17 September 1999
Transcript: Albright, Perry Sept. 17 Briefing on North Korea
(Perry: We are finally moving on the path to normalization) (5000) Although former Secretary of Defense William Perry's recent review of U.S. policy toward North Korea and the Berlin understanding with North Korea on its missile program hold the possibility of long-term stability and eventual reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula, the United States has no illusions about the process, according to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. During a special briefing on the President's decision to ease U.S. sanctions on North Korea at the State Department September 17, Albright said these developments had started both sides down a new and more hopeful road. "It's a road America and its allies want to walk down with the North, but it is not a one-way street," she said. "If circumstances warrant," Albright said, "we go back to Square One, we can do so without damage to our interests. If circumstances require that we go down a different road altogether, we will do so to defend our interests; but I think most Americans, and most people of all nationalities in East Asia, would like us to keep moving in the direction of more stable relations -- if that is at all a reasonable prospect." Albright emphasized that Perry's review, the talks in Berlin, and the decision to ease sanctions had been coordinated very closely with Seoul and Tokyo. "Our policy of seeking to ease tensions, prevent destabilizing developments, and explore the possibilities of a different and better relationship with North Korea, are fully in accord with the positions of our allies," she said. "So is our staunch support for the Agreed Framework, which is the linchpin of our effort to end North Korea's nuclear weapons program." Perry called the Berlin understanding "the first positive step towards the suspension of testing" of weapons of mass destruction by North Korea. "I welcome this step, but I also want to point out to you that much more remains to be done" he said. "If we are unsuccessful, we are prepared to move to the alternative path of protecting our security. But I am hopeful that that will not be necessary, and indeed, that we are finally moving on the path to normalization." "For more than 40 years the threat of another war on the Korean Peninsula has hung over our heads like a dark cloud," Perry said. "Today that cloud is beginning to drift away." Following is the State Department transcript: (begin transcript) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Spokesman September 17, 1999 ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT AND DR. WILLIAM PERRY ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA Washington, D.C. ALBRIGHT: Good afternoon. I am very pleased to welcome to the State Department today a very good friend of mine and one of America's most respected leaders. William Perry earned bipartisan praise as an outstanding Deputy Secretary and then Secretary of Defense, and over the past year he has served our country in a different but related capacity. At President Clinton's request, he agreed to undertake a thorough and comprehensive review of our policy towards North Korea. Given the complexity and the controversy involved, this was the classic thankless task, but Bill Perry didn't hesitate, because he knew the stakes for the 37,000 American troops stationed in Korea, for our nation's security, and for East Asia's stability. Today I want to thank him, publicly, for turning that thankless task into a potentially important turning point on the Korean Peninsula. Recently in Berlin, we held discussions with the North Koreans, during which we reached an understanding that the North will refrain from any long-range missile flight tests for as long as our negotiations to improve relations are underway. This morning, President Clinton announced that -- consistent with the understanding reached in Berlin, my recommendations to him and Dr. Perry's policy review recommendations -- the United States is suspending restrictions on certain categories of non-military, trade, financial transactions, travel, and diplomatic contacts with North Korea. In a moment, Dr. Perry will discuss and answer your questions about his review, and the recommendations that flow from it. I simply want to make a few, brief points from my perspective as Secretary of State. The first is to emphasize that the Perry review process, the talks in Berlin, and the steps we take today have been coordinated very closely, especially with our counterparts in Seoul and Tokyo. Our policy of seeking to ease tensions, prevent destabilizing developments, and explore the possibilities of a different and better relationship with North Korea, are fully in accord with the positions of our allies. So is our staunch support for the Agreed Framework, which is the linchpin of our effort to end North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Others in the U.S., and elsewhere, may advocate a different strategy, but ours is the approach judged best by the three governments elected by the three citizenries most directly affected. Second, we have no illusions. Dr. Perry's review and the Berlin understanding start us down a new and more hopeful road. It is a road that holds out the possibility of long-term stability, and even eventual reconciliation, on the Korean Peninsula. It's a road America and its allies want to walk down with the North, but it is not a one-way street. If circumstances warrant that we go back to Square One, we can do so without damage to our interests. If circumstances require that we go down a different road altogether, we will do so to defend our interests; but I think most Americans, and