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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

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QUESTION: Could we try? This is a place -- again, some is coming from Auckland, on the North Korean "sort-of" pledge not to test missiles? What form does the pledge take and the quo is what, that the US will consider lifting sanctions?

MR. RUBIN: Let me start by making the general point. We have always said that, as the North Koreans implement the 1994 Agreed Framework, that we would move forward to improve the economic and political relationship between the United States and North Korea. So there is nothing new about that. The possibility of lifting or suspending sanctions was raised and first made possible by the 1994 nuclear agreement. So I think one has to be careful drawing direct linkages, when this possibility has existed for some time.

Where we are is that, based on Ambassador Kartman's discussions with the North Koreans in Berlin this week, he briefed the Secretary of State and what he told her is that, based on his discussions, he thinks it is fair to say that our understanding and expectation that the North Koreans will refrain from testing any long-range missiles for the duration of negotiations that are aimed at improving our relations. So in this interim period, they have indicated and made statements, and through three rounds of talks - including five full days in the third round - that Ambassador Kartman, who has a long history of working closely on this subject and understanding the difficult nuances in talking to the North Koreans, is saying that he thinks it's fair to say that we do not expect there to be any long-range missile testing during the course of the follow-up that is expected between us and the North Koreans.

So it is an interim situation, and it's our understanding that there will be an interim freeze of that kind. It is not a formal document - a treaty -- but that is our understanding, and in the past when similar arrangements were made that were short of a treaty or a formal agreement we believe that we have understood how to read the signals accurately.

QUESTION: The other freeze involved the United States, South Korea and Japan undertaking to provide a rather hefty reserve of power and less-ominous reactors to North Korea. Taking what you said at face value about the economic sanctions --

MR. RUBIN: Which I know you always do --

QUESTION: -- has always been out there. I mean, would it be unduly suspicious on my part to think that North Koreans were expecting something right on the table to reward them for a freeze? Have we said anything specifically about --

MR. RUBIN: I think we've been quite clear that --

QUESTION: The sanctions are about food.

MR. RUBIN: Yes, let me answer both questions.

QUESTION: OK.

MR. RUBIN: I think we've been quite clear in saying that, if North Korea were to test its long-range missile, it would have serious consequences for our relationship. That's negative consequences. We have also made clear that, if North Korea would be prepared to forego testing, that it would be a benefit to the relationship.

Based on the Secretary's conversations with Ambassador Kartman yesterday, she is prepared to recommend to the President that we move ahead with easing restrictions on the trade of non-sensitive goods and investment, certain financial transactions, and transportation restrictions. We would not make any recommendations for easing of terrorism, proliferation or statutorily controlled items.

In other words, if you look at those areas primarily under the Trading With the Enemy Act, that go beyond the restrictions imposed on North Korea because they are on the list of terrorist states, there are some sanctions that she is prepared to recommend the easing of. I am not prepared to give you the specifics, because that will come only when the recommendation goes to the President, which I would expect to occur in the coming days.

QUESTION: Jamie, is there any discussion of renewing the leading --

MR. RUBIN: Excuse me one moment. You also asked me about food. Food did not come up in Berlin. Food was not part of this discussion. There was no issue of food aid at all discussed in Berlin.

QUESTION: It's still your position food is separate; it's a humanitarian matter. They don't get rewarded with food for - or punished, depending on their activities in other areas?

MR. RUBIN: That is still our position. But in addition to that position, let me tell you that the subject of food wasn't even raised by the North Koreans in Berlin.

QUESTION: Have there been any more discussions about the US and North Korea trying to find property in each other's countries so that consular offices could be opened?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I will check that, and I don't know the answer to that. I don't think that was primary among the issues being discussed in the last couple of days. In that regard, let me say that we also expect that Secretary Perry's report will be going to the Congress in the coming days.

QUESTION: Can we nail this down a little bit further? There will be a suspension on the part of the North Koreans of any long-range missile tests, as long as there are negotiations and talks that will continue to go forward or progress; there has to be progress on the talks, or there just has to be talks, or do you know?

MR. RUBIN: The way I would frame it is the following: It's our understanding that the North Koreans will refrain from testing any long-range missiles for the duration of our negotiations, in order to improve our relations. Now, obviously, prime among any objective in our negotiations to improve relations would be to formalize the intentions of North Korea with respect to the testing of missiles. So we would expect to continue to negotiate for quite some time, until we were able to achieve that objective; including getting Bob Einhorn and others to meet with the North Koreans on the substance of this.

Let me say in this regard that, for as long as I've been standing at this podium, many of you have asked me either about North Korea's nuclear program, or about North Korea's missile programs, and accurately reflecting the concern we have and the concern the world has had about the dangers of North Korea developing a long-range missile; testing it, then deploying it and, ultimately, possibly deploying it with the combination of conventional and/or non-conventional weaponry.

We have stated as our objective to retard and prevent that development. In the nuclear side, we have been able to suspend and freeze their activities at the Yongbyon reactor, without which we would have faced a situation where there would've been many tens of nuclear weapons that North Korea could have produced by now - since 1994.

Now what we're trying to do is suspend, and then make permanent, the freeze on the testing of missiles, which will greatly enhance the security of our friends and allies in the region, and greatly enhance the security of the United States. So this is a very substantial step forward, to have an understanding like this, and let me say that obviously we're going to be monitoring this very carefully, and it's the absence of testing that will be the true achievement. But to have this kind of a situation develop, after these efforts, is something that we consider a very important step forward.

QUESTION: Does this lessen the need for a missile defense? It certainly picks at one of the arguments used.

MR. RUBIN: There are two phases involved: one is a near-term situation; and one of those - the initial deployment envisaged in Alaska -- is not designed to defend against the potential of a North Korea, or an Iran, or some other country, or an Iraq, that would in the year 2010 or 2011 be able to hit the United States. So the initial deployment is not premised on North Korea having a long-range missile in the next couple of years.

QUESTION: What about a regional defense - a Pacific theater involving Japan and Taiwan?

MR. RUBIN: This is -- as we just explained in the discussion -- this is a situation where we're expressing our understanding. This isn't a formalized treaty; we're a long way from having all the objectives of missile talks achieved; and that is what Bob Einhorn and others are going to need to pursue. So I'm not prepared to say what this, standing alone, will do, because it's not an understanding like this that is critical; it's the more formal arrangements that we would still be seeking through the missile talks, that could change the strategic calculations in East Asia.

QUESTION: One more on North Korea?

MR. RUBIN: Yes.

QUESTION: Was there any mention at the Berlin talks about the Northern Limit Line?

MR. RUBIN: I don't believe that - I think they had their hands full in working on this situation. I don't believe that came up.

QUESTION: Is this a step in the right direction for a formalized treaty concerning missiles between the US and North Korea? Has progress been made in that regard?

MR. RUBIN: I think there is no question that this is a step in the right direction towards achieving our objective of reducing the danger of a North Korea long-range missile capability. There is no question about that.

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