOCKHART: No, there's a broad range of sanctions that remain
in place against North Korea. This is an easing of commercial and trade
sanctions.
Q But it's not in the specific categories of trade and
banking, transportation -- is it not a lifting?
MR. LOCKHART: The sanctions no longer exist on certain
commercial and trade transactions.
Q -- that the assets remain frozen? Is that all assets?
MR. LOCKHART: Well, there are some assets that are frozen --
Q That have been unfrozen?
MR. LOCKHART: No, there are some assets that remain, that have
not been litigated. And that was not part of these discussions. So the
assets do remain frozen.
Q Joe, what's the state of --
Q -- assets, right?
MR. LOCKHART: Yes, I think so.
Q I think it's 1953.
MR. LOCKHART: I don't know the precise origins of the frozen
assets, but I do know that they remained frozen and were not part of this
arrangement.
..................
END 12:17 P.M. EDT
#116-09/17
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