most people of all nationalities in East Asia, would like us to keep moving in the direction of more stable relations -- if that is at all a reasonable prospect. Third, I want to thank leading members of Congress, from both parties, for encouraging Dr. Perry to undertake his review, for their counsel during it, and for what -- I am sure -- will be their thoughtful response to the results of it. Finally, I would like to thank Ambassador Wendy Sherman, and Ambassador Charles Kartman, and the interagency team for the extraordinary efforts they have made in coordination with Dr. Perry to bring us to this point of renewed promise and steadfast resolve. Now, I am delighted to say that soon, very soon -- and right now -- Dr. Perry will answer your questions. PERRY: Thank you very much, Madame Secretary. In June of '94, just over five years ago, the United States was close to a military conflict with North Korea over the nuclear program they had centered at a facility called Yongbyon. We were literally within a day of imposing severe sanctions on North Korea -- sanctions which they said would be equivalent to an act of war. We were within a day of making major additions to our troop deployments in Korea, and we were about to undertake an evacuation of American civilians from Korea. That crisis was resolved through the Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework called for a freeze of the nuclear activities at Yongbyon; it called for a dismantlement of those facilities in time; and it called for a path to normalization between the United States and North Korea. Today, Yongbyon remains frozen. This is a facility that, in the last five years, could have produced enough plutonium for -- literally -- dozens of nuclear bombs. The dismantlement still awaits construction of the Light Water Reactor, so it is still several years away and, therefore, production of plutonium could be restarted at Yongbyon if the Agreed Framework were to be aborted. The third element of the agreement -- normalization -- was, to use the words of Robert Frost, was "a road not taken." Now it seems that we are headed for another crisis like 1994. Intelligence has indicated suspect nuclear sites; it has indicated the production and deployment of long-range missiles in North Korea. All of this has taken place over the past year. All of this came to a head late August of last year when the North Koreans flew a long-range missile over Japan, in a failed attempt to launch a satellite. The result of that was strong public reaction, both in the United States and Japan. In this environment, the Congress called for an outside policy review, and the President asked me to undertake it. I agreed that it was time for a serious solid review of our policy in North Korea. Much had changed in the five years since this crisis, and I recognize now, as I recognized then, that the stakes were very high. After nine months of intensive effort, which included very close consultation with our allies, this study is now concluded. The first conclusion of the study was that the Allied Forces in Korea are very strong today, and that this is understood by North Korea and, therefore, deterrence remains strong; but that deterrence could be upset by the introduction of nuclear weapons and missiles in North Korea. Now, there has been no production of fissile material in the last five years, but I have already pointed out to you that could be restarted in a few months. I think I would summarize it by saying that the status quo for the last five years has worked, but it is probably unsustainable. It certainly would unsustainable in the face of continued missile launchings. The next conclusion we came to in the study was that we should not assume that the regime in North Korea would collapse, even if the United States were to put pressure on them. We must deal with the North Korean government as it is, not as we wish it would be. Therefore, we made the following policy recommendations: We recommend that if North Korea were willing to forego the long-range missile program, in addition to the nuclear program, that the United States should move to normalizing relations with North Korea. Because of the deep mistrust that has existed for many years between both nations, we did not believe that this should be a package deal, negotiated once and for all; rather, it should be comprehensive, but implemented step by step. If, on the other hand, North Korea demonstrates, by its actions, that it's not willing to forego those dangerous programs, then we have to pursue an alternate strategy. We have to take the actions necessary to protect our own security. Now, it is obvious, I believe, that the first strategy -- the strategy towards normalization -- is to be preferred. The second strategy is expensive, and it's dangerous; and in effect, it could take us back to the crisis situation we were in, in June of 1994. So we prefer or greatly prefer the strategy of normalization. But we can not unilaterally enforce that strategy. It requires a full participation by the Allies, and it obviously requires cooperation with North Korea. The Secretary of State has already described to you the close consultation we have conducted with our allies, and I am pleased to report to you that we will have their full support in this strategy that I've outlined. In order to determine whether we get this cooperation from North Korea, we made a trip to North Korea early this summer. We were received with great courtesy in Pyongyang. We had long and serious discussions. I want to emphasize that there no polemics in these discussions. It was very much down to business, exploring the alternatives. The first goal of our visit to Pyongyang was to make meaningful contact with senior officials in North Korea, so that we could pursue this with them on into the future, if they were interested in going down this path to normalization. The second goal was to nail down a continuation of the constraint on the nuclear program. Both of those goals were successful. The third goal was to explore whether the North Korean government was interested in going down this path to normalization, and, indeed, they were very much interested. Finally, the fourth goal was to explore whether they were willing to forego their long-range missile program, since we considered that a necessary step, in order to move down this path of normalization. In those discussions, it was quite clear that they placed a high value on their missile program, from the point of view of their own security -- deterrence, that is -- and the prestige, and from the dollar value it brings them -- the cash value it brings them -- from their exports. It was equally clear that they understood that giving up their missiles was necessary for moving to normalization. In those meetings, I indicated that we would be willing to create a positive environment for moving towards normalization, by taking a first step in that direction, by easing some of the sanctions that have been imposed on them. And I asked if they were willing to create a positive environment by taking a first step of their own, namely by foregoing the test of the long-range missiles. During the time I was in Pyongyang, it was not at all clear what their answer to that would be, but they did agree to follow-on discussions. Since then, we have had three follow-on discussions: in Beijing, in Geneva, and just last week in Berlin. They were conducted by Ambassador Kartman. The first two were positive discussions, but no real progress and, finally in Berlin, we made the first positive step towards the suspension of testing I welcome this step, but I also want to point out to you that much more remains to be done. But we are started. Each step in the negotiations with the North Koreans has been frustrating and difficult in the past, and will continue to be difficult -- no doubt -- in the future. If we are unsuccessful, we are prepared to move to the alternative path of protecting our security. But I am hopeful that that will not be necessary, and indeed, that we are finally moving on the path to normalization. For more than 40 years the threat of another war on the Korean Peninsula has hung over our heads like a dark cloud. Today that cloud is beginning to drift away. Now I'm prepared to answer your questions. Q: Dr. Perry, have you received assurances from the North Koreans that they will not sell these missiles or missile technology to countries unfriendly to the U.S.? PERRY: In the path to normalization that I described to you, we envisioned that North Korea would, in time, become compliant with the standards of the MTCR -- the Missile Technology Control Regime -- and that would mean they would have to sign up to neither producing, deploying, or exporting missiles that fall under the standards of that regime; which in simplified terms, are 300 kilometers range and 500 kilograms payload. We are not at that point in the agreement yet. All we have, at this stage, is an agreement for suspension of testing. But that is where we are headed. Q: Can you describe more fully what would be involved for the United States in carrying out the second option of increasing security? Are we talking about a major increase in the troop presence, or a change in the weapons profile in South Korea? PERRY: No, I will not describe that. We would have to take steps, as I said, to protect our security. We understand what those steps are; if we had to take them, we would evaluate them at the time, and under the circumstances. It would be a situation like we faced -- in some ways -- in June of '94, but under different circumstances. And so the plans -- the reactions -- would probably be different. Q: Have you informed the North Koreans of what would be entailed? Are they aware of the kind of steps you'd be taking? PERRY: They are aware that we have an alternative plan. We do not intend to describe to them, or to describe in public, what the strategy would be, what the tactics would be for implementing that. Q: Dr. Perry, if I'm correct there was no formal announcement of this promise not to test at the end of the talks in Berlin; it sort of leaked out and developed. And this is not a complaint about a statement that didn't disclose to the public what had been accomplished. The question goes to whether this suggests -- as it seemed to in the first few days -- that there's something sort of not rock-solid about this promise -- you know, it's not in writing; it wasn't announced jointly. Is there any reason -- not getting into the mechanics -- that's over with and gone -- but is there any cause, any reason, to be a little dubious about North Korea's commitment, because it wasn't officially announced by the two sides, or by North Korea in Berlin? PERRY: I am not dubious about it, and I expect that North Korea will clarify their intentions on this in the weeks ahead - not in the months ahead, but in the weeks ahead. Q: Do you make any recommendations in your report as to how the process of monitoring their compliance is going to happen? As you said, even with their nuclear freeze there have been reports that they haven't done it; there were all these rumors; we had to send a team in there. Do you make specific recommendations as to how this can be monitored? PERRY: The nuclear freeze has a very extensive, and high-confidence monitoring system, through the IAEA -- the International Atomic Energy Agency -- which includes full-time inspectors on site at Yongbyon. Ultimately, if we had an agreement on missiles, as comprehensive as that agreement on nuclear weapons, there would be required to be a compliance regime in some ways comparable to that. The only step we are taking at this time, though, is a step that involves a suspension of the testing of long-range missiles, and we are confident -- we are confident -- that we can verify unilaterally whether or not they are testing long-range missiles. Q: You mentioned in your opening statement that intelligence indicated that there were suspect nuclear sites, and I think we're all aware that there was a site in Kumchang-ni that you all were concerned about. First of all, were there other sites that you all are concerned about that may contain some prohibited or some suspect nuclear facilities? And, you also mentioned that the IAEA does some of the compliance verification work. Does that apply to the country as a whole or only to Yongbyon? PERRY: The IAEA is at Yongbyon, and is monitoring the compliance at Yongbyon. It does not have access to the country as a whole. Now we have unilateral intelligence which covers activity all around the country, and our intelligence indicates military connection of a number of sites, some of which may or may not have a nuclear connection. Only one of those sites was large enough that it could have supported the production and processing of fissile material. That was the site at Kumchang-ni. We were, therefore, enough concerned about that that we pressed for the right to visit that site. That visit took place early this summer, and the inspectors came out with a very positive report, that not only is this site not involved in the nuclear reactor end-processing; but it is, in fact, unsuitable for that purpose. So I have to say that I was concerned about that particular site, and I was greatly relieved with that report. Q: As former Secretary of Defense, Mr. Perry, what is your analysis of the sanctions that have been proposed or will be lifted today, I understand, as having a bearing on the security of South Korea, the stability in the area? Is there any bearing? Secondly, I would ask, this 13-page report is confidential. Is it going to be kept that way, or will there be something that we can see regarding the spoken agreements of the end writings -- something for the press? PERRY: On the question of the report: It is a classified report, primarily because it goes into some detail in describing what the alternative strategy is. It lays out some tactics. We do not plan to make those tactics public. But the rest of the report -- when those are taken out, the rest of the report should be available to the public, and we expect that in the near future that that report will be available to the public. It has the essence of our recommendations in it. That was the second question. The first question? Q: The first question had to do with are you completely certain that sanctions that are going to be lifted will not detract from security? PERRY: Yes, I am. The sanctions that are being eased now, have to do with the buying and selling of consumer goods. Many other sanctions remain in place. Q: Would you recommend a similar approach by the Administration vis-a-vis other so-called rogue states who are in the business of trying nuclear weapons or trying long-range missiles? PERRY: That's a good question to which I am not going to give an answer. I would think that each country needs to be considered as a special case -- a separate case -- and looked at very carefully. I would not want to make a sweeping general statement in that regard. Q: Will you be more specific about the help, or what's in it for the North Koreans: what they will get, what they want, and what they expect to get? PERRY: I would want to distinguish, in that question, between what comes out of this first step, which is, I said, an easing of sanctions that have to do primarily with the buying and selling of consumer products, which is a relatively small consideration, and has to do with the suspension of missile testing. I think both sides would see that that test is a positive step, but not terribly significant in and of itself, and both sides are looking forward to moving to a path of normalization -- the normalization of diplomatic relations, normalization of economic relations. In both cases, all countries concerned, I think, will see a considerable benefit in all of that. This is just a small first step. Q: The agreement focuses on halting its missile testing, but how confident are you that North Korea won't deploy a type Taepo Dong 2 secretly to its rocket forces? PERRY: I have relatively good confidence that we can monitor the deployment of missiles in North Korea. If I had any responsibility for the North Korean military deployments, I would not permit the deployment of a missile that had never been tested. And the Taepo Dong 2 missile has never been tested. Q: Yes. I understand the Korean government is fully behind the recommendations and so on, but I would still like to know if North Korea will be taking any positive steps to have direct, meaningful dialogue between North and South Korea, which is also one of the agreements in the Framework. PERRY: In order to really reach a normalization of relations on the Peninsula, in order to reach peace on the Peninsula, in order to have that cloud drift away, there have to be very direct and very meaningful and significant talks between North and South Korea. Those have started. They have been on-again-off-again talks, but those are essential in order to move ahead on this path we're talking about. We believe -- and the Republic of Korea also believes -- that the steps I'm talking about today will help create the environment which will facilitate those talks. Q: Can you talk a little bit about your reaction to some critics who worry or who are uneasy that you are just opening the flood gates to basically support a Stalinist regime? And can you also talk specifically about next steps? Do you have meetings scheduled? There has been some report about a senior North Korean official coming to Washington. PERRY: Precisely because this is a totalitarian regime, and a regime which poses a military threat to the United States and its allies, it is all the more important for us to deal with them, and particularly to deal with them on issues that affect our security so profoundly, like with missiles and nuclear weapons. If they were a friend and ally of the United States, we would be less concerned about them having missiles. There was another question here. Q: What the next steps are. There was talk about a senior North Korean official coming to Washington. Have the North Koreans agreed to resume North-South dialogue? PERRY: At the end of my visit in Pyongyang, I invited my interlocutor there, the First Vice Foreign Minister, to return the visit, and visit me in the United States. I would welcome, and do expect, a return visit either by him or some comparable North Korean official. I look forward to that. Q: Could you talk a bit about the philosophy of what you've done here? Specifically, do you worry at all that with this deal, and the nuclear deal, we have created a situation in which the North Koreans will view that they are being rewarded for military provocations? PERRY: The specific actions that we have taken, relative to the missile, which involve an easing of sanctions, I do not see as a reward. It is just a move towards the kind of normal relations that we have with most countries in the world. If they remove this threat from us, we have every reason to want to move towards normal relations with them. Q: You mentioned in your opening statement, I believe, that even with the nuclear freeze, that North Korea still has the capability to break out of it and produce more nuclear weapons -- I think you said within weeks or months. Is that because there is still some hidden nuclear weapons capability there in North Korea? PERRY: Thank you for asking that question, so I have an opportunity to clarify it. The facility at Yongbyon consists of nuclear reactors and consists of a large processing facility. Those facilities, in aggregate, are capable of producing enough plutonium to make perhaps 10 nuclear bombs a year. That is the activity which has been frozen by the Agreed Framework. Now, the Agreed Framework also called for dismantling those, after we made the delivery of the Light Water Reactor. That delivery is several years away and, therefore, the site at Yongbyon now frozen is not yet dismantled. Therefore, if the Agreed Framework were to be aborted, either by our side or by their side, then in a matter of months they could start the reactors up again, and therefore could begin the production of plutonium. That's what I meant by that. Q: And that is the nuclear fuel. Do they retain then the capability to assemble actual weapons so you actually have ten ready-made weapons a year? PERRY: I cannot describe about North Korea or, for that matter, any other country about with whom we don't exchange secrets. I can't describe to you what they might be doing in their laboratories. But we do know that what weapons designers call the physics of nuclear weapons can be accomplished in a rather small facility with a rather small number of people. Therefore, it would be prudent to assume that that capability either exists or could exist in North Korea. Q: North Korea has been on the terrorism list I believe since -- well, I don't know how many years, but here has been no terrorist activity attributable to them, according to the U.S. Government, since 1987. Is there any thought of removing them from the list? PERRY: Not at this time. A better statement for me to make is: I have made no such recommendation. Q: For the efforts to normalize the relations with North Korea -- we assume there will be more conferences and so on -- would that be conducted at a higher level, and would you be participating in it? What would be your role in the future? PERRY: I am prepared to participate, to the extent it's necessary and useful. And we do expect further conferences, and we do expect them with high level officials in North Korea and I can't forecast to you who those officials would be. One last question. Q: You've hinted, talked around it perhaps, what do you think now after your studies: Does Korea have nuclear weapons that can be mated with the Taepo Dong? Do they, in fact, pose a nuclear threat by missile delivery? PERRY: Before we negotiated the Agreed Framework, before we froze the activity at Yongbyon, they had operated a research reactor at that facility for several years. This was in the early '90s. During a part of that time it was not under inspection by the IAEA. It's possible that during that period of time that they generated spent fuel and processed spent fuel of a few kilograms. This would be enough for perhaps the manufacture of one or two nuclear weapons. That is as precise a statement as I can make: that they possibly have the capability of making one or two nuclear weapons. The activity that was frozen at Yongbyon, as I indicated to you, would have given them the capability of being able to make about ten nuclear bombs a year. That's what our attention was on; that's what we focused on, and that's what we stopped through the Agreed Framework, and that's what we want see continued stopped. Thank you very much. (The briefing concluded at 12:47 P.M.) (end transcript)
